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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the decision-making processes 
which take place between husband and wife. It focuses on the 
ownership of time-saving durable goods: why do some
households own goods such as washing-machines and microwave 
ovens, whereas other households do not? This thesis considers 
three approaches to studying this issue, of which the first 
two are conventional in economics. The first approach assumes 
that a household behaves as if it had a single decision-maker 
(due to consensus, or because one person imposes his/her will 
on other household members) ; this suggests that ownership may 
be related to the price-of-time of the wife. The second 
approach assumes that different members of a household 
disagree about priorities, and bargain with each other - each 
attempting to obtain his/her preferred spending pattern; in 
this 'bargaining' approach, the wife's weekly actual or 
potential earnings (relative to those of her husband) may 
determine her success in bargaining. I also consider a third 
approach, associated with the sociology of Jan Pahl: that the
system of financial management adopted by a household tells us 
about underlying structures within that household.
This thesis uses survey data from Britain and India to test 
the above approaches. The British data are from UK government 
surveys - especially the British Household Panel Study, and 
the Family Expenditure Surveys. These give a representative 
picture of the whole British population, and provide data on 
durable goods ownership since 1969. For India, I use data 
from two surveys commissioned for this thesis, carried out in 
1992 and 1997. The Indian survey data are limited to the four 
largest Indian cities (Bombay, Madras, Delhi and Calcutta) .
This thesis finds considerable support for Jan Pahl's 
approach, in both Britain and India, and recommends this as a 
way forward for economics.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 OVERVIEW: AIMS OF THIS THESIS
This thesis is concerned with the study of 'time-saving' goods, which are 
intended to reduce the amount of time spent on certain housework tasks. 
Such goods are not normally bought as status symbols (Bowden & Offer, 1994: 
p. 733), so households which own them must have two characteristics: the
household has (or had) sufficient money to be able to purchase goods which 
are not essential to life; and the household chose to spend money to 
reduce time on housework, rather than on items such as leisure goods. 
Which households own such durable goods?
According to the most widely-used economic theories in this field, women's 
employment is expected to be an important influence on durable goods 
ownership:
"both the joint utility [associated with Becker] and 
bargaining approaches identify employment as a key determinant 
of the intra-household distribution of welfare"
(MacPhail & Bowles, 1989: p. 63).
Households have been widely observed to have a division of domestic labour
so that a wife does most or all of the housework whether or not she is
employed - in both the UK (James, 1995, pp. 281-2; Gershuny, 1983: p.
153), and India (Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 41; Standing, 1991: p. 71).
Hence, it appears that households owning time-saving goods are those where
the wife has sufficient power to buy goods which save her time. Yet,
dramatrices such as 8<7> (chapter 8) suggest that many households have
enough money to buy such goods, but do not spend their money in this way:
they buy leisure durables instead. What are the key differences between
households, which give them different spending patterns? Conventional
economic analysis (discussed in chapter 2) suggests that a wife's earnings
are a vital influence on this decision; but much empirical work has failed
to support such a view, and this thesis offers further evidence that
conventional economic analysis is not yet sufficiently detailed to model
household behaviour successfully. Women's employment and earnings are
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important influences: in particular, women's employment increases total
household income, and I have found this to be the most important single 
determinant of whether or not a household owns time-saving durables (see 
chapter 9). But controlling for total household income, women's employment 
has been found to reduce the likelihood of a household owning time-saving 
goods in some circumstances (see chapter 9).
If conventional economic analysis is lacking in its ability to explain 
household ownership patterns, what other explanations can we use? In 
chapter 2, I consider various perspectives from sociology, psychology, and 
marketing. Having tested various ideas (not all reported here, for reasons 
of space), I find that one of the most promising factors is whether or not 
the wife manages the day-to-day finances for the household - a topic 
usually associated with the sociologist Jan Pahl.
GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE OF THIS THESIS
The geographical coverage of this thesis is the UK and India, but the data 
used here do not represent the whole of India: it is limited to the four
largest cities (Bombay, Madras, Delhi and Calcutta), so I refer to my 
results as applying to "urban India', and I do not claim insights into 
rural Indian households. For the UK, I use two different sources: Family
Expenditure Surveys, and the British Household Panel Study. The former is 
intended to be representative of the UK, whereas the latter is limited to 
England, Wales, and Scotland south of the Caledonian canal; I refer to 
this as "Britain', on the assumption that Scotland north of the Caledonian 
canal is not very different to the rest of Britain. More details of the 
datasets used are given in chapter 6.
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1.2 THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter 2 is a review of theoretical literature, which examines the most 
popular theories relevant to this thesis: I emphasise theories devised by-
economists, but include theories from other academic fields - especially 
sociology. Chapter 3 outlines a selection of previous empirical research: 
while not exhaustive, this gives a flavour of previous empirical research. 
Previous empirical work is reported in other chapters, where appropriate.
Chapter 4 explains the two methodologies used in this thesis: regression
analysis, and "dramatrix1 analysis. I use both methodologies in this 
thesis, and consider them to complement each other. Chapter 5 contains a 
mathematical model of a household, which I devised myself, but which is 
based loosely on the ideas of other writers such as Manser & Brown (1980). 
My model uses a game theory approach, which is widely used in contemporary 
economics. My own model justifies empirical research on husband's 
employment, which I have found to be important (see chapter 9).
Chapter 6 outlines the datasets used for this thesis, and also discusses 
other datasets which I have considered using - this information may be 
helpful to future researchers. I attempt to explain briefly the advantages 
and disadvantages of each of these datasets. I also outline the empirical 
methods which I used to process these datasets.
The next four chapters contain my own empirical research. Chapter 7 tests 
the price-of-time hypothesis, associated with the work of Gary Becker. 
Then, chapter 8 tests the (currently) most widely-used economic analysis 
of household behaviour: "bargaining' models, based on game theory. In
chapter 9, I produce evidence to suggest that neither the price-of-time 
hypothesis, nor the bargaining models, can adequately explain the patterns 
of durables ownership I observe. Chapter 10 brings in a new perspective: 
by adding insights from the sociologist Jan Pahl, I test the idea that 
household financial management gives us insights into the workings of 
households.
Finally, chapter 11 brings together the key elements of this thesis, and 
attempts to suggest directions for future research.
Bound in with this thesis is a copy of a joint article by Ben Fine & 
myself, which was published in Applied Economics in 1995.
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1.3 TYPOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER CONVENTIONS
There are eleven chapters, each divided into sections. Each section is 
numbered (for example, this is section 1.3). Within a section, there are 
often subsections, such as "'geographical coverage of this thesis’ (in 
section 1.1 above). Subsections are not numbered, but are indicated by a 
heading in BOLD text. Each section (but not each subsection) begins on a 
new page.
Abbreviations of dataset names are shown in italics, e.g. FES; the full 
names of these datasets are given in chapter 6.
Each table is numbered by chapter, and (within each chapter) each table is 
individually numbered: for example, table 8<1> is the first table in
chapter 8. For each table of regression results, there is a section in the 
appendix giving more details of the regression results. The appendix 
section number corresponds to the table number - for example, appendix 
section A8<1> has more details on the regression results reported in table 
8<1> of the main text.
Equations are identified by names such as [5A], where the number 5 refers 
to the chapter-number; within each chapter, equations are in the order 
[5A], [5B], and so on.
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2.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter considers some of the previous theoretical work, which is
relevant to understanding the links between women's employment and the
ownership of time-saving durable goods. Because so much has been written
on this area, this chapter cannot be exhaustive - rather, it attempts to
give an outline of some relevant theories. This chapter is grouped in
sections in my attempt to give a structure to the many references cited:
they are organised in order of decreasing reliance on the assumption of
'rational' economic behaviour. Neoclassical economics (section 2.2) is
based on the idea that each person attempts to maximise his/her own utility
(or that of his/her household) - a questionable assumption:
"What may be questioned is whether individuals behave, even on 
average, coherently with their preferences when engaging in 
emotionally charged undertakings such as finding a mate, 
raising a child, or looking after an elderly relative. If 
that condition were not satisfied, families would not be 
susceptible to economic analysis."
(Cigno, 1991: p. 2).
This opinion of Alessandro Cigno appears unnecessarily restrictive for 
economics. Cigno (1991: p. 1) describes economics as "a method for
generating empirically falsifiable predictions about human behaviour under 
the assumption that, on average, individuals behave coherently with their 
own preferences (which need not be selfish)". But economists could (at 
least in principle) develop theories to explain forms of human behaviour 
which do not appear to be in the individual's best interests. Later in 
this chapter, a number of such theories are discussed (not all from 
economics) - in particular, the impact of marketing on consumer behaviour 
(section 2.6); the influence of culture and 'social norms' (section 2.7); 
and the importance of financial management systems (section 2.8).
This chapter will focus on various theories on consumption: for each
theory in turn, I will assess the type of explanations offered by that 
theory as to why different families might behave differently. This is
12
intended to provide an insight into the general question of how households 
make decisions on which durable goods (if any) to purchase.
Gary Beckerf perhaps the most influential neoclassical economist in the
field of household behaviour, sees the division of labour between men and
women purely in terms of "rational1 economic behaviour, with little scope
for ideology to influence the division of labour:
"If women have a comparative advantage over men in the 
household sector when they make the same investments in human 
capital, an efficient household with both sexes would allocate 
the time of women mainly to the household sector and the time 
of men mainly to the role of the market sector."
(Becker, 1981: p. 22).
An apparently similar view was expressed by Naci Mocan:
"Economic theory suggests that in order for the labor force 
participation rate to rise there must be changes in the value 
of market or non-market time, or tastes."
(Naci Mocan, 1991: p. 1).
However, Naci Mocan went on to give a rather different impression of the
way in which economists see the world:
"The change in tastes represents changes in social and 
psychological attitudes like changing sex roles, life styles 
and family structures. [...] the changing labor force 
participation behavior in turn alter the attitudes towards 
education, family formation and fertility decisions."
(Naci Mocan, 1991: p. 2).
The second of the above quotations from Naci Mocan suggests some parallels
with the work of sociologists and psychologists, in which ideology is
thought to have important effects on household behaviour:
"Family behaviourists have long held that the perception of 
"power-influence" held by family members is the key towards 
unlocking the puzzle of household decision behaviour. 
According to this view, if one can adequately determine the 
allocation of decision influence between family members, one 
can predict the distribution of household role structure and 
responsibility. Blood and Wolfe (1960) contend that the 
influence held by husbands/wives upon household decisions is 
directly related to society’s cultural norms and role 
expectations."
(Qualls, 1987: p. 267).
Gary Becker accepts that apparently identical households vary in their 
behaviour, which he interprets in terms of differences in "tastes'. 
Orthodox consumption theory does not attempt to explain differences in
tastes (Bowden & Offer, 1994: p. 735), but this may be a weakness in
economics:
"economic theory does not explain the formation of tastes.
Nor can one usually look to sociology or psychology since the 
theory in these fields has not been developed sufficiently to 
be of much help. [...] The heavy reliance on presumed 
differences in tastes when explaining differences in consumer 
behaviour is, therefore, a weakness of the traditional theory 
of choice"
(Becker, 1971: p. 44).
Gary Becker's attitude to sociologists and psychologists may be part of a
pattern, in which academics from different disciplines have little respect
for each other. For example, David Levine (who appears to be a
psychologist) wrote:
"Since the seminal work of Jacob Mincer (1962), neoclassical 
economists have attempted to explain married women's labor 
supply with relative prices such as reservation wages and 
market wages, while assuming that tastes are fixed. As 
described below, these attempts have met with only modest 
success.
(Levine, 1993: p. 665; emphasis added).
Levine appears to dismiss economic analysis in this field (since 1962) as
being of little value; and later, he adds:
"Married women's LFP [labour force participation] rose by 
approximately 1% a year from 1972 to 1982, and has continued 
to rise - and nobody knows why."
(Levine, 1993: p. 667; emphasis added).
Gary Becker's dismissive view of sociology and psychology seems difficult 
to defend even in 1971; but I feel Levine's comments do not do justice to 
economics, in suggesting that economists know nothing about why women's 
labour force participation has risen. A central theme of this thesis is 
that economists have much to learn from other disciplines. This chapter 
continues by looking at conventional economics approaches to studying the 
effects of women's employment on time-saving durable goods; I then proceed 
to look at perspectives from other disciplines.
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2.2 NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: 'UNITARY' MODELS
Neoclassical economics is based on the idea of rational behaviour, in which 
economic agents (usually assumed to have perfect information) have a set 
of preferences, and maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint 
(Green, 1971: p. 22). Neoclassical economists assume that each household 
behaves as if it were a single individual - maximising a joint household 
utility function which is a function of the utility functions of one or 
more household members (Chiappori, 1992: p. 2). One of the earliest such 
models was the 'consensus' view, associated with Paul Samuelson (see 
Poliak, 1985: p. 598). The household utility function can be used to 
predict how all household decisions are made - including decisions on 
employment of household members, as well as on household spending.
There is an underlying assumption in neoclassical economics that different 
households tend to share a similar utility function, with some variation 
between households due to different 'tastes' of household members. 
Neoclassical economists could interpret evidence of similarities in 
behaviour of different households as evidence that households behave 
"rationally". If consumption of a durable was found to increase with 
rising household incomes, it would be called a 'normal' good; whereas if 
consumption fell with increasing household income, it would be called an 
'inferior' good (Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch, 1994: p. 71). It appears
difficult to disprove such a theory.
Differences between behaviour of households are explained by neoclassical 
economists as being due to different 'tastes' - the implication being that 
'tastes' are unpredictable (random, but stable) variables, which are beyond 
the scope of economics to explain. If 'tastes' are stable, then we may be 
able to make reliable forecasts of aggregate spending on certain items 
durables; but we are likely to be less successful in explaining the 
behaviour of an individual family.
The neoclassical economics approach to consumer behaviour deserves 
criticism on the grounds that it is not falsifiable. If empirical evidence 
suggested that all households behave identically, neoclassical economists 
could interpret this as evidence of 'rational' economic behaviour; whereas 
if households behave differently to each other, this could be interpreted 
as evidence of differences in 'tastes'. Neoclassical economics suggests 
that different households tend to behave similarly to each other - incomes
15
seem important in predicting behaviour; but other differences are due to 
(unpredictable) differences in 'tastes'. To predict the effect of income 
on the purchase of a household durable good, we need to know whether the 
good is a 'normal' or 'inferior' good. Neoclassical economics claims that 
if households purchase more of a good as their incomes rise, then that good 
must be a 'normal' good, and other households will tend to buy that good 
as their incomes rise. Neoclassical economics may help us to understand 
household behaviour, but it is less helpful in making predictions. We do 
not know in advance whether items such as washing-machines are inferior 
goods (perhaps households prefer laundry services); so we cannot predict 
if ownership of such goods will increase if incomes rise.
A further problem with the neoclassical economics approach is that 
econometric findings from testing neoclassical models may be biased - for 
example, Becker's theory requires us to estimate the price of a woman's 
time in terms of her hourly wage, if employed; the price of her time 
cannot be directly measured if she is not employed. If we take a sample 
of employed women, this sample will not be representative of households in 
general, and may give biased results if we generalise the findings to the 
whole population. Beyond these estimation problems, however, lies a more 
fundamental problem for econometricians: econometric analysis assumes that 
we can clearly distinguish between 'independent' and 'dependent' variables, 
whereas this thesis faces the problem that factors such as fertility, 
employment, and education level are all inter-related (this problem has 
been discussed before - e.g. Mincer & Polachek, 1974, p. 419, p. 428; Naci 
Mocan, 1991: p. 2; Sanchez, 1993: p. 435). Neoclassical economists
attempt to explain purchase of durable goods in terms of the price of time 
(especially of wives), and to explain the price of a woman's time in terms 
of her earnings; but a woman's labour market participation is influenced 
by the presence of durable goods - a circular argument. This problem 
becomes more serious when we observe that women's employment may be 
influenced by the presence of children; and many writers have argued that 
employed women are likely to prefer to have fewer children (e.g. Willis, 
1987). Other issues such as level of household savings, ages of husband 
and wife, and education levels also complicate the picture. I discuss 
these problems further in other chapters.
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THE PERMANENT INCOME and LIFE-CYCLE HYPOTHESES
One view (within neoclassical economics) of the expected impact of women's 
employment on durables ownership is the "Permanent Income Hypothesis', 
associated with Milton Friedman (see Friedman, 1957; Holmes, 1974). This 
hypothesis fits into the neoclassical economics framework, in that it is 
based on the assumption of "rational' economic behaviour. This view 
suggests that women's income may be interpreted as partly "transitory1 
income, if she expects to take time out of the labour market to raise 
children. If so, the household may save a larger fraction of her wages (in 
order to "smooth out" consumption over the household's lifetime). Spending 
on durables may be used as a form of saving; so ownership of (all types 
of) durables should increase in households in which the wife's earnings are 
a large proportion of total household income. In other words, the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis predicts that durable goods ownership will tend 
to be positively associated with women's employment. However, women's 
attachment to the labour force is now more permanent than in earlier years, 
so a wife's earnings may now be treated in the same way as a husband's 
earnings (Strober & Weinberg, 1980: p. 339).
There are links between the "permanent income hypothesis' and the "life 
cycle' hypothesis, which claims that a household adjusts consumer spending 
over time to keep the marginal utility of wealth constant over time 
(Blundell, Browning & Meghir, 1994: p. 57). I do not attempt to test 
either the Permanent Income hypothesis, or the life-cycle hypothesis, here 
due to restrictions on the length of this thesis.
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2.3 NEW HOME ECONOMICS and the PRICE OF TIME
Gary Becker is one of the founders of a branch of neoclassical economics r 
known as "new home economics' (Folbre, 1986: p. 6), or "economics of the 
family' (Piachaud, 1982: p. 471), or "economics of the household' (Rosen, 
1993: p. 28), or the "theory of household production' (Sandmo, 1993: p. 
12). Becker's approach has been described as the main approach within 
economics to analyze household behaviour (Sandmo, 1993: p. 12; Khandker, 
1988: p. 111). Becker’s ideas fit within neoclassical economics, and have 
been used and developed by other economists such as Gronau (1973) and 
Mincer & Polacheck (1974). This section outlines Becker's approach, and 
then considers the relevance of work by Becker and those who share his 
approach, to household decisions on purchases of time-saving goods and 
services.
Becker's ideas build on the neoclassical analysis of household behaviour. 
As a neoclassical economist, Becker assumes that individuals are rational 
agents, who maximise utility subject to a budget constraint. And like 
earlier economists, Becker claims that the behaviour of a utility- 
maximising consumer is entirely determined by prices, income, and "tastes' 
(Becker, 1971: p. 43). Becker emphasises the "cost of time1, and created 
the concept of "total household income' which includes both monetary income 
and time availability of household members (Becker, 1971: p. 46). Becker 
developed a model of "household production': each household combines time
of household members with resources such as time-saving durable goods, to 
create a set of services which the household needs - this breaks down the 
distinction (used by earlier neoclassical economists) of time as either 
work (outside the household), or leisure (often inside the household). For 
example, raw food (which costs money) is usually combined with cooking 
(which takes the unpaid work of household members) to create a meal for 
household members (Becker, 1971: p. 42). This emphasis of production (as 
well as consumption) taking place within households improves our 
understanding of "make-or-buy" decisions (Poliak, 1985: p. 588).
Another difference between Becker's work and standard neoclassical 
economics is his analysis of household utility functions. In some of his 
work, Becker attempts to explain how the utility function of each household 
member influences the household welfare function; in particular, Becker's 
more recent work has emphasised the idea that a household member may feel 
"altruistic" or "envious" towards other members of his/her household: this
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view is outlined in the "caring and altruism* subsection of section 2.4 
below.
In many economic models of the household, it is assumed that a married 
couple household has the potential to be better off than the same people 
as two single-adult households: this could be due, for example, to lower
housing costs if a couple live together; or less time preparing a meal for 
two, rather than two separate meals. There is also a possibility that two 
people might enjoy each other's company, and prefer to live together. Such 
benefits from marriage are sometimes referred to collectively as the 
marriage "surplus" (Poliak, 1994: p. 149). In Gary Becker's recent work, 
the distribution of this marriage surplus is determined by the "marriage 
market':
"Becker views assortative mating (who marries whom and who 
remains unmarried) as crucial and sometimes assumes that 
prospective spouses, when they meet in the marriage market, 
can costlessly make binding, costlessly enforceable agreements 
concerning distribution within marriage. If such costless, 
contingent agreements could be made in the marriage market, 
then all bargaining would take place prior to marriage. [..3 
Perhaps because Becker believes that the marriage market and 
individuals' prospects after divorce narrowly constrain 
distribution within marriage, his focus has been on these 
constraints rather than on the determinants of the division of 
the surpluses within particular marriages."
Poliak (1994, p. 149).
Gary Becker1 s approach has been criticised in that his work attempts to
justify the existing distribution between husbands and wives: Becker
"explains, justifies, and even glorifies in role differentiation by sex"
(Barbara Bergmann, cited in Nelson, 1995: p. 142). Certainly, some of
Becker's writing does give the impression that women's roles are determined
by biology: for example, he wrote in 1981 that
"Women not only have a heavy biological commitment to the 
production and feeding of children, but they are also 
biologically committed to the care of children in other, more 
subtle, ways. Moreover, women have been willing to spend much 
time and energy caring for their children because they want 
their heavy biological investment in production to be 
worthwhile."
(Becker, 1981: pp. 21-2).
I now move on to the aspect of Becker's work which I attempt to test in 
this thesis: the price-of-time hypothesis.
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THE PRICE OF TIME
Implicit in Becker' s approach is the idea of a trade-off between time and
money (Willis, 1987: p. 69), which may help us understand household
behaviour. Becker's emphasis on the price of time led him to stress the
importance of the wage-rate of employed members, as a guide to how much
money he/she will be prepared to spend to save time. Where a household
member is not employed, Becker's approach attempts to provide a framework
for assessing the value of his/her time. Becker's approach suggests that
a household will buy time-saving goods (such as a washing-machine) if the
value of the time saved is worth more to the household than the financial
cost of the good, but not otherwise (Becker, 1971: p. 33):
"The higher the value of time, the more likely it is that the 
household will substitute time-saving, "money-intensive" forms 
of production for money-saving, "time-intensive" forms."
(Iannaccone, 1995: p. 181).
Becker's model suggests it can be rational for one member of a household 
to specialise in market work, and another member to specialise in unpaid 
domestic work (Ghez & Becker, 1975: pp. 142-3). This claim is based on the 
idea that time spent in domestic work has an opportunity cost determined 
by that person's market wage-rate. People who can obtain high wages are 
likely to choose market work, whereas those who can only obtain low-paid 
work will tend to choose unpaid work (Cigno, 1991: p. 70). It is likely 
that women (rather than men) will specialise in domestic work, because 
employed women typically leave the labour market to have children - and 
this broken employment record reduces their human capital, and hence the 
wage they can obtain on their return to employment (Becker, 1981: pp. 21- 
22) .
To study Gary Becker's ideas in more detail, I now discuss the model of
household behaviour in his 1965 article. Becker assumes that a household
maximises a utility function: utility depends on consumption of
commodities, where a typical commodity uses a combination of time and money
- for example, a trip to the theatre requires not only the price of a
ticket, but also the time of the playgoer (Becker, 1965: p. 495). Becker
thuses Zi to represent the amount of the i commodity consumed (there are m 
goods available): to obtain Zi of commodity i, the household buys quantity
x.j of market goods, and spends time It on consumption (quantity Z^  could be 
obtained from various mixes of x- and ). Becker (1965: p. 498) uses the 
concept of "full income" (W) , meaning a combination of money income and 
unpaid domestic work. There are two constraints facing a household: money
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income, and time of household members. The first of these constraints is 
equation (6) in Becker (1965: p. 496), which I reproduce as equation [2A] 
below:
GOODS CONSTRAINT: (jPi-Xj) = V + TwW
where p i is the price of good i [2A]
xi is the quantity of good i bought 
V is non-earned' income 
Tw is time in paid work 
w is the wage-rate
The above equation tells us that a household cannot spend more than it 
earns (a standard assumption in economic models of the household). The 
next constraint, though, represents one of Becker's claims to originality: 
in equation (7) in Becker (1965: p. 496), which I reproduce as equation 
[2B] below, Becker assumes that total time available (T) must be divided 
between earning money, and consuming some combination of the i commodities.
m
TIME CONSTRAINT: £  ( T± ) = T - Tw
l
[ 2B ]where T± represents time spent consuming good i 
T is total time available 
Tw is time spent on paid work
Becker then multiplies the second equation by the wage-rate, and adds this 
to the first equation, to arrive at his equation (9):
(piX i) + £  (T±W) = V + TW [2C]
This is then be re-written as Becker's equation (10), reproduced here as 
equation [2D]:
HI
5^ [ (Pibj) + (tiw) ]Z± = V + Tw
i
where b± is the number of units of good i j-2D-j
needed to make one uni t of Z± 
t± is the amount of time needed 
to consume one unit of good z±
In conventional economic analysis, time is spent at "work" or on "leisure"; 
so if a household member does more paid work, there is more money available
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but less leisure-time. In Becker's model, by contrast, more income seems 
to require more time: for example, a theatre ticket is of no use without
the time to visit the theatre. Conversely, a household can reduce the 
amount of paid work done by its members (to obtain more time) - but this 
means losing some earnings, so the household would need to produce some 
commodities by more labour-intensive methods. If money income falls too 
far, the household will lose utility because it will be unable to buy 
sufficient market goods (such as food) - there is a limit to how far a 
household can make up for this by unpaid work. Becker devises a formula 
for the amount of "full income' forgone or "lost" if a household reduces 
its paid work by a small amount: he calls it the "loss function' L, and
he reports it in his equation (15) (see Becker, 1965: p. 499); I reproduce 
it below as my equation [2E]:
m
LOSS FUNCTION: L = tiZi [2E]
How, then, will a household choose to combine time and money (to create 
commodities)? This can be broken down into two decisions: the household
chooses the optimal combination of commodities; and decides how to produce 
those commodities. Regarding which commodities to consume, Becker (1965: 
pp. 498-9, footnote 2) presents his equation (31), which I reproduce as 
equation [2F] below:
dW _ Pi t>i o
dZ± 1 + a [2F]
where a is xmarginal productivity of money income1
The above equation tells us that the household chooses the optimal mix of 
commodities, taking into account factors such as prices of goods (p^ ), and 
what Becker calls the "marginal product of money income' (a). As regards 
how best to obtain the chosen commodities, Becker (1965, p. 513: footnote 
1) claims that utility is maximised (subject to the constraints in 
equations [2A] and [2B] above) by choosing so that
du/dx± _ dZi/dxi _ p.
dU/dTi dZi/dTi dL/dT1 [2G]
The above equation [2G] can be interpreted as a make-or-buy decision. 
Assuming that the household has decided which commodities to consume, the 
household could then use more time-intensive or labour-intensive methods. 
For example, the family could eat out in a restaurant, or cook a meal at
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home; this decision would be influenced by the price of each alternative 
(Pj) , as well as by the wage-rate (which enters via the loss function L) .
Gary Becker concludes from his analysis (which I summarise in equations
[2A] to [2G] above) that
"an increase in the relative market efficiency of any member 
would effect a reallocation of the time of all other members 
towards consumption activities in order to permit the former 
to spend more time at market activities *"
(Becker, 1965: p. 512).
This gives an "incentive to economise on time as its relative cost 
increases" (Becker, 1965: p. 513). Becker cites the example of home-
delivered milk, arguing that a household is more likely to have milk 
delivered to the home (rather than shopping for milk) if the value of time 
is high, i.e. in high-earning families (Becker, 1965: pp. 514-5). Hence, 
if a household member is employed at a higher wage-rate, then it becomes 
worthwhile for the household to spend more money to save time. We can use 
the above analysis for durable goods, provided we treat the above quantity 
as the value of the services obtained by owning the durable good 
(Becker, 1965: p. 495).
For this thesis, the essential prediction of the above model by Gary Becker 
is that the 'price of time’ is an important influence on the decision of 
whether or not to buy a time-saving durable good. This decision will 
depend on the value of time of household members; if a durable good saves 
time for only one household member, then the purchase decision depends on 
the value of that person's time. A household will buy a washing-machine, 
for example, if (and only if) the cost of time saved is more than the value 
of the services obtained by owning a washing-machine.
It could be argued that this model by Becker leaves a number of questions 
unresolved. The cost of time of an employed person is his/her wage-rate; 
but if s/he is not employed, the cost of time is not so simple to assess. 
Willis (1987: p. 69) argues that the cost of time of a non-employed person 
is a function of the wage-rate of other household member(s) who are 
employed; but Willis does not tell us exactly what this function is, 
except that it is an increasing function. Other writers take a different 
view on how to estimate a non-employed person's price of time (see section
7.2 below). But in general, the above (Becker) model predicts that a
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household is more likely to buy a time-saving durable good if wage-rates 
received by household members are higher, other things being equal.
To summarise this section, the 'new home economics' approach used by Gary 
Becker and others is more detailed than previous neoclassical economists. 
Becker predicts that time-saving goods (including durable goods) will be 
bought by households with higher wage-rates. In chapter 7, I discuss 
previous research which has tested Becker's ideas, and also offer my own 
evidence on this approach.
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2.4 BARGAINING MODELS OF THE HOUSEHOLD
The above section outlined "unitary' models of household behaviour, which 
assume that a household behaves as if it maximises a single utility 
function. The most widely-used alternative in economics is to assume that 
each household member has his/her own utility function, which influences 
household behaviour: such models are often called "collective1 models
(Lundberg & Poliak, 1996). But if members of a household disagree with 
each other (on decisions such as what durable goods to buy) , which 
household member gets his/her own way? The "collective' models are 
generally based on bargaining, using insights from game theory.
Several game theory models assume a "co-operative' solution (such as 
Ermisch, 1993; and Handa, 1996); whereas other writers use "non- 
cooperative1 bargaining models of household behaviour (Poliak, 1994: p.
148). The difference is that "cooperative' models assume players are able 
to make binding long-term agreements, whereas "non-cooperative' models 
assume that agreements between spouses cannot be enforced (Ott, 1992: pp. 
22-7). A cooperative model always produces an outcome which is Pareto- 
efficient, whereas a non-cooperative model need not produce a Pareto- 
efficient outcome (Bourguignon & Chiappori, 1992: p. 359).
Game theory emphasises the importance of "threat points' (or "reservation 
utilities'), which are the minimum levels of utility which each partner 
will accept. Threat points are thought by game theorists to be important 
influences on the relative strengths of each partner's bargaining position. 
The difference between the minimum level of utility accepted by each 
"player', and the maximum possible utility if that person had his/her ideal 
outcome, indicate the "surplus' over which bargaining takes place; many 
writers assume that this surplus is distributed according to Nash 
bargaining (Nash, 1950), which maximises the product of husband's and 
wife's surplus. Bargaining models assume that if there is disagreement 
between husband and wife over purchase decisions, then the ability for a 
woman to get her own way depends partly on her earning power, because 
higher earnings imply a better threat point.
Game theorists disagree on what "threat points' to use in practice. Some 
writers (e.g. Handa, 1996) assume threat points are the utility levels each 
partner could get outside marriage; these are presumably linked to the 
earning level which (husband and) wife would expect to earn if a divorce
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occurred, and a useful predictor of this may be each person's current
earnings. However, some economists suggest that there are limits to how
far each partner can threaten divorce:
"it seems unlikely that couples resolve disagreements about 
ordinary household matters by negotiating under the pressure 
of divorce threats. If one spouse proposes a resolution to a 
household dispute and the other does not agree, the expected 
outcome is not a divorce. A more likely outcome is harsh 
words and burnt toast, until the next offer is made"
(Bergstrom, 1996: p. 1926).
Other researchers (e.g. Lundberg & Poliak, reported in Phipps & Burton,
1995: p. 178) assume that threat points are the utility levels obtainable 
in a non-cooperative marriage - each partner threatens not to cooperate, 
but does not threaten divorce. Empirically, it is very difficult to 
measure "threat points' (Chiappori, 1992: p. 8): it is not yet clear if
it will ever be possible to estimate threat points empirically (Bourguignon 
& Chiappori, 1992: p. 359). However, some research in this area is
possible: for example, John Ermisch (1993: p. 357) refers to a study in
Japan, which found that women who said they had contemplated divorce tended 
to be in full-time paid employment, which offers some support for a game 
theory view. It has been suggested that male violence against women is a 
method by which some men control women, and that (threats of) violence may 
influence "threat points' (Poliak, 1994: p. 151).
Game theorists assume that individual members use strategies to further 
their own interests. Myra Strober (1988: p. 176) suggests that husbands 
report displeasure at their wives1 obtaining paid work because they think 
the wife may be attempting to leave an unsatisfactory marriage. In terms
of game-theory, a wife's attempt to improve her bargaining power by taking
employment, and her husband's attempts to prevent her employment, are both 
strategies.
Several writers have suggested that women may seek employment in order to 
strengthen their ability to control household resources (Schultz, 1990: p. 
457). However, a wife's earnings could have the opposite effect:
"the additional income from the wife's employment may serve to 
increase the amount of marriage-specific capital (e.g., home 
ownership, durable goods, children, and market and nonmarket 
skills), consequently making divorce or separation a less 
attractive alternative for both wife and husband."
(Greenstein, 1990: p. 674).
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The above comment illustrates the difficulties of applying game theory to 
household behaviour. Nevertheless, most bargaining models imply that a 
woman’s earnings tend to increase her bargaining power within the 
household, and hence increase the probability of her household owning time- 
saving durable goods. This idea is tested in chapter 8.
CARING AND ALTRUISM
Another application of Game Theory to household behaviour is the model by 
Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori & Lechene (1991), which builds on the 
"household production' model associated with Gary Becker (see section 2.3) , 
and also on Becker's work on marriage and divorce (1974). Becker's more 
recent work has emphasised the idea that a household member may feel 
"altruistic" or "envious" towards other members of his/her household 
(Becker, 1981: p. 173). This interdependence of the utility functions of 
different household members may lead to complex household behaviour. For 
example, if a household head cares enough about other household members, 
then the household will behave as if it maximised the household head's 
utility function (Becker, 1974: p. 331). Although Becker's altruist model 
was not written in terms of game theory, it can be interpreted as a two- 
player game (Poliak, 1994: p. 148); however, Becker has consistently de­
emphasized the importance of bargaining between spouses (Poliak, 1994: p.
149) .
In the model by Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori & Lechene, household 
members are assumed to "care' about each other in the sense of Becker's 
analysis of "altruism' and "envy1 - in which a household member may receive 
utility or disutility (respectively) from the happiness of another 
household member. Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori & Lechene assume that 
each household member has a utility function which depends on the goods 
consumed by the household, and that the utility function of the whole 
household is a function of the individual utility functions of all 
household members. Each household member attempts to persuade other 
household members to accept his/her preferred spending pattern; the income 
of each household member determines how likely s/he is to be successful, 
because a high income now indicates that a household member with a high 
income is likely to be relatively well-off if they were divorced: this
gives that person more bargaining power. Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori
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& Lechene test their model by studying certain goods which they call 
"assignable goods': these are goods which are thought to be desired by one
household member, but not by other household members. An example of 
"assignable goods' are clothes which are only worn by one household member. 
In this model, a household member's earnings is likely to influence the 
chance of their obtaining an "assignable good' which s/he (presumably) 
wants. The model was tested empirically in both Bourguignon, Browning, 
Chiappori & Lechene (1991), and in Chiappori (1992): both articles
concluded that their game theory model performs better than neoclassical 
models of household behaviour. Note, though, that their results could be 
interpreted differently - for example, Becker's model suggests that 
households containing a high-earning wife are likely to buy labour-saving 
durable goods because her price-of-time is high (I return to this issue in 
section 8.3).
PRINCIPAL/AGENT MODELS
Some economists analyze day-to-day management of household finances in
terms of a "principal/agent' model, in which the husband (the "principal1)
has power over the household, but he prefers his wife (the "agent’ ) to
carry out certain tasks such as shopping (which requires her to deal with
household finances to some extent); hence the husband delegates some of
his power to his wife:
"if the partner who does the shopping likes dark meat, and the 
non-shopping partner likes light, the household may end up 
eating chicken legs instead of breasts. The shopper, or 
"agent" makes choices. However, some people may feel 
themselves constrained in choosing between light and dark meat 
by the knowledge of what might await them if they return home 
with chicken legs - constraints imposed by the "principal"."
(Woolley & Marshall, 1994: p. 425).
It seems plausible that a principal-agent theory can be modelled by a 
bargaining model based on game-theory, as suggested by Maskin & Tirole 
(1992: p. 1).
Another view (related to principal-agent models) is the "Transactions Cost' 
approach, which assumes that there are generally advantages to all 
household members in co-operation (Poliak, 1985: pp. 584-6); but a
household is a "governance structure', in which each household member is 
expected to carry out certain tasks, in return for rewards. Poliak's model
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emphasises the incentives of each household member to work for the well­
being of the household, and the monitoring of each member to ensure that 
they are performing the tasks they are expected to do (Poliak, 1985: p. 
584) .
The principal/agent approach, and the "transaction cost' approach, both 
imply that day-to-day involvement with tasks such as managing money and 
shopping may give a household member some influence on spending patterns. 
It seems unlikely that a wife might buy a durable good such as a microwave 
oven without her husband noticing; but it is plausible that she might buy 
such an item without first consulting her husband. In addition, a wife who 
is involved with financial management may be better informed on how rich 
(or poor) her household is. These factors may explain my findings in 
chapter 10.
BARGAINING MODELS IN SOCIOLOGY
The work of some sociologists appears to parallel the work of game
theorists in economics: for example, many sociologists suggest that people
have conflicting interests (Morris, 1989: p. 449), and negotiate on
resource allocation (Wilson, 1989: p. 174). Some sociologists consider
that bargaining positions depend on the individuals 1 earnings - referring
to India, Khanna & Varghese (1978: p. 39) wrote "Some working women become
bossy and authoritative because they earn as much as their husbands do":
Khanna & Varghese emphasise wives 1 earnings as determinants of power within
the home. Similarly, Wheelock (describing the UK) states
"As employment opportunities have altered, men have become 
economically less powerful and their wives more so, thus 
changing the balance of the domestic bargain in favour of 
women."
(Wheelock, 1990: pp. 151-2).
Several observers claimed that men often conceal their earnings/wealth from 
their wives, in order to maintain power within the home (including, for the 
UK: Pahl, 1980: p. 317; and for India, Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 44).
This withholding of information might be interpreted as a "strategy1 in 
Game Theory economics (although neither Pahl nor Khanna & Varghese use the 
term "strategy"). Bina Agarwal (1997: p. 30) suggests that many Indian 
women take paid work to enhance their bargaining-power, which in turn 
should increase their say in household decision-making. Another example
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of a sociologist discussing strategic behaviour is where women take paid
work to reduce their housework:
"women's paid employment was significant in officially 
designating a period of time to organizational pursuits, a 
formal "excuse" from what would usually be seen as their 
household demands, and thus became valuable as currency in 
domestic negotiations."
(Hessing, 1994: p. 628).
More generally, sociologists Brannen & Wilson (1987: p. 5) claim that
"strategies' are adopted by each household member to create, dispense, or
exploit household resources. Kate Young agrees:
"In developing countries, independent access to income and 
resources may help wives to change the terms of the conjugal 
bargain and provide them with a stronger bargaining position."
(Young, 1992: p. 153).
Consumer researchers, like economists and sociologists, also discuss the 
idea of bargaining: Schiffman & Kanuk (1994: pp. 355-6) suggest that
different roles are adopted by husbands and wives in attempting to 
influence consumption decisions: "expert1, "legitimacy', "bargaining1,
"reward1, "emotional1, and "impression1: these appear to be different
strategies.
While observing similarities between sociology/psychology and economics,
we must not ignore the differences. Unlike most economists, sociologists
using game theory approaches put bargaining in a social context (MacPhail
& Bowles, 1989: pp. 62-3). As one sociologist put it,
"Relationship bargains are framed within a social context in 
which societal values and norms permeate our ways of thinking 
about marriage and how to behave as husband and wife".
(Knudson-Martin & Mahoney, 1996: p. 138).
Graham Crow (1989: p. 20) claims that while analyzing strategies, we should
not dispense with institutional analysis. Hilary Standing, describing
Calcutta, wrote:
"There is a great deal of pressure on married women to suffer 
in silence rather than end a marriage; pressure which comes 
partly from ideology - it is shameful and ignominious [ . . . ] 
but also for the profoundly practical reason that her 
alternatives are fairly dismal, especially if she is poorly 
qualified and has children to support"
(Standing, 1991, pp. 157-8).
The above quote suggests the importance of the wife's perception of her own 
situation if divorce takes place (like economic game theorists' concept of
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"threat points'); but unlike economist game theorists, Standing also
emphasises the importance of ideology. Kate Young wrote:
"In developing countries, independent access to income and 
resources may help wives to change the terms of the conjugal 
bargain and provide them with a stronger bargaining position.
But this will not necessarily be transformed into greater 
power and control over budgetary allocations. To understand 
this type of power within the domestic setting, we first need 
to analyze and understand the differences in the social 
position and relative social value of men and women within 
their kinship group and the wider community."
(Young, 1992: p. 153).
So, according to Kate Young, "social position1 is an important influence 
on bargaining between household members: we cannot predict a woman1 s power
simply on the basis of her earnings.
The above discussion might suggest that women are helpless victims of
social pressures which (in certain societies/times) forbid women from
working; but Yvonne Smith implies that a woman can use a network of
friends and relatives to change her husband's values:
"for women living in dual-adult households, labour market 
participation may depend on a process of negotiation and 
decision-making. This process may encompass not only 
partners, but also a support network which includes both 
members of the extended family and friends [. . . ] These may 
be concerned with challenging a partner's perceptions about 
the role of working wives, the role of men in the home when 
women obtain employment, and the use of an "extra1 wage."
(Smith, 1997: p. 1174).
Other writers have discussed women's active role in attempting to influence 
behaviour:
"industrial work seems to be "real' work in a way that 
domestic work doesn't; the latter resembles a cushy number.
This ideological climate clearly makes it hard for the 
houseworker to establish that the industrial worker should do 
more work in the home. [...] However, when she returns to 
the labour market she, to some extent, turns the ideology to 
her own advantage by insisting on the right to control her own 
earnings."
(Hunt, 1978: p. 570).
Cromwell & Olson (cited in Touliatos, Perlmutter & Straus, 1990: pp. 431-2) 
use a three-stage analysis of family behaviour: power bases, processes,
and outcomes. French & Raven (cited in Touliatos, Perlmutter & Straus, 
1990: p. 431) refer to six sources of power for each household member: 
"normative authority'/"legitimacy'; "identification1; "superior
knowledge'; "persuasive ability'; "ability to reward'; and "ability to
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punish'. These power bases include control over spending (the focus of 
economic bargaining models) as "'ability to reward', but add other factors: 
for example, "ability to punish' includes the (threat of) violence, which 
can be used as a resource in a manner similar to money, according to 
Touliatos, Perlmutter & Straus (1990: p. 432). Economists who use
bargaining models usually "solve" their mathematical model by making a set 
of assumptions such as the Nash game-theory model (see chapter 5); but the 
Cromwell & Olsen model analyses the bargaining process (how husband and 
wife reach a compromise) in more detail than economists do, which might 
improve the performance of economists' theories.
REDUCING CONFLICT WITHIN HOUSEHOLDS
The "bargaining1 models discussed above imply that every household is in
permanent conflict - each member of the household wishes to obtain their
own way regarding numerous household decisions (including spending). But
conflict may itself seem undesirable to an individual, so a household
member may accept a less desirable decision in return for domestic harmony:
Maune & Mullin concluded from their study of USA data that
"working mothers of preschool-age children who relied on their 
husbands for child care were more likely to quit work. [. . . ]
Our explanation for these results centers on patriarchal 
values (which define the care of children as a woman's 
responsibility) that many men and some women continue to hold. 
Employed women risk conflict with their husbands when husbands 
supervise children while they work; this conflict may be 
resolved by women quitting work."
(Maune & Mullin, 1993: p. 543).
Kuntal Agarwal found in a 1985 study of Meerut (India) that women often
obey their husbands in order to keep peace in the family: one respondent
said "My husband feels himself superior. To avoid conflict I accept his
decisions" (Agarwal, 1988: p. 189). Graham Crow (a sociologist) sees
limits to the usefulness of game theory models:
"In situations of great inequalities of power, game theory's 
analysis of competing "players' is quite inappropriate. Where 
the outcome of any interaction is a foregone conclusion, it
can be considered more realistic for disadvantaged individuals
to concede defeat to their superiors at the outset, rather 
than go through the motions of being "played with'. Social 
structures operate not only to create but also to deny 
opportunities"
(Crow, 1989: p. 15).
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In summary, then, we can see parallels between game-theory economics and 
some sociological theories (including ideas analogous to 'threat points', 
and 'strategic1 behaviour); however, when these sociologists explain 
behaviour, they do so with reference to the social norms of the society 
being studied. In addition, sociologists (unlike economists) do not 
present mathematical models, but rather attempt to describe (rather than 
model) the behaviour they perceive. Some sociological bargaining models 
are more complicated than economic bargaining models: the former include
factors such as social norms. There would appear no reason to adopt a 
complex model, if a simpler model (based entirely on 'economic 
rationality1) is sufficient to explain observed household behaviour; but 
as I outline in chapter 9, the ability of economic bargaining theories to 
explain household durables ownership is disappointing, so sociological 
theories may be worth considering as a way to improve economic models.
EXCHANGE THEORY and RESOURCE THEORY
Another sociological approach (related to the above bargaining perspective) 
is 'exchange theory1, in which each partner compares his/her own 
contributions to the household with his/her rewards, and maximises his/her 
individual well-being (Benin & Agostinelli, 1988: p. 330; Burr, 1973: pp. 
54-7; Wheelock, 1990: p. 101). Performing a role (such as "breadwinner") 
has specific rewards and costs within the home: a male breadwinner's
preferences are satisfied, and a wife subjugates her preferences to those 
of her husband and children in exchange for other rewards (Qualls, 1987: 
p. 268). According to 'exchange theory1, a husband must successfully 
perform his role of wage-earning, to ensure his wife performs her role of 
providing love, companionship, and household services (Touliatos, 
Perlmutter & Strauss, 1990: p. 423). Despite being apparently unconnected 
with economics, resource theory appears to assume rational behaviour by 
each individual, in that each partner tries to maximise his/her rewards and 
reduce his/her costs (Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994: p. 111).
According to Touliatos, Perlmutter & Strauss (1990: p. 423), a combination 
of 'exchange theory' with 'role differentiation theory' gave rise to 
'resource theory'. In 'resource theory1, the power of husband and wife 
depend on the resources (financial and other) each spouse brings to the 
household (Unger, 1979: p. 282): this implies that a wife's power depends
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on her earnings relative to those of her husband (Lim, 1977: p. 34) . In
a sense, resource theory is similar to game-theory models in economics, in
that a wife's earnings give her power; but the link between earnings and
power are not as direct as economic bargaining models (in which a wife's
earnings affect her threat point) - an employed wife still needs to
"challenge" her husband's power:
"Resource theory suggests that working women attain the 
ability to challenge gender inequality at home through their 
participation in the paid labor force."
(Lim, 1977: p. 32).
The above discussion of bargaining models in economics suggests 
similarities between economics and sociology. I now turn to other 
sociological theories, which are less similar to economics.
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2.5 ROLE THEORY
Several neoclassical economists (such as Becker: see section 2.3) have
attempted to explain why members of a household specialise in certain 
tasks: for example, why we often see a household containing a "housewife"
who does no paid work, and a husband who does little or no housework. 
Neoclassical economists explain this is in terms of rational decision­
making, based on (potential or actual) wage-rates of each household member 
(see section 2.3 above). In contrast, one sociological approach to 
studying the way a person specialises in certain tasks is "role theory': 
for example, Talcott Parsons described post-war USA society thus:
"To be the main "breadwinner" of his family is a primary role 
of the normal adult man in our society [. . . ] "housekeeping" 
and the care of children is still the primary functional 
content of the adult feminine role"
(Parsons, 1949: p. 191).
Similarly, Keller (cited in Iglehart, 1979: p. 9) considers that the core 
aspects of the female role emphasise nurturance; reliance on a male 
provider; concentration on marriage, home, and children; and a ban on 
expressions of assertion and aggression. The sociology of role theory, 
emphasising the interaction between people in different roles, has many 
similarities with psychological theories (e.g. Qualls, 1987), which often 
emphasise an individual's personality: for example, sociologist Ann Oakley
(1974: p. 82) claims that a gender role defines personality traits and 
behavioral responses.
Role theory claims that men have more control than women over household 
decisions, because of culturally-transmitted ideas of "appropriate" roles 
for men and women (Beechey, 1983: p. 33). Role theory is linked to social 
norms, which are "regularities in behavior which are agreed to by all 
members of a society and specify behavior in specific recurrent situations" 
(Schotter, cited in Ott, 1992: p. 123). Berk (reported in Gershuny & 
Robinson, 1988: pp. 537-9) claims that the household is a "gender factory1, 
which perpetuates traditional roles for men and for women, by defining a 
territory of work for each family member. Role theory suggests that roles 
of men and women are conveyed to the individual by socialization; and 
sanctions will follow if men and women do not behave according to their 
socialization (Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994: p. 117). This indicates a 
fundamental difference between sociologists and (some) psychologists: 
sociologists imply that roles change as society changes; whereas some 
psychologists (e.g. Heylen, Dawson & Sampson, 1995) imply that some
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differences between men and women's sex role orientations arise from 
genetic inheritance and childhood socialization, so an adult does not 
change his/her role within the household in response to changes in culture.
One version of role theory is the "sex-role orientation' approach from
psychology, in which sex-role orientation means "the attitudes, values,
opinions, behavioral standards, and cultural norms that define the
appropriate behavior for men and women in their society" (Qualls, 1987: p.
270). This approach is linked to the study of "ideology', which can be
defined as follows:
"ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that 
groups of individuals possess that provide both an 
interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how 
that environment should be structured"
(Denzau & North, 1994: p. 4).
The "sex-role orientation' perspective claims that each social role is 
associated with an ideology: so a person carrying out the role of
"housewife" would have a particular set of opinions about "appropriate1 
behaviour for a housewife. For example, a study of Irish women by Margrat 
Fine-Davis concluded that traditional sex-role attitudes are associated 
with a belief in sharp differentiation between roles of men and women, and 
a belief in male superiority couched in socially acceptable stereotypes 
(Fine-Davis, 1983: p. 129). Similarly, Webster (1994: p. 328) suggests 
that there is a relationship between a patriarchal power structure, and 
traditional sex-role orientation.
Ideologies (based on roles of men and women) have been detected in many 
aspects of household behaviour. Pauline Hunt (1978: pp. 568-70) argues 
that there is an ideology among the (British) respondents she studied, in 
which a household member in a paid job has the right to decide how his/her 
earnings are spent, so employed women insist on the right to control their 
own earnings. Studying 200 households in northern England, Kerr & Charles 
found that a typical housewife feels that her husband "deserves' a "proper1 
meal, whereas she herself has less right to food - indeed, by consuming 
food, she is "stealing" resources from other household members (Kerr & 
Charles, 1986: p. 122; pp. 128-9). They argue that we should not see this 
as men making forceful or overt demands about food consumption (Kerr & 
Charles, 1986: p. 116): a wife feels guilty when her husband refuses (or
shows reluctance) to eat food she has prepared, or feels satisfied when her 
husband has enjoyed a meal (Kerr & Charles, 1986: pp. 121-2). Charles &
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Kerr (1988) perceive a complex cause-and~effect relationship between 
ideology and role, in which food practices maintain the existing social 
norms (as well as food practices being affected by norms): for example,
the wife's subordinate position is demonstrated to children by her 
preparing meals chosen by her husband (Charles & Kerr, 1988: pp. 225-6).
Gail Wilson claimed that different households have a "men's", "women's", 
or "children's" food system - depending on the household member whose 
preference are considered as most important (Wilson, 1989: p. 175). Women 
felt it was a woman's role to satisfy the preferences of other household 
members; there was no question of women meeting their own preferences, 
except in richer households where all household members' preferences could 
be satisfied (Wilson, 1989: pp. 178-9). Food consumption is usually a 
matter of negotiation within a household: women usually have some control
over food consumption, except where the household income is low, or where 
women have little control over household spending (Wilson, 1989: pp. 172- 
4) .
In the "role theory' perspective, men are thought to have more power than
women, partly because men have greater access to paid work than women do
(for several reasons, including legislation and social policy - see Pahl,
1980: p. 333); and men's greater income gives them more power than women
within the home (Pahl, 1980: p. 330). This suggests that a woman has
little control over her "role' - being born female, a women is destined to
be powerless both outside and within the home. In the Hindu religion (the
most widely-held religion in India: see Vijayanunni, 1995: p. x), the
status of women in traditional religious values has been described as:
"Ideologically, woman was considered completely inferior 
species, inferior to the male, having no significance, no 
personality; sociologically she was kept in a state of utter 
subjection; denied all rights, suppressed and oppressed"
(Desai, cited in Ramu, 1987: p. 905).
This view of women as powerless would be an oversimplification, for two 
reasons. Firstly, a woman's role as housewife gives her some authority 
within the home: "Depending on their age and personal resources, wives [in 
India] have customarily exercised covert influence in domestic decisions 
on critical matters" (Ramu, 1987: p. 914). The second reason to doubt that 
women are powerless is that roles are changing. There has been a trend for 
women to take on paid work in recent decades (this is discussed in section 
3.2 below), and this has effects on power relationships: wives' employment
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tends to reduce the husband's traditional authority (Buric & Zecevic, 
1967), and makes women more assertive (Sharan, 1988: pp. 304-5).
If we wish to use insights from "role theory' to improve economic analysis, 
we must consider the possibility that household decision-making processes 
have changed in recent decades. Qualls (1987: p. 269) claimed that in a 
traditional household, conflict resolution takes the form of concession by 
husband or wife to predetermined roles; whereas in a modern household, 
more negotiation takes place between husband and wife, due to more 
egalitarian values. It is interesting to observe that this (claimed) 
increase in bargaining between household members in recent decades 
coincides with economists1 growing interest in bargaining models of 
household behaviour: it appears that economists' theories reflect the
society in which they live. This might appear desirable, in that 
economists should be in touch with human behaviour: but it may give rise
to different theories in different decades. Ideally, economics should 
provide theories which understand human behaviour at a deeper level - a 
theory which applies in the 1970s but not in the 1980s, for example, would 
be of limited use. The time-trend I report in chapter 8 may be evidence 
of a changing culture in Britain since 1969.
There is a way for economists to defend their work against the charge that
we ignore ideology: it could be claimed that an ideology is simply an
effect of economic factors, and that ideologies do not greatly influence
behaviour - if that is true, then economists may be justified in leaving
the study of ideology to other social scientists. Perhaps a person's
ideology is dependent on their economic situation, but his/her behaviour
is determined by economic factors. However, a person's ideologies is not
always consistent with his/her economic position: for example, we might
expect employed women to feel less dependent on their husbands, but when
Ramu (1987) studied single-earner and dual-earner households in Bangalore
(southern India), it appeared that
"dual-earner wives are the most conservative in their role 
perceptions [ . . . ] The continuing influence of traditional 
values governing marital roles has encouraged wives to 
acknowledge and defer to their husbands even though they share 
the provider role"
(Ramu, 1987: p. 913).
Assessing if a person's behaviour depends on his/her ideology (controlling 
for economic factors such as earnings) is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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2.6 CONSUMER RESEARCH
In this section, I consider various approaches to studying durable goods 
consumption, which fall into the area of 'consumer behaviour1. It may be 
argued that academics in the field of "consumer behaviour' have the best 
basis to examine durable goods ownership, because they can draw on the 
insights from many disciplines. Fine & Leopold {1993: p. 39) point out 
that this field draws "in order of importance, from psychology, sociology 
and economics"; but that "consumer behaviour' has failed to integrate its 
parent disciplines (Fine & Leopold, 1993: pp. 39-45). In principle,
consumer research could incorporate bargaining/game theory approaches from 
economics and sociology, but in practice few "consumer research1 academics 
develop mathematical models in the way economists do - the discipline 
appears to be based more on psychology than on economics (Fine & Leopold, 
1993: pp. 42-3).
Schiffman & Kanuk (1994: p. 13; p. 26) observe two approaches within
consumer research: the "positivist1 side, seeking objective theories of
cause and effect; and the "interpretivist' (or postmodern) approach, which 
emphasises values and meanings.
DIFFUSION OF DURABLE GOODS
The idea of "diffusion1 is that customers are slow to adapt to new 
technology, such as microwave ovens, and that this initially slows down the 
acquisition of new goods. The diffusion literature implies that ownership 
of goods tends to follow a particular pattern, know sometimes as the 
"product life cycle' or "product cycle' (Bowden & Offer, 1994: p. 74): 
ownership grows slowly at first, but then accelerates until most households 
possess the good; ownership levels then flatten out. The time-lag between 
introduction of a good and widespread ownership varies between goods: it
has been claimed that this time-lag is much longer for time-saving goods 
than for "time-using' (leisure) goods (Bowden & Offer, 1994: p. 730).
The "diffusion’ literature claims to observe a pattern, in which a small 
fraction of consumers may influence the purchases of other people they meet 
- the "diffusion1 perspective suggests that the purchase of a new consumer 
good spreads like a communicable disease, in which contact with a person 
who owns a new durable good may lead others to purchase the same good (Fine
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et at, 1992a: p. 2). Spiegel & Templeman (1985: p. 320), reporting
Duesenberry1s view, suggest "a person's preferences will be influenced more
by the consumption of those with whom he has close contact". Sociologists
often consider the first 2.5% of consumers to be "innovators" (Schiffman
& Kanuk, 1994: p. 544); the identity of "innovators" is of considerable
interest to market researchers. Hudson implies that such 'pioneers' are
often middle-class:
"once the middle-classes had hot-water systems, vacuum 
cleaners, stainless steel cutlery, washing-machines, central 
heating and food-mixers, the working-classes not unnaturally 
demanded and got the same."
(Hudson, 1983: p. 52).
Fine et al (1992a: p. 3) discuss the view that the first purchasers of a
new good are "an elite who establish a new fashion which trickles down to
the lower orders through emulation". However, Fine et al reject the claim
that the first purchasers are necessarily different to later purchasers:
"it is almost inevitable or tautologous that the first 
adopters of a new consumption good are going to be relatively 
wealthy and "adventurous" and "informed" in some sense. 
Otherwise, they would not be able to afford nor to know about 
what has become available. Subsequent consumers might learn 
about, or be able to afford, the good at a later time but this 
does not mean that they followed earlier consumers in any 
other than the chronological sense."
(Fine et al, 1992a: pp. 3-4; emphasis in original).
Sultan & Winer (1993: p. 588) suggest that researchers have failed to 
identify a group of consumers who are 'innovators' - some consumers may be 
innovators for some products but late adopters for another product.
The speed of diffusion is another issue discussed in consumer research:
"The standard model of the diffusion of technical innovations 
posits an S-shaped, or logistic, curve for the time path of 
adoption [ . . . ] diffusion could represent a gradual learning 
process in which adopters acquire information about household 
durables as they see others purchasing them."
(Besley & Levenson, 1996: p. 40).
Note, however, that the logistic pattern may not apply to all durables: 
Helger Bonus (1973: p. 669) found that ownership of television sets and 
washing-machines grew according to a logistic curve, but ownership of other 
goods (including refrigerators and cars) increased linearly over time.
Perhaps most or all of the logistic curve pattern observed in the diffusion 
literature can be explained in terms of household income: increases in
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ownership are likely to be due to a combination of rising real household 
incomes (Besley & Levenson, 1996: p. 40) and falling real prices of some 
durables such as microwave ovens (Oropesa, 1993). Cigno (1991: p. 36) 
considers that rising female wage-rates "helps to explain the very rapid 
diffusion of convenience foods and domestic time-saving appliances" in 
industrialized countries since the second world war. Assessment of whether 
or not a household is a "pioneer" in consumption is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.
MARKETING APPROACHES
Another perspective is given by Ben Fine and Ellen Leopold, who emphasise 
the active role of producers in creating a market for their goods via 
advertising and reducing prices (via mass-production). They distinguish 
between different types of commodities, arguing that each commodity should 
be studied in terms of a 'system of provision' (Fine & Leopold, 1993: p. 
22). The implication of their ideas is that we should not expect consumer 
behaviour for one type of goods to be consistent with the behaviour of 
consumers over purchasing a different type of goods. For example, some 
commodities are more strongly influenced than others by advertisements 
(Fine & Leopold, 1993: p. 244). They also claim that cultural patterns 
tend to influence some goods more than others - a case of this is Britain’s 
high sugar consumption, which can be partly explained by Britain's imperial 
past (Fine & Leopold, 1993: p. 34). A further complication is that the 
nature of consumption for one good may change over time: Fine and Leopold
claim that "Many of the new domestic appliances that have enlarged the 
scope of consumption within the home [ . . . ] often enter the market as 
luxuries" (Fine & Leopold, 1993: p. 301), and these goods have changed from 
luxury status to mass-consumption goods via "active marketing" such as 
advertising (Fine & Leopold, 1993: p. 90). A further complication is the 
need for consumers to be "informed", in order to be successful in buying 
and operating modern goods such as microwaves. To summarise the work of 
Fine & Leopold, they present a model in which consumption is not determined
Fine & Leopold use the term "luxury" to mean "commodities 
produced by highly labour-intensive and skilled methods" of 
production, rather than by mass-production (Fine & Leopold, 1993: 
pp. 29-30). In economics, a more popular definition of 'luxury' 
is a good which is of lower priorities for consumption, and hence 
usually only consumed by the rich (Gershuny, 1985: p. 128).
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entirely by '’economically rational’ behaviour, but in which advertising 
(along with other factors along the chain of provision) plays a role; 
however, the importance of advertising and other factors vary between 
goods, and over time. Other writers claiming that advertising influences 
spending patterns include Grigg (1995: p. 257).
PERSONALITIES AS INFLUENCES ON HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOUR
A common theme in psychology is emphasis on the individual's personality.
An example of this is the work of Rosen & Granbois (1983: p. 254), who use
the terms "internals' and "externals’. They define an "internal’ as a
person who sees events in his/her life as the result of his/her own
actions; whereas an "external’ sees their life as being affected by
uncontrollable forces. Some economists consider differences between
individuals to be important: regarding whether housework is done by
husband or wife,
"research shows that relative wages of the couple appear to 
matter some, but that much of the division of labor is 
independent of wages and depends on the identity of husband 
and wife."
(Juster & Stafford, 1991: p. 498).
Psychologists emphasise differences between individuals, often using the
term "personality’ to indicate the aspects of a person's brain which (they
claim) directs an individual to behave differently to someone else:
"Some women early in life are able to earn a reputation for 
being able to handle people (including their husbands) and 
being able to manage things well. Such women often are able 
to gain considerable autonomy in their households [ . . . ]
However, the personality of the husband and sometimes that of
his mother and father can also affect this. [. . . ] Thus,
within the social, economics and cultural parameters mentioned 
above there is still room for significant variation among 
households."
(Mencher, 1989: p. 139; emphasis added).
This view emphasises individual personalities of household members; this 
appears incompatible with the neoclassical economists' assumption of 
'rational' economic behaviour (which implies that people will behave 
identically if they are subject to the same economic forces).
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2.7 CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND SOCIAL CLASS
This section considers the impact of culture, and of ideology, on durable
goods ownership. I use the term 'culture' in the same way as Max Steuer:
"For present purposes the term culture is used to refer to 
that part of behaviour which is acquired by unconsciously 
imitating the conscious or unconscious example of the 
surrounding society."
(Steuer, 1989: p. 2).
Alessandro Cigno, on the other hand, sees culture partly in terms of wage-
rates, and relative prices of good/services:
"some of what goes under the name of 'culture' in this as in 
other contexts may be interpreted as the debris of past states 
of the economic environment - a consequence of the fact that, 
when the structure of incentives and disincentives changes, it 
takes time to realize it, time to decide how best to respond 
to it, and time to modify the pattern of one's life."
(Cigno, 1991: p. 195).
In the opinion of many sociologists, the behaviour (including consumption
patterns) of households depends heavily on the culture/ideology of
household members, including social norms (Pahl, 1980: p. 319). In the
words of Kate Young,
"Any work on household resource management should involve an 
understanding of what marriage involves in a particular 
culture, especially the degree of 'jointness' of a couple and 
their incomes and assets."
(Young, 1992: p. 149).
Young' s view appears to be completely incompatible with most of the
economic analysis discussed earlier in this chapter, which is built on the
implicit assumption of 'rational' behaviour: but perhaps the gap between
sociology and economics is not as great as it appears. Recently, a number
of economists have become increasingly ambitious to extend the scope of
economics. James Buchanan, for example, wrote
"Economics is a science of human behavior, a behavior that is 
more complex than that of nonhuman animals. Genetic 
determinants remain central to any exploratory enterprise, but 
human behavior is also influenced by norms that act as 
internal constraints. And such constraints may differ as 
among separate interaction environments that may be 
temporally, geographically, culturally and institutionally 
classified."
(Buchanan, 1995: p. 194).
The title of Buchanan's paper ('Economic Science and cultural diversity') 
implies that he has two projects: to make economics more "scientific", and
to extend economics to include culture. This may seem surprising, in that
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scientific methods (using controlled experiments, to produce repeatable 
results) seem incompatible with culture (which is difficult to measure 
objectively). Nevertheless, if economic behaviour does vary between 
cultures, then perhaps economists need to understand such differences - and 
Buchanan's attempt to classify cultures may be a valuable step forward. 
Assar Lindbeck also wishes to extend the scope of economics - to include 
'social norms':
"In a broad psychological perspective, both economic 
incentives and social norms may be regarded as giving rise to 
purposeful, or "rational" behaviour [...] this suggests that 
not only economic incentives but also social norms may be 
analyzed by means of utility theory".
(Lindbeck, 1997: p. 370).
Mair (1984) claims that in Muslim and Hindu societies (which includes most 
of the population of India: see Vijayanunni, 1995: p. x), a man is proud 
if he is able to support the household financially, without the need for 
his wife to earn money. Referring to India, Kate Young develops this view 
in more detail:
"It is not culturally appropriate for wives to have a separate 
income or budget; indeed, many are not permitted to work
outside the home. Those who do generally hand over all
earnings to the household head or manager for reallocation. 
In-marrying wives are not seen as co-equals with their 
husbands but very much as their subordinates; in many cases 
the wives are also subordinate to all other members of his 
family, particularly all other males. As the woman grows 
older and as she bears children - particularly sons - the 
degree of her subordination decreases. If she ever achieves 
the status of wife of the patriarch, then as her husband's 
proxy she probably also simultaneously achieves the status of 
family-resources manager."
(Young, 1992: p. 150).
Kate Young implies that women’s power over the domestic budget does not
derive directly from her earnings, but from her 'status' within the home.
A slightly different view is expressed by Gay Young:
"A wage earning woman's position [...] depends, in part, on 
how vital to household maintenance her earnings are perceived 
as being"
(Young, 1993: p. 9 - emphasis added).
Along similar lines, Ann Whitehead wrote:
"Overall a woman's effective possession of the resources she 
has either produced, or earned, within the family based 
household is determined by her relative power vis-a-vis other 
household members, especially her husband."
(Whitehead, 1984: p. 109).
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Jan Pahl claimed that the relative power of men and women is influenced by 
various factors, including each person's views on the nature of gender 
relationships (Pahl, 1984: p. 46). This view appears to be more difficult 
to test than the neoclassical economics model of 'rational' behaviour 
(discussed in section 2.2). Hilary Standing (in the context of Calcutta, 
India) claimed that
"In households where husbands or fathers appropriate the 
earnings of wives and daughters, women's employment tends 
mainly to raise the level of conflict among household members. 
Employed women whose husbands take control of their wages are 
structurally in a position little better than that of non­
employed women dependent on an allowance system. "
(Standing, 1991: p. 101).
Other writers have taken a similar view to Standing: for example, Gay
Young (1993: p. 8) claimed that in patriarchal families, a woman's earnings 
may be absorbed by her father. Another possibility is that her earnings 
may be so low that her earnings are trivialized as "help", hence having 
little impact on her power. This suggests that the level of earnings of 
each household member is not the whole story: we also need to understand
how each person's earnings are interpreted in the household context. I now 
consider a body of work which attempts to understand exactly what earnings 
'mean' in different cultures.
RESOURCES IN A CULTURAL CONTEXT
Economists may be able to learn from the “resources in a cultural context'
literature, such as Rodman's attempt to classify cultures by focusing on
women's employment:
"The balance of marital power is influenced by the interaction 
of (1) the comparative resources of husband and wife and (2) 
the cultural or subcultural expectations about the 
distributions of marital power."
(Rodman, 1967: p. 322).
Rodman's views are reminiscent of “bargaining1 (game theory) perspectives 
discussed in section 2.4 above; but Rodman implies that we should go 
beyond this, to understand how real households behave in different 
countries (and in different subcultures within one country). In this 
approach, the earnings of women are central aspect of women's power over 
decisions:
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"Research on the wife's resources has concentrated 
predominantly on her employment. The results suggest that 
women who work, whether in more economically developed nations 
like the United States and Germany or in less economically 
developed nations like Yugoslavia and Puerto Rice, have more 
power in decision making within the family than women who do 
not work"
(Cooney, Rogler, Hurrell & Ortiz, 1982: p. 622).
Note, however, that (according to Rodman et al) women' s earnings do not
increase her power within the home in all societies. Rodman classified
countries according to their level of development (Cooney, Rogler, Hurrell
& Ortiz, 1982: pp. 621-2): he considered India to be at the lowest stage
('patriarchal'), at which a husband's power is so strong that his
socioeconomic status is irrelevant. In a 'modified patriarchal' society
(such as Greece), modern values weaken a husband's power. In a
'transitional egalitarian' society such as USA, higher socioeconomic status
gave a man more power in his household. But in 'egalitarian' societies
such as Sweden, egalitarian values make socioeconomic status irrelevant to
a husband's domestic power. Britain would, presumably, be an 'egalitarian'
society in Rodman's analysis, given that the British are significantly less
"anti-feminist" than other European citizens (Morgan & Wilcox, 1992: p.
158). In a "patriarchal1 society such as India,
"the interests of the husband are paramount; wives cannot
influence marital decisions because the norms prevent them
from doing so, regardless of their relative contributions of 
resources to the marriage"
(Warner, Lee & Lee, 1986: p. 122).
In research on intergenerational Puerto Rico families by Cooney, Rogler, 
Hurrell & Ortiz (1982: p. 630), they found that higher socioeconomic
achievement by a man in the younger generation enhanced his power (by 
increasing his income); but that higher socioeconomic achievement by a man 
in the parent generation reduced his authority, by socialising him to 
modern attitudes and values. If employment exposes women to modern values, 
then this change might be as important as her earnings, as an effect on her 
power over household spending. Morgan & Wilcox (1992: p. 163) suggest that 
women may become more 'feminist' in response to discrimination they
encounter at work (especially likely where female participation rates are 
low). If we use economic models based on the wife's employment (such as 
those outlined in chapters 7 and 8 below), we may find apparent support for 
the model, because employed women have powerful ideas (rather than because 
their earnings make them powerful).
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THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CLASS
The importance of social class on behaviour is a common view among
sociologists. A thorough treatment of the issue of social class would
require an entire thesis, but I offer this section as a brief introduction 
to the some of the issues relevant to this thesis.
Perhaps the most striking feature of social class is that while 
sociologists agree that class is important, there is little agreement on 
what class is. Wright & Cho (1992: p. 89) suggest that there are three 
aspects of class differences: 'property’ (ownership); 'authority'; and
'expertise'. A quite different list of three factors is given by Julie 
Nelson (1994): an individual's 'standard-of-living'; 'agency1, which
refers to behaviour such as paid work, and control over earnings; and 
'affiliation1, which represents affection or love between partners.
Given the disagreements about what class is, it is not surprising to find 
disagreements on how to measure it. Many alternative measures of social 
class have been proposed - for example, the BHPS survey includes the 
following measures of class based on respondents' job: SEG, RGSC,
Goldthorpe, Hope-Goldthorpe, Cambridge, and ILO-ISCO 88; and BHPS also
includes a measure of subjective class - whether the respondent thinks of 
him/herself as middle-class or working-class (Taylor et al, 1996).
In addition to disagreements about how to identify groups of social
classes, there is also disagreement about what it is we are trying to
classify: is social class a characteristic of an individual person, or of
a household? A key issue here is how to classify wives: is a wife's
social class the same as that of her husband (on the grounds that he is
probably the chief wage earner in the household) , or should we work out a
wife's class from her own job if she is employed? Annemette S(j>rensen wrote
"The distinction between the class position of individual men 
and women, and the class position of families is crucial"
(S(|)rensen, 1994: p. 44).
Despite agreeing that this question is important, sociologists do not agree 
on the answer:
"little consensus exists on either the best way to combine 
information about both husband's and wife's occupational class 
into a joint measure of the family's class position, or on the 
wisdom of doing so"
(S(j)rensen, 1994: p. 41).
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Perhaps many effects of social class are irrelevant to this thesis, but
one class difference I consider relevant is the ideology of "sharing".
Hilary Standing, describing Calcutta, wrote
"high income professional households are characterized by a 
self-conscious model of shared decision making which is less 
in evidence in poor households."
(Standing, 1991: p. 98).
If an ideology of "sharing" does exist (in a particular social class), we
should not assume that affects actual behaviour. Susan McRae studied
families where husband and wife are in different social classes:
"one might well ask why so many cross-class families choose to 
regard their income as joint funds. I would like to suggest 
that the answer lies in the couples' efforts to ease 
difficulties which seem to be inherent in cross-class family.
[...] Regarding both incomes as joint funds - family funds - 
allows these differences to be smoothed over in family life, 
allows an ideology of equality to surmount a reality of 
inequality"
(McRae, 1987: p. 121).
Social class may partly explain the household behaviour I have observed in 
Britain and India: see the quote by Nelson (19 94) in section 9.2 below.
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2.8 THE "HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS' APPROACH
Many sociologists have criticised economists for treating households as a 
"black box" between earning and spending (Pahl, 1990: p. 120). One attempt 
to peer inside this black box is the study of "Household Allocative 
Systems' (associated with Jan Pahl). Writers in the Household Allocative 
Systems school argue that Household Allocative Systems influence spending 
patterns of the household and decisions on the amount of paid employment 
(if any) each household member will seek. The Household Allocative System 
is a mechanism through which various forces (economic and social) influence 
household behaviour. The "Household Allocative System' approach is based 
on dividing households into different types, depending on which household 
member(s) have day-to-day responsibility for management of spending 
decisions. In her 1985 article, Jan Pahl indicates that the idea of 
studying Household Allocative Systems arose from her study of women who had 
left violent partners to move into a refuge for battered women (Pahl, 1985: 
p. 34). Many of the women interviewed by Pahl found that they gained 
greater control over the household income when they separated from their 
partner; many of these women were better able to feed their children by 
allocating a larger share of the household income to food - despite the 
fact that the household income had fallen (often considerably). Pahl, and 
others, use this method of analysis to study all households: by carrying
out in-depth interviews of a small sample of (mainly) women, it was claimed 
that each household could be categorised into one of a small number of 
types of household - each type based on a "Household Allocative System1. 
Pahl found that Household Allocative Systems appears to explain the change 
in behaviour of women with violent husbands/partners, when they leave their 
partner. This may have led her to over-emphasise the importance of 
Household Allocative Systems in more conventional households.
Kerr & Charles (1986: p. 144) is another study which discusses the
importance of who manages the household finances. They studied households 
in northern England, and found that women with joint or exclusive 
responsibility for money management usually spend more household money on 
their children or themselves, than do women in households where husbands 
control money. Kerr & Charles appear to see control over income as a 
reliable indicator of power inequalities within marriage (Kerr & Charles, 
1986: p. 152).
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Jan Pahl (1980: pp. 316-327) divided households into four types of
"Household Allocative System':
1: In the "Whole Wage1 system, the husband/male partner hands
over the entire wage-packet to his wif e/partner, and she 
returns some of it as his personal spending money; she uses 
the remainder to pay for household expenses.
2: In the "Allowance* system, a husband gives his wife/partner an
allowance, keeping the rest of his wage (a large part of which 
is his personal spending money); she pays most household 
expenses from the allowance. The size of the allowance 
depends on social norms, and the husband1s income level.
3: In the "Pooling1 system, the husband and wife pool their
incomes and pay household expenses from the common pool.
4: In the "Individual control1 system, the husband and wife have
separate incomes, and each is responsible for certain areas of 
household spending.
The above (four-way) system of classification is not the only system which
has been used in the Household Allocative System literature. For example,
Vogler (1989) uses six categories ("female whole-wage1, "female pool1,
"male whole wage1, "housekeeping allowance1, "male pool' and "joint pool1
systems). On the other hand, Barrett & McIntosh (1982) use only three
2
types of Household Allocative System categories . A criticism of the 
"Household Allocative Systems1 approach is this problem of definition - 
writers disagree on what categories of Household Allocative System can be 
observed; they even disagree on the number of categories to use (varying 
from three, to six or more). None of the articles discussed in this 
chapter explains why one classification system is "better1 in understanding 
household behaviour. This lack of precision may be due to the lack of an 
underlying model of household behaviour. It is not clear how power is 
distributed within households in the writing of Household Allocative System 
theorists - at certain times, they appear to explain male household power 
as a result of sexist attitudes caused by defective upbringing of children; 
at other times, as a result of labour markets which discriminate against 
women.
Pahl (1983: p. 251) argues that money is a "tracer1 - it can be used to 
reveal patterns of power and deference within households. In practice, 
this appears to mean classifying a household into one type of Household
"tipping-up1 - apparently another term for a whole-wage system; 
"allowance1; and "pooling1.
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Allocative System - and presuming that the Household Allocative System 
adopted tells us a great deal about relative power within the household. 
This is another problem with the Household Allocative Systems approach: 
it could be argued that whether or not a household uses an 'allowance' 
system is less important than the size of the allowance, when one is paid; 
but this aspect is not captured by the classification system suggested by 
Pahl (or others).
Several writers who use qualitative (rather than quantitative) research 
methods have commented on the importance of handling money for women's 
autonomy. For example, Mencher wrote
"it is clear that having control over the family purse 
strings, and especially the fact that some of the money comes 
from her own work, does seem to improve the status of women 
within the household."
(Mencher, 1989: p. 128).
It has been suggested that women sometimes seek greater earning-power to
increase their control over domestic resources: Hilary Land wrote
"In households in which there is a rigid housekeeping system 
the wives are more likely to take paid employment. This is so 
that they can have some control as well as having additional 
resources for the family."
(Land, 1977: p. 168).
This suggests that links between 'household allocative system' may be 
complicated by strategic behaviour of wives (and husbands). This appears 
to give support to use of a bargaining model, of the type discussed in 
section 2.4 above. However, many writers reject the claim (implicit in 
some bargaining models) that an increase in a wife's earnings automatically 
gives her more control over household spending. Susan McRae studied 
households in which the wife earns more than her husband, and concluded 
"There is, then, no simple connection to be made between the level of 
earnings and decision-making processes" (McRae, 1987: p. 119), although 
McRae appears to consider household allocative systems to be important 
influences on a woman's power. Other writers suggest that day-to-day 
management of household finances does not give women real power over 
financial decisions. In Hilary Standing's (1991) study of households in 
Calcutta (India), she appears rather dismissive of the importance of who 
manages household money (as an influence on control over household 
decisions). She wrote:
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"the common fund manager is more like a caretaker who oversees 
the disbursement of funds according to already determined 
understandings of need. The locus of decision making lies 
elsewhere than with the manager."
"The allowance system [...] though nominally female, is 
notable for the lack of control which it bestows on the 
manager, the absence of any area of autonomy over even small 
amounts of money"
(Standing, 1991: p. 97; p. 100).
Some, but not all, of the above comments suggest that women's influence on 
household money may be important for household decisions in general.
If we focus on Household Allocative Systems as intermediate structures
between societal forces (such as social norms) and household behaviour, we
may be in danger of exaggerating the importance of Household Allocative
Systems. Factors such as household income and ideologies appear to be very
important in determining household behaviour; studying Household
Allocative Systems should not distract our attention from these factors.
Even if we do find evidence that Household Allocative Systems appear to be
relevant to durable goods ownership (see chapter 10 below), we cannot
easily understand why. Lewenhak (1988: p. 110) claims that
"It has been noted in Egypt, in Kenya and in South India that 
when men who had been working away from home in towns or as 
contract labour abroad, returned, their wives had more self- 
confidence and were disinclined to revert to their previous 
degree of inferiority so that sometimes family friction 
resulted."
(Lewenhak, 1988: p. 110).
This may indicate that wives' management of household decisions is 
important in increasing management skills and understanding; or perhaps 
there are other forces at work - women (temporarily) without husbands may 
seek independent incomes, or become habituated to the absence of 
domineering men.
Another weakness in the "household allocative systems' literature is that 
it has not yet developed a clear theory of which households will be wife- 
managed, which joint-managed, and which husband-managed. If money is a 
"tracer1, as Pahl (1983: p. 251) suggests, then increases in women's power 
should also give women more control over financial management - but this 
pattern is not always observed:
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"More women are going out to work. They earn part of the 
family income. They participate in making decisions for the 
family. [...] In almost all activities the wife's autonomy 
prevails except in the case of financial management when the 
differentiation pattern submits to her husband's authority."
(Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 41).
Another problem with the household allocative systems approach is that it
emphasises differences between household types - yet households with
different allocative systems may share common behaviour patterns (for
example, husbands/male partners may exercise a large degree of control over
household spending, whatever type of allocative system the household
adopts). Study of allocative systems may distract us from what is really
important about intra-household decision-making, by focusing on the day-to-
day management of cash - when the more important decisions are on issues
such as the type of goods bought by the household, and whether or not the
wife/female partner is employed. Shirley Dex claimed that
"Pahl (1983) has recently opened up the issue of the 
allocation of money within the household, but the detail of 
our present knowledge is insufficient to know what women's 
income is spent on."
(Dex, 1985: p. 184-5).
Nevertheless, Household Allocative Systems appear to be linked to important 
aspects of household behaviour, and may be of some help in understanding 
why households behave as they do. It seems that Household Allocative 
Systems offer us a possibility of seeing inside the "black box' of the 
household, and hence may be useful tools to aid our understanding of how 
social and economic forces shape household behaviour. The question we need 
to answer is: does the Household Allocative System tell us more about the
household's behaviour than do the forces (such as women's employment) which 
determine which Household Allocative System is adopted? Chapter 10 tests 
the Household Allocative Systems approach, by assessing whether or not 
households with different allocative systems have different patterns of 
durable goods ownership.
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COMPARISONS BETWEEN -HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS' AND 'BARGAINING' MODELS
The 'household allocative system1 adopted by a household may reveal 
information on the bargaining power and skills of household members. 
MacPhail & Bowles state
"the more complex variants of the bargaining approach suggest 
that the relationship between employment and bargaining power 
should not be viewed mechanistically but must take account of 
other factors influencing the ability of individuals to 
bargain effectively."
(MacPhail & Bowles, 1989, p. 63).
What "other factors" might we take account of? Sudhanshu Handa, using a 
game theory approach, includes a term (<|>) as a potential influence on 
consumer spending: "from an empirical perspective, any variable which
reflects relative authority or bargaining power within the household is a 
candidate for <|>"; (j) includes variables such as wage rates, and the
"cultural environment" (Handa, 1996: p. 121). But for economists who use 
a 'bargaining' approach, the findings of this chapter may offer hope of new 
insights into the bargaining process. This application of 'household 
allocative systems' might be taken as evidence that information is a source 
of power. Presumably a woman who manages her household's finances is 
likely to be better informed (than other women) about the extent to which 
her household could afford to purchase new durable goods. There is some 
evidence that husbands withhold information on their income level from 
their wives - in both Britain (Michael Young, 1952: p. 307) and India 
(Khanna & Varghese, 1978; p. 44).
Many sociologists interpret the position of women as being powerless 
victims of a 'patriarchal' society, in which men dominate women due to the 
social norms and cultural expectations. By contrast, game theory suggests 
a symmetry between men and women: humans behave rationally, and it is only
the greater earning power which gives husbands greater control than wives 
over household decisions.
Judith Treas suggests that the decision on which financial management
system is adopted may be linked to the level of commitment to the marriage:
" "Separate purses” describes the financial strategies of 
husbands and wives who preserve individual property rights by 
holding resources back. The "common pot" characterizes
couples who merge their individual interests into a single 
economic collective."
(Treas, 1993: p. 723).
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But this perspective (of Treas) raises more questions than it answers.
Treas herself asks
"Why do some couples see themselves as an integral economic 
unit with inseparable fates and fortunes rather than as two 
free agents joined expediently for the exchange of goods and 
services?"
(Treas, 1993: p. 723).
A possible answer to the question posed by Treas is suggested by Burgoyne
(1990: p. 638), who argues that adoption of a "joint1 or ‘'husband-managed'
financial management system may help to avoid conflict when the norm of
man-as-breadwinner is violated. Alternatively, perhaps a "joint1
management system is adopted in response to practical problems associated
with the presence of children:
"In first marriages, a joint account can facilitate management 
in the child-bearing years when wives are less likely to be 
contributing substantially to the household income"
(Burgoyne & Morison, 1997: p. 394).
They suggest that once a joint account is set up, the couple may retain it 
when the wife returns to employment "because of ideology, or inertia" 
(Burgoyne and Morison, 1997: p. 394).
To summarise this discussion, several sociologists appear to use a 
perspective related to "bargaining1 (game theory) models; but they also 
consider other forces not widely studied by economists. For example, a 
woman's ability to control her own earnings may be linked to her status 
within her household, which (it is claimed) can vary between different 
cultures.
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2.9 SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to summarise the main schools of thought in 
contemporary economics (and sociology), as regards consumer behaviour. In 
general, the various approaches have very different assumptions, and arrive 
at quite different conclusions.
There are many overlaps between different approaches discussed in this 
chapter; and many comments made by economists can be compared with similar 
comments by sociologists. An example of this is the analysis of 
'bargaining1 (game theory) models in section 2.4 above.
Most of the theories discussed in this chapter suggest a clear link between 
a woman's employment, and her power within the household: this improves
her 'price of time' (according to Becker et al), or her 'threat point1 (in 
bargaining models). However, some of the above theories disagree: for
example, the 'resources in a cultural context' theory claims that a wife's 
employment only enhances her domestic power in 'transitional' societies 
(i.e. not in extreme patriarchal societies, such as India; nor in 
egalitarian societies, such as Sweden).
The following chapters will try to present testable models based (loosely) 
on the various theories discussed above, at the risk of oversimplifying 
each view.
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CHAPTER 3
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH on 
DURABLES OWNERSHIP and WOMEN'S WORK
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, I compare India with the UK because these two countries are 
at different levels of development. This difference is apparent in GNP 
(Gross National Product) per person estimates, in 'international Dollars' 
(these use 'Purchasing Power Parity', to create an appropriate exchange- 
rate to compare UK £s with Indian Rupees). In 1995, the average UK income 
was $19,260 compared with only $1,400 in India (World Bank, 1997: table 1). 
The gap between UK and India may be exaggerated by these GNP figures, 
because subsistence farming is excluded from GNP. But India and UK are 
very different; and differences between UK and India (reported in this 
thesis) may shed some light on economic development.
It could be argued that Britain is a more "developed" country than India, 
and hence that India today is comparable with Britain in previous decades. 
However, I am cautious about this view - for example, there may be many 
cultural, religious, and other differences between two countries at the 
same development level.
This chapter considers evidence on women's paid work, and on women's unpaid 
domestic work. Many writers report that women spend a lot of time on time- 
consuming domestic tasks - for example, Hilary Standing found in Calcutta 
(India):
"The low incidence of items such as pressure cookers and 
fridges means that there is little scope for saving time or 
fuel or for storing cooked food. House cleaning and washing 
utensils are likewise made laborious by the lack of domestic 
appliances and cleaning aids"
(Standing, 1991: p. 70).
In order to understand why many women spend a long time on domestic work, 
I study the causes, and the effects, of women's paid and unpaid work; and 
consider why some households own labour-saving devices when others do not.
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The following topics are included in this chapter: a discussion of the
causes and effects of wives' employment (section 3.2); time spent on 
housework, by husbands and wives (section 3.3); class differences in time- 
use and consumption (section 3.4); the potential for durable goods to 
reduce time spent on housework (section 3.5); assessing what women's 
priorities are for durables ownership (section 3.6); and some other 
factors which might influence durable goods ownership (section 3.7). 
Section 3.8 summarises the key issues in this chapter.
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3.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT
This thesis studies the effects of women's employment on durable goods 
ownership. In this section, I consider some influences on women's paid 
work; many have been studied, such as wife's age (Dex, 1988: p. 101); 
wife's education level (Dex, 1988: p. 101); and children (see below).
WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN THE UK AND INDIA
In this subsection, I compare employment patterns between the UK and India. 
As an overview, table 3<1> below contrasts the UK with India: it reports
the "general level of employment1, for men and for women. The data refer 
to 1996, which is the latest year for which I could obtain such data.
TABLE 3<1>: LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE, UK and INDIA, 1996
MEN WOMEN
UK 55.5 % 45.3 %
India 57.4 % 28.6 %
source: ILO (1997), statistical annex: table 7.
The above table highlights one way in which India differs from the UK: 
women's employment. In Britain, the proportion of women who are employed 
is almost as great as that of men; but for India, the labour force 
participation rate of women is less than half that of men. Yet, in other 
ways, the difference between India and the UK is less than might be 
expected: the proportion of men employed is similar in India (57.4%) to
the UK (55.5%). More details on work (paid and unpaid) can be found by 
looking at time-use patterns, which I report in table 3<2> below.
TABLE 3<2>: TIME-USE IN BRITAIN AND INDIA
_____________ (hours per week)_____________
MEN WOMEN
PAID UNPAID PAID UNPAID
UK (1984) 30 11 14 30
India (1989-92) 43 14 28 41
source: computed from UN (1995: pp. 108 & 132).
Note that the time-use data in table 3<2> above are indicative only - the 
data are reported in different tables in UN (1995), and hence the UK data 
may not be comparable with that for India. The "unpaid" work consists of 
housework - for the UK, this includes "household chores', and childcare;
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in India, "unpaid" work also includes subsistence work, which is reported 
as 4 hours for week for men and 7 hours per week for women (no data on this 
are reported for the UK). Table 3<2> suggests that the total workload 
(paid and unpaid) of women is higher than men: this applies to both India
and the UK. A difference between countries appears to be that women do 
more hours of paid work in India (28 hours per week) than in the UK (14 
hours per week). This seems difficult to reconcile with table 3<1> above, 
which showed many more women being employed in the UK than in India; I 
believe that this apparent contradiction is a result of the prevalence of 
part-time employment among women in the UK.
To shed more light on the differences in employment between the UK and 
India, I now consider education levels. It has been argued (Cigno, 1991: 
p. 137) that women's employment in postwar Britain rose because of 
increases in women's education. Perhaps the higher participation rate of 
British women (compared with Indian women) in table 3<1> above is a result 
of greater education levels? I report some evidence on this in table 3<3> 
below. Table 3<3> reports the latest comparable evidence in World Bank 
(1997): it refers to school enrolment in 1980. But this table tells us 
something about the education level of people who are now of working age.
TABLE 3<3>: SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT, UK and INDIA, 1980
MALES FEMALES
UK 82 % 85 %
India 39 % 20 %
source: World Bank (1997), table 7.
There are two striking features of table 3<3>. The first is that secondary 
school enrolment was much higher in Britain than in India. The second 
feature is that UK enrolment rates are very similar for males and females 
in Britain, whereas in India there is a big gap between male and female 
enrolment - in India, the female enrolment ratio is about half that for 
males. The generally low level of female education in India could explain 
(at least partly) Indian women's low participation in employment.
To summarise tables 3<1> to 3<3> above, I would claim that there are clear 
differences between the UK and India, in both employment and education. 
Indian women have low participation rates in employment and education, and 
women's low education level may partly explain their low participation in 
paid work. I now consider other possible influences on women's employment.
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THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN
Several writers report a pattern of women's employment over the life-cycle
in the UK: a woman may be employed full-time before the birth of her first
child, then leave the labour market while her child(ren) are young; she
returns to employment {perhaps part-time) as her children reach school age
(Dex, 1984). Many writers emphasise the importance for women's employment
of the presence, and ages, of children - the age of the youngest child in
the household is especially important (Floge, 1989; p. 51; Layard, Barton
& Zabalza, 1980: p. 60) because "The younger the child, the more care they
need" (Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994: p. 121). The presence of a child
under school age is important (Joshi, 1978: 16); and children tend to
attend school for longer hours as they get older (Blundell & Walker, 1982:
p. 360). Children influence not only the decision to take employment, but
also how many hours of paid work to take:
"any measure of female labour supply (for example,
participation or hours of work if participating) is negatively 
correlated with any measure of young children (for example, 
the number of preschool children or the presence of an
infant). Casual observation and any number of surveys from
different places and different times have found this"
(Browning, 1992: p. 1449).
If the presence of children is an important influence on women's paid work,
then changes in the number of children may produce a trend in women's
employment. This thesis uses data from 1969: many writers report changes
in birthrates over this period, in the UK and India. Referring to the UK:
"The baby boom of the 1960s, for example, was the outcome of 
the rise in tempo of fertility over the 50s and 60s, and 
subsequent fall at the start of the 70s. What caused those 
changes of tempo? Three major changes took place, over the 
period in question, in the factors affecting a woman's 
participation in the labour market. One was the rapid 
increase in the amount of education received by women [. . . ]
The other two were the increase in labour productivity
(through technical progress) and the mitigation of sexual 
discrimination."
(Cigno, 1991: p. 137-8).
Cigno offers no evidence in support of his analysis of demographic changes, 
and it would be difficult to test his ideas: so many changes have taken
place in Britain (and other countries) over the last few decades, that it 
seems virtually impossible to separate cause from effect. Links between 
fertility and women's employment are difficult to measure, due to numerous 
inter-relationships.
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As well as the above estimation problems, there is a further difficulty:
it has been suggested that relationships between these variables may vary
over time. Calhoun & Espenshade, examining U.S. data, concluded that
"the negative impact of children on the labour market hours 
and earnings of women have been declining over time. [...]
In some instances, market substitutes for parents' time may be 
available in the form of direct expenditures on goods and 
services related to child care."
(Calhoun & Espenshade, 1988: p. 29).
Assessing if trends in fertility are a cause or effect (or both) of trends 
in female employment is not central to this thesis; but such trends may 
explain the trend I found in my empirical work, reported in chapter 8.
TRENDS IN WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT
There seems general agreement that there have been large changes in women's
employment in recent decades, both in Britain (Dex, 1985: p. 3; Fine,
1992: p. 145; Kalleberg & Rosenfeld, 1990: p. 331) and in India (Khanna
& Varghese, 1978: p. 41). England & McCreary (1987: p. 161), referring to
Western countries, imply that this is due to economic forces: "As the wage
rate paid to women rose (in absolute real terms, not relative to men's pay)
between 1950 and the early 1970s, more women went into paid employment".
However, the reason for increased female participation may be due to
cultural rather than economic changes: several writers have reported
changing attitudes to gender roles in recent decades - there is increasing
acceptance of women's employment, which is part of a general change in
attitudes, in Britain and elsewhere:
"In Britain, as in most other European countries over the last 
decade or so, there has been a clear change in sex role 
attitudes: both men and women have increasingly espoused more
egalitarian views"
(Kiernan, 1992: p. 101).
Laura Sanchez (1993: p. 435) suggests that women's increased labour-force 
participation in the Third World since the 1960s is due to both economic 
changes and population growth. But Veronica Beechey sees social norms as 
important: she argues that it is impossible to explain the fluctuations
in married women's employment without reference to (strongly-held) beliefs 
about which jobs are "acceptable' for women (Beechey, 1983: p. 33).
Shirley Dex, describing Britain, suggests that new employment patterns have 
led to women being seen as employees rather than as housewives:
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"Whilst women's growing visibility in the workforce has 
occurred gradually, the recognition of women as employees or 
workers has been more sudden, dating from the late 1960s".
(Dex, 1985 : p . 3).
It has been argued, however, that these changes (in recent decades) were
less dramatic in India than in Britain:
"The working woman is not a new phenomenon. A rural culture 
which is predominantly agricultural does not impose any major 
adjustment problems in marriage even when the woman plays a 
vital role outside the home, participating with the male in 
sowing, planting, husking and pounding."
(Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 38).
The trend for an increase in women's earnings has been widely discussed: 
for example, Hutton (1994: p. 21) suggests that women's increased labour- 
force participation since the 1960s "gave the impression of considerable 
progress" but adds that "The incomes available to a woman are unlikely 
to be high enough to provide an adequate independent living standard for 
herself and any dependent children" (Hutton, 1994: p. 21). The question 
of whether women's employment is increasing rapidly in India is complicated 
by regional variations: see the "geographical variations' subsection below.
For Britain, it is often claimed that the industrial revolution took place
in the eighteenth century (Fine & Leopold, 1993: p. 10); but many writers
consider India a developing country (Bardhan, 1989-90: p. 104) or a low-
income country (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982: p. 813), so I look at Indian
employment trends in the context of "developing countries'. Many writers
claim that women lose ground as economic development proceeds (see Buvinic,
1983); but other writers suggest that economic development has helped
women (see Sanchez, 1993: p. 435). A third view is that women's employment
shows a U-shaped pattern as development proceeds - declining in the early
stages of development, but later rising again as development proceeds
(Mathur, 1994: pp. 474-6; World Bank, 1995: p. 25). Ester Boserup, an
influential writer on development economics, claimed that
"A main characteristic of economic development is the progress 
towards an increasingly intricate pattern of labour 
specialization. In communities at the earliest stage of 
development, practically all goods and services are produced 
and consumed within the family group, but with economic 
development more and more people become specialized in 
particular tasks and the economic autarky of the family is 
superseded by the exchange of goods and services."
(Boserup, 1986: p. 15).
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I n  B o s e r u p 1s  v i e w ,  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  o w n e r s h i p  o f  t i m e - s a v i n g  d u r a b l e  g o o d s
is part of a pattern, in which households are increasingly spending money
to save time on housework. If such changes have taken place, are they
related to changes in culture? Alessandro Cigno, an economist, argues:
"As societies develop and mature, the optimal household size 
tends to become smaller and, at the same time, the role of the 
family as an allocator of resources tends to decline. Neither 
of these developments is caused, according to our analysis, by 
changes in preferences or culture. They are, rather, a 
response to changes in the structure of incentives and 
disincentives associated with the process of economic 
development."
(Cigno, 1991: p. 195).
Other writers disagree with Cigno, placing more importance on cultural
forces. A major theme of Ester Boserup1s analysis is the importance of
culture as an influence on development: for example, she wrote "American
influence and presence in the Far East has helped to open office doors to
women and make office employment acceptable to them" (Boserup, 1986: p.
132). Ehrenfels (1956: pp. 197-8) claims that Indian women, especially
upper-class women, have gained some freedoms (such as the ability to move
o u t s i d e  t h e i r  h o m e s )  d u e  t o  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  w e s t e r n  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e  o f
equality between sexes. Heather Joshi (1989: p. 163) claimed that we must
understand both economic forces and prevailing customs/values, to make
sense of the division of labour between husband and wife. And David Levine
(1993: p. 665) claimed that in the USA, "a woman's attitudes are important
predictors of which women work any given year". Other writers deny the
importance of links between attitudes and behaviour:
"A dual-earner marriage does not necessarily result from, nor 
lead to, androgynous attitudes (House, 1986) and, therefore, 
a range of sex-role attitudes are represented among two-earner 
couples. [. . . ] nontraditional sex-role attitudes are not
always reflected in behavior, particularly in the domestic 
sphere (Araji, 1977). The relationship between sex-role 
attitudes and division of household labor and responsibility 
has consistently been shown to be slight, at best"
(Lewis & Cooper, 1988: p. 155).
How is increasing female employment relevant to durable goods ownership? 
Many writers have reported a trend for increasing ownership of time-saving 
durable goods (see the subsection on 'diffusion' in section 2.6); but with 
so many changes (increasing wife's employment, increasing women's wage- 
rates, increased durables ownership, etc), it is difficult to disentangle 
these factors. Some writers deny that there is a simple cause-and-effect 
explanation for these trends: Fine & Leopold suggest that there are
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"interactions" between time spent cooking and women's employment; and also 
interactions between women's employment and ownership of "durables, most 
notably fridges, freezers and microwaves" (Fine & Leopold, 1993: p. 166).
DIFFERENT MOTIVES FOR WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT
It has been argued by many writers that women have different reasons for
taking paid work. Myrdal & Klein (1968), describing Western societies,
wrote of two distinct "streams" of employed women: women in poor
households are forced to take paid work to supplement their husband's
income; whereas other (educated) women seek paid work to give them some
independence from their husband. Many writers echo the ideas of Myrdal &
Klein in observing a marked difference between rich and poor women's
employment, for Britain (Gomulka & Stern, 1990: p. 184), and for India
(Kapadia, 1993: p. 314; Liddle & Joshi, 1986: p. 90; Sengupta, 1974: p.
245) . Many of these writers imply that women are only employed in the
poorest and the richest households - but this pattern may be changing:
referring to Calcutta (India), Standing found
"A 'culture' of women's employment is thus beginning to emerge 
which is no longer confined to a few upper-middle-class women 
and the very poor."
(Standing, 1991: p. 123).
It has been claimed that a woman is more likely to be employed if her 
husband is lower-paid (Nelissen, 1990: p. 49); I now turn to two possible 
(economic) reasons for this: relative poverty, and absolute poverty.
WIFE’S EMPLOYMENT AND RELATIVE POVERTY
One hypothesis on why certain women take paid employment is that employed 
women take paid work in order to bring their household up to a particular 
standard of living - perhaps comparing their own standard of living to that 
of a 'life-cycle reference group1, as suggested by James Duesenberry (see 
Strober, 1977). Hilary Standing (1991: p. 117) wrote "Economic necessity 
is itself partly a subjective category, trading class-specific expectations 
of living standards against wives' socially reproductive work". Research 
in the Netherlands suggests that women's employment was negatively 
correlated with husband's income, up to about 1970; but after 1970, the
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relationship weakened due to the women's movement and efforts to equalise 
opportunities (Nelissen, 1990: p. 49).
If women's wages do bring household incomes up to some sort of 'reference' 
level, we would expect employed-wife households to have about the same 
number of durable goods as non-employed-wife households. Alternatively, 
perhaps women's employment is linked to the level of dissatisfaction with 
the marriage. For either of these reasons, an observed link between 
women's employment and durable goods ownership may be a result of the more 
independent women seeking paid work (such women may be more likely to seek 
their own personal goals, such as ownership of time-saving durables).
ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT
It seems plausible that a husband on a very low income-level is less able
to prevent his wife from taking paid work. In Britain, it is feasible for
households to live (partly or entirely) on state benefits, if the husband
is unemployed (Joshi, 1984: p. 25) or is on a low income; but in India,
state unemployment benefits are virtually non-existent, so an Indian woman
may be forced to seek employment if her husband's income is low (Jain,
1985: p. 248; Khanna & Varghese, 1978, p. 177; Sengupta, 1974: p. 245).
Referring to India, Joan Mencher wrote
"even women who are active in union activities sometimes take 
work that pays below the minimum wage if there is nothing else 
available, especially if they have had to stay at home for a 
few days listening to the cries of hungry children"
(Mencher, 1988: p. 100).
The above discussion suggests some complications in the links between 
durable goods ownership and women's employment: it is difficult to isolate
the effect of women's earnings from other influences on household 
behaviour. A fundamental problem with the economic theories of durables 
ownership discussed in the previous chapter is suggested by Ben Fine (1992: 
p. 186): if employed-wife households are mainly those in which women are
forced to take paid work (due to poverty), then these will be least able 
to afford (time-saving) durables. This is the opposite of most economic 
analysis discussed in this chapter, which predict women's employment will 
be associated with greater durable goods ownership. I provide evidence in 
chapter 9 that to understand the effects of women's employment on durables 
ownership, we should divide employed women into different groups - those
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in poor households (perhaps forced to take paid employment by poverty) , and 
those in rich households (who may prefer to be employed).
A POOR WIFE IN A RICH HOUSEHOLD
The previous few paragraphs considered the possibility that a woman might 
be forced into employment because her household has a low income- But 
there is another type of poverty: a woman might live with a rich husband,
but have little access to household money (Pahl, 1980: p. 316). Smith 
(1997: p. 1164) wrote "wives may feel impelled to obtain paid work because 
they are denied access to husbands' earnings or because of the desire for 
some financial independence". Similarly, a woman may take paid work to 
reduce her feelings of powerlessness (Morris, 1989: p. 462). These issues 
might be explained using bargaining models (see chapter 8), or in terms of 
"Household Allocative Systems' (see chapter 10).
PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND THE POVERTY TRAP
It has been suggested that for Britain at least, part-time employment is 
seen as normal for women with young children: this may help women to
combine employment with domestic tasks such as childcare (Dex, 1984).
Several writers have suggested that there are discontinuities in the 
benefits of employment. Consider, for example, a person who was offered 
employment for one hour per day: by the time transport costs and travel
time are taken into account, the person might be better off unemployed. 
This is known as the "poverty trap', and may well keep women out of 
employment. An extra complication is the possibility that part-time 
employment may be paid at a lower hourly wage-rate than similar full-time 
employment: in the USA, part-time workers may be paid 30% less per hour
than comparable full-time workers (Averett & Hotchkiss, 1997: p. 461).
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THE '"FAMILY WAGE’
In the 'family wage’ ideology, a man is expected to earn enough money to
s u p p o r t  h i m s e l f  a n d  h i s  w i f e  a n d  c h i l d r e n .  T h i s  e m p l o y m e n t  p a t t e r n  a p p e a r s
t o  b e  l i n k e d  t o  a  s e t  o f  a t t i t u d e s :  " t h e  b r e a d w i n n e r  -  v e r s u s  -  h o m e m a k e r
specialization is often justified by beliefs about innate sex differences"
(Iglehart, 1979: p. 9). Nicholas & Oxley (1992: p. 17) trace the birth of
this 'breadwinning husband' ideology back to the mid-nineteenth century,
at least in England. Similarly, describing colonists from Britain who
settled in the USA, Zelizer states
"the 19th-century domestication of housewives placed married 
women outside the productive economy. [ . . . ] Families [in the 
twentieth century] thus constructed distinct forms of monies 
shaped by a powerful domestic culture and by changing social 
relations between husbands and wives"
(Zelizer, 1994: pp. 140-1).
Leonore Davidoff (1976), describing England in the late 18th and 19th
century, claims that housework had a symbolic role: tasks such as cooking,
preparing food, and childcare were seen as essential to maintaining order
and morality in the household. This suggests that there has been a "family
wage1 ideology in Britain since the 19th century; but there are reasons
to think that this ideology has been breaking down in recent decades:
"the conflict model in sociology implies that change comes 
from women organising collectively to overcome male advantage 
[ . . . ] the post-1970 declines in occupational segregation 
(Beller, 1984) have increased the interest of women in 
organized efforts to improve their pay and opportunities for 
promotion"
(England & McCreary, 1987: p. 160).
Chamberlayne (1993: p. 190) claimed that "Until the mid-1970s the family 
wage still formed the centrepiece of union wage bargaining" in Britain, and 
Beechey (1983) claims that many employers and trade union members prefer 
the "family wage’ system to the employment of women. Pahl (1980: p. 333) 
wrote that the idea of a man earning a "family wage1 was enshrined in UK 
legislation during the first half of the twentieth century.
Harriet Bradley (1989: p. 107) claimed that the "family wage' system
"mirrored the family arrangement of pre-industrial families, where ultimate 
control of the household's resources lay with the male head of house". 
Bradley suggests that the prevalence of the "family wage1 is a result of 
social norms inherited from previous generations, in which men controlled 
all household resources. Bradley also implies that industrialisation has 
been beneficial for women, in giving opportunities for a woman to earn
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money in her own right. Veronica Beechey claims that over a long period 
of time, employers have tended to substitute women employees for male 
employees, to reduce labour costs: and the domestic labour patterns
interact with local demand for women workers (Beechey, 1987: p. 45).
Beechey's analysis implies a circular relationship between women's 
employment and consumption: as more women are employed, they spend more
money on labour-saving goods and services, which increases demand for such 
goods, and hence increases the demand for women's employment.
Vickery (1979: p. 167) claims that observed changes in women's paid
employment are constrained by customs. Francis Vella, who studied data 
from Australia, claimed that attitudes to gender roles have a dramatic 
impact on labour force participation (Vella, 1994). British research on 
women's (consideration of) return to paid work after childbearing reveals 
that a man often expresses negative attitudes to his wife's employment - 
because he consider financial support of the family to be a man's role, or 
because he sees his wife's employment as a challenge to his authority 
(Smith, 1997: p. 1163).
The above paragraphs suggest that the 'family wage' ideology is a form of 
oppression of women by men, in which employers and trade unions conspired 
to prevent women's employment - leading to women becoming dependent on 
their husbands. Not all historians take this view, however: Jack Goody
(1983: p. 30, footnote 15) described life in the nineteenth-century village 
of Lark Rise, in which villagers lost their land and men were employed as 
labourers. Goody claims that at the same time, there was a process of 
"embourgeoisement', in which any work outside the home was considered 
"unwomanly" for women in Lark Rise - and "even the vegetable garden and 
allotment were forbidden". Yet, for Goody, this is not oppression of 
women: he argued that the poor reputation of "field women' had "given most
country-women a distaste for 'goin' afield'" (implying that women chose not 
to leave their own home). Further insight into Goody's view is given by 
his observation that "Later on the women even managed to shift the fetching 
of water from the well to their husbands" (Goody, 1983: p. 30, footnote 
15), as if being confined to the house is evidence of women's power. Here, 
Goody' s view of history seems out of step with that of most observers; but 
other writers caution against an over-simplistic analysis in which 
oppressive husbands control powerless wives: referring to 1987 research
in Turkey, Mine Cinar wrote that
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"Among those who never worked, the majority did not work 
before marriage due to lack of father's permission [...]
When they married, they did not look for jobs outside the home 
due to lack of their husband's permission. Most of the women 
were proud of the fact that their husbands would not let them 
work outside the home."
(Mine Cinar, 1994: p. 374; emphasis added).
There is a widespread feeling among sociologists that a feminist revolution
has taken place in Britain. Prue Chamberlayne wrote that in Britain,
"from 1970-89 [. . . ] on the agenda were policies aimed at the
reconstruction of gender roles, male and female, as were 
policies aimed at more public validation of "female' roles".
(Chamberlayne, 1993: p. 192).
The "feminist' agenda was thought by many to be successful in Britain: for
example, Coote & Campbell wrote
"By 1986 we were writing about something that was no longer 
with us in the same form: women's liberation as a self-
contained and singular movement had become part of our recent 
history."
(Coote & Campbell, cited in Chamberlayne, 1993: p. 191).
The changes in British society went beyond women's employment: in her
research in Sunderland (North-East England) in 1985-6, Jane Wheelock found
"traditional gender roles breaking down in North East working-class
families, when men become unemployed, but their wives remain at work"
(Wheelock, 1990: p. 164). other writers, though, are less convinced that
fundamental changes have been taking place in Britain:
"Sceptics argued that women's greater entry into the public 
sphere had simply led to a shift in subjection from private to 
public patriarchy, in the nature of oppression and 
subordination rather than its elimination."
(Chamberlayne, 1993: p. 192).
Morgan & Wilcox (1992: pp. 153-4) claim that there have been two waves of 
feminism in northern Europe: in 1928, women gained the franchise; and a
second wave of feminism swept Western Europe after 1968.
There are some reasons to believe that India lags behind Britain in terms
of attitudes to women's rights. For example, Johanna Lessinger (1989: p.
122) found that women traders in Madras remain dependent on men for buying
supplies, and states that
"in endless ways the structure of patriarchal control and 
privilege remains intact, since women themselves continue to 
observe many of the conventions of male-female separation"
(Lessinger, 1989: p. 122).
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Kuntal Agarwal (1988: p. 189), referring to money-centred decisions in
Indian families, claimed that "Real power is in the hands of husbands
irrespective of wife's income, education, and profession". Hilary Standing
wrote recently about Calcutta:
"In contemporary bourgeois marriage as in customary practice 
and cultural understanding, wives are constructed as economic 
and legal dependents of the husband, particularly through 
systems of law and taxation. Trade unions, predominantly male 
in membership, have also constructed the interests of their 
members within the ideological parameters of men as 
breadwinners."
(Standing, 1991: p. 105).
In the USA literature on earnings, several researchers have claimed that 
husbands earn more if their wives are not employed (Jacobsen & Rayack, 
1996: p. 268). However, recent research suggests that this is a result of 
applying inappropriate regression methods ("ordinary least squares'). 
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) used "instrumental variables' to control for the 
possibility that husbands' and wives' employment is determined 
simultaneously, and concluded that the true causality is the reverse: that
women with rich husbands do less paid work than women with less rich 
husbands. They even suggest that the observed negative correlation between 
husbands and wives earnings is a result of "marital matching", in which 
"men with positive labor-market characteristics pair with women who have 
less attachment to the labor market" (Jacobsen & Rayack, 1996: p. 272).
PRESERVING THE IMAGE OF HUSBAND-AS-PROVIDER
Many sociologists suggest that both men and women attempt to present an
image of their family in which the husband is the main earner, in order to
uphold the husband's social status. Describing Calcutta (Eastern India),
Hilary Standing wrote
"Ideologies of family status have meant that the idea of wives 
and daughters taking up employment and leaving the protection 
of the family home (and the social control of senior 
relatives) has been a rather shameful one, reflecting badly on 
the ability of middle-class men in particular to provide for 
their dependents"
(Standing, 1991: p. 12).
In households where the husband earns slightly below average, one might 
expect the husband to value income earned by his wife, because the
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household's standard of living will be closer to that of neighbouring
households; but several writers have found the opposite:
"Those men who are denied a sense of occupational success are 
less likely to view their wives' market work as a gift. 
Sensitive to their husbands' feelings of failure, some wives 
respond by not resisting their husband's dominance to 
"balance" his low self-esteem."
(Pyke, 1994: p. 89).
Interestingly, Statham & Rhoton (1983: p. 87) studied USA households, and
concluded that a wife's employment status was unrelated to her husband's
attitude to his wife's employment, but that her employment was related to
her assessment of her husband's opinion on women's employment. Statham &
Rhoton suggested that this may indicate women misperceiving their husband's
views (or could indicate that men's attitudes to employment of women in
general is more important than his views of his own wife's employment):
perhaps Statham & Rhoton feel women are oversensitive, and that their
husbands are not really hostile to their wives' employment. Other writers,
though, see less subtlety in men's opinions on this subject:
"some men express negative attitudes towards their partner's 
employment participation. They only tolerate wives'
employment providing standards of housework do not decline."
(Smith, 1997: p. 1163).
Yvonne Smith implies that in many cases, men do not "tolerate" their wife's
employment - implying that some men (at least) have the power to prevent
their wives from taking paid work. Other writers share Smith's view:
"There are examples from many countries, including the now 
developed countries in their earlier stages of growth, in 
which men have refused to allow their women to participate in 
the labour force, preferring that they remain housewives."
(UN, 1986: p. 20).
Several writers report that many wives of unemployed men are themselves not 
employed (Smith, 1997: p. 1165). Researchers have sought economic
explanations for this, such as the unemployment benefit rules (Dex, 
Gustafsson, Smith & Callan, 1995: p. 627), or because husband and wife 
share a similar level of education and face the same local labour market 
(Smith, 1997: p. 1165). But are there non-economic reasons for low
employment levels of wives of unemployed men? Joshi suggests that not
wishing to "usurp the role of the former breadwinner" is one reason put
forward to explain why many British women married to unemployed men do not
take paid work (Joshi, 1984: p. 25); a similar comment is made by Smith 
(1997: p. 1165).
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The empirical evidence on the link between women's employment and marital 
disruption is not entirely clear. In his study of USA data, Greenstein 
(1990: p. 673) found a link between wives' employment and marital
disruption, but claimed that the direction and nature of this link was not 
necessarily consistent with much of the sociological literature. If men 
do prevent their wives from taking employment, then this could be 
interpreted as "strategic' by the bargaining-based models - husbands may 
wish to prevent their wives from obtaining economic independence (see 
section 2.4 above). Alternatively, if men prevent women from taking 
employment, this might be seen as evidence that the society is 
"patriarchal1, i.e. that role theory is the appropriate explanation (see 
section 2.5 above).
The idea that wives are under pressure not to take paid work is widely
discussed by sociologists. An example is Alfreda Iglehart, who described
the position of wives in 1950s USA:
"The wife who wished to work outside the home probably felt 
that she should not do so. Friends, neighbors, and husband, 
as well as prevailing norms, said that she was rejecting her 
wifely duties by even thinking about taking a job."
"During the fifties, wives1 employment was seen as synonymous 
with the disintegration of the home."
(Iglehart, 1979: p. 13; p. 23).
The relationship between attitudes, a woman's employment, and her husband's 
income is complicated. Jane Wilkie studied U.S. survey data, and found
"The lower their income, the more likely men are to disapprove 
of married women earning money. This relationship is in 
contrast to actual experience, wherein, as husbands' income 
decreases, married women's employment increases except at the 
very lowest levels."
(Wilkie, 1993: p. 276).
If some women remain housewives because of pressure from their husbands, 
then it is plausible that more educated women may refuse to accept control 
from their husbands, due to the modernising effect of education on women's 
values (Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 29).
When considering the claim that husbands often prevent their wives from 
taking paid work, we should also consider the possibility that some (or 
all) women prefer not to be employed. Elizabeth Roberts claimed that 
British working-class women are ambivalent to wage-earning work: those
employed were proud of their skill, effort, and contribution to the family
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budget, but they rarely had ambitions to go on earning all their lives -
these women saw giving up employment as a sign of higher social status:
"Because it was generally (and rightly) presumed that a women 
only worked if there was an inadequate family income, many 
skilled men did not like their wives to be seen earning money 
- it reflected badly on their own status as a breadwinner.
There is no evidence that women questioned this point of 
view."
(Roberts, 1984: p. 137; emphasis added).
Referring to rural India, Sharma (1990: p. 594) claimed that households
gain prestige if the wife does not take paid work - if so, presumably woman
and men both gain from this higher prestige. Some writers claim that a
wife's status mainly depends on her husband's job:
"a woman may obtain status not only from her own paid job, but 
also, or even exclusively, from the paid job of her partner, 
whereas a man derives his status predominantly from his own 
paid job."
(Van der lippe & Siegers, 1994: p. 117).
GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS IN ATTITUDES TO WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT
Several writers have commented that there are distinct cultural differences
within India. It appears that women's employment is more accepted in
southern India than in northern India (Khanna & Varghese, 1978: pp. 28-9;
Mathur, 1994: p. 488; Miller, 1981: p. 158). These regional differences
may be important:
"In the North [of India], it is observed that even in the 
lowest strata, men do not allow women to go out for menial 
jobs as they consider it below their dignity. Even if the 
family is impoverished, women usually do not go out of their 
homes to do menial work."
(Khanna & Varghese, 1978: pp. 28-9).
Khanna and Varghese go on to suggest that northern India is richer than the 
rest of India, and hence there may be fewer households in which poverty 
forces women into paid work. The above quote might suggest that northern 
Indian women consider paid work to be beneath them, but this is far from 
accurate: women in northern India have lower status (within the household)
than women in other parts of India (Miller, 1992: p. 175).
In an attempt to distinguish cultural effects from economic forces, Alaka 
Basu studied migrants from different parts of India who had migrated to 
slums in north Delhi. The survey asked who was responsible for deciding
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on household spending on clothes and other non-food items; Basu (1992) 
found that 23% of migrants from Uttar Pradesh (north India) had "near-total 
responsibility", compared with 47% who migrated from Tamil Nadu (south 
India). It seems difficult to explain such differences in purely 
'economic’ terms: culture appears to have a strong influence.
Various reasons have been put forward to explain this north/south divide
in India, including religion (Agarwal, 1997: p. 44). Northern India may
have been affected by the impact of Islam, including "Purdah' , a form of
female seclusion (Basu, 1992: p. 256):
"The term parda regions or parda zone can be used for the 
large parts of the subcontinent that include Northern India 
through Uttar Pradesh, where parda practices are taken to be 
the central elements of social life"
(Markova, 1995: p. 85).
It is not clear that north-south differences in Indian women's freedoms are
due to religion - Hinduism (widespread in southern India) is similar to
Islam in this respect:
"It is sometimes asserted that the low ritual status of women 
in the North is due to six centuries of Muslim rule, but in 
fact classical Hindu literature makes it clear that a woman’s 
husband is her lord and it is her dharma to serve him."
(Maloney, 1974: p. 290).
Other writers claim that India can be divided into zones according to the
language spoken, and that language differences keep cultures within India
distinct from each other. The southern cultural group is often referred
to as 'Dravidian', and the northern culture as 'Brahminical’ (Miller,
1981: p. 159) or 'Aryan' (Dutt & Noble, 1982: p. 1).
"The linguistic regions possess a certain homogeneity of 
culture, traits and kinship organization. The common language 
makes communication easy, sets the limits of marital 
connections and confines kinship mostly within the language 
region."
(Karve, 1965: p. 4).
Another explanation for north-south differences is the rice-growing system 
in southern India which relies heavily on female labour (Lessinger, 1989: 
p. 108), as opposed to wheat-growing in northwest India (Agarwal, 1997: p. 
31).
A different analysis of the north/south differences is in terms of kinship 
systems and land ownership patterns (Hershman, 1981). Plog, Jolly, Bates 
& Acocell (1980: p. 364) define kinship as "how different peoples classify
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their kin and how these classifications relate to social behavior and
social organization". One of the key aspects of kinship is who a person
may marry: in north India, marriages within a village are forbidden, and
m a r r i a g e s  a r e  u s u a l l y  b e t w e e n  s t r a n g e r s ;  w h e r e a s  i n  t h e  s o u t h  o f  I n d i a ,
marriages are usually between people who were geographically close (Dutt
& Noble, 1982: p. 10). Clarence Maloney considers these kinship
differences to be important:
"Because a man and his bride may have known each other as 
children and may indeed have been playmates, a wife in the 
south is less likely to be a docile creature thrust as a 
youngster into an unknown family where she would be expected 
to revere her husband and defer to all in the household."
(Maloney, 1974: p. 325).
If there is a north-south divide in India, it is not clear where to draw 
the line (Dutt & Noble, 1982: pp. 1-5). Mathur (1994: p. 488) found a 
pattern in which female employment is more widespread in southern and 
western India (relative to the rest of India). Other writers divide India 
into more than two regions: Tyler (1973) divides India into four zones;
and Khanna & Varghese (1978: p. 6) divide India into five zones.
While acknowledging regional variations within India, we should not
overemphasise them. Robin Jeffrey (1989: p. 31) comments that women in
Kerala (south-west India) have more autonomy than do women in other parts
of India, but claims there are limits to these advances: "women may do
more things in Kerala than elsewhere in India; but they do not enjoy
equality with men." Similarly, there are similarities in kinship between
north and south India:
"cross-cousin marriage, preferred and we might even say 
prescribed in the South, is forbidden in the North (among 
Hindus) [•**] But this contrast [...] does not take into 
account the numerous and important features common to both 
regions"
(Dumont, 1994: p. 91).
Some aspects of household behaviour apply to India as a whole: "women in
r e l a t i o n  t o  m e n  a r e  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  i n  s o m e  d e g r e e  i n  a l l  p a r t s  o f  I n d i a "
(Agarwal, 1997: p. 30); for example,
"the social construction of appropriate behaviour (the 
emphasis on soft speech, deference to male elders, etc) 
operates in some degree everywhere [in India]"
(Agarwal, 1997: p. 44).
The difference between urban and rural areas within India should be borne 
in mind when interpreting results in this thesis: my Indian samples (1992
76
and 1997) are both entirely urban (see section 6.3). Khanna & Varghese 
(1978: p. 176) claim that female employment is more common in rural India 
than in urban India.
Regarding Britain, I doubt that cultural differences between (for example) 
north and south England are as strong as they are in India, so dividing the 
UK sample into regions might not reveal the effects of culture: but we
should not assume British people are not influenced by culture, simply 
because we cannot easily see such effects within Britain.
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3.3 TIME SPENT ON HOUSEWORK
Several sociologists and economists have used time-use data to examine 
household behaviour. One of these is Jonathan Gershuny, a sociologist, who 
uses an approach developed from neoclassical economics: he emphasises the
use of time, and the production of services within the home using time- 
saving goods. Gershuny claims that in Europe, a long-term trend in
household behaviour can be detected since the mid-nineteenth century, in 
which there is a tendency for more tasks to be carried out within the 
household as domestic equipment becomes more efficient (Gershuny, 1978: p. 
55). Like economists, Gershuny explains household purchasing in terms of 
a '"hierarchy of needs' (Gershuny, 1985: p. 128), which suggests that as a 
household becomes richer, it is likely to obtain goods to make domestic 
tasks easier. But Gershuny is using a sociological explanation of 
household behaviour (Gershuny, 1983: p. 156): he considers that the
household division of labour (between husband and wife) is not compatible 
with economically rational behaviour. Rather, observed hours of work 
should be explained either in terms of the exploitation of wives by
husbands, or in terms of tasks being allocated between husbands and wives
according to traditional patterns (Gershuny, 1983: p. 156; Wheelock, 1990:
p. 101).
The conventional economic view suggests that there are tasks which the 
household wishes to be carried out (such as cleaning and cooking) because 
household members derive utility from the results of such work: a clean
home, or a cooked meal, is desirable. However, Juster & Stafford (1991: 
p. 491) indicate an alternative perspective: that certain tasks, such as
childcare, may be pleasant to carry out. This could have important 
implications for time-saving durables ownership: in principle, a person
might decide not to buy a time-saving good because this would reduce time 
spent on a pleasant activity. I have no evidence on this possibility, but 
I think it unlikely to be an important influence on durables purchases - 
the goods studied in this thesis are mainly intended to reduce time spent 
on tasks such as laundry, which Juster & Stafford (1991: p. 498) describe 
as "drudge' work: "activity which is valued primarily for its output
rather than its inherent satisfaction".
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HOUSEWORK BY HUSBANDS
Many researchers have reported a clear division of household labour between
women and men, in which most domestic work such as washing, cleaning, &
cooking is done by women - in both the UK (James, 1995, pp. 281-2;
Gershuny, 1983: p. 153), and India (Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 41;
Standing, 1991: p. 71). Men do carry out certain types of housework: for
example, men are responsible for household repairs and maintenance, at
least in the case of Britain (James, 1995, pp. 281-2). In the case of
India, men sometimes help with shopping and fetching water (Standing, 19 91:
p. 75). But where both husband and wife are employed,
"In the absence of other determining factors, an equal 
division of home labor should then develop. However, in 
examining the influence of time availability on the division 
of housework, researchers have found substantially less than 
equality in housework in response to equal time invested in 
paid labor."
(Hardesty & Bokemeier, 1989: p. 254).
Evidence that housework is not equally divided even where both husband and 
wife are both employed full-time is provided for Britain by Kiernan (1992: 
p. 101).
There are many factors to consider (such as the hourly wage-rates of each 
spouse) in assessing whether or not households divide domestic tasks 
rationally; the asymmetry may be a result of women having worse bargaining 
positions, due to women's weaker position in the labour market - so, for 
example, education is less useful in the labour market to women than it is 
to men (Hardesty & Bokemeier, 1989: p. 255). Nevertheless, the apparent 
asymmetry between husband and wife does call into question conventional 
economic analysis, which assumes rational responses to economic forces. 
I now turn to some alternative explanations of these asymmetric time-use 
patterns.
Some researchers have reported links between attitudes and housework. 
Referring to a USA survey, Hardesty & Bokemeier (1989: p. 264) reported "we 
find that women's work-role attitudes are significantly and positively 
related to their husband's contribution to housework". For Britain (at 
least), there is evidence that attitudes of both men and women are 
important influences on who does the housework:
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"In situations where domestic division of labour forms a 
strong facet of the female partner's identity, that is, where 
she sees it as integral to being a woman, wife and mother, 
then - on the basis of our evidence - it would seem highly 
likely that traditional forms of the domestic division of 
labour will manifest themselves. In contrast, shared forms of 
the domestic division of labour seem more prevalent within 
households where both partners reject the associations between 
domestic labour and women's work."
(Gregson & Lowe, 1993: p. 498; emphasis in original).
Van der Lippe & Siegers (1994: p. 117) claim that husbands may be
discouraged from doing domestic work if traditional norms are prevalent, 
because of sanctions resulting from the traditional expectations for male 
behaviour. The opposite sanctions could apply, however, if a man does 
little housework in a society with "egalitarian' norms (Van der Lippe & 
Siegers, 1994: p. 118).
Time-use data from various countries was studied by Gershuny et al (cited 
in Juster & Stafford, 1991: table 6, p. 499): they report an increase in
men's time on housework in the UK between the 1960s and the 1980s. This 
increase was not straightforward - the amount of men's housework fell by 
12 minutes between the 1960s and the 1970s, before increasing again by 20 
minutes between the 1970s and 1980s. The reported pattern could, of 
course, be a result of changes in methodology or sampling between surveys, 
rather than a reversal of a trend. Regarding India, Kuntal Agarwal 
reported findings from a 1985 survey in Meerut (Uttar Pradesh); Agarwal 
suggested that housework was traditionally done by women, but that things 
had changed by 1985 - most husbands now help their wives with domestic 
tasks, although men's help is only "occasional' for 55% of husbands, and 
20% of husbands never did domestic work (Agarwal, 1988: p. 180).
The question of who does housework may be related to other household
decisions, such as who controls spending: referring to the USA, it has
been claimed that
"Within this [USA] cultural context, it is not viewed as the 
responsibility of men to engage in housekeeping tasks 
associated with the homemaker role. The division of housework 
is not dependent on resources alone but hinges on the cultural 
norms that stem from the patriarchal control of such 
resources."
(Hardesty & Bokemeier, 1989: p. 256).
Here, we can see parallels with the "resources in a cultural context' 
approach outlined in the previous chapter (section 2.7).
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3.4 EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CLASS ON TIME-USE AND DURABLES OWNERSHIP
Most surveys discussed in this thesis attempt to obtain a sample which 
represents a cross-section of society in a particular geographical area; 
but some writers report differences within a sample. One of the most 
widely-discussed differences is social class: Gershuny et al (cited in
Bowden & Offer, 1994: p. 734) found that in Britain, time on housework by 
working-class women fell from just under 500 minutes per day in 1937, to 
about 45 0 minutes in 1961; but for middle-class women, it rose from about 
250 minutes per day in 1937, to about 450 minutes in 1961. Since then, 
women of both classes spent less time on housework - falling to 350-375 
minutes in 1974/5, but rising again by 1984 (Bowden & Offer, 1994: p. 734).
This thesis assumes that people who do housework (usually women) wish to 
own time-saving goods. I focus on six durable goods: regarding shopping
and food preparation, refrigerators and deep-freezers allow less frequent 
shopping trips, and one meal may be cooked for consumption on several 
occasions. Food-processors speed up the process of chopping food. 
Microwave ovens cook certain types of food more quickly than conventional 
ovens; and dishwashers reduce time on washing up. Regarding laundry, 
washing-machines require less work than hand-washing clothes.
For this thesis, I exclude certain durable goods for which ownership data 
are available in the datasets I study, but which I do not consider to be 
"time-saving"; vacuum-cleaners (which might save time on cleaning, but 
they may simply provide a higher standard of cleanliness); tumble-driers 
(which may save time washing and drying clothes, but could simply be bought 
to avoid having wet clothes around the home for too long); and cookers 
(other than microwave ovens). It is plausible that women might place a 
higher priority (than men do) on such goods; but this thesis is about 
time-saving durables, and theories I test (such as the Becker et al price- 
of-time hypothesis) might not be relevant to durables which raise cleaning 
standards, or reduce the amount of wet clothing around the house.
A complication in deciding which durable goods are "time-saving" is the
possibility that some goods may be bought as status symbols ("conspicuous
consumption'). Referring to India, Hilary Standing wrote
"In the highest income households, the woman's earnings tend 
to be seen as providing what are described as "luxuries' - a 
fridge or television, entertainments, or [..]".
(Standing, 1991: p. 105).
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Bowden & Offer do not think that durable goods such as washing machines are 
bought as status symbols in USA or Britain: "On the whole, household
appliances do not have much value for status display" (Bowden & Offer, 
1994: p. 733).
Research on the USA by Richard Coleman suggests that social class may be
an important influence on durables purchase. Coleman claims that
"The Lower-Middle Class woman is more single-mindedly 
concerned with furnishing her home so that it will be "pretty" 
in a way that suits her and might hopefully win praise from 
her friends and neighbours. [...] she is quite different 
from the Upper-Lower wife who is apt to care more about having 
a full array of expensive, gleaming white appliances in her 
kitchen"
(Coleman, cited in Britt, 1966: p. 260).
The above study of US society implies that social class is (or at least
was) an important influence on consumption. Bhatty suggests that social
class is also important in India:
"Reference has been made in the literature on consumer 
behaviour to the "standard package" of consumer goods and 
services. This standard package is associated with a class or 
group of consumers who have commonalities, not only in the 
level (range) of income, but who are at the same stage in 
their family cycle and have similar occupations"
(Bhatty, 1989: p. 43).
Bhatty's comment suggests that in addition to income and number of children 
(which are usually included in empirical economic work in this field), that 
we should include "occupation" - by which Bhatty appears to mean social 
class.
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3.5 DO 'TIME-SAVING' GOODS REALLY SAVE TIME?
In referring to certain goods as 'time-saving' , I am aware that others may 
disagree. Findings from time-use research in several countries suggests 
that time-saving durables do not greatly reduce the time spent on 
housework:
"The hypothesized negative relationship between the ownership 
of time-saving devices and time spent on housework receives 
confirmation only for activities related to doing the laundry 
(Hefferan 1982; Leibowitz 1975). Others find no overall 
effect (Berk 1985; Robinson 1980), and at least one study 
reports that every additional appliance results in a slight 
increase in time devoted to household tasks"
(Brines, 1993: p. 336; emphasis in original).
A similar comment was made in the USA context by Vanek: greater
availability of washing-machines has led to higher standards of laundry -
but the overall time spent may not be lower (Vanek, 1974: p. 120). This
curious pattern was described by Gershuny (1983: p. 146) as the "domestic
labour paradox": the provision of domestic labour-saving devices such as
washing-machines appears to increase the amount of time spent on domestic
work. Gershuny explains this in terms of productivity: the availability
of domestic machinery makes a person more productive, so it may then be
rational for that person to spend more time on domestic work (Gershuny,
1983: p. 146). For the USA and Britain,
"There is evidence that household appliances had little effect 
on the time spent in housework. In 196 0 American women were 
spending about as much time as they were in the 1920s. [...]
Washing machines did not save time since clothes were washed 
more often. Vacuum cleaners were used to clean the floors 
more frequently.1
(Bowden & Offer, 1994: pp. 733-4).
Bowden & Offer (1994: p. 734) suggest that standards of house care rose 
from the 1920s. Evidence such as that discussed by Bowden & Offer (above) 
does not disprove the claim that durables reduce housework time: we must
distinguish between the long-term effects on women in general (who are 
expected to meet higher standards), and the effect on a particular woman 
(who faces a particular set of social norms at one place and time). If 
washing machines lead to clothes being washed more often, then households 
without washing-machine may feel they also need to increase the amount of 
time spent on washing, to bring their household up to the new standards. 
Hence time spent on washing might increase for both washing-machine owners 
and non-owners; if so, then washing-machines may become even more useful 
over time, as time-saving devices. Agarwal and Anand consider time-saving
83
goods to be helpful to women in developed countries such as the UK
(implying that such durables are not widely available in the Third World):
"In the industrialised world, technologies such as vacuum 
cleaners, dishwashers, washing machines and cooking gadgets 
have helped to reduce household drudgery"
(Agarwal & Anand, 1982: p. 304).
A similar perception on the value of durable goods (in India) is suggested
by Khanna & Varghese (1978: p. 110): "Modern amenities like cooking gas
and electrical domestic gadgets make kitchen work less tedious."
Similarly, Anuradha Bhoite (1988) reported evidence from the 1973 study
"Problems of employed women In rural areas', conducted by Poona University
in Pune (India):
"Modern labour saving devices have revolutionized the kitchen 
in western countries and have proved a real boon to the 
working wives. [...] to the author’s surprise the sample 
unfolded that not a single woman was using all or some or any 
one of the modern labour and energy saving tools of home 
making such as gas ovens, pressure cookers, electric mixer- 
grinder, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, refrigerators etc."
(Bhoite, 1988: p. 235).
To confirm Bhoite's claim that many Indian households lack time-saving 
goods, consider evidence from the 1991 Census of India: only 33% of Indian
households had a water tap within their home (Nanda, 1994: p. 691).
Bowden & Offer claim that time spent on housework in Britain has declined 
since the early 1960s, but this decline occurred a long time after most 
households obtained time-saving durables (Bowden & Offer, 1994: p. 734). 
Here, Bowden & Offer use circumstantial evidence, which seems unconvincing: 
for example, washing-machines improved considerably after their initial 
introduction, so the reduction in time-use might have taken place as a 
result of buying a more recent washing-machine (a household with only a 
primitive washing-machine might find it of little help, but such a 
household would be considered an owner). A reliable assessment might be 
possible if we had detailed time-use data for a sample of households, 
together with data on durables ownership and information such as number of 
children, but such research is beyond the scope of this thesis.
While admitting that there seems little hard evidence, I feel justified in 
suggesting that the time-saving durables studied in this thesis are likely 
to save time - or at least are thought to do so, by purchasers. If not, 
there seems little reason for such items to be purchased.
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RAISING HOUSEWORK STANDARDS
The previous few paragraphs suggest that so-called "time-saving" goods may 
not save much time on housework. Related to this view is the idea that 
standards of cleanliness have risen over recent decades , and this might 
suggest a different reason to buy durables such as washing-machines: to
raise housework standards (Gershuny & Robinson, 1988: p. 538). For
example, a dishwasher might be purchased because it is thought to be more 
effective than cleaning crockery and utensils by hand; and a washing- 
machine might be thought more effective than hand-washing. I do not know 
of any data to test such a view; I can only suggest that this possibility 
be considered, when assessing empirical results reported in this thesis.
The above claim (by Vanek et al) that rising standards have increased 
women's housework time, also implies a possible way out for women: by
lowering standards, a woman may be able to reduce the time she spends on 
housework. Bowden & Offer (1994: p. 739) suggest another approach: women
could reduce time on housework by working more intensively. These factors 
may have implications for durable goods consumption, in that they offer 
alternative ways for women to ease their time pressures. These 
alternatives are both beyond the scope of this thesis, but they may not 
offer as much hope as they appear: social norms, and husbands'
disapproval, may prevent women from lowering their standards too far. And 
regarding intensity of effort, the hard work entailed by tasks such as 
hand-washing clothes are likely to prevent people from completing such 
tasks quickly.
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3.6 ARE TIME-SAVING GOODS A HIGH PRIORITY FOR WOMEN?
If there is a division of labour between men and women, then men and women 
might be expected to disagree about the priorities for household spending. 
If each household member places a higher utility on his/her own time than 
on that of another member, then the observed pattern of time use suggests 
that women would prefer to buy goods which save time on housework (such as 
microwave ovens, deep-freezers, and washing-machines), whereas men would 
be expected to prefer leisure goods (such as video-cassette recorders), and 
goods which save time on tasks usually carried out by men (such as power 
tools). However, there are problems in classifying goods as "male1 or 
"female1, due to the complex nature of human behaviour. For example, we 
might expect that a deep-freezer is a "female* good, because it saves time 
in preparing food and permitting less frequent shopping. This view is 
supported by Strober & Weinberg's (1980: p. 346) finding that employed-wife 
households use frozen TV dinners more often, in the case of the lowest 
income group studied. But Strober & Weinberg found employed-wife 
households no different to non-employed wives, in the other income groups 
they studied. This may be because employed women "may be particularly 
interested in assuring that employment does not interfere with family well­
being" (Strober & Weinberg, 1980: p. 346).
Support for the view that some durable goods are preferred by men and
others by women, in the case of the UK, is provided by Gallup's 1993
surveys "Women's attitudes to their lives' and "Men's attitudes towards
women' (Gallup, 1994: p. 34; p. 46). These findings (reported in table
3<4> below) suggest that women place a higher priority on washing-machines,
whereas men prefer television sets. According to Martin Zober,
"Wives generally place less value on having a new car than do 
their husbands. Furnishing the home, saving money,
providing for the children are objectives in the hierarchy of 
values usually regarded more highly by the wife than the 
husband."
(Zober, reproduced in Britt, 1966: p. 225).
A similar view is expressed by Pyatt (1964), who divides durable goods into 
two groups, I and II. Pyatt's group I contains labour-saving items: 
cooker, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, and refrigerator; Pyatt claims 
these are "used predominantly by the housewife". Pyatt's group II includes 
radios, record players, and televisions: these goods "are associated with
entertainment and are used by all (non-inf ant) members of the household" 
(Pyatt, 1964: p. 30). Gershuny & Miles (1985: pp. 39-40) report evidence
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from a study in Brighton (UK), which found time-saving goods such as
washing-machines and food-mixers are used far more by women than by men;
this was not true of leisure goods such as television and audio systems, 
which were used about equally by men and women.
The above discussion suggests that a woman would prefer her household to
own durable goods which she would (like to) use, whereas a man would 
prefer goods used by men - primarily leisure or status goods. This view 
is supported by the evidence shown in table 3<4> below:
__________ TABLE 3<4>: Priorities of men and women - UK, 1993 _______
Responses to the question "If you could only have one of 
these appliances, which one would it be?"
(source: Gallup, 1994: p. 34, 46).
WOMEN MEN
TELEVISION SET 1 8  % 3 6  %
RADIO 10 % 1 7  %
MICROWAVE OVEN 1 % 2 %
WASHING MACHINE 4 3  % 1 4  %
TELEPHONE 23 % 1 8  %
DISHWASHER 3 % 4 %
SOMETHING ELSE 
/NONE OF THESE
3 % 9 %
Other evidence to support the view of different priorities of men and women 
is provided by a 1965 study of middle-class USA households for Life 
magazine, which included a question on whether the "initiator" of a 
decision to buy a durable good was husband, or wife, or both. It was found 
that the initiator was wife or husband-and-wife jointly in 89% of cases for 
refrigerators, compared with 83% for vacuum cleaners and 93.5% for rugs and 
carpets. The equivalent figure for automobiles, by contrast, was only 39% 
(Blackwell, Engel & Kollat, 1969: pp. 158-9).
Most of this thesis will focus on the dynamics of decision-making between 
a man and a woman; but dramatrix 8<9> (chapter 8) also considers single­
adult households, and it supports the claim that single men and women have 
different priorities, at least in the UK.
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RELATIVE PRICES OF SERVANTS AND TIME-SAVING DURABLES
One alternative to buying time-saving goods is to hire servants - such as 
cooks, cleaners, and childminders. This approach was used in Britain among 
richer households, but Gershuny & Miles (1985: p. 37) claim that the amount 
of time spent on domestic work by middle-class women increased between the 
1930s and 1960s, because of the "virtual disappearance" of domestic 
servants; servants were largely replaced by domestic machines, as the 
price of servants increased (Gershuny, 1978: p. 78). It has been claimed 
that for the UK in the post-war period, time-saving durables became cheaper 
in real terms (Joshi, 1985: p. S149), and domestic technology for cooking 
food and washing clothes improved, leading to an increase in consumption 
of durable goods (Gershuny, 1978: p. 81). Because of these relative price 
changes, hiring servants is no longer a cheap way of reducing housework for 
British households.
For India, relative prices are very different to Britain: it is relatively
cheap to hire servants in India. Kalpana Bardhan claimed that
"At the present stage of economic growth in most South and 
Southeast Asian cases, the release of middle-class women from 
menial chores is achieved through servants rather than through 
gadgets".
(Bardhan, 1989-90, p. 104).
For India specifically, Khanna & Varghese (1978: p. 110) state that "with 
improved social status, women get the help of servants who decrease the 
domestic work load"; and Bhoite (1988: p. 235) wrote "One of the solutions 
for lessening the burden of work in the house of the employed woman is to 
employ servants". The key difference between India and Britain may be the 
cost of hiring servants, which is lower in India: "in India we can hire
help at a reasonable rate" (Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 41; emphasis 
added), whereas time-saving electric appliances are expensive in India 
(Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 110).
INFERIOR GOODS
It is possible that some of the durable goods studied in this thesis are 
'inferior goods': if they could afford it, households might prefer to hire
servants, or purchase services, rather than own time-saving goods. Hebden 
& Pickering, describing their research on British data, wrote
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"In other parts of our research we found that some households 
were increasingly using launderettes in preference to washing 
machines".
(Hebden & Pickering, 1974: p. 81; emphasis added).
It is difficult to be certain if any of the goods studied in this thesis 
are 'inferior goods1 , in the UK or in (urban) India: there are many
complications, such as the possibility that some households may rent 
accommodation which includes goods such as washing-machines. One way to 
assess this question is to look at tables 9<4> to 9<12a> (chapter 9); 
those tables suggest that none of the time-saving durables studied here is 
an 'inferior good’.
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3.7 OTHER FACTORS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT DURABLES OWNERSHIP
There are many factors which may be relevant to durables ownership. I do 
not claim to be able to discuss them all, but this partial list may help 
researchers who wish to take this research further. Even for this limited 
list, I can do no more than sketch some of the more widely-discussed 
claims, due to limitations on the length of this thesis.
EDUCATION
Some writers perceive links between education level and housework: more
educated women spend more time on housework than do less-educated women.
The opposite applies to men: more educated men do more housework than
less-educated men (Brines, 1993: p. 312). If housework is linked to
education, it may by egalitarian values which education is thought to give
(Hersch & Stratton, 1994: p. 123). But education may have various effects:
"The more educated a woman is, specially after a certain level 
of education, the more complicated her married life becomes.
She becomes less compromising, more independent in her views, 
and more preoccupied with intellectual pursuits. This causes 
frustration in her married life."
(Khanna & Varghese, 1978: p. 31).
ETHNIC DIFFERENCES WITHIN A COUNTRY
The idea that a nation is made up of different "ethnic1 groups, and that
there are ethnic differences between different countries, is suggested by
many sociologists. One definition of ethnicity is
"the divisions of society into segmented communal groups, the 
members of which have common descent belief, a sense of 
distinct identity from the rest of society and 
institutionalized boundary marking mechanisms that maintain 
and emphasise their social separation"
(Kurien, 1994: p. 762).
In addition to differences between Britain and India, we should bear in 
mind that there are differences within any one country. In India, spending 
in restaurants and on convenience foods was studied by Taplin & Simister 
(1995: pp. 266-7), who examined four ethnic groups in Bombay and Madras; 
they concluded that the English and Portuguese ethnic groups spend 
significantly more on these items than did the Muslim or Hindu groups.
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THE EFFECTS OF RELIGION
A number of writers have commented that religious beliefs appear to be
correlated with certain aspects of household decision-making. For example,
"research suggests that in both Catholic and proreligious 
families, husbands have the major influence on specific 
purchase decisions. In contrast, in both Jewish and 
nonreligious families, husbands and wives share equally in 
most decision making."
(Schiffman & Kanuk, 1994: p. 358).
Other writers have commented on the negative impact of certain religions
on women's autonomy: for example, Morgan & Wilcox (1992: p. 159) wrote
"The connection between Catholicism and anti-feminism is well documented".
The impact of Islam has also been much discussed: Muslim women seem to be
less able to take paid work outside the home, due to the "honour and shame’
code of conduct in Islam (Standing, 1991: p. 117). Other writers, however,
take a more complex view regarding the effects of religion on behaviour:
"There is a widespread belief that the ideology of Islam is 
hostile to the labour force [ . . . ] although it is obvious 
that there are some factors in the Muslim Middle East which 
are resulting in low recorded levels of female labour force 
participation, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of 
Islam from other cultural influences [...] the evidence for 
a direct impact of Islamic attitudes on female labour supply 
decisions does not appear to be strong."
(Papps, 1992: pp. 606-7).
If religion is an important influence on behaviour, then this suggests that 
households in India will behave differently to this in the UK: in 1981,
it was estimated that about 83% of the Indian population was Hindu, and 
about 11% Muslim (Gupta, 1992: p. 42), whereas most of the UK population 
is nominally Christian.
THE CASTE SYSTEM
In the Hindu religion, a person's caste is determined by birth (Chen, 1995: 
p. 45), and caste has been claimed to be an important influence on 
behaviour:
"Three things are absolutely necessary for the understanding 
of any cultural phenomenon in India. These are: the
configuration of the linguistic regions, the institution of 
caste and the family organization. Each of these three 
factors is intimately bound up with the other two."
(Karve, 1965: p. 1).
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Karve suggests that a caste group can be seen as a form of extended family:
"Endogamy and distribution over a definite area make caste 
members related to one another either by ties of blood or by 
ties of marriage. Therefore caste can be defined as an 
extended kin group."
(Karve, 1965: p. 5).
Several writers on India claim that women in higher castes face more 
restrictions on their behaviour than do lower-caste women, and that this 
restriction is important for the family's status: "the more secluded the
woman the higher her household's status or prestige" (Chen, 1995: p. 46). 
Liddle & Joshi (1986: pp. 90-1) suggest that women in the lowest castes are 
forced to take paid work (when jobs are available) ; those in middle-level 
castes do no paid work, but do unpaid work in the family-owned fields; and 
high-caste women are entirely economically dependent on men.
EFFECTS OF CHILDREN ON DURABLES OWNERSHIP
Robert Wilkes found a general pattern in consumer spending, linked to the
presence of children in the household:
"expenditures rise with household establishment, then decline 
with the presence of children in the household, then rebound - 
generally to a level higher than before the arrival of 
children - as families grow and mature, and, finally, taper 
off - sometimes sharply - during the last one or two stages of 
the life cycle"
(Wilkes, 1995: p. 39).
Wilkes suggests that children increase the workload for parents; but older 
children may carry out some housework (Hardesty & Bokemeier, 1989: p. 257).
THE EXTENDED FAMILY
Some writers (cited in Warner, Lee & Lee, 1986: pp. 122-3) claim that women
in nuclear families may have more power than do women in extended families.
This presents a complication in studying Indian households, due to the
prevalence of the extended family (Greenfield, 1981: p. 42; Pescatello,
1976: p. 72; Standing, 1992: p. 71). However, in India, there are
"changes in family composition as a consequence of 
urbanization [...] "Complex' forms are fragmenting into 
nuclear families under the impact of modernization"
(Standing, 1991: p. 9).
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For this thesis, I refer briefly to results for single-adult households 
(see dramatrix 8<9> in chapter 8 below), but the rest of my research is 
limited to nuclear families, i.e. households containing two adults with or 
without children: this greatly simplifies the analysis, and makes it
possible to create mathematical models such as the one I develop in chapter 
5. But the reader should be aware that extended families are more common 
in India than in Britain, and that my findings do not necessarily apply to 
extended families. Members of the extended family may influence nuclear 
families: Khanna & Varghese (1978: pp. 55-6) found that only a third of
their sample lived in extended families, but in most Indian homes "there 
is frequent interaction with relatives outside the nuclear unit". The 
situation of a household at the time of a survey interview may not be an 
accurate guide to how widespread extended families are (Ram & Wong, 1994: 
p. 863).
EFFECTS OF TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION
There are several reasons why the family home may influence the purchase 
of durable goods. One such reason is that a home may be rented as 
furnished accommodation: if so, items such as washing-machines may be
rented with the accommodation. Such households would be treated as if they 
own the durable (such as a washing-machine) in FES surveys (for the UK): 
FES codebooks refer to ''number of washing machines in household' (see 
Department of Employment, undated). However, information on housing tenure 
(owned versus renting) ijs available in FES surveys, so it is possible to 
investigate this issue. The BHPS survey (also for the UK) includes a 
question on whether or not durables such as washing-machines are owned by 
a household member (question H24b: see Taylor et al, 1996). The WAS
surveys, used in India, refer to 'owning' items such as a washing-machine; 
but in practice, this might be interpreted by some respondents to include 
the use of durable goods which are rented with their home. The WAS 
questionnaires are reproduced at the end of the appendix to this thesis; 
note that interviewers usually translated the questionnaire into a local 
language, for the sake of the respondent.
Treating those who rent a durable good (with their accommodation) in the 
same way as those who own such durables, may be appropriate if the family 
pays rent which includes use of durable goods. However, such rental
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arrangements reduce freedom of choice for families: they may find it more
difficult to find accommodation to rent if they do not want a washing- 
machine, for example (presumably access to such durable goods would tend 
to raise the rent on accommodation). My own analysis of FES data (not 
reported in this thesis due to lack of space) suggests that controlling for 
'rented' versus 'owner-occupied' accommodation has little effect on my 
conclusions. The BHPS dataset offers the opportunity to carry out further 
analysis on this, but I would not expect it to affect my results 
significantly - and, of course, excluding non-owners from the sample would 
tend to reduce the effective sample-size in a dataset.
Another complication is the size of the home (and especially the kitchen): 
is the kitchen large enough to contain all durables which are wanted? 
Appliances such as washing-machines, refrigerators, deep-freezers and 
dishwashers are physically large objects, and some households may be unable 
to buy all of these because they do not have enough space. It could be 
argued that a family which can only afford a small home will also be unable 
to afford time-saving durables, but this argument is not entirely 
convincing. Some data on the type of home each family lives in is 
available in FES surveys (see section 6.2), such as information on the 
number of rooms available to the family; but such information does not 
seem sufficiently detailed to assess whether or not a home is large enough 
for all appliances the family would like to acquire. This problem should 
be borne in mind when assessing the findings of this thesis, but I see no 
reason to suppose that it affects my conclusions significantly.
There is another reason to consider the size of the family home. Studying 
United States time-use data, Hersch (1991: p. 159) suggests that the number 
of rooms in a family home affects the amount of time spent on housework by 
the couple. I presume that having large-sized rooms would have a similar 
effect. This might suggest that richer families, who can afford larger 
houses, may have more housework to do, and hence more reason to purchase 
time-saving goods. I do not attempt to assess that possibility in this 
thesis.
A further problem is access to electricity. All of the durable goods 
studied in this thesis normally operate on mains electricity (although some 
can use alternative energy sources, such as gas-powered refrigerators). 
A household may be prevented from buying such goods because they have no
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connection to mains electricity - this could happen in rural areas of the 
UK, but it seems more likely to occur in India. However, I do not feel too 
concerned about this problem. I was informed by the Indian Market Research 
Bureau {see section 6.3) that many urban Indian households have television 
sets, and hence (I presume) access to electricity; I do not generalise my 
urban India findings to rural India. As to the UK, the vast majority of 
the population live in urban areas; it is possible to isolate which 
households in FES surveys (see section 6.2) do not have access to 
electricity, but I did not do so (this might be a desirable step for future 
research, but I doubt it would significantly alter the conclusions).
EFFECTS OF THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY
Household consumption may be influenced by the state of the national 
economy. In general, spending on consumption (especially on consumer 
durables) is likely to increase during a time of economic growth (Besley 
& Levenson, 1996: p. 39). India has had fairly rapid economic growth in 
recent years (Hunter, 1997: p. 648), so my 1992 and 1997 WAS* surveys may 
give a misleading impression; the FES data I use for the UK should be more 
representative, being based on a longer time-period (from 1969 to 1996).
Alessie, Devereux & Weber (1997: p. 55) suggested that access to loans may 
be an important influence on durable goods purchase, and that easing of 
British laws requiring purchasers to make a cash deposit may explain the 
surge in durables purchases in 1983. A different perspective on Britain's 
recent economic history is that of Attanasio & Weber (1994: p. 1301) who 
detect rapid growth in consumer spending during the 1980s, and consider the 
possibilities of this being an effect of easier access to loans, or rising 
house prices, but they conclude that neither explanation can account for 
the fall in the UK savings rate between 1986 and 1988.
DIVISION OF DECISION-MAKING AREAS
A further complication in studying household consumption is that some 
decisions may be made by one person, but other decisions made by his/her 
spouse:
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"Studies that have examined both the extent and the nature of 
husband/wife influence in family decisions have found that 
such influence is fluid and likely to shift, depending on the 
specific product or service, the family role structure 
orientation, and the specific stage in the decision-making 
process."
(Schiffman & Kanuk, 1994: p. 356).
An example of a division of decision-making is a US study reported by 
Blackwell, Engel & Kollat (1969: p. 158), who examined which partner
initiated a decision to buy certain types of good - they found that 93% of 
husbands had suggested buying a car, compared with only 39% of wives; 
whereas for vacuum cleaners, only 36% of husbands had suggested buying, 
compared with 83% of wives. But Blackwell, Engel & Kollat are referring 
to an "initiator": we cannot assume that this person decides whether or
not to buy the good - indeed, the fact that these researchers discuss 
concepts such as "initiator" implies that the purchase decision is joint 
between husband and wife.
An example of a division of responsibilities between husband and wife is 
from Greek households in 1964: decisions relating to choice of friends and
leisure were found to be 'masculine1, whereas decisions related to child- 
rearing, and purchase of clothes, furniture, household equipment and 
budgeting were 'feminine' (Safilios-Rothschild, 1967: p. 345). Woolley & 
Marshall (1994: p. 426) studied 1988 survey data from the Winnipeg area of 
Canada, and found that food, household supplies, gifts and clothing are 
female decisions, but insurance is a male decision. Hilary Standing (1991: 
p. 98) claims that in Calcutta (India), husbands are often responsible for 
housing costs, whereas women often deal with food, clothing, and daily 
household expenditure.
There is other empirical evidence that there is a division of decision­
making between partners: Engel, Blackwell & Miniard (1993: p. 174) present
evidence on the relative influence of husbands and wives, in the form of 
a triangular diagram - the three vertices being 'wife dominant1, 'joint', 
and 'husband dominant’ (this diagram being based on earlier work by Davie 
and Rigaux: see Engel, Blackwell & Miniard, 1993: p. 176). The diagram
indicates that lawn-mowers are generally "husband dominant" decisions, 
whereas refrigerators, television sets, stereo audio equipment and cars are 
more "joint" decisions. Schiffman & Kanuk (1994: p. 357) reports that the 
choice of purchase of a car has remained a predominantly husband-dominated 
decision since the 1950s (at least).
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The question of division of decision-making complicates this thesis: 
rather than just seeking to know how "powerful1 a wife is, we need to know 
to which dimensions her power extends. In order to keep this thesis within 
manageable limits, I will focus on the dimension of time-saving durable 
goods purchase, and ignore other dimensions of wives' power.
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3.8 SUMMARY
I now wish to highlight some key elements of this chapter. I have reported 
evidence that most domestic work is done by women rather than men (in both 
India and the UK) ; women have made progress in persuading their husbands 
to take on a share of domestic work, but the burden still falls mainly on 
the wife, even when she and her husband are both employed full-time. This 
may be a result of cultural forces and social norms (which change slowly); 
but households do not appear to behave according to conventional economic 
analysis (Hardesty & Bokemeier, 1989: p. 254). Attitudes to roles of men 
and women may be "mediating factors between resources and the division of 
household labor", where 'resources' refers to attributes each spouse brings 
to the marriage, such as education and earnings (Hardesty & Bokemeier, 
1989: p. 257).
Domestic work is thought by social scientists to be hard work, and 
unpleasant to carry out; and most (but not all) writers suggest that 
ownership of time-saving durables can considerably improve the lives of 
women. It appears from section 3.6 that women do wish to own time-saving 
durable goods. Indeed, Oakley (1982; p. 171) wrote "it is the washing 
machine, not the vote, which is the true liberator of women". Yet, several 
commentators have expressed surprise that many women have few (or no) 
devices to ease the domestic workload. Why is it that some households own 
time-saving goods, whereas other households are not? This is the subject 
of the remainder of this thesis.
The above discussion outlines some of the influences on women's employment.
it may be helpful to examine the causes of women's employment, if we wish
to understand the effects of their employment. It is not always easy to
distinguish cause from effect:
"an increase in the value of a mother's time may induce her to 
enter the labour force and spend less time cooking by using 
pre-cooked foods and less time on child-care by using 
nurseries, camps or baby-sitters."
(Becker, 1965: p. 514).
Becker implies that women's employment depends on the price of her time: 
this complicates the cause and effect model in Becker's work, in which a 
wife's price-of-time depends on her wage-rate. Most studies discussed in 
this thesis treat women's employment as 'cause', and spending on time- 
saving goods as 'effect'; but I hope to show in chapter 9 that this 
separation into cause and effect oversimplifies the way households behave.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines one of the two methodologies used in this thesis: 
'dramatrix' tables. I do not discuss the other methodology (logit 
regression) in this chapter, as it is standard in econometrics: the reader
is referred to Greene (1990) for details. Both techniques have advantages 
and disadvantages, which I discuss in this chapter.
Sections 4.2 to 4.5 introduce various alternative methods of studying the 
ownership levels of several durable goods at once. In section 4.3, I 
outline the "ordering’ technique associated with Ben Fine, which is based 
on production of dramatrices: this methodology is not widely-used in
economics, so I explain in some detail the rationale behind the dramatrix 
approach. Section 4.4 discusses how to interpret a dramatrix. In section 
4.5, I report my own attempts to develop confidence intervals for the 
"ordering' methodology.
In section 4.6, I suggest that the two methodologies used in this thesis 
(logit regression, and the "ordering1 technique) can be used together, and 
that these methods complement each other.
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4.2 ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL DURABLES AS A GROUP
In. principle, regression techniques could be used to consider demand for 
several durable goods at once. For example, the '’Almost Ideal Demand 
System’ (A.I.D.S.) system considers spending on a number of items, and the 
regression coefficients for all spending items are estimated 
simultaneously. However, there is a serious problem: the A.I.D.S.
methodology assumes that price data are available for the spending 
categories being studied, but price data are not generally available for 
individual durable goods. Researchers studying broad classes of spending 
can often use price indices produced by governments, and an index on 
"durable household goods’ prices is available (CSO, 1994: table 18.7).
However, it is more difficult to obtain prices for individual durable 
goods, and the price of a microwave oven (for example) may fall as a mass 
market develops. Prices of durable goods often vary widely, due to quality 
differences, etc: Cramer (cited in Pyatt, 1964: p. 122) reported that
prices paid for durable goods are an increasing function of wealth, which 
is consistent with the idea that richer households buy better quality 
goods. In addition, durable goods often improve over time due to 
technological advances, and this is likely to be reflected in prices. 
Hence, the A.I.D.S. system cannot be applied in this field; '‘mainstream’ 
economists limit their analysis to the study of one durable at a time. The 
use of a "social choice’ framework is a method of studying ownership of the 
ownership of a durable good relative to other durable goods. Some "social 
choice’ approaches are examined in the remainder of this chapter.
THE POINT CORRELATION MATRIX APPROACH
This subsection assesses one methodology which can be used to estimate the 
"order of acquisition’ of a group of durable goods, based on correlation 
coefficients. The method is to define a variable for durable good i which 
has a value of one for each household owning good i, or zero for non­
owning household. This is repeated for another good j. The value of the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between good i and good j (r-jj) is 
calculated for each pair of durables - this is known as the "point 
correlation matrix1. The point correlation coefficient approach can be 
used to assess whether or not an "order of acquisition’ is common to most 
or all members of a population. If the point correlation matrix is a 
"simplex’ matrix, then the population is said to have a general order of
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acquisition. A matrix is classified as a "simplex' matrix if it is 
possible to find a set of numbers d1, d2, ... dk such that r- = d^/dj 
for each 1 and j (see Paroush, 1965: p. 229).
"PRIORITY PATTERNS' APPROACH
The next methodology studied here was pioneered by Pyatt (1964), and 
developed by Hebden and Pickering (1974). Pyatt develops a framework to 
assess the priority patterns of ownership of a set of durable goods. 
Pyatt's approach is to assess the probability that a household which owns 
a certain combination of durables will purchase a particular durable (not 
already owned) from the set. If there are k durable goods under 
consideration, then Pyatt's approach is to estimate a k by k matrix of 
probabilities, referred to as P* which can be estimated empirically. An
if
element of matrix P is defined by Pyatt as the probability that
durable i is the jth durable to be acquired by the household. Note, 
however, that Hebden and Pickering (who use Pyatt's methodology) disagree 
about this interpretation of on the grounds that in empirical work,
it is possible for p^ to be negative (which is impossible for a 
probability). Hebden and Pickering (1974, p. 76; 86) suggest that a
negative "probability1 might be observed because some households discard 
(or fail to replace) a durable which is thought inferior to an alternative 
good - for example, a black-and-white television might be thought inferior 
to a colour television; or a negative "probability' estimate might be due 
to errors in estimating a coefficient (perhaps due to a small sample).
"thPyatt defines the index E([i]) (where [i] indicates the i member of the 
set of durables under consideration). Pyatt's claim is that small values 
of E([i]) indicates that good [i3 has a high priority in the population. 
In general, E(i) < E(j) implies that good i is given a higher priority 
than j (Pyatt, 1964: p. 25). Assuming there are k durables under
consideration, the definition of E([i]) is
k
E{ [i] ) =52 (j p dj) [4A]
J= 1
This approach is used empirically both by Pyatt (1964) and by Hebden &
Pickering (1974).¥
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A criticism of the above approach developed by Fine (1983: pp. 247-8) is 
based on the mathematical model underlying the approach. Here, I use P-jjj 
to indicate the probability that a household which owns j goods will buy 
good 1 next (confusingly, Fine uses p- which is different to that used 
by Pyatt, and Hebden & Pickering). Fine starts with equation [4A] above, 
to find E(i) in terms of to obtain:
Jc-1
E(i) = ~52 <Pi|j) + k  [4B]
j=l
Expanding the summation, we obtain:
E(i) = - pi|1 - pi{2 ... - pMk_x + k C4C]
In the above equation, pn-,j is interpreted as the number of households 
which own j goods including good i, expressed as a proportion of all 
households owning j durables. Fine denotes the number of households which 
own j goods including good i by P^ j and the number of households which 
own j durables by nj so that p^ jj = (P^/nj). Focusing on the first two 
terms in equation [4C] gives:
#(i) = - Ell - Ell - ... [4D]
Imagine that one household in group n2 (which does not own good i) now 
purchases good i, without any other changes taking place in the 
population. Hence, this household changes from group n2 to group n,| 
so that the size of the first group falls to (n2-l), whilst the second 
group increases to (n^+1). In addition, P^ increases by one, whereas P^ 2 
remains the same (because previously, the changing household did not own 
good i). The value of Pyatt's index becomes
, .. P.-.+l P- o
E{l) = ~ ~ ~ ... [4E]%+! n2-l
(where all terms other than the first two are unchanged) . Note that there 
is a mistake in Fine (1983: p. 248), in that the second term is given as 
(Pi2-1)/(n2-1) rather than (Pi2)/(n2~l) - but this does not alter the
force of Fine's argument. Fine (1983) then asks us to consider whether the 
value of index E(i) increases or decreases, as a result of one household 
having bought good i. If n2 is large and nn small, then E(i) might 
decrease: this would mean that good i could fall in the "order of
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acquisition' , despite the fact that the ownership of good i has increased. 
This is an undesirable property of the approach pioneered by Pyatt, which 
Pine refers to as a breach of the "monotonicity' assumption. Note,
however, that Fine offers no evidence that this characteristic is likely 
to be important in empirical work.
The above discussion suggests that Pyatt's approach is not ideal. Another 
criticism of Pyatt' s approach is that it does not provide a rigorous 
measure of when an observed behaviour pattern is, or is not, an "order of 
acquisition1 which is common in a society (except in the extreme case where 
all households display the same order, which I have not observed in either 
UK or urban India survey data). It is possible to use the Guttman
coefficient of reproducibility in conjunction with Pyatt's approach, but 
neither Pyatt (1964) nor Hebden and Pickering (1974) do so.
A third area of criticism of the Pyatt approach is that discussed in Hebden 
& Pickering (1974): the practical problems of estimating the coefficients.
Hebden & Pickering point out that in empirical work (especially in small 
samples), it may be impossible to estimate some coefficients - if, for 
example, no household owns more than (k-2) of the k durables. Hebden & 
Pickering suggest two alternative methods of giving values to the undefined 
coefficients (called "extrapolation' and "scaling up'), but report that 
"Neither method is entirely satisfactory in all situations" (Hebden &
Pickering, 1974: p. 93).
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4.3 THE "ORDERING' METHODOLOGY: THE DRAMATRIX
I now turn to the second approach used in this thesis (the first being 
logit regression). This second methodology is associated with the work of 
Ben Fine, and I refer to it here as the "ordering' method. It is based on 
the "Borda rule', which is explained below.
THE BORDA RULE APPROACH
Empirical work by Fine et al (1992a to 1992e) is based on the mathematical 
model developed by Borda, and is described in Fine (1983). The Fine et al 
approach is in turn based on the "Borda rule', which Fine (1983) claims has 
a number of "intuitively appealing" properties.
The Borda method is to examine the proportion of a population which owns 
good i. The most widely-owned durable is given the Borda score of (k-1), 
where k is the number of durables in the list; the second most widely- 
owned good in the list is given the Borda score (k-2); and so on. Hence, 
the least widely-owned good is given a Borda score of zero. When a number 
of durables are equally widely-owned, the Borda scores are equal: "the
points are shared" (Fine, 1983: p. 242). This suggests that if two goods 
share ith place from a list of k goods, then each good will be given a 
Borda score of ((k-i) + (k-i-1))/2 = (k-i-H) . On the other hand, Fine
et al (1992a to 1992e) used a slightly different approach: when two (or
more) goods are equally widely owned, both goods are given the Borda score 
(k-1). It is not clear if this difference is important empirically.
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4.4 INTERPRETING A DRAMATRIX
In order to help the reader to make sense of the dramatrix evidence I 
report in this thesis, I include dramatrix 4<1> below, which is a copy of 
dramatrix 8<9> (from chapter 8). For more details of the data used to 
create this dramatrix, see chapter 6.
DRAMATRIX 4<1> (copy of dramatrix 8<9>, 
to explain the dramatrix methodology)
% ownership
GPl
54.6
GP2
74.0
GP3
59.4
REFRIGERATOR 0 0 0
WASHING-MACHINE -2 0 0
TELEPHONE 0 0 -1
DEEP-FREEZER -1 0 1
CENTRAL HEATING 3 0 0
VIDEO 0 0 0
FIRST CAR 0 0 -2
MICROWAVE OVEN 0 0 1
TUMBLE-DRIER -1 0 1
CD-PLAYER 1 0 0
SECOND CAR -1 0 -1
DISHWASHER 1 0 1
Pop uniformity 977 977 977
Subgroup uniformity 1331 893 1078
Conformity 1440 893 1168
Sample size 1618 18657 2612
VALUES FOR HOUSEHOLD TYPE:
GPl single man, or male single parent 
GP2 couple, with or without children 
GP3 single woman, or female single parent
The top line of dramatrix 4<1> indicates the contents of each column: 
household groups GPl, GP2, and GP3 are explained at the bottom of the 
dramatrix. The next row of the dramatrix tells us the average ownership 
levels of the twelve durable goods, in each of the three household groups.
The main evidence in dramatrix 4<1> is in the next twelve rows (one row for 
each durable good). Consider the order of durables: they are arranged
from most-frequently owned (REFRIGERATOR) at the top of the table, down to 
least-frequently owned (DISHWASHER), based on the frequencies of ownership 
of the entire sample (i.e. all three columns). The middle column of the 
above dramatrix is for couples (with or without children); each number in 
this column is a zero, which tells us that there is no difference between 
the priority of couples and the priority of the whole sample (we should not
105
read too much into this: it reflects the fact that almost the entire
sample consists of couple households). For the right-hand column of 
dramatrix 4<1>, the numbers are not all zero: the number on the third row
is -1, which tells us that TELEPHONE has a lower priority in households 
containing a single woman (with or without children). Similarly, the 
number 1 in the fourth row of the right-hand column tells us that DEEP- 
FREEZERS are a higher priority in single-woman households. We can use
these numbers to reconstruct the original order of priority for each of
these three groups, which I report in table 4<2> below:
TABLE 4<2>: order of priorities in three household types,
derived from dramatrix 4<1>
GP l
REFRIGERATOR
CENTRAL HEATING
TELEPHONE
WASHING-MACHINE
DEEP-FREEZER
VIDEO
FIRST CAR
MICROWAVE OVEN
CD-PLAYER
TUMBLE-DRIER
DISHWASHER
SECOND CAR
GP2
REFRIGERATOR
WASHING-MACHINE
TELEPHONE
DEEP-FREEZER
CENTRAL HEATING
VIDEO
FIRST CAR
MICROWAVE OVEN
TUMBLE-DRIER
CD-PLAYER
SECOND CAR
DISHWASHER
GP3
REFRIGERATOR
WASHING-MACHINE
DEEP-FREEZER
TELEPHONE
CENTRAL HEATING
VIDEO
MICROWAVE OVEN 
TUMBLE-DRIER 
FIRST CAR 
CD-PLAYER 
DISHWASHER 
SECOND CAR
VALUES FOR HOUSEHOLD TYPE:
GPl single man, or male single parent 
GP2 couple, with or without children 
GP3 single woman, or female single parent
In a sense, we could interpret dramatrix 4<1> as a compact method of 
expressing the information in table 4<2>. We can see in table 4<2> that 
second cars are less frequently owned (i.e. are a lower priority) in both 
the single-man and single-woman households, which is unsurprising: a
couple would have more use for a second car than would a single adult. But 
table 4<2> also tells us that a first car is a lower priority for single­
woman households, relative to the other two columns of table 4<2>. Chapter 
8 includes more details on interpreting the above dramatrix.
In this thesis, I do not consider the evidence of the uniformity and 
conformity figures (at the bottom of a dramatrix), but these figures can 
be used to assess the extent to which a group of households share a common 
order of priorities, as indicated in the next section.
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4.5 HOW CLOSELY DO INDIVIDUALS CONFORM TO "SOCIAL NORMS'?
Imagine all members of a population were asked which durable goods they 
own, out of a list of (n) durables. We would expect some members of the 
group to own more durable goods than other group members (depending on 
income, life-cycle stage, etc), which makes comparison of members more 
complicated. One solution to this is to use the methodology pioneered by 
Fine et al (1992a to 1992e), in which the frequency of ownership of 
durables by one group is compared with that of another group. The 
population is divided into subgroups; for each subgroup, we consider which 
is the most frequently-owned durable, which the next-most-frequently 
owned, and so on. In this way, we assign an "order of acquisition' of the 
n durable goods, on the grounds that if the subgroup has distinctive 
"social norms' of durable goods ownership, then each individual in the 
group will tend to purchase durables in the same order - this order 
represents the priorities of members of the group. Differences in a 
subgroup's "order of acquisition' are presented in a "dramatrix' (see Fine 
& Simister, 1995: p. 1056), as outlined in the previous section.
The evidence for a "social norm' for a subgroup appears to be stronger if 
we find that a subgroup has a very different "order of acquisition' to the 
population as a whole. We also wish to know, however, the extent to which 
different members of this subgroup share a common order of acquisition with 
each other. One aspect of the Fine et al methodology is that it attempts 
to explore how consistent are the members of a group: for example, it is
possible to assess the extent to which all members of the working class 
share a set of social norms (Fine et al, 1993: pp. 130-3). This is
assessed by the "uniformity' measure, which is defined as follows. For 
a group of people, we consider the "ranking' of durable goods, from a list 
of durables for which we have data on ownership. The frequency of
ownership of the (n) durable goods is sorted, so that the most-
frequently-owned durable is called the first durable; the second-most- 
frequently-owned durable is called the second durable; the third-most- 
frequently-owned durable is called the third durable, etc. This order is 
known as the "ranking' of the whole population. In order to assess how 
similar or different these group members are to each other, we consider one 
person in the group, and compare his/her order with this rank order. If 
the first person owns P durables, then the rank order offers a prediction 
of which P durables this person is likely to own. This person might own 
one, or two, or up to P of the P durables predicted; the actual number of
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"predicted1 durables owned by this person is called A. If the first person 
owns three durables from a list of five durables, then the value of A 
cannot be zero: the lowest ("worst") possible value of A is one, because
the group ranking predicts which three durables will be owned, and there 
must be an overlap between the actual durables owned, and the predicted 
ownership. The lowest possible value of A (which depends on P) is known 
as W.
The above discussion considers only the first member of the group; but the 
logic can be generalised to other members of the group. For the ith group 
member, I refer to P as P^ ; A as A^ ; and W as W^ . Then, we can form an 
index, known as the uniformity measure:
i ^  — p 
uni for mi ty- V '  (— -— -)J 4-j ' w.-p. i= i  *1
The higher the value of the uniformity measure, the more consistent is the 
order of acquisition of durables among members of this subgroup. When 
considering various subgroups, Fine uses the term subgroup uniformity to 
describe how consistent is the behaviour of each subgroup (measured in the 
same way as uniformity) . Fine et al (1992a to 1992e) also use the ■ term 
conformity, which considers how closely a subgroup conforms to the order 
of acquisition of the whole group. The conformity measure is defined in 
the same way as uniformity, except that the rank order of the whole 
population is used to assess the behaviour of each subgroup.
MONTE-CARLO TESTING OF FINE’S "UNIFORMITY* MEASURE
It would be helpful to know if any observed "uniformity' figure is higher, 
or lower, than we would expect; in this way, we are able to assess whether 
or not the observed pattern of ownership is random, or if there is a 
tendency for different households to acquire durable goods in the same 
order. If we find a tendency for different households to own the same 
durables, this suggests that there are "social norms" in society. In order 
to assess this, "Monte-Carlo1 techniques were used: due to the complex
mathematics required to derive the theoretical distribution of 
"uniformity' , it is difficult to predict the distribution of the
108
3
'uniformity' measure. For comparability with GHS 1989/90 data , a set of 
thirteen random numbers were generated using computer routines from the 
Numerical Algorithms Group (NAG) library (each with value zero or one), 
with probabilities equal to those shown in the GHS 1989/90 dataset below. 
The random data were generated as follows:
(1) In GHS 1989/90, 93.19% of respondents owned a television set. I
created a random variable to represent television ownership, set to 
one (with probability .9319) or zero (with probability 1 -.9319 = 
.0681). The next random variable created represented the next most 
widely-owned durable, with a probability of .8648 of equalling one; 
for the third random variable, the probability of equalling one was
.8606; and so on, until thirteen random values were generated.
(2) Process (1) was repeated 10623 times (this sample size was chosen
for comparability with GHS 1989/90 data) . This produced a set of 
random data, consisting of 13 columns and 10623 rows of numbers 
(each number zero or one); this was saved as a file.
(3) The random data were analyzed using the methodology developed by 
Fine & Simister (1995: pp. 1054-5), to find the population
uniformity of this random data. This estimate of the uniformity was 
written to a second file, called 'distrib1.
(4) Steps 1 to 3 were repeated, and the answer written to the 'distrib'
results file, a total of 3,000 times.
The processes (1) to (4) above produced a large 'distrib1 file, containing 
3000 values of the population uniformity. The data in the 'distrib' file 
were analyzed using SPSS, to find the mean value of the uniformity figure; 
this was found to be 1.557, so the above figure for GHS 1989/90 (0.0947) 
appears to be surprisingly low. We can also use the random data to carry 
out a test for statistical significance: to test the hypothesis that the
uniformity is lower than would be expected for GHS 1989/90, the 
distribution of (random) uniformity estimates in the 'distrib' file was 
divided into percentiles. It was found that 99% of the uniformity 
estimates were above 1.5320, which confirms this hypothesis. Hence we can 
be confident (at the 99% confidence level) that the GHS 1989 uniformity 
figure is lower than expected, which supports the claim by Fine et al 
(1993) that there are "norms" of durable goods ownership.
At the time of carrying out the Monte Carlo experiments, I 
intended to use GHS data for this thesis; I subsequently 
discovered that FES data would allow me to observe a longer time- 
span, so I use FES (not GHS) data for the rest of this thesis.
I created random data to be comparable with GHS 1989/90 data, 
because this was the latest GHS dataset available at that time.
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The above technique was also used to assess movements of subgroups relative 
to the larger group. Using the steps (1) to (4) above (to be comparable 
with GHS 1989/90), data to simulate durable goods ownership were generated 
artificially. A random number was generated, with a value equal to either 
0 (with probability 0.5) or 1 (with probability 0.5); this random number 
was used to subdivide the artificially-generated sample into two equal­
sized subgroups, and the order of acquisition of both subgroups was 
calculated. This was compared with the order for the whole group, and a 
table of relative movements was generated (in the same way as is done with 
GHS data: see below). The resulting table was then comparable with a
'dramatrix' table for GHS 1989/90 data in which there were two equally- 
sized subgroups. I consider the evidence from the random data to be quite 
clear: there were no instances in this random data for which either
subgroup had a different order of acquisition to the whole group. This 
indicates that for a two-column table with equal numbers of people in each 
column, any deviation of a subgroup's order from that of the whole group 
is statistically significant (at the 99% level). Unfortunately, it is not 
clear how far we can generalise this finding: there may be a case for
extending this research, so we can apply statistical significance tests 
more widely.
THE GUTTMAN COEFFICIENT OF REPRODUCIBILITY
Some researchers using 'order of acquisition' methods have used the Guttman 
'Coefficient of Reproducibility1 index, known as Rep. (see Paroush, 1965: 
p. 228), although it is not used in most such studies (e.g. Hebden & 
Pickering, 1974). The Guttman index is defined as
i=I
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Rep. = 1- 1 ,   [4H]
kJ2 Wi>
i= 1
where each household containing i goods is compared with the most 
frequently-owned i goods, and Si is the number of deviations from the set 
i where a 'deviation1 is defined as the minimum number of changes required 
in the most popular order of acquisition in order to make it match the 
ownership observed in one household; this number of deviations is summed
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over all households. is the number of consumers in set 1. Note that
the Rep. measure is equivalent to the conformity measure in the Fine et al 
approach (Fine & Simister, 1995: p. 1054); I report the conformity figure 
for all dramatrices presented in this thesis.
GROUPS OF DURABLES: INFORMATION FOR DIFFERENT YEARS
The problem of which durables to include, and for which years, has a 
different effect on dramatrices to regression analysis. We only need data 
on one durable in a given year to be able to carry out regression analysis; 
but the dramatrix approach requires us to compare a group of durables. In 
creating a dramatrix from data for different years, it is necessary to 
choose a group of durables for which data are available for each chosen 
year. When deciding which durables to include in the group, there is a 
trade-off between studying more durables (which may reveal more differences 
in priorities), versus using more years' data (which should increase the 
reliability of results by increasing the sample-size, but may require a 
durable to be dropped from the group because it was not included in a 
survey in one year). In order to simplify comparisons between regression 
and dramatrix results, I use the same year-groups for dramatrices as I do 
for regression (see section 6.4).
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4.6 SUMMARY: TWO COMPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGIES
This chapter has examined alternative approaches to studying ownership of 
household durable goods. Many economists study each durable good 
separately, to examine the effects of several variables on ownership of a 
particular durable good (often using logit/probit regression). This 
approach is founded on well-developed statistical theory, and it is 
relatively straightforward to assess whether or not a regression 
coefficient is statistically significant. There are, however, drawbacks 
with this approach: it is generally agreed that it is important to control
for household incomes in such analysis, but it is difficult to do so in 
practice (see, for example, discussion of the 'Permanent Income Hypothesis' 
in section 2.2 above).
There are a number of alternatives to studying one durable good in 
isolation. By examining ownership of a set of durable goods within a 
population, we are able to assess the priorities of the population: which
good is generally bought first, which second, and so on. There are 
different methods of determining the 'order of acquisition': this chapter
has examined three such methods, namely Pyatt's 'Priority Patterns'; the 
point correlation approach; and the Borda rule, used by Fine et al (1992a 
to 1992e). All of these approaches share a common weakness: there is no 
universally accepted method of assessing the extent to which a population 
holds a common order of acquisition. Various attempts have been made, 
several of which have been examined above (such as Guttman's 'Coefficient 
of Reproducibility'; the simplex test applied to a point-correlation 
matrix; and the 'uniformity' measure reported in Fine & Simister (1995). 
Each of these measures has been used in empirical work.
The logit/probit approach used by Piachaud and others (see section 8.3) 
allows the researcher to assess the statistical significance of each 
coefficient; hence, it is possible to report whether or not a variable 
appears to influence the ownership of a durable good. But approaches which 
consider a number of durables simultaneously help us to isolate the effects 
of income on durables ownership. This chapter has discussed problems with 
the alternative approaches. In particular, the study of one durable in 
isolation requires the researcher to control for difference in household 
income, which is difficult in practice: this is a particular problem for
the study of the effects of women's employment (which will tend to raise 
a household's income). The use of 'order of acquisition' methods not based
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on the Borda rule have been criticised by Fine (1983) on the grounds that 
they can have undesirable properties.
There are advantages to the 'ordering' technique, in avoiding some 
practical problems of regression: in particular, the question of which
control variables to include in the regression equation. Several of the 
problems with regression (such as simultaneous equations bias and 
endogeneity) do not apply to the 'ordering' technique of Fine et al. In 
regression estimates discussed below, I examine the sign and size of the 
coefficient on women's employment, after controlling for certain 'relevant' 
variables; but which control variables should be included? In a sense, 
the ordering approach is intrinsically controlling for total household 
income, because it examines the priorities of types of households, and 
makes differences in household priorities apparent.
The remainder of this thesis uses both logit regression, and the Fine et 
al approach (reporting dramatrices, and utilising the Borda rule). This 
chapter has demonstrated that the Borda rule approach has advantages over 
alternative approaches; the fact that the dramatrix approach has been used 
empirically by previous researchers to study the effects of women's 
employment (Fine et al, 1992a to 1992e) suggests that it may be a promising 
method for the topic of this thesis.
PROBLEMS COMMON TO BOTH METHODOLOGIES
The above comments suggest that regression and the 'ordering' methodology 
complement each other. However, the reader should be aware that some 
problems apply to both methodologies. For example, consider the timing of 
survey data-collection: survey data indicate the ownership of durable
goods at the time of interview, but a durable may have been bought years' 
earlier:
"a woman's current employment status should not be confused 
with her status at the time in which the durable was purchased 
(often many years prior to the survey)".
(Oropesa, 1993: p. 575).
This argument suggests that we should study non-durables rather than 
durable goods; but these, too, have problems - for example, higher 
expenditure might be associated with higher quality (such as conspicuous
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consumption) rather than a greater priority for time-saving. In principle, 
BHPS panel data could be used for this purpose, in that it indicates if a 
household bought a durable good in the last year; but in practice, 
limiting the BHPS sample to new purchasers would reduce the sample-size too 
much to be reliable. I follow most previous research, in assuming that 
this problem can be ignored in practice.
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CHAPTER 5
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
5.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter develops a mathematical model of household behaviour, as the 
basis for subsequent empirical work. As with any economic model, there is 
a trade-off between developing a more complicated model (which may reflect 
reality more accurately) and keeping the mathematics relatively simple. 
A complex model may distract us from practical issues, such as whether or 
not the model can be used to make predictions. And, as in any model, 
unrealistic assumptions may lead to misleading results.
This model analyses a two-adult household; each household is assumed to 
be a married couple, with or without children. The couple is currently a 
heterosexual couple who are married or cohabiting; but there is a 
possibility that the couple may divorce/separate at any time in the future, 
which would lead to the two adults living separately from each other.
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5.2 STAGES OP DECISION-MAKING
Like many models in this field (such as Barnett, 1979: p. 542, and Chiuri 
& Simmons, 1997: p. 381), this model assumes that households make decisions 
in two stages: 
stage I:
the couple chooses how many children to have, and also how 
much paid work each will do (taking into account factors such 
as the availability of paid work, and local wage-rates). 
Husband and wife also decide on a system to allocate domestic 
work, as explained below.
stage II:
In the light of the above decisions, the household divides its 
available income into three categories:
"Basics" such as food and rent, B;
"Time-saving" goods and services. S',
"Luxury" goods and services, L.
This model does not attempt to examine stage I: these decisions are
assumed to be exogenous to this model. It would be easy to criticise this 
assumption of exogeneity: for example, it has been claimed that women's
domestic work commitments often prevent them taking paid work (Gershuny & 
Robinson, 1988: p. 537). This restriction is needed to produce a model 
which can be solved - modelling stage II alone is complicated, as can be 
seen below. I do not suggest that there need be any delay between stage I 
and stage II: but when a household is deciding how to allocate money
between "time-saving" goods and "luxury" goods, it will take factors such 
as the number of children as pre-determined (note that this may include 
making allowances for children which the couple intend to have in the 
future).
Household spending is limited by the budget constraint, which can be 
written as
B + S + L = E [5A]
where E is the combined weekly net earnings of husband and wife; it is 
assumed that unearned income is insignificant. It is also assumed that 
households cannot save or borrow. Spending on leisure is a "public good" 
within the household, in that leisure spending increases utility for all 
household members: this seems reasonable for goods such as television
sets, but is a rather severe restriction for non-durables (for example, it 
implies that no household member goes on holiday without every other member 
of the household being present, or having a holiday of equal cost).
116
The decision for the household at stage II is how to choose the optimal 
level of time-saving goods and services S : such spending will tend to
increase the utility of both adults, by giving more free time F which is 
divided between husband and wife. Because of limited income, each 
household faces a trade-off between spending more on time-saving goods (to 
obtain more free time), or spending more on "luxury" goods L. If a simple 
linear utility function were used, then households would spend all 
available money (after spending on "basics") on either "luxuries" or "time- 
saving" goods, depending on the relative values of luxury goods and leisure 
time - but my analysis of survey data in both the UK and India suggest that 
this is not a realistic assumption: a more plausible model would predict
that each household will buy some "luxuries" and some "time-saving" goods. 
This property will follow if the utility function has the property of 
"diminishing marginal returns ' , in that the rate at which utility increases 
from each extra unit received tends to decline as more of that item is 
obtained: for example, the first hour of leisure time is valued highly,
whereas each subsequent hour of leisure is of less value to the person. 
Hence the utility function of a household member used here is based on 
logarithms, as follows:
U = a + b.LnCfree time,) + c.Ln (spending on luxuries) E5B]
In the utility function [5B] above, a and b and c are constants, and 
Ln() indicates natural logarithm (written as LOGe( ) by some writers). 
This logarithmic utility function has diminishing marginal returns to both 
time and luxury goods: this can be shown formally by considering the first
(partial) derivative of U with respect to free time:
UTILITY PROVIDED BY ANOTHER HOUR OF LEISURE TIME:
[5C]
______ d U = b
d (free time) free time
The above equation indicates that as free time increases, the marginal 
utility from each extra hour declines. A similar analysis applies to the 
marginal utility of "luxuries" spending. Using this utility function, 
household spending will normally be greater than zero for both leisure and 
"luxuries"; indeed, this desirable property is a necessary assumption with 
this utility function, because the logarithm of zero is not defined. Hence 
it is also necessary to assume that the household income is (at least 
slightly) above the level needed to provide the "basics". It should be
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noted that this "basic" expenditure is unknown; I assume it is constant
for each household with a given number of children, but some writers have
suggested that perceptions of what is "necessary" is influenced by cultural
pressures: for example,
"A poverty line is necessarily defined in relation to social 
conventions and the contemporary living standards of a 
particular society, and in this way somebody in the United 
States may be adjudged poor even though he has a higher income 
than the average person in India."
(Atkinson, 1975: p. 186).
For this thesis, I do not need to measure the household's expenditures on 
"basics" or "luxuries", as will be explained below. Nevertheless, the 
reader should be aware that classifying goods as "time-saving" or not 
"time-saving" is also open to dispute: for example, Piachaud (1982)
appears to analyze car ownership as a time-saving good, when others might 
consider a car to be mainly bought as a status good.
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5.3 PAID WORK, UNPAID WORK, AND LEISURE
Housework, in this model, refers to time spent on all unpaid tasks which 
are needed to maintain the household - such as cooking, cleaning, and 
(where applicable) childcare. I use D to represent the number of hours of 
unpaid domestic work (per week) by husband and wife combined. P h and P w 
represent the number of hours of paid work, per week, carried out by 
husband and wife respectively. I use M to represent the maximum time 
available to each person in a week: it is the number of hours in a week
(168) minus the number of hours needed for that person's survival (sleep, 
eating, and so on). This model is restricted to two-adult households, in 
order to simplify the analysis: households containing two parents with
their offspring would be included if the offspring are aged under 16, but 
at 16 or older the children may earn a significant fraction of household 
income (and hence might be expected to influence household expenditure 
patterns). Hence, 2M is the time equivalent to total income in the budget 
constraint: the total amount of paid and unpaid work, and leisure, for
husband and wife combined, must be limited as follows:
M + M = Ph + P w + D + Fh + F w
And the above equation tells us the total amount of leisure time for 
husband and wife combined:
Fh + F„ - 2M - P„ - P„ - D [5D]
In order to develop a testable model, I must make assumptions about how
housework and leisure are allocated between husband and wife. It seems
plausible that the amount of domestic work done by each partner is
influenced by the amount of paid work each one does: for example, in the
Indian context, it has been claimed that
"households attempt to equalize substantially the internal
distribution of work effort among their members [..] a model
that analyzes time allocation decisions only at the individual 
level will yield misleading results since it fails to capture 
the intrahousehold distributional responses that seem to be 
extremely important."
(Behrman & Deolalikar, 1993: p. 419).
There is evidence (from several countries) that in most households, wives 
do more housework than husbands, but that most husbands do some paid work 
- see Gershuny (1983, p. 153), Gershuny et al (1986, p. 29), James (1995, 
pp. 281-2), and Wheelock (1990: p. 101) for the UK; and for India, see
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Agarwal (1988, p. 180), Khanna & Varghese (1978: p. 41), and Ramu (1987: 
p. 913). There is also evidence that when a wife obtains paid work, she 
tends to cut down the time she spends on housework, and husbands tend to 
do more domestic work - see Kiernan (1992: p. 103) for the UK; and Khanna 
& Varghese (1978: p. 41), and Ramu (1987: p. 913), for India. The same 
pattern has also been reported for other countries - see Williams & Donath 
(1994: p. 439) for Australia; Hessing (1994: p. 629) for Canada; and 
Brines (1993: pp. 312-3) and Manke et al (1994: p. 657) for the USA.
However, it should be noted that some writers, including Wheelock (1990: 
p. 101) for the UK, suggest that husbands do not usually increase their 
domestic work if their wife takes paid employment. I suggest that this 
apparent contradiction in the evidence may be because the increase in 
husbands' housework resulting from wives ' employment is small (this comment 
has been made by several of the writers referred to in this paragraph) , and 
hence may not be detected in small-scale studies such as the sociological 
studies considered by Wheelock (1990, p. 101). To summarise, this model 
assumes that husband and wife share domestic tasks, taking into account the 
amount of paid work each one does, so that the husband always receives part 
(but not all) of the leisure time available to the couple.
I adopt a simple model, which could explain why husbands take on more 
domestic work when their wives take paid work: I assume that husband and
wife see the total amount of leisure time (F ) available to both of them as 
a resource, which they share - but they may not share it equally. To allow 
the possibility of inequality between husband and wife, I assume that the 
husband receives a constant fraction © of free time, for every household; 
hence the amount of free time for the wife will be a fraction (1-©) of 
the total leisure time available to the couple. Using equation [5D] above, 
the amounts of free time available to the husband and wife are given by:
HUSBAND: Fh = © (Fh + Fv)
0  (2M - P h - F w - D)
C5E]
WIFE: F w =  (1-Q) (2M - Ph - P„ - D)
Note that the fraction 0 might be modelled as an outcome of bargaining 
between husband and wife; but I assume here that it is the same for every 
household.
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5.4 NASH BARGAINING
This model is intended to predict the level of spending on time-saving 
goods/services in a household. Like most of the economic models explored 
in this thesis, I base the model on the assumption of "rational1 economic 
behaviour: in particular, on the idea that husband and wife have conflict
of interest, in that each wishes to have more leisure time and leisure 
spending for themself. Like many such models, I base this on analysis of 
the "marriage surplus' (the sum of benefits to husband and wife from being 
married: see section 2.4 above). The distribution of this surplus is the 
central difference between different models of household behaviour: in
Becker's model, the allocation of the "marriage surplus' is divided between 
husband and wife according to the "marriage market' (see section 2.3). In 
this chapter, I adopt the Nash bargaining approach, which is often used in 
"bargaining1 models (outlined in Manser & Brown, 1980: p. 38; Canning, 
1992: p. 878; and Ermisch, 1993, p. 356); in many cases, "the Nash model 
provides a natural framework for analyzing the joint decisions of household 
formation and intrahousehold allocations" (McElroy, 1990: p. 577).
However, the reader should be aware that assuming Nash bargaining may 
prevent us from understanding the way households bargain in practice. For 
example, the Nash bargaining assumption assumes that any two married 
couples with identical demographic and income situations would always 
arrive at the same "bargain'. The Nash approach is not the only solution 
which has been used in this research field: for example, the Lindahl
solution is described in Chiuri & Simmons (1997). However, there are 
reasons why Nash bargaining is so widely adopted in economic bargaining 
models: David Canning claims that if both players are "rational1 (playing
the best replies to their partner's choices), and have "complete' 
algorithms (their thought-processes can react to every situation they may 
face), then the game will always produce a Nash equilibrium (Canning, 1992: 
p. 877). I will return to this issue in the conclusion to this chapter.
The Nash solution to such "games" uses the concept of a "reservation 
utility', which is the outcome if the two "players' cannot agree to a 
solution. In the case of this model, the reservation utility is defined 
as the expected level of utility of each spouse after a divorce (the 
preferences of children are ignored in this model). Under the Nash 
bargaining model, it is assumed that households maximise the Nash function 
N defined as
N = [Uh - Vh'l.lVv - Uu»] [5F]
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where t/h and l/w are the levels of utility experienced by husband and 
wife within the marriage; and the equivalent utilities if a divorce occurs 
are denoted by [7h’ and U " respectively. The Nash analysis of 
bargaining behaviour assumes that each household maximises the above 
function N , by choosing the optimal level of spending on time-saving 
goods/services £ and on leisure goods/services L (spending on these two are 
linked by the budget constraint). The utility function outlined in 
equation [5B] above can now be simplified by removing the a term, because 
this enters in both Uh and £/h' and hence will cancel out (and likewise 
for £/w and t/w" ). This gives :
U = jb.Ln(free time,) + c. Ln (spending on luxuries) 
so £7h = b.Ln (0(2M - Fh - Pw - D)) + c.Ln(L) [5G]
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5.5 TIME-SAVING EXPENDITURE
This model assumes that the total time spent on domestic work (by husband 
and wife combined) will fall by a constant number of hours (t) for each 
£1 spent on time-saving goods and services - the simplest model we could 
adopt. Hence the total leisure time available to the couple will increase 
by tS hours per week, which must be included in the above utility 
function. Clearly, the time spent completing domestic tasks cannot be
negative, so we must assume that S does not exceed (D/t) for any
household. From equation [5G], the husband's utility function becomes:
Uh = b.Ln( Q(2M - Ph - Pw - (D - tS)) ) + a.Ln(L)
and we can now substitute S in terms of L from the budget constraint in
equation [5A] above:
S - E - B - L
This gives the value of the husband's utility function as:
Uh = b.Ln( Q(2M - Ph - Pw - D + t[E -B -L]) ) + c.Ln(L)
so Uh = b.Ln( Q(2M - Ph - Pw - D + t[E -B] -tL) ) + c.Ln(L)
to simplify the algebra, I combine several exogenous variables into one
(unknown) factor T as follows:
T - 2M - Ph - Pw - D + t[E -B]
so the husband's utility level is given by
£/h - b.Ln( Q(T-tL) ) + c.Ln(L)
= b.Ln(Q) + b.Ln(T-tL) + c.Ln(L) [5H]
Similarly, the wife's utility function (whilst married) is given by
Uw = b.Ln(l-B) + b.Ln(T-tL) + c.Ln(L) [51]
The expressions for husband's and wife's utilities in equations [5H] and 
[51] above can be substituted into equation [5F] above? hence the Nash 
function N is given by
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N~[b.Ln(Q) +b.Ln(T-tL) +c.Ln(L) -Uh']. [b.Ln(l-B) +b.Ln(T—tL) +c.Ln(L) -Uw"7
Separating the terms in L from the terms which are exogenous to the 
model, this becomes:
N =[b.Ln (T-tL) +c.Ln(L) +b.Ln(®)-Uh' ] . [b.Ln(T-tL)+c .Ln(L) +b.Ln(l-Q) -Uu" ]
[5J]
Now focusing on the common factor [b.Ln(x-tL) +c .Ln(L)] and multiplying
the first bracket by the second, leads to:
N = [b.Ln(T-tL)+c.Ln(L)J2
+[b.Ln(T-tL)+c.Ln(L)] . [b.Ln (Q)-U^ ' tb.Ln(l-Q)-U^"]
+ [b.Ln(©)-Uh'] . [b.Ln(l-Q)-Uw"]
The second line can be simplified by the substitution
[i = [b.Ln(Q)-Uh'+b.Ln(l-e)-U^" ] [5K]
to produce
N = [b.Ln (T-tL) -hc.Ln(L)]2
+ [b.Ln (T-tL) +c.Ln(L) ] [1
+ [b.Ln O) -Ufo' J . [b.Ln(l-e)-Uv”J [5L]
This equation for N can now be optimised by differentiation. The only 
factor over which the couple have immediate control is spending on leisure 
goods L (spending more on L must be at the expense of spending on time- 
saving items). Note that several terms in equation [5L] may vary from one 
household to another (e.g. expected utility after divorce, Uh' and U " ); 
but such terms can be treated as constants in this optimisation, because 
they are assumed here to be exogenous to a household's decision on how much 
to spend on luxury goods (L) . Differentiating N with respect to L gives:
dN = 2 [b. Ln(T-tL) +c .Ln(L) ] d [b.Ln (T-tL) +c.Ln(L) ] + |i 6. [b.Ln (T-tL) +c .Ln (L) ] 
d L d L d L
So regrouping terms, we obtain
dN = d [b.Ln (T-tL) +c.Ln(L) ] {2 [b.Ln(x-tL) +c.Ln(L) J + [i} 
d L dL
dN = [b(-t) / (T-tL)+c/L] {2 [b.Ln (T-tL) -tc.Ln(L) ] + }
dL
dN = [ -bt + c ] . {2 [b.Ln(T-tL) +c.Ln(L) J + [i} [5M]
dL (T-tLj L
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Expanding the second term in the above expression for (dN/dL) gives us
(2 [b.Ln (T-tL) +c.Ln(L) ]+\x]
={2[b.Ln(T-tL) -hc.Ln(L) ] + [b.Ln(Q) -Uh' -hb.Ln(l-Q) -C/H" 3 }
={ [b.Ln (T-tL) tc.Ln(L) ] +[b.Ln (©) -£7h '+[b.Ln (T-tL) +c.Ln (L) ]+b.Ln (1-©) -U^"] }
= "h - V  + - V  t5N]
from equations [5H] and [51] above. If this were zero, it would indicate 
that the total marriage surplus for husband and wife is zero - or, in other 
words, that the couple are indifferent whether they remain married or get 
divorced. This is a special case, which I do not attempt to model here: 
it seems unlikely that a household will remain in this situation for long, 
since factors such as incomes and the presence of children vary over time. 
The value of [5N] cannot be negative in this model, or the household will 
divorce immediately. Hence, I will assume that the second term of equation 
[5M] is strictly positive. So the optimal value of L, at which (dN/dL) is 
zero, occurs when the first term in equation [5M] is zero, i.e.
0 = [ -bt -he] [ 5P ]
(T-tL) L
hence bt/ (T-tL) = c/L so btL = Tc -ctL
and L(bt-hct) = Tc and L = T c/(b+c)t
which, combined with the definition of T before equation [5H] above, gives
L = . c (2M - Ph - Pw - D + t[E -B]} [5Q]
(b-hc) t
In order to check that this is the maximum value (as opposed to the minimum 
or point of inflection), we must look at the second derivative of N:
d2N - d [ -bt +c] . {2 fb.Ln(T-tL) +c.Ln(L) 1 +[i) 
dL dL (T-tL) L
= [ -bt +c] .2 [ -bt +c] +(-bt42/ (T-tL)2 -c/L2) {2 [b.Ln(T-tL)+c .Ln(L) ]+\i) 
(T-tL) L (T-tL) L [5R]
The optimal value of L must be where the (partial) derivative of N with 
respect to L is zero, provided that the second-order (partial) derivative 
of N with respect to L is negative for that value of L. At the value of
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L given by equation [5Q], the bracket f-bt/(T-tL) +c/L] is zero, so the
first term of equation [5R] must be zero. The second term of equation [5R]
must be negative, because the final term in {} brackets is strictly
2 2 2positive, as explained after equation [5N]; and (-bt /(T-tL) -c/L ) 
must be negative (assuming that b and c are both positive). Hence the 
maximum value of N must be obtained when L is as shown in equation [5Q],
Using the budget constraint in equation [5A], we can obtain an expression 
for time-saving goods expenditure B as follows:
S = E - B - L
S = E - B - c (2M - Ph - P - D + t[E - B]}
(b+c) t
so S = (Ph +PU) [ c ] + (E-B) r b 1 + Dc - 2Mc [5S]
(ib+c) t (b+c) (b+c) t (b+c) t
This suggests that spending on time-saving goods (S) will tend to increase 
if total household earnings (E) rises, or if either husband or wife do 
more hours of paid work per week. In fact, this model predicts that one 
more hour of employment of the husband should have the same effect as one 
more hour of the wife, because of the way P  ^and Pw enter the first term 
of [5S]. I refer to this as the hypothesis of 'symmetry', and I assess it 
briefly in section 8.6 below.
It is unclear how the number of children in the household would influence 
S r because children would influence both the cost of basic spending (B), 
and the amount of domestic work (D) - the amount of housework to be done 
increases if there are more children, or younger children, in the household 
(Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994: pp. 120-1).
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5.6 APPLYING THE MODEL
In this mathematical model, husband and wife are assumed to divide leisure 
time between themselves, in such a way that the husband gets a fraction 
© of the couple's available leisure-time. Because of the assumption of 
Nash bargaining, combined with a log-linear functional form for the utility 
function, this fraction does not influence the optimal level of spending 
on time-saving goods. This model suggests that such spending will be a 
linear function of the number of hours of paid work by husband and wife 
combined - spending patterns should be unaffected by whether the husband, 
wife, or both are employed (unless wage-rates are different, in which case 
total household earning E will be affected: see equation [5S] above).
Total household earnings may influence spending on time-saving goods: the
second term of equation [5S] increases as E rises. Similarly, the number 
of children in the household may influence S, but the direction is unclear.
SUMMARY
The mathematical model developed in this chapter is based on the idea that 
time is scarce, and that both husband and wife do some housework (although 
the housework is not divided evenly between them) . Each partner would like 
to obtain more leisure time, by buying time-saving durable goods; but the 
household budget is limited, and time-saving goods can only be bought at 
the expense of "luxury" goods (such as leisure goods). It is assumed that 
husband and wife bargain with each other, to try to persuade their partner 
to accept the individual's preferred spending pattern; and that the 
outcome of this bargaining is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. the outcome which 
maximises the product of the level of utility of the two partners.
The key point of this model is that an extra hour of paid work by the 
husband should increase spending on time-saving goods to the same extent 
as an extra hour's employment for the wife: this is in contrast to the
work of Piachaud (1982) and others, who assume durable goods ownership is 
affected by wife's employment but not by husband's employment. This 
mathematical model (in conjunction with the regression methodology outlined 
in chapter 4) will be used in table 8<8> (chapter 8) of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 6
SOURCES OF DATA 
USED IN THIS THESIS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the survey datasets used in this thesis, and suggests 
a number of datasets which may be of interest to other researchers in this 
field; I comment on the advantages and disadvantages of each survey. I 
divide datasets into UK and India, and discuss surveys in alphabetical 
order (within each country). The list of survey datasets in this chapter 
is not exhaustive; many hundreds of surveys on households and individuals 
have been deposited at the ESRC Data Archive (University of Essex, UK), 
and many of these include information on ownership of household durable 
goods. I discuss only the datasets which I have considered using for this 
thesis.
Unless indicated otherwise, the surveys below contain information on all 
household members (although information is sometimes obtained by proxy from 
a different member of the household, if one household member cannot be 
interviewed: for example, for the GHS, see OPCS, 1994: p. 149).
Information is collected by face-to-face interview (often supplemented by 
a written self-completion questionnaire), except where noted below.
Data from the UK government surveys are Crown Copyright; these data are 
used by permission of the Office for National Statistics. Other surveys 
are also protected by copyright. For all of these surveys, researchers 
must obtain permission via the Data Archive at the University of Essex.
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6.2 DATASETS AVAILABLE - UK
There are a number of alternative sources of data in Britain, many of which 
have been collected by the UK government. In recent years, there have been 
attempts to harmonise UK government-commissioned surveys, to improve 
comparability between surveys - this appears to include a standard list of 
durable goods (Government Statistical Service, 1996: pp. 58-59).
Similar methods of selecting samples are used by FES, FRS, GHS, and LFS (UK 
government surveys), and by BHPS (financed by the UK government, but 
managed by the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change); due to space 
limitations, I outline here only the sampling method used by the General 
Household Survey (GHS). The GHS is designed to provide a representative 
sample of the population of Great Britain living in private households 
(OPCS, 1992: p. 1). The households interviewed in GHS surveys were chosen 
at random using a two-stage, stratified, sampling method. The first stage 
of the sampling method before 1984 was to choose a number of electoral 
wards at random: electoral wards in Britain were first 'stratified',
according to the percentage of homes in the ward which are owned by the 
local authority, and by the proportion of heads-of-household who were in 
socioeconomic groups 1-5 or 13 (OPCS, 1994: p. 148). The second stage of 
the sampling method (having chosen a number of wards) is to select 
individual households at random from the electoral register. From 1984, 
the GHS sampling method was changed to use postcode sectors rather than 
wards as the Primary Sampling Unit, and to use the 'Postcode Address File1 
instead of the electoral register for the second stage (OPCS, 1994: p.
148). In summary, the UK government-commissioned surveys discussed here 
provide a sample which is representative of the population of Britain 
(BHPS) or the UK (FES).
BRITISH HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEY (BHPS):
The BHPS is a sample of non-institutional households in Britain (not UK - 
BHPS does not include Northern Ireland); geographical coverage is limited 
to England, Wales, and Scotland south of the Caledonian canal. The sample 
was obtained using the small user file of the Postcode Address File 
(Laurie, Rose, Whelan & Williams, 1993: p. 6). The BHPS is a 'panel
study': a number of households were initially selected at random, with a
view to re-interviewing each chosen household every year. Fieldwork for
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the BHPS began in 1991-2. The target sample-size for BHPS is 5,000 
households (Taylor, 1996). The BHPS does yet allow us to observe long-term 
trends: at the time of writing, data for five waves (one wave per year)
are available to the academic community. The BHPS has good coverage of 
durable goods, and includes questions on household financial management and 
attitudes. Because BHPS is a panel study, it would be inappropriate to use 
more than one wave of data as if they were independent samples: this would
double-count households, and give a misleading impression of consistency. 
For this reason, I use only data from the first wave of BHPS. Further 
information on BHPS is available in machine-readable documents obtainable 
from the Data Archive (Taylor, 1996).
BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES (BSA):
The BSA surveys are a set of annual surveys, produced by SCPR (Social and 
Community Planning Research): BSA began in 1983. These surveys interview
around 4,000 people per year, randomly selected from all over the UK (see 
Jowell et al, 1987). Since 1986, the respondents were asked questions 
about 'household allocative systems' (see section 2.8). However, these 
surveys do not include information on durable goods ownership, or give 
details about incomes of individuals or households.
EUROBAROMETER SURVEYS (EB):
The Eurobarometer series of surveys have been sponsored by the Commission 
of the European Community/European Union. The first study in this series 
was in 1973 (this is the 'European Community Study1, but is often referred 
to as EB0) . Eurobarometers have been carried out at least twice per year 
since 1975; over fifty Eurobarometer surveys are available to the academic 
community. A Eurobarometer interviews about a thousand people in each 
country which is (at the time) a member of the European Community/European 
Union; recent Eurobarometer surveys also include samples from Finland and 
Norway. At least four Eurobarometer surveys asked respondents about 
durable goods ownership: EB17 in 1982; EB22 in 1984; EB26 in 1986; and
EB28 in 1987. Eurobarometers only interview one person per household, and 
have rather limited information on incomes, but do include many attitude 
questions. Eurobarometers may be used to compare European countries.
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FAMILY EXPENDITURE SURVEY (FES):
The FES surveys are annual surveys, which cover the whole of the UK (in 
contrast to GHS, which excludes Northern Ireland). The FES began in 1961, 
but it only includes information on durable goods from 1968; the first 
time-saving durables were only included from 1969 (CSO, 1993: p. 7). Note, 
however, that FES includes washing-machines and refrigerators in 1964 (CSO, 
1993: p. 7) - but FES surveys between 1964 and 1966 inclusive are not
available at MIDAS (perhaps because the data are stored in an
unconventional format).
Each FES survey includes around 7,000 households (CSO, 1995: p. 21), and 
there is very detailed information on incomes, including earnings from a 
second job, and information on incomes before and after tax (CSO, 1995: p. 
21). Until 1993, FES included fewer durable goods than GHS, but now 
contains more than GHS (FES includes refrigerators, which were dropped from 
GHS in 1985). Most FES surveys include information on whether or not each 
household member has a bank account.
We are advised to bear sampling error and the effects of non-response in 
mind when interpreting FES (and other survey) data, but "so far as checks 
can be made these effects seem to be fairly slight" (Department of 
Employment, 1971: p. 19).
For the earlier FES surveys, fieldwork for each survey was carried out 
during one calender year. However, since 1994, FES fieldwork has been 
based on the financial year (April to March), rather than the calender
year; this follows the practice for GHS, which changed to fiscal years in
1988 (OPCS, 1992: p. 1). So, although each FES survey refers to a twelve­
month period, recent FES surveys are referred to as (for example) FES 
1994/5, rather than FES 1994.
More information on FES survey datasets can be found in the FES annual 
reports, such as Department of Employment (1978); and also in machine- 
readable codebook files (obtainable via the UK Data Archive) such as 
Department of Employment (undated).
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FAMILY RESOURCES SURVEYS (FRS)
The FRS is a relatively recent survey. At the time of writing, data from 
this source are available to researchers for two fiscal years, which does 
not help us to place results in historical perspective. Both of the FRS 
surveys include a similar list of durables to BHPS, and to recent FES and 
GHS surveys; the main advantage of FRS is that it has a slightly larger 
sample-size (around 15,000 households per year) than the BHPS, FES, and GHS 
surveys.
GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS (GHS):
The GHS has been carried out each year since 1971, but only data from 1973 
have been made available to the academic community at MIDAS. GHS surveys 
attempt to interview each household member aged 16 or over (OPCS, 1994); 
where a person cannot be interviewed, information on the person is sought 
from another member of the same household. The GHS interviews around ten 
thousand households per year (slightly more in the earlier years). In 
terms of including data for a number of durables for many years, GHS has 
the best coverage of durable goods ownership of any survey I know (with the 
possible exception of NRS below): for most years, there are more durables
included in GHS than for the equivalent year of FES data.
The GHS sample (since 1971) has been extended to include an extra sample 
of households in Scotland, which doubles the size of the GHS sample there: 
this extra sample is known as the 'Scottish Supplementary Sample'. 
However, since 1978, this supplementary sample was only asked a shortened 
version of the GHS questionnaire (OPCS, 1994: p. 148).
There are a number of problems in the GHS data, such as:
"Fridge freezers were attributed to both 'refrigerator1 and 
'deep freezer' in 1979 and 1980, but were excluded from deep 
freezers in 1978"
(OPCS, 1982: p. 47).
This problem appears to be a mistake by GHS interviewers. I have found 
other problems with GHS data: all data on women's income are missing in
households with children for GHS 1979; and all cases of total household 
income, or wife's gross earnings, are missing for GHS 1982 & 1983.
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THE LABOUR FORCE SURVEY (LFS):
The LFS is a continuous survey of residents of private households in the
UK, which began in 1973 (Harrop & Plewis, 1995: p. 93): it was conducted
in alternate years until 1983, and then annually until 1991, and is now 
quarterly. The LFS has a much larger sample-size than any other UK 
government survey discussed in this thesis (Harrop & Plewis, 1995: p. 93). 
The method of obtaining the LFS sample has changed over the years: it was 
based on local authority wards until 1981, but is now based on the
"postcode address file' (Harrop & Plewis, 1995: pp. 93-4).
NATIONAL READERSHIP SURVEYS (NRS):
The NRS were originally carried out by the British Market Research Bureau 
Ltd. (for some years), and Research Services Ltd. (for later years - see 
Fine et al, 1992f: p. 1). The NRS surveys began in 1956, and provide 
information on very large samples - much larger than the sample-size used 
by the GHS; and the NRS surveys provide information on more durable goods 
than any of other survey I know of. However, the NRS includes less than 
the FES on socio-demographic information for respondent households. 
Another drawback with the use of the NRS is that the sample is based on 
respondents to a questionnaire mailed to randomly-chosen individuals. Such 
mail-based surveys typically suffer from relatively poor response rates, 
and hence there is a danger that those respondents who do respond may not 
be representative of the wider population. A further weakness of the NRS 
for this research is that the data collected are obtained from only one 
person in each household, unlike FES surveys (which attempt to interview 
all adults in the selected households). This may be important when 
examining issues such as women's employment, since it is desirable to know 
the earnings of both husband and wife in a household being studied.
SOCIAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC LIFE INITIATIVE (SCELl):
The SCELI is a one-off survey which was carried out in six areas of Britain 
in 1986/7 (Vogler, 1989: p. 3). Three separate surveys are included in 
SCELI: a work attitudes/history survey (sample-size 6110); a
household/community survey (sample-size 1816 households); and an 
employers' survey (sample-size 1308 employers) (Gallie, 1991). Only one
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of these three could be relevant to this thesis: the household/community
survey, which has good coverage of durable goods (Gallie, 1991: p. 63), and 
includes information on household financial management (Vogler & Pahl, 
1993: p. 76). The SCELI sample is based on six towns (Aberdeen, Coventry, 
Kirkaldy, Northampton, Rochdale and Swindon); it might be argued that 
these six areas are not representative of Britain as a whole.
CHOOSING THE MAIN DATA SOURCE FOR THE UK
For UK data for this thesis, I chose to focus mainly on FES data in 
preference to the other surveys discussed above. The reason for this 
decision is that the FES provides the longest series of information on 
durable goods and explanatory variables relevant to this thesis (the FES 
began in 1961, but I use data from 1969: see above). However, it should
be noted that each of the other surveys discussed above have some 
advantages over the FES: for example, the GHS includes more durable goods
than FES between 1973 and 1992; and NRS surveys began earlier than FES. 
I use data from all FES surveys currently available, apart from 1961 to 
1963, which do not contain information on time-saving durables ownership. 
Hence, my main UK sample is data from FES surveys of 1969 up to 1995/6 
inclusive: the latest UK data I have refers to the first quarter of 1996.
In addition to FES data, I use BHPS for data on household financial 
management, which are not included in FES.
I must add a note on the quality of UK data available. Having commissioned 
my own surveys in India, I am struck by the extremely high quality of data 
collected by the various agencies: OPCS, the UK government Department of
Employment, and the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change. Surveys 
such as the BHPS, FES, GHS and LFS offer a combination of large sample- 
sizes, large amounts of information on each household/person surveyed, and 
the opportunity to observe long-term trends. The fact that information is 
provided on each household member adds greatly to the usefulness of the 
data. I suspect that Britain has the best data of any country in the world 
for research such as this thesis.
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6.3 DATASETS AVAILABLE - INDIA
In India, it appears that there are fewer large-scale surveys than in 
Britain; and of the survey datasets which do exist, several are not made 
available to academics. Because so little information is available, I also 
refer to an international survey (IWS*>, which could shed some light on 
India.
CENSUS OF INDIA:
The Census of India is carried out every ten years by the Indian 
government. This is a very large sample, but unfortunately does not appear 
to cover durable goods. It has information on details such as method of 
fuel used for cooking, type of house, access to water, and toilet 
facilities. In response to my letter, I received a written reply from the 
Office of the Registrar General (Data dissemination wing) of the Government 
of India, informing me that census information is available to the academic 
community on computer diskette - but the data appear to be aggregated to 
district level, and hence would be of little help in a project like this 
thesis which studies individual households.
NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY (NSS):
The Indian government studies consumption patterns every five years, using 
the NSS; the findings are published in the Indian government's regular 
journal Sarvekshana, but the data are not generally made available to the 
academic community (at least outside India). The NSS covers expenditure 
on, rather than ownership of, durable goods. Nevertheless, this would be 
an excellent source of information, being based on extremely large sample- 
sizes, and representative of India as a whole - including both urban and 
rural samples.
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WORK, ATTITUDES AND SPENDING (WAS):
When I began the research for this thesis, I was keen to compare Britain 
with a "Third World’ country in order to understand the process of economic 
development. It was clear that I could obtain access to a variety of 
excellent datasets for Britain (see section 6.2), but there seemed little 
household-level data available for any Third World country. I concluded 
that if I was to study households in the Third World, I would need to 
obtain the data myself. I was assisted in this by financial help from my 
brother and sister-in-law (Graham Simister and Ceiri Roberts), to whom I 
am grateful. I was also advised by various academics in the UK, including 
Jan Pahl, and several employees working on the British Household Panel 
Study (based at the University of Essex).
I chose the name "WAS1' to refer to two surveys I commissioned for this 
thesis; the fieldwork for these surveys was carried out in 1992 and 1997. 
Both WAS' surveys were carried out by the Indian Market Research Bureau 
Ltd. ; I am grateful to IMRB for advice on questionnaire design, and I took 
their advice on how to select a random sample. The 1992 survey studied 
2,654 households, of which half were in Bombay and half in Madras; the 
1997 survey included 1,003 households, divided evenly between Bombay, 
Madras, Delhi and Calcutta. In 1992, the households were chosen at random 
from the electoral register; eleven other households in the same immediate 
vicinity were also interviewed - this "clustering’ helps to cut travel 
costs, and is widely used in UK surveys (Durant, 1978: p. 42.12). Only one 
person was interviewed in each household. For the 1992 survey, roughly 
half the respondents were female. For the 199 7 sample, however, the small 
sample-size meant that certain modifications to the sampling method were 
made: the sample was adjusted to satisfy quotas on the education-level and
social class of the chief wage earner (reflecting the number in each social 
class in these four cities); two-thirds of the selected respondents were 
female; and the sample was restricted to married respondents. I deposited 
the 1992 dataset at the UK Data Archive (University of Essex) as SN:3290, 
and I will soon deposit the 1997 dataset. I reproduce copies of both WAS 
questionnaires at the end of the appendix to this thesis: note that I re­
typed them, to fit onto A4-sized paper (foolscap-sized paper was used for 
the original questaionnaires) .
I did not seek a rural survey of India, on grounds of cost: I was advised
by IMRB that this would be several times more expensive than a survey near
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one of their fieldwork centres (in the five largest Indian cities) due to 
the large travel costs. Note also that fieldwork in rural India presents 
other difficulties: Anker, Khan & Gupta claimed that private interviews
are impossible in rural India, due to social customs and taboos; a friend 
or relative of the respondent would normally be present at an interview, 
which is believed (by many researchers) to distort a respondent's answers 
(Anker, Khan & Gupta, 1988: p. 10; p. 65).
The WAS questionnaire used several questions from the first wave of the 
British Household Panel Study (see above); I am grateful to the BHPS, 
because I was able to take advantage of their selection and field-testing 
of questions. However, I must emphasise that WAS is not comparable with 
BHPS in several respects. WAS only asked a couple of dozen questions, 
because of my limited budget - whereas the BHPS survey includes several 
hundred questions in each wave. The BHPS survey is also better in that all 
adult members are interviewed in each chosen household, whereas the WAS 
survey only interviewed one person per household. The BHPS sample-size is 
far larger than WAS. And BHPS is a panel study, interviewing the same 
households each year; whereas WAS is only two surveys (five years apart), 
with separate cross-section samples (the 1992 WAS households were not re­
interviewed in 1997). Add to this the fact that BHPS is a representative 
of Britain as a whole (whereas WAS is limited to urban areas, and 
restricted to two cities in 1992 and four cities in 1997), and we can see 
that BHPS is a much more impressive dataset. Nevertheless, I feel that WAS 
may be useful for researchers wishing to compare Britain with India - 
simply because there is so little alternative data on variables such as 
household allocative systems.
WORLD VALUES SURVEY (WVS) :
The WVS is an occasional survey, which covers many countries; there are 
currently two waves available to the academic community (1980-1 and 1990), 
of which only the second wave includes India (both WVS waves include 
Britain). The WVS surveys contain no information on durable goods 
ownership, and have very limited information on incomes; but WVS does 
contain a large number of attitude questions, which may be useful to 
compare different cultures.
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DATA SOURCES CHOSEN FOR INDIA
For India, I used my own WAS survey data, for both 1992 and 1997. Although 
the sample-sizes are much smaller than the UK datasets, I consider them to 
be sufficiently large for regression analysis. Most previous research on 
household financial management in India has been based on much smaller 
sample-sizes: for example, Standing (1991) was based on a sample of 114
households.
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6.4 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE DATA
I discuss, in this section, a number of the complications with carrying out 
empirical work on this topic. Most of my decisions (in facing these 
problems) are unlikely to be controversial, but I report them to help the 
reader assess the most appropriate choices for future research.
USING HOUSEHOLD INCOME AS A CONTROL VARIABLE
One of the most widely-discussed theories in the economics of consumption 
is the theory of "Engel curves' (see, for example, Klein, 1974: p. 376), 
which assumes that there is a link between income and expenditure: the
fraction of income spent on any one good or service tends to follow a 
particular pattern as income rises. Bonus (1973: p. 668) refers to "quasi- 
Engel curves' in the case of durable goods, because the dependent variable 
is zero or one. All studies of durable goods ownership discussed in this 
thesis include total household income as a control variable; but the best 
mathematical form of the Engel curve to use is not clear (Klein, 1974: p. 
376). Blundell & Meghir (1986: p. 6) suggest using log of income (rather 
than income) as an explanatory variable; this is not the only form used - 
for example, Blundell, Pashardes & Weber (1993: p. 572) suggest that the 
square of log of income (or higher powers) can be added.
HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALENCE SCALES
The level of the household income appears to be extremely important as a 
determinant of household durables ownership (see chapter 9); and this may 
make it more difficult to assess the effects of other variables. For 
example, to assess whether or not women's employment is associated with 
increased ownership of household durables, the level of total household 
income should be controlled for; but this may be complicated by a number 
of factors, such as the travel expenses incurred by working-wife households 
(Rubin, Riney & Molina, 1990: p. 43; Strober & Weinberg, 1980: p. 340).
If two households with the same net income have different compositions (for 
example, a two-person household and a family of five), then the standard 
of living may be very different. The aim of a "household equivalence 
scale' is to control for different household circumstances, taking account
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of the number and ages of household members (DSS, 1993). Using this
approach, researchers hope to be able to use income data on households of
different types, in order be able to compare their standards of living.
In practice, this is very difficult to achieve, and researchers disagree
about the details on how to compare households with different compositions:
"There are many different equivalence scales in existence.
Scales have been estimated using a wide range of different 
methodologies in a number of countries. All the methods for 
deriving equivalence scales, however, have weaknesses of one 
form or another. As a result, there is no consensus on the 
best method for estimating scales and no single set of scale 
values commands general acceptance."
(DSS, 1993: p. 125).
In addition to the above problems with controlling for income, the
"Permanent Income hypothesis' suggests that even when comparing two
households with the same demographic characteristics (such as number of
children), there may be reason to question conventional logit/probit
approaches to studying consumption. For example, the share of household
income earned by the wife might influence how far the household's income
was perceived to be "permanent" or "transitory" - a wife's earnings might
be regarded as "transitory" income, if she expected to leave employment for
childbirth (see section 2.1). Friedman argues that
"A common method of analyzing the factors affecting 
consumption is to "hold income constant" while studying the 
effect of other variables. Income, it is argued, is the major 
factor affecting expenditures, so, unless its influence is 
first eliminated, the effect of other variables will be 
swamped. In this method, "income" is almost invariably taken 
to be what we have called "measured income" for a particular 
year [...] If the [Permanent Income Hypothesis] is accepted, 
it is clear that these methods do not hold income constant in 
a sense that is meaningful for the determination of 
consumption behavior. What they hold constant is a mixture of 
income in such a sense - our permanent component - and 
accidental additions to or subtractions from current receipts 
that play little or no role in determining consumption 
behavior. And the particular mixture is likely to be related 
to the other variables being studied in a systematic way. 
Instead of eliminating the influence of income, these methods 
simply disguise its influence; it shows up as if it were the 
effect of other variables."
(Friedman, 1957: p. 85).
Having noted the above comments, I ignore them in chapters 7 and 8: I have
discovered a fundamental problem with all empirical research in this field 
(see chapter 9), which I consider more serious than Friedman's concerns. 
Nevertheless, Friedman's comments suggest that the results I report in 
chapters 7 and 8 are unreliable.
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STUDYING GROSS or NET INCOME
Previous researchers have disagreed on whether to use gross (before tax) 
or net (after tax) income. Layard, Barton & Zabalza (1980: p. 65) used 
gross income to study British women’s labour force participation, because 
"the gross wage is also the marginal wage for three-quarters of all women" . 
However, for several surveys, only data on net earnings are available, 
including WAS, and several years of FES. I use net rather than gross 
earnings for all FES surveys, for consistency over time; and I have no 
choice for the other two surveys - I use net earnings for WAS; but the 
only total household income variable available for BHPS is gross income.
GROUPING DATA FROM DIFFERENT YEARS
There is some evidence that data from different years should be kept
separate. Megan Partch studied purchases of a group of durable goods in
the USA in both 1970 and 1977; her reported results suggest that the
employment of the wife of head of household was statistically significant
in 1970, but not in 1977 (Partch, 1984: pp. 501-2). A second piece of
evidence is specifically on the ownership of microwave ovens: Oropesa's
(1993) study of U.S. households between 1978 and 1989 found that high-
income households with pre-school children (ages 2-5) and teenagers (13-17)
were apparently highly likely to purchase microwaves in 1982-3; but recent
years saw the disappearance of the effect of women's employment on
microwaves purchase (Oropesa, 1993: pp. 575, 577). Oropesa (1993: p. 570)
suggested that changes over time of the influence of women's employment
might be a result of falling prices of microwave ovens, or linked to the
4question of which households are the first to purchase a new good . There 
are other complications with grouping data from different years together: 
for example, Attanasio & Weber (1994: p. 1301) report that the UK savings 
ratio fell sharply between 1986 and 1988; they discuss two theories to 
explain this fall: a result of a massive increase in house prices, or due
to increases in perceived permanent income. In both theories, access to 
credit is important in permitting households to spend more than their 
income. A similar comment is made in the Indian context by Cameron & Golby 
(1991: p. 79).
The question of which households are "innovators" is discussed in 
the diffusion literature (see section 2.6).
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Another reason to study different years separately is that the proportion 
of women in employment has grown in recent decades, in both UK (Levine, 
1993: p. 667) and India (Standing, 1991: p. 7), which may affect spending:
"A problem common to all studies is the fact that the increase 
in the proportion of working wives and the greatly changed 
economic conditions, which have occurred since the 1972-3 data 
were collected, may have altered the factors influencing 
family consumption expenditures."
(Foster, 1988: p. 17).
This issue of which households are the first to buy a new type of product 
is central to the 'diffusion' literature, which was discussed in section
2.6 above. For example, Bonus (1973: p. 669) divides major household
durables into three types, depending on the rate at which ownership of the 
durable increased over time: refrigerators and vacuum cleaners were
classified as "type-two", whereas washing machines were classified as 
"type-three" (ownership grew according to a logistic curve).
Several durables are included in FES surveys for some years but not others. 
Presenting data for groups of years separately permits us to take account 
of possible long-term trends in coefficients; aggregating the data might 
conceal valuable insights. The question of which durables to include, and 
which years, has a different effect on dramatrices to regression analysis. 
We only need data on one durable in a given year to be able to carry out 
regression analysis; but the dramatrix approach requires us to compare a 
group of durables (see section 4.3): in creating a dramatrix from data for
different years, it is necessary to choose a group of durables which are 
all available for each chosen year. When deciding which durables to 
include in the group, there is a trade-off between studying more durables 
(which may reveal more differences in priorities), versus using more 
years' data (which should increase the reliability of results).
Despite the above drawbacks, I chose to combine several years of FES data 
into regression estimates. By merging data from different years, I greatly 
increased the sample-size: larger sample-sizes makes FES regression
estimates in this thesis more reliable. I have sought a compromise between 
a desire for greater sample-size (to make each coefficient estimate more 
reliable) , and a wish to allow time-trends to be seen (by reporting several 
coefficients). Future research may group FES surveys into more, or less 
groups depending on the aims of their research.
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6.5 CONTROLLING FOR INFLATION
For the FES and BHPS datasets, I corrected for inflation by dividing all 
income variables by the UK "earnings deflator" estimated by the UK 
government (series GIEDAU, obtained from the on-line 'search_cso' system 
at MIDAS on 18/8/1997). One alternative to the earnings deflator would be 
the Retail Price Index (RPI). A more specific index of durable goods 
prices, series CBAEAU (RPI: durables) is available from CSO for 1974-86, 
and series CHBYAU (RPI: durables) is available for 1987 onwards; but even 
together, these two series do not cover the entire period of FES data used 
in this thesis (FES survey data for 1969 onwards are used in this thesis - 
see chapter 6). Although RPI and 'RPI: durables' are useful measures, they 
do not fully capture price changes of any one durable good; the price of 
one durable may rise faster, or slower, than that of other durables. For 
this thesis, I consider the most appropriate means to convert incomes is 
an 'income deflator'. All UK variables I use are at 1996 prices.
For India, I was unable to find an 'income deflator' measure, or any 
inflation figure as recent as 1997. Hence, I used the 1995 India inflation 
figure of 8.5% per year (Hunter, 1997: p. 648), as if this inflation-rate 
continued for the entire period between 1992 & 1997. I found that this 
adjustment produced a very similar average income in 1997 to that obtained 
in my 1992 survey. Hence, all Indian variables I use are at 1997 prices, 
as opposed to 1996 prices for the UK.
The above corrections for inflation were applied to total household income, 
and (for chapter 7) to hourly wage-rate; hence, regression results for 
different years can be compared. Note that when considering monetary 
variables (such as wage-rates), the UK coefficients are not directly 
comparable with urban India coefficients in the same table: UK figures are
in £s per week (at 1996 prices), whereas urban Indian figures are in Rupees 
per month (at 1997 prices). I was unable to find an appropriate exchange- 
rate to compare the different currencies: if possible, a 'purchasing power
parity' exchange-rate should be used. For this thesis, however, I am 
mainly concerned with the sign and statistical significance of the 
coefficients - none of the conventional economic theories studied in this 
thesis seem adequate to explain the observed patterns I report in chapter 
9.
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6.6 RESTRICTING THE SAMPLE
I adopted David Piachaud's 1982 paper as the starting-point for my own 
empirical research in this thesis. Piachaud (and this thesis) use "logit1 
regression - the standard technique in econometrics for dealing with a 
dependent variable which equals zero or one - see Greene (1990). Piachaud 
(1982: p. 472) restricted the 1977 FES sample, to households which
satisfied all of the following four criteria:
{1} households containing only one household;
{2} households containing a head of household & spouse (with or 
without children);
{3} households containing husbands aged under 65;
{4} family incomes between 100% and 300% of the supplementary 
benefit level.
Piachaud's restriction {2} might include cohabiters (often referred to as 
"common-law" spouse). The 1995/6 FES questionnaire explicitly refers to 
"partner/spouse/cohabitee" of household head as one category (CSO, 1995: 
p. 6); the equivalent for FES questionnaires in earlier years, such as FES 
1977 used by Piachaud, is simply labelled "Wife or husband" of household 
head, but there is no separate category for cohabiters (Department of 
Employment, undated, coding frame 20; Department of Employment, 1978; 
Kemsley, Redpath & Holmes, 1980). I conclude that Piachaud's sample 
includes both legally married and cohabiting couples, and I follow Piachaud 
in including cohabiting couples in my sample. In this thesis, I use the 
word "wife" to mean "wife or female partner1, and "husband" as shorthand 
for "husband or male partner1. Homosexual couples are beyond the scope of 
this thesis: I am interested in the interactions between husband and wife.
I restrict the sample to households containing one (heterosexual) couple.
Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori & Lechene (1991) interpret household goods 
as "assignable' or "non-assignable'. I assume in this thesis that time- 
saving durables are "assignable1 to women, on the grounds that women do 
most housework: for example, a washing-machine is likely to be used more
by wives than by husbands (Kiernan, 1992: p. 102). It may be desirable to 
remove from the analysis the few households where men do most or all of the 
housework, where this is known. Such time-use data are not available in 
FES surveys; I do not remove households from the sample where the husband 
does housework from BHPS or WAS1 surveys, because these sample-sizes are 
already small. Future research would benefit from large sample-sizes, 
provided this does not mean dropping questions on factors such as time-use.
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6.7 REGIONAL VARIATIONS WITHIN INDIA
Several writers report strong regional differences within India (e.g. Dyson 
& Moore, 1983: p. 35). For India, I experimented with adding to all my 
regression equations a dummy variable "CITY1: in the 1992 survey, this
equalled one for Bombay respondents, or zero for Madras respondents. For 
the 1997 survey, I used a different variable - equal to zero for 
Bombay/Madras, or one for Delhi/Calcutta. I concluded that these dummy 
variables had little effect in practice - the four cities seem to display 
similar behaviour patterns, with the exception of "wet grinder" (for 
grinding wheat grains to make flour, as an alternative to a mortar-and- 
pestle): this durable showed marked regional variation - perhaps due to
north-south differences in cuisine - so "wet grinders" are not studied in 
this thesis. Having experimented in this way, I feel justified in 
reporting my results based on 1992 Bombay/Madras survey data as 
representative of what I call "urban india1. Note, however, that there are 
marked differences between Indian cities - for example, average incomes in 
Bombay are higher than those in Madras: my claim is not that Bombay and
Madras (for example) are identical, but that women's employment has similar 
effects in the two cities (as far as I can tell).
I do not think that the variations within the UK are as important as those 
within India; I follow previous research on the UK (examined in this 
thesis), in not including such a regional dummy variable.
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6.8 ACCESSING AND PROCESSING THE DATA
All of my data-processing was carried out using the cs6400 unix computer 
at Manchester University (the national UK academic computing facility), 
except for initial processing of my own WAS datasets. The BHPS and FES 
datasets (and also FRS, GHS and LFS) are made available to the academic 
community via the UK Data Archive, at the University of Essex. After 
obtaining permission from the Data Archive, these five UK datasets can be 
accessed on-line via "Manchester Information Datasets and Associated 
Services' (MIDAS), at Manchester University: I found the on-line access
at MIDAS greatly simplifies access to data, and I recommend this method to 
other researchers.
I processed the survey data (for UK and India) in nine steps, which I refer 
to here as steps (A) to (I):
(A) obtaining a subset of data: The UK (BHPS and FES) datasets
are provided in the form of SIR files, and the Indian (IVAS) 
data as SPSS files. I wrote a Pascal program to identify 
which variables are available in which survey, and to write 
SIR and SPSS commands to extract the chosen variables. This 
Pascal program has been made available to registered users of 
BHPS and FES (and also FRS and GHS) at MIDAS: it is known as
"gbd' (more information on gbd is available from MIDAS).
After using gbd, I had three data files stored in SPSS (one 
for each of BHPS, FES and WAS). This information consisted of 
some household information specific to one household member.
(B) processing data on individuals: I produced SPSS files to read
in the above data subsets. These SPSS programs carried out a 
number of tasks: calculating derived variables, ensuring that
missing data were dealt with consistently, and copying 
information on husband to that of the wife. This stage was 
needed for FES and BHPS, but not for WAS data.
(C) writing a datafile for dramatrix tables: To prepare for the 
next step, I wrote a SPSS program to limit the data to 
households containing no more than two adults, and make 
certain corrections to the data, such as correcting for 
inflation (see section 6.5). The SPSS program then writes a 
file of "ASCII' data. This file had a common format for all 
three datasets (BHPS, FES and WAS), including the durables 
studied, followed by variables for use in the dramatrices.
(D) producing "dramatrix1 tables: The next stage used the "nrsBm1 
computer program, written in FORTRAN by Nigel Foster 
(Economics Department, Birkbeck College). Before running 
nrs5m, I prepared a ".in" file for each dataset (a file 
containing the list of durable goods and socio-economic 
variables). The nrs5m program carries out various tasks,
146
including sorting durables into order of ownership for each 
group of households (calculating the most frequently-owned 
durable, then the next most frequently-owned durable, and so 
on: see section 4.3).
(E) selecting information on wives: For BHPS and FES datasets, I 
limited the sample to wives of head of household; because of 
step (B) above, this also included information on each woman's 
husband/partner. The SPSS program to do this also wrote the 
data to an ASCII data file ready for Limdep. Each of the 
three data files (BHPS, FES and WAS) used a consistent format, 
which is similar - but not identical - to step (C) above.
(F) splitting the datasets into year groups: In order to simplify 
producing tables showing different groups of years (such as 
table 8<1>), I wrote a Pascal program to split the FES and WAS 
data files into different year-groups, for step (G) below.
(G) carrying out regression: I used the Limdep program on the 
cs6400 computer (version "limdeplO1, which can analyze larger 
datasets) to carry out logit regressions. Note that a 
different file is needed for each year, as Limdep must know 
the number of observations to read in from the data file.
(H) Placing regression estimates into a table: Because Limdep
produces rather detailed output (such as the convergence 
criteria in each iteration step), I wrote a Pascal program to 
process the results file produced by Limdep and create the 
tables used in this thesis (such as table 8<1>).
(I) producing "crosstab1 tables: I used SPSS to create various
tables, such as table 9<1> in chapter 9.
The data-processing task for this thesis was very complicated; I have 
summarised briefly the steps I used to process the data, but I am unable 
to give full details due to the word-limit on this thesis. Future 
researchers may find the "gbd' program I wrote helpful in selecting a 
subset of variables.
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6.9 SUMMARY
This chapter has examined sources of data on household durable goods 
ownership. There are many alternative sources of data on household durable 
goods in the UK, some of which have been discussed in this chapter. The 
FES was chosen as the best overall dataset because of its value for 
observing long-term trends, supplemented by BHPS for information on 
household financial management. For India, I use my own WAS datasets for 
1992 and 1997.
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CHAPTER 7
'UNITARY' MODELS: 
THE PRICE OP TIME
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to test the approaches known as "unitary’ models, as 
outlined in sections 2.2 and 2.3 above. The most widely-used models within 
the unitary framework are the 'consensus' view associated with Samuelson, 
and "altruist' approach associated with Becker: see Poliak (1985: p. 598).
These models are based on the assumption that households behave 
"rationally', so that they maximise a household utility function. This 
assumption has been described as the standard approach in microeconomics 
until the 1980s (Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: pp. 141-2).
The basic assumption of "unitary' models is that a household behaves as if 
it had a single utility function: this suggests that household members do
not expend time and energy in conflict with each other over household 
decisions. There are various reasons why such (apparently harmonious) 
behaviour might take place: one possibility is that a household may be
harmonious, as a result of mutual agreement by all household members on all 
decisions (Apps, Killingsworth & Rees, 1996a: p. 1), but this seems
unlikely in view of the large numbers of decisions taken by households. 
Another reason for apparent agreement is if one or more members of the 
household behave "altruistically', i.e. they "care" for each other (see 
section 2.4). However, the 'unitary' models need not rely on such pleasant 
behaviour: another possible reason why a household may appear to follow
a unique set of values is that one household member may be powerful enough 
to impose his/her wishes on other members of the household. The 'unitary' 
models do not normally seek to test how the household utility function is 
arrived at, but take it as their starting-point for empirical work.
In addition to various theoretical reasons why households might maximise 
one utility function, some economists may be forced to use this assumption 
due to lack of data on each individual household member:
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"the approach has been criticised for ignoring or abstracting 
from the individual decision-taking of family members [ . . . ] 
the limitations of the empirical work stem rather from the 
attempt to estimate labour supply parameters on data sets [ . . ] 
providing information only on market hours of work and 
household consumption of market goods. A characteristic 
feature of these data sets is that two types of important 
information are missing: information on inputs and outputs to 
domestic production and information on individual consumptions 
of pure leisure and of domestic and market goods."
(Apps, Killingsworth & Rees, 1996a: pp. 1-2; emphasis in original).
Apps, Killingsworth & Rees (1996a: p. 2) argue that because we generally 
do not have data on individual consumption, we cannot estimate the 
behaviour of individuals within the household unless we make arbitrary 
assumptions about individual preferences, and/or select a particular form 
of utility function (in which case the functional form may strongly affect 
empirical results).
I investigate one aspect of the 'new home economics' approach associated
with Gary Becker: his "price-of-time" hypothesis. Studying the effect of
wives' wages seems an appropriate test of the 'price-of-time' hypothesis:
"Becker's contribution to the "new" theory of consumption was 
his emphasis on time allocation and on the wage rate as the 
alternative cost of time used in household production".
(Sandmo, 1993: p. 14).
I consider that in testing the price-of-time hypothesis, I am in effect 
testing the 'unitary' model used by neoclassical economists. If it can be 
demonstrated that households do not take account of the value of each 
household member's time, then I feel we can reject the 'unitary1 model, 
because this would prove that households do not behave rationally (as the 
'unitary' model assumes).
Gary Becker’s price-of-time hypothesis is outlined in section 2.3; in the 
next section, I consider some of the practical details of testing the 
price-of-time hypothesis.
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7.2 SPECIFYING THE PRICE-OF-TIME HYPOTHESIS
According to several neoclassical economists (especially Gary Becker: see
Ermisch, 1993), a 'rational' household would take account of the amount of 
paid work carried out, and the price of time, for each household member 
when deciding on consumption spending (Ghez & Becker, 1975; Van der Lippe 
& Siegers, 1994: pp. 119-20). In particular, some writers have discussed 
the importance of the price of a woman's time as an influence on household 
spending; this is referred to as the "female cost-of-time" hypothesis by 
Willis (1987). In this view, a household is more likely to buy goods and 
services which save the wife's time if the 'price' of her time is high:
"Households' willingness to spend extra money on time-saving 
technologies or services partly reflects their valuation of 
the housewife's own time. As women's participation in the 
labour force increases, their time becomes scarce and 
potentially of greater monetary value."
(Bereano, Bose & Arnold, 1985: pp. 174-5; emphasis added).
Gary Becker indicates that most housework is done by wives (see Becker, 
1981, chapter 2); if one family buys a washing-machine whereas another 
does not, this would be explained in terms of the hourly wage-rate of the 
wives (who are normally responsible for laundry: see Kiernan, 1992: p. 
102). It is possible that the value of each household member’s time might 
be constantly renegotiated between household members, in the light of 
pressures such as the health of children in the household. However, to 
test the price-of-time hypothesis, we need a specific estimate of this 
value of time.
Different methods of estimating the wife's price-of-time have been used by 
previous researchers. We might use her hourly wage: if a woman is
employed at a high wage-rate, then it appears rational for her household 
to buy time-saving goods (for example, she may be able to obtain more paid 
work if she can reduce her time spent on domestic tasks). However, what 
is the price of time of a non-employed woman? We could exclude non­
employed women from our sample, but this would produce sample-selection 
bias (a subsample of employed women would not be an unbiased sample of all 
women). Human capital theory suggests that we can estimate the wage she 
would expect to obtain, using information such as her education level. In 
this approach, a sample of employed women is used to estimate the expected 
wage for a given level of education (other variables such as age are 
usually added); it is assumed that a non-employed wife with the same 
education level would expect to receive the same wage-rate, so this
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estimated wage is used in place of the actual hourly wage (Kalleberg & 
Rosenfeld, 1990: p. 343). When researchers use this approach, they often 
use the Heckman procedure to correct for sample-selection bias, typically 
by using the inverse Mills ratio (see, for example, Wong & Levine, 1992: 
p. 96). There are other problems: many datasets have too little
information to predict an expected wage-rate for a non-employed wife 
reliably (Blundell & Walker, 1982: p. 353).
Alternatively, we could estimate the price of a non-employed woman's time 
in terms of the "input substitute" method (Apps, Killingsworth & Rees, 
1996b: p. 18), in which each hour of the wife's domestic work is valued at 
the market rate for that activity - this requires us to know wages for 
childminders, cooks and cleaners etc, as well as detailed time-use data. 
An example of this is referred to by Bonke (1992: p. 286) as the 'market 
employment housekeeper cost' method, in which the "wage rate" for non- 
employed wives is set to the market wage rate for paid housekeepers.
Reuben Gronau (1970: p. 10) used a model in which "the price of time equals
the sum of the marginal wage rate and the money equivalent of the marginal
utility of work"; but by 1973, he had adopted a different model:
"The price of time changes over the life cycle. For some 
periods, when the woman works, it equals the marginal wage 
rate, and for other periods, when the woman stays out of the 
labor force, it exceeds the wage rate."
(Gronau, 1973: p. S172).
Another view of the value of a wife's time was put forward by Willis, who 
suggested that the wife's price-of-time depends on her husband's wage-rate:
"When a wife does not take market work, I (1974) showed that 
the shadow value of her time, and hence the marginal cost of 
children, is an increasing function of husband's income and 
when women do participate in the market, the cost of time is
determined by her (marginal) wage rate"
(Willis, 1987: p. 69).
All of the above methods (for estimating a price-of-time for non-employed 
women) have drawbacks; but there is a further complication. Gary Becker 
and others developed a 'reservation wage1 model, in which women take paid 
employment if they are offered a wage above a critical level, or do not
take paid work if they cannot find employment at a wage-rate above this
level (Nakamura & Nakamura, 1992: p. 6). This critical wage-rate depends 
on a number of factors such as the cost of childcare, and the distance 
travelled to work. If a wife chooses not to accept paid work, then her
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true price of time (her 'reservation wage') must be higher than that
obtainable in the labour market (estimated by human capital theory).
Hence, the price of time would be higher than her expected wage:
"According to traditional labor-supply theory, the value of 
time in the home always depends on the individual' s work 
status. If the individual works, the value of time w* is equal 
to the wage, and if she does not work, w* exceeds the wage. "
(Grossbard-Shechtman, 1995: p. 105).
On the other hand, if a wife seeks employment but cannot obtain it (perhaps 
due to local unemployment), then the price of her time may be lower than 
human capital theory predicts. In summary, the true price-of-time could 
be higher, or lower, than that indicated by human capital theory; in fact, 
the price-of-time estimate from human capital theory models is the one 
value which a non-employed wife's time cannot possibly bel
In view of the above controversies about estimating the price-of-time for 
a non-employed woman, I avoid the problem by limiting the sample to 
employed women. in this thesis, the wife's wage-rate is calculated by 
dividing her total net earnings (including second jobs and overtime 
payments) by the number of hours of paid work she does; this estimates the 
average, not the marginal, wage-rate. By limiting the sample to employed 
women, I create another problem: my sample is unrepresentative of the
whole population, and hence my results would be biased if they were 
generalised from employed-wife households to all households (Kalleberg & 
Rosenfeld, 1990: p. 343).
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7.3 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK
Stafford & Duncan (1980: cited in Dornbusch & Strober, 1988, p. 171) test
Becker's model, limiting their study to households containing employed
women. Stafford & Duncan found no significant relationship between wives'
hourly wages and ownership of several time-saving durables, which seems
convincing evidence against Becker's view. Research by Laura Sanchez
(1993) into the effects of women's employment on husband's participation
in housework found no significant link, but she did find that low-paid
wives got more help from husbands than did not-employed wives:
"This tentative finding does suggest that families with upper- 
wage wives might have been replacing the demand for husbands' 
housework with commodities or domestic help"
(Sanchez, 1993: p. 445).
Some research, however, contradicts this rejection of the price-of-time 
theory. Bryant (1988: p. 38) claims that previous research suffered from 
three problems:
the dependent variable should be the stream of services 
obtained from owning a durable good, not the ownership of it;
most studies used inappropriate estimation techniques, and 
excluded variables which economic theory considers relevant;
previous work used as the explanatory variable wife's 
employment, rather than the price of her time.
After correcting for these problems, Bryant came to the opposite conclusion 
to previous work: he claimed that women's employment is associated with
ownership of durable goods. A similar finding (for microwaves only) is 
reported by Oropesa (1993). Hence, previous research has not entirely 
rejected Becker's model.
If we accept Becker's view that the price of (women's) time is central to 
the make-or-buy decision, it appears that (at least in India) women's time 
is often valued little: Lewenhak (1988: p. 139) illustrates this by the
example of rice-milling in New Delhi, in 1986 - many women milled rice by 
hand, although it could be done by machine at a cost of only 13 Paise per 
Kilogram (100 paise equals one Rupee; the Indian Rupee was equivalent to 
around 2 UK pence). Lewenhak's comment suggests that we could use 
household spending patterns to estimate the "price" put on a wife's time 
by her household; but for such analysis, it would be better to consider 
regular expenditures (rather than a one-off durable good purchase), so this 
approach is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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The regression equation I use in this section, [7A] below, was adapted from 
that used by Piachaud (1982) (shown as equation [8A] in chapter 8):
(lfx) = «0 +“iy +«2* +aiK +«4A
where X = probability of ownership 
Y = log of (family income)
K = log of (number of children)
Ww = log of (wifefs hourly wage-rate)
A - dummy: household head at least 30
More details of the logit regression method are given in chapter 4. 
results of this regression are shown in tables 7<1> to 7<12> below: 
use FES and WAS data, in each year for which data are available 
chapter 6 for details).
[ 7A]
The 
they 
(see
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7.4 NEW EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 7<1> below is restricted to employed-wife households where the 
husband is below retirement age: I do not attempt to estimate the wage of
non-employed women, for reasons given in section 7.2 above.
TABLE 7<1> Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: 
WASHING-MACHINE OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS
WIFE 1s SIZE RATIO WIFE'S SIZE RATIO
WAGE-RATE WAGE-RATE
1969-74 0. 078 8953 3.0
1975-80 0.128 10822 7.4
1981-86 0.255" 10259 19.2
1987-92 0.419" 10004 46. 0
1993- -0.092 4378 94. 2 0.764 74 11.3
In order to highlight the essential coefficients for this thesis, I only 
report coefficients for the wife's employment in the empirical chapters, 
i.e. coefficient CX3 in equation [7A] above; the coefficients for the 
other variables in equation [7A] are reported in appendix (for table 7<1>, 
this is appendix section A7<1>). Coefficients which are statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level are indicated by " and those 
significant at 99% indicated by " (immediately after a significant 
coefficient) . In table 7<1> above, four of the five UK coefficients are 
positive, and two are statistically significant; and the urban India 
coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. This table 
appears to offer some support the price-of-time hypothesis (which predicts 
positive coefficients); but other evidence (below) casts doubt on this 
support.
Tables 7<1> to 7<12> report the "odds ratio' - a widely-used measure of the 
success (or otherwise) of a logit regression, which is an alternative to 
the "R-squared' measure of goodness-of-fit often used with OLS regression. 
As a general guide, an "odds ratio' of 1 would indicate that there were as 
many unsuccessful predictions as successful ones, and hence the model is 
not a great help in forecasting which households will buy a durable good 
(an equally successful prediction could be obtained by flipping a coin!); 
but that a model with a higher "odds ratio' is more successful. In 
principle, the odds ratio could rise to infinity (if every prediction was
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successful ), but this did not occur in any of the regressions reported in 
this thesis. The reader should bear in mind that the odds ratio is 
measuring the combined predictive power of all variables in equation [7A]; 
hence a high value of the “odds ratio' does not necessarily indicate that 
women's employment is a good predictor of who owns the durable good. The 
odds ratio is very high in the last row of table 7<1> in the UK, for 
example, because over 99% of UK households of households own a refrigerator 
by this time.
Table 7<1> may appear to support the Becker hypothesis, in that nearly all 
of the coefficients are positive. However, the next table casts doubt on 
the price-of-time hypothesis. I use an identical equation to [7A], but 
replace wife's wage by husband1s wage - which requires me to exclude non- 
employed husbands (as opposed to non-employed wives). I obtain the results 
shown in table 7<2> below.
TABLE 7<2> Husband's hourly wage-rate: 
WASHING-MACHINE OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
HUSBAND'S 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF 
HUSBAND's 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
1969-74
1975-80
1981-86
1987-92
1993-
0.619"
0.628"
0.435"
0.409“
0.494
17039
17107
14553
12121
4914
3.4 
7.9 
18.9 
42.6 
90. 0 0.183 463 8.9
Becker's theory clearly predicts that it is the wife's wage, not the 
husband's wage, which is relevant to the price-of-time (see section 2.3). 
Because most coefficients for both husband's and wife's wage-rate are 
positive (and often statistically significant) in tables 7<1> and 7<2>, it 
seems plausible that we are really observing the effects of household 
income - the results in appendix sections A7<1> and A7<2> indicate that 
total household income is highly significant in all years, and wage-rates 
will tend to be correlated with household income (especially if there is 
only one earner in the household) . This means that we cannot easily 
separate the price-of-time effects from the effects of household income. 
An alternative interpretation of the link between higher male wages and 
washing-machine ownership is in terms of social class: I return to this
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(and other) interpretations of my results in chapter 9. But my conclusion 
is that the Becker et al price-of-time hypothesis performs poorly in 
explaining washing-machine ownership.
I now consider other durable time-saving goods, beginning with dishwashers. 
This durable good was not included in either of my WAS surveys, and for FES 
surveys is only included in recent years. I retain the format of tables 
7<1> and 7<2>, because (as becomes more clear in chapter 8) I consider it 
vital to see my results in time context.
TABLE 7<3> Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: 
DISHWASHER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
WIFE 1s 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF SAMPLE 
WIFE'S SIZE 
WAGE-RATE
ODDS | 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993- 0.400" 4378 to 00
The above table 7<3> suggests some support for the price-of-time 
hypothesis, in that the coefficient on wife's wage is positive and 
statistically significant. However, husband's wage-rate is also 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) in explaining dishwasher 
ownership, as shown in table 7<4> below:
TABLE 7<4> Husband's hourly wage-rate: 
DISHWASHER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
HUSBAND's 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF 
HUSBAND 1s 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
1969-74
1975-80
1981-86
1987-92
1993- 0.385" 4914 3.1
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Overall, I consider the above evidence on the effects of higher wage-rates 
on dishwasher ownership to be unclear - it does not offer strong support 
for, or rejection of, the price-of-time hypothesis. This link between 
women's wages and dishwasher ownership may be related to social class - 
evidence from the 1990 UK NRS survey suggests that dishwashers are higher 
priorities for social classes "A* and 'B1 than for other social classes, 
in the classification used by NRS {Fine et al, 1992a: pp. 10-12); and 
people in higher social classes are likely to earn higher wages.
I now turn to food-processors. These are not included in BMPS or FES, 
although other UK surveys (including SCELI) do include them. The results 
for urban India are shown in tables 7<5> and 7<6> below.
TABLE 7<5> Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: 
FOOD-PROCESSOR OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
WIFE'S 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF SAMPLE 
WIFE'S SIZE 
WAGE-RATE
ODDS | 
RATIO j
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
I 1987-92 
| 1993- 0.697 74 13.8 |
Tables 7<5> above, and 7<6> below, are based on very limited sample-sizes; 
hence, the coefficients in these two tables are unreliable, because so few 
women in the WAS 1997 sample were employed. Both wife's and husband's 
wage-rates appear positively associated with ownership; but whereas 
husband's wage-rate is statistically significant, wife's wage-rate is not. 
I consider this to be evidence against the price-of-time hypothesis, 
although it is rather unconvincing due to the small sample-size in WAS 
1997.
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TABLE 7<6> Husband's hourly wage-rate:
FOOD-PROCESSOR OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
HUSBAND 1S 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF 
HUSBAND's 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS | 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993- 0.556" 463 2.7 |
Next, I focus on ownership of microwave ovens. These reduce the time spent 
cooking, because they speed up cooking time compared with conventional 
ovens, for certain foods.
TABLE 7<7> Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: 
MICROWAVE OVEN OWNERSHIP
UK
I
S’
E
URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
WIFE 1s 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF 
WIFE'S 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS j 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993- -0.115 4378 5.2
Table 7<7> above has no coefficient for wife's wage-rate in urban India, 
even though microwave oven ownership was included in the 1997 WAS survey. 
The coefficient could not be estimated due to the small sample-size: of
the almost 500 households which met the sample restrictions I use (see 
section 6.6), only eight households owned a microwave, and (in these eight) 
only one wife was employed - and wage data was missing even for this one 
employed wife! This problem did not apply to any other table in this 
thesis, being a combination of the very low ownership levels of microwave 
ovens in India, and the small proportion of Indian women who are employed; 
but it does highlight the need to obtain large sample-sizes, where 
possible.
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TABLE 7<8> Husband's hourly wage-rate:
MICROWAVE OVEN OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
HUSBAND'S 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF 
HUSBAND's 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS | 
RATIO j
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993- -0.019 4914 4.9 0.342 463 56.9 |
The above results for microwave ovens offer an apparent rejection of the 
price-of-time hypothesis, because the coefficient on wife's wage-rate for 
the UK in table 7<7> is negative. Note, however, that this coefficient is 
not statistically significant, and hence is not a persuasive rejection of 
the price-of-time hypothesis.
As a further check on the two previous tables, I now assess if the results 
are sensitive to the exact form of the regression I used. I take one year
(1994) and one country (UK: FES data), and change the regression
specification - I use the number of children, rather than the LOG of number 
of children, as an explanatory variable. The results are shown below:
— ^ —  = -2.17" - 0.03 W w +0.68f,Y - 0 . 0 5  NI - pi w
where
Pi is the probability of owning a microwave oven [7b] 
Ww is tvife/s wage (£s per hour)
Y is log of net household income (£s per week)
N  is the number of children 
' indicates a coefficient significant at 5%
I indicates a coefficient significant at 1%
Equation [7B] above indicates that the coefficient on wife's wage is 
negative, but is not statistically significant: this is the same finding
as for table 7<7> above (and can be compared with the results in appendix 
A7<7>, as well as with table 7<7> above).
I now report equation [7C], a similar regression to equation [7B], but this 
time referring to husband's wage-rate (rather than wife's wage-rate).
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— =-2—  = - 1.03 + 0.002 Wh + 0.44nY - 0.06 N
i  -  Pi
where
Pi is the probability of owning a microwave oven 7^C] 
Wh is husbands wage (£s per hour)
Y is log of net household income (£s per week)
N  is the number of children 
" indicates a coefficient significant at 1%
Hence, equation [7C] is an alternative specification to that used to create 
table 7<8> above. Equation [7C] indicates that the husband's wage-rate has 
a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect on microwave oven 
ownership. In table 7<8>, the coefficient was negative; but both [7C] and 
7<8> indicate that the coefficient for the husband's wage-rate is very 
close to zero.
To summarise equations [7B] and [7C] above, they suggest that using 
logarithms for the number of children (as was done for tables 7<1> to 7<12> 
in this chapter) had little effect on the overall findings: my results are
not very sensitive to this change in regression specification.
I now turn to refrigerator ownership, which may save time in shopping, 
because it allows foods such as milk to be stored for longer (and hence 
less frequent shopping trips are required). A refrigerator could also 
store cooked food, to allow several meals to be cooked at once (assuming 
food can be reheated, or eaten cold).
TABLE 7<9> Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: 
REFRIGERATOR OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS |
WIFE'S
WAGE-RATE
SIZE RATIO WIFE'S SIZE 
WAGE-RATE
RATIO |
[ 1969-74 0.515" 8953 5.2
| 1975-80 0.748" 10822 37.4
| 1981-86 0.388 10259 127.2
I 1987-92 0.610 10004 243.0
| 1993- 0.187 4378 363.8 1.269 74 7.2 |
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All coefficients in table 7<9> are positive, and the first two in the UK 
are statistically significant; for later years in the UK, the lack of 
statistical significance may be due to the very high ownership rates of 
refrigerators. The urban India result is not statistically significant, 
perhaps due to the small sample-sizes (husband's and wife's earnings were 
not included in the larger 1992 sample).
TABLE 7<10> Husband's hourly wage-rate;
REFRIGERATOR OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS |
HUSBAND's SIZE RATIO HUSBAND 1s SIZE RATIO |
WAGE-RATE WAGE-RATE
| 1969-74 0.649" 17039 4.3
| 1975-80 0.674" 17107 26.5
| 1981-86 0.466 14553 105. 2
! 1987-92 0.703" 12121 211.6
1 1993- -0.387 4914 233.0 0.497 463 3.6 |
Table 7<10> shows a similar pattern to table 7<9>, except for a negative 
coefficient at the bottom of table 7<10>: I consider this negative result
to be spurious (a result of the fact that there are so few UK households 
in 1993-96 who do not own a refrigerator). But the general pattern is that 
husband's wage-rate is at least as important as wife's wage-rate: there
are three statistically significant coefficients in table 7<10>, but only 
two in table 7<9>. Again, this casts doubt on the price-of-time 
hypothesis.
I now turn to ownership of deep-freezers, which can save time in shopping 
and cooking in the same way as do refrigerators. I was advised by IMRB in 
1992 that deep-freezers were very rarely owned in India (even in cities), 
so this durable was not included in my WAS surveys; however, given India's 
rapid economic growth in recent years, deep-freezers may be worth including 
in similar surveys in the future.
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TABLE 7<11> Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: 
DEEP-FREEZER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS
WIFE's SIZE RATIO WIFE'S SIZE RATIO
WAGE-RATE WAGE—RATE
1969-74
1975-80 0.143 3556
CO 
1—
1
1981-86 0.307" 10259 3.6
1987-92 0.130 10004 12.6
1993- 0.082 4378 26.5
It appears that there is only a weak link between wife's wage-rates and 
ownership of deep-freezers (only one of the four coefficients in table 
7<11> is statistically significant), and that husband's wage appears to be 
positively related to deep-freezer ownership (although none of the 
coefficients for husband's wage-rate are statistically significant: see
table 7<12> below). Again, this seems to offer little support to the 
price-of-time hypothesis.
TABLE 7<12> Hourly wage-rate of the husband: 
DEEP-FREEZER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF 
HUSBAND'S 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF 
HUSBAND'S 
WAGE-RATE
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
1969-74
1975-80
1981-86
1987-92
1993-
0. 097 
0.109 
0.185 
0. 281
5408
14553
12121
4914
1.8
3.3
12.1
27.1
Tables 7<1> to 7<12> above, overall, offer little support to the '"unitary1 
school: work by Gary Becker and others suggests that the price of a 
woman's time will be higher if she is employed at high wages, and hence 
time-saving durables should be more widely-owned by households containing 
high-earning wives.
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FURTHER REGRESSION TESTS OF THE PRICE-OF-TIME HYPOTHESIS
Tables 7<1> to 7<12> above cast doubt on Becker's price-of-time hypothesis, 
which predicts that employed-wife households are more likely to own time- 
saving durables if the wife's wage-rate is higher. The wife's wage-rate 
seemed less important than husband's wage-rate, in predicting ownership of 
time-saving durables. As a further test, I now present the results of a 
regression which includes both husband's and wife's wage-rates: this
requires the sample to be limited to households in which husband & wife are 
both employed. I consider microwave oven ownership, using UK (FES) data 
for (calender year) 1994, excluding households in which the husband is over 
retirement age; the resulting sample is 832 households. I do not take 
logarithms of any variables in this regression equation, except for total 
household income. The results of this regression are shown in equation 
[7D] below.
— — —  = - 2 . 3 5  + 0 , 0 3 flil "0.01 Ww + 0.67^-0.11 N1 - pi h w
where
P± is the probability of owning a microwave oven [7°] 
Wb is husband1 s wage {Zs per hour)
Ww is wife's wage (£s per hour)
Y is log of net household income (Zs per week)
N  is the number of children
None of the coefficients in equation [7D] are statistically significant; 
so it is not convincing evidence for, or against, Becker's hypothesis. But
the coefficient on wife's wage-rate is negative, whereas Becker's model
predicts it should be positive; so confidence in Becker's model is 
decreased by equation [7D] - the change of specification used in equation 
[7D] did not alter the impression from previous tables in this chapter - 
which (I claim) cast doubt on Becker's price-of-time hypothesis. I do not 
report similar results for other durable goods, or for India, for reasons 
of space.
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DRAMATRIX EVIDENCE ON THE PRICE-OF-TIME HYPOTHESIS
I now turn to the dramatrix approach, which is an alternative methodology 
to the above logit regression (see section 4.3). Dramatrix 7<15> below 
shows the priorities of households grouped according to the wife's wages. 
Dramatrix 7<15> can be compared with regression results in tables 7<1>, 
7<3>, 7<5>, 7<7>, 7<9> and 7<11> above; however, unlike those regression 
results, non-employed women are included (as the left-most column). Note 
that in dramatrix 7<15>, UK wages were converted to 1996 prices (see 
section 6.5) before grouping data from FES 1993, 1994/95, and 1995/96
surveys to form the above dramatrix. This time-period (1993-6) corresponds 
to the last line of tables 7<1> to 7<12> above.
DRAMATRIX 7<15>
PRIORITIES AT DIFFERENT WIFE'S WAGE-RATES, UK {FES) , 1993-6
GP1 GP2 GP3 GP4 GP5
% ownership 68.7 75.3 76.3 80.3 84.2
REFRIGERATOR 0 0 0 0 0
WASHING-MACHINE 0 0 0 0 0
TELEPHONE 0 1 0 0 0
DEEP-FREEZER 0 2 0 0 0
CENTRAL HEATING 0 -2 -2 -2 - 1
VIDEO 0 1 1 1 -1
FIRST CAR 0 2 1 1 2
MICROWAVE OVEN 0 0 0 0 0
TUMBLE-DRIER 0 0 0 0 0
CD-PLAYER 0 0 0 0 0
SECOND CAR - 1 0 0 0 0
DISHWASHER 1 0 0 0 0
Pop uniformity 9 7 7 97 7 9 7 7 9 7 7 9 7 7
Subgroup uniformity 8 7 8 8 2 7 8 1 3 8 6 3 1 0 4 1
Conformity 8 8 3 9 3 0 8 5 1 8 9 7 1 0 5 6
Sample size 4761 98 1746 1629 1076
VALUES FOR WIFE HOURLY WAGE:
GPl n o t  ie m p l o y e d
GP2 0 t o 2 p o u n d s p e r h o u r
GP3 2 t o 4 p o u n d s p e r h o u r
GP4 4 t o 6 p o u n d s p e r h o u r
GP5 o v e r 6 p o u n d s p e r h o u r
The UK households with the highest-paid wives do not place time-saving 
durables at a higher priority than do the other households; in fact, the 
opposite is true - households with the lowest wife's wage-rate place deep- 
freezers at a higher priority. This appears to reject the 'unitary' model 
of Becker et al, on the importance of the wife's price of time: for women
with low wages, there is less incentive to spend money (on deep-freezers)
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to save time. Hence dramatrix 7<15> (like the regression results earlier 
in this section) does not support the price-of-time hypothesis.
I do not report dramatrices for other time-periods in the UK, due to 
limitations on thesis length: none of these offers much support to the
price-of-time hypothesis (several of the earlier time-periods also show a 
tendency for freezers to be higher priorities in households where the 
wife's wage is low). I do not report an equivalent dramatrix for India, 
as there are too few households in 1997, and wife's earnings are not 
included in the 1992 WAS survey.
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7.5 SUMMARY: DO HOUSEHOLDS TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 'PRICE OF TIME'?
This research is built on the assumption that most housework is done by 
women, rather than men. Applying the price-of-time hypothesis, we would 
expect households in which the wife has a high wage-rate to own more time- 
saving goods. This hypothesis receives little support in this chapter: 
although some of the coefficients for wife’s wage are positive and 
significant (as predicted), most coefficients were not statistically 
significant, and husband's wage-rate was found to be a better predictor of 
ownership, contrary to Becker's model (in chapter 3, I confirm Becker's 
assumption that most housework is done by women, not men).
People with high wage-rates tend to be in rich households; an association 
between wage-rates and durables ownership may reflect interdependence of 
wage-rates and earnings, rather than support for the price-of-time 
hypothesis. This may explain the fact that some coefficients reported in 
this chapter are positive and statistically significant. Overall, I find 
little support for Gary Becker's view.
For half the tables in this chapter, I have considered the effects of 
wife's wage-rates, using a subset of data: those households where the wife
is employed. In order to give a representative picture of the whole 
population (of UK or urban India), we could use the Heckman procedure - 
including a weighting factor which measures the probability that a woman 
is employed (Wong & Levine, 1992: p. 96). However, the preceding results 
suggest there would be little justification for doing so: no evidence
based partly on the behaviour of non-employed-wife households (for whom the 
'price of time* is unclear) would override the findings based on employed- 
wife households (for which Becker's model gives clear, but generally 
incorrect, predictions). I do not feel any need to use Heckman's methods 
as a further test of Becker's model.
Becker's price-of-time model has now been abandoned by most economists (see 
chapter 2), and this chapter does not offer much support for Becker’s view. 
But Gary Becker's work outlines how a 'rational' household should behave. 
The evidence I report in chapter 9 may partly explain the apparently poor 
performance of the price-of-time hypothesis. The next chapter considers 
a popular alternative to Becker's view: bargaining models.
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CHAPTER 8
TESTING 'BARGAINING * MODELS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter tested (and rejected) the "unitary" models of 
household behaviour, in which a household behaves as if it maximised a 
single utility function. Because the unitary model has now been rejected 
by many empirical researchers (see section 7.3), many writers have 
attempted to provide alternative theories - most of these are based on game 
theory, and are often referred to as 'collective' models; in this thesis, 
I call them 'bargaining' models.
Bargaining models are outlined in section 2.4 above. In bargaining models, 
each household member attempts to influence the spending patterns of the 
household; the outcome of this bargaining is influenced by the resources 
(such as earnings) of each household member (MacPhail and Bowles, 1989; 
Haddad and Reardon, 1993; Haddad and Hoddinott, 1994). In this approach, 
when a household considers buying a durable good, each household member 
considers the advantages to him/herself. A woman's earnings (per year, 
rather than per hour) are thought to be central to her ability to bargain 
successfully to obtain her choice of household spending priorities 
(MacPhail & Bowles, 1989: pp. 62-3). Each partner's current earnings are 
an indication of their likely earnings (and hence utility) after divorce, 
which is central to several game theory models. Phipps & Burton (1995), 
considering various game-theory models, focus on womens' earnings relative 
to those of their husbands. Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene 
(1994: p. 1067) consider the effects of the level of wife's wages relative 
to the level of total household income.
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Referring to intra-household differences in food consumption in India, 
Nancy Folbre wrote
"Unless and until inequalities within the family can be 
systematically linked to differences in bargaining power, it 
can be argued that they represent voluntary choices, 
collective decisions, or simple cultural prejudices. In this 
respect the empirical record can only be described as weak."
(Folbre, 1986: p. 24).
Folbre appears unimpressed by the empirical record of 'bargaining1 models, 
but other researchers have been more positive. For example. Browning, 
Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene (1994) claimed to find support for one 
such 'bargaining' model. This chapter offers new evidence on this debate.
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8.2 PREVIOUS TESTS OF 'BARGAINING' MODELS
Numerous studies have tested the 'unitary' approach, on many aspects of
household behaviour. The general picture which emerges from empirical work
is that the unitary model is found to be unsuccessful:
"a substantial body of evidence rejects Becker's unitary 
approach to modelling household behaviour on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds"
(Phipps & Burton, 1995: p. 178).
Several writers have tested the claim of 'income pooling' (incomes of 
different household members are treated as equivalent) implicit in unitary 
models, and "A large number of recent empirical studies have rejected 
pooling" (Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: p. 144). This empirical evidence on the 
unitary model refers to various aspects of household behaviour; I now turn 
to the specific topic of this thesis: durable goods ownership.
EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS
To understand the problems of testing the bargaining model against the
unitary model, consider this comment:
"Tests of the hypothesis that, with prices and wage rates held 
constant, only the sum of husband's income and wife's income
affects the demand for goods and the allocation of time are
conceptually simple. However, the implementation of such
tests has been hampered by difficulty in finding data on
income from sources that are exogenous to the demands and 
allocations being analyzed."
(Lundberg, Poliak & Wales, 1997: p. 464).
We could use unearned income (rather than earnings) to test the 'pooling' 
hypothesis, but this too has problems: for example, interest-payments are
endogenous because wealth is a result of previous saving, which in turn
depends on previous labour supply (Lundberg, Poliak & Wales, 1997: p. 465).
A simple model of household spending is a linear model, in which each
household member's level of consumption is proportional to his/her own
income - this is the basis for research (using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function) by Apps, Killingsworth & Rees (1996b: p. 16). A more complex 
model is developed by Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori & Lechene (1991: p. 
22), using equation [8A] below:
171
C = ay + | f 2 +cyf +dy„ + -|yf2 +-| ym2 +9ymyf +^P
where Y = household income j-8A]
yf = female adult's income 
ym = male adult's income 
z - socio-demographic variables
The above equation has five coefficients related to the relative earnings 
of household members: c, d, e, f, and g. These five coefficients could
be individually tested, for each category of spending studied - if any one 
coefficient was statistically significant, we might infer that relative 
earnings does influence spending. But at the 5% significance level, we 
would expect one coefficient in twenty to be statistically significant even 
with random data; it is possible that we would find a statistically 
significant effect in one of the five coefficients - even if no such effect 
really existed. The Bourguignon et al paper reduces this risk, by a joint 
test that coefficients c, d, e, f, and g are all zero, in all regression 
equations simultaneously. This approach reduces the risk of spurious 
results, because they use only one test rather than five. Because the 
joint test was rejected, Bourguignon et al conclude that the five 
coefficients are not all zero, and hence the relative earnings of each 
household member does influence household spending for the French dataset 
they use. However, the joint test (of five coefficients) has problems: 
we cannot tell which coefficient(s) are having most impact on the joint 
test, or what type of impact. For example, it is possible that two-earner 
households behave very differently to single-earner households (due, for 
example, to greater childcare costs); if so, then coefficient g above 
might be very different to zero, and the joint test could indicate that 
relative earnings are (jointly) a significant influence on spending. Even 
more serious is the question of the sign of the coefficient: the joint
test on the coefficients would be significant if women's earnings reduced 
spending on goods such as women's clothing, but this would not be 
compatible with the "bargaining' theory. Bourguignon al wrote that
"the paper indicates a very simple way of testing Chiappori’s 
"cooperative or "sharing rule' approach. [..] This suggests, 
more generally, that testing "collective' models of household 
behavior may not be as difficult a task as it was suggested in 
some occasions"
(Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori & Lechene, 1991: p. 24).
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The joint test used by Bourguignon may be a reasonable way of testing 
Chiappori's "sharing rule' hypothesis, which claims that the relative 
earnings of each household member influences household spending (their 
view is in opposition to work by Samuelson & Becker, in which relative 
earnings are thought to be irrelevant because the household behaves as if 
it had a single joint utility function: see Chiappori, 1992: p. 2). But
the test used by Bourguignon et al is not an adequate test of the 
"bargaining' hypothesis discussed in this chapter, in which a woman's 
earnings give her more power over household spending. In a more recent 
paper (Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, & Lechene, 1994: p. 1081), the 
same writers present a different method of testing the effects of relative 
earnings; but, again, they use a joint test which does not allow us to 
focus on the significance (or otherwise) of the coefficient for women's 
earnings. Their approach is not entirely clear:
"we may expect that an increase in the relative income of one 
person increases his or her share of total expenditure on 
private goods [...] Note the "may" here. We do not have any 
model to this effect and it is not necessarily true in 
general. This will certainly be the case if there are 
unobservable (to the econometrician) factors at play in the 
bargaining".
(Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene, 1994: p.1080 & footnote 9).
It is conventional in economics to present a hypothesis - that a phenomenon 
will have a particular effect - with the qualification "ceteris paribus' 
("all other things being equal"). There is always a danger of unobserved 
factors influencing the results of empirical research. But when Browning 
et al wrote that they "do not have any model" to predict that an increase 
in a person's relative earnings will raise his/her personal consumption, 
their model seems too vague to be helpful. Most writers in the 
"bargaining1 (game theory) school discussed in this section do have a model 
of this: for example, MacPhail and Bowles (1989) wrote
"The bargaining approach has a number of variants which differ 
in the complexity and realism of their models of the 
household. One of the variants is the neo-classical game- 
theoretic approach to marriage. [ . . . 3 an increase in women's 
employment opportunities, for example, would enable women to 
bargain for a solution to the game which is more favourable to 
them."
(MacPhail & Bowles, 1989: p. 62).
Many game-theory models of household spending patterns focus on the effects 
of women's earnings on household spending; to assess such a model, we 
would check both the significance level, and the sign, of the coefficient
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which measures the effect of women's earnings on household spending. If 
we find evidence to support such a model, then we would also confirm the 
ideas of Browning et al that relative earnings influence household spending 
(Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, & Lechene, 1994: p. 1081). But this 
link does not hold in reverse: support for Browning et al' s very general
hypothesis is not, in itself, sufficient to support the view that a woman's 
earnings give her more power. For example, if evidence were found that a 
woman's employment decreased her personal consumption, this would confirm 
Browning et al' s hypothesis, but reject the "bargaining1 model used in this 
chapter.
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE ON "BARGAINING' MODELS
For time-saving goods, it may be expected that women will place a higher 
priority on a durable good such as a washing-machine, on the grounds that 
such a good will save their time on housework: this prediction follows
from several different theoretical perspectives in economics and sociology. 
Has this prediction been supported by empirical work? Several previous 
studies use paid work by housewives, as a predictor of whether or not her 
household will buy time-saving durable goods. These studies typically use 
the wife's hours of employment, or a dummy variable for wife's employment 
(equal to one if the wife is employed, or zero otherwise), as a measure of 
the wife's labour force participation (see section 8.3). Consider the 
following comments on the effect of women's employment on durables 
ownership:
"In summary, most studies found that the employment status of 
the wife did not have a significant impact on the purchase or 
ownership of durables, while income and life cycle did."
(Soberon-Ferrer & Dardis, 1991: p. 386).
"Existing studies found no relationship between wife's 
employment and expenditure on time-saving durables once the 
effects of income and other factors are taken into account."
(Foster, 1988: p. 16).
"The relationship between wives' employment and household 
consumption expenditures, particularly of durables, has 
received considerable attention. [...] Wife's employment was 
found to have no influence on expenditures for appliances or 
other durables when income differences were accounted for"
(Rubin, Riney & Molina, 1990: p. 44).
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Other research which found no relationship between women's employment and 
durables ownership, controlling for factors such as total household income, 
includes Strober (1977); Strober & Weinberg (1980) and Weinberg & Winer 
(1983). But a few researchers, including Bryant (1988) and Oropesa (1993), 
found that women's employment does increase spending/ownership of time- 
saving durables. It is possible that the findings of Bryant (1988) and 
Oropesa (1993) were different to other studies because of a time-trend: 
they are both relatively recent studies, and I have found a trend in the 
UK, in which women's employment appeared to have a negative effect on 
durables ownership in the 1970s, but which became positive from the mid- 
1980s to (at least) the mid-1990s - see section 8.7 below. Nevertheless, 
the overwhelming majority of previous research has found no significant 
link between women's employment and durable goods ownership; this seems 
to reject both the (Becker et al) price-of-time hypothesis, and the 
bargaining models examined in this thesis.
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8.3 WIFE'S HOURS OF PAID EMPLOYMENT
Many writers have commented that a woman's employment increases her power 
(relative to her husband), especially over money matters (Spitze, 1988: p. 
602). According to the most widely-used economic theories, women's 
employment is thought to be an important influence on durable goods 
ownership:
"both the joint utility [associated with Becker] and 
bargaining approaches identify employment as a key determinant 
of the intra-household distribution of welfare".
(MacPhail & Bowles, 1989: p. 63).
In this chapter, I wish to assess the performance of 'bargaining' models,
relative to the price-of-time hypothesis (which is based on 'unitary'
models, studied in chapter 7). Several writers consider that testing
bargaining models against unitary models is equivalent to a test of 'income
pooling' : a household with a single utility function pools income from all
sources before deciding expenditure; whereas if incomes are not pooled,
a wife's earnings increase her bargaining power. But there are problems
with studying the wife's relative earnings:
"Income pooling implies a restriction on family demand 
functions that appears simple to test: if family members pool
their income and allocate the total to maximise a single 
objective function, then only total income will affect 
demands. [...] A test of the pooling hypothesis requires a 
measure of husband's and wife's relative control over 
resources. Relative earnings would seem to be an attractive 
candidate for this measure [. . . ] The difficulty with this 
approach is that earnings are clearly endogenous with respect 
to household time allocation decisions [ . . . ] If we think of 
earned income as the product of hours worked and a fixed
market wage, then the first factor, hours worked, is a
standard choice variable in models of household behavior and
is determined simultaneously with the expenditure patterns the
pooling test examines."
(Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: pp. 144-5).
One 'solution' to the simultaneity problem, according to many economists,
is to use the wife's hours of paid work (rather than her earnings) as the
explanatory variable. Consider the logic of this argument: we cannot use
a wife's earnings to explain consumption patterns, because her employment 
is determined simultaneously with spending (on time-saving goods); so
instead, we use her work hours. But this is no solution: the wife's hours
in paid work are more closely linked to time-allocation than her earnings. 
The suggestion (in the above quote from Lundberg & Poliak) that hourly 
wages are "fixed" seems implausible - cleaners do not earn the same wage- 
rate as barristers; but if wage-rates were constant, weekly wages would
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be proportional to hours of paid work, so using wife's hours would be no
less endogenous than wife's earnings. In other words, if wage-rates are
constant, hours employed are as endogenous as wife's earnings; and if
wage-rates vary (as they do, in both Britain and India) then hours employed
is worse than earnings as regards endogeneity. My criticisms in this
paragraph are not directed at Lundberg & Poliak, who (in my view) correctly
report the methodology of most empirical economists in this field. Many
economists do not even attempt to justify using wife's hours of work: for
example, consider the work of David Piachaud - his only explanation for
using wife's work hours is
"Rather than relate this to the man's and woman's income it is 
considered first in relation to the woman's hours of work"
(Piachaud, 1982: p. 477).
Despite the above quote, Piachaud did not test any other model for durable
goods; yet after reporting findings based on wife's paid work hours, he
feels able to apply them to incomes:
"there are only very limited indications that combined 
expenditure on particular items bears a different relationship 
to the man's than to the woman's income."
(Piachaud, 1982: p. 477).
There seems no justification for treating work hours as synonymous with 
income, as Piachaud appears to do; and using hours does not solve the 
simultaneity problem. Yet the use of wife's hours of paid work is 
relatively widespread in this field, despite the fact it is not an 
appropriate test for any of the main economic theories (Bryant, 1988: p. 
39). I suspect that wife's hours is often used because (arguably) this 
measure discriminates between the 'unitary' and 'bargaining' models. In 
testing competing theories, we must use methods which can assess which 
theory is true and which false. Suppose we found that spending on time- 
saving goods is associated with higher wife's earnings (controlling for 
total household income); a 'game-theory' economist might interpret this 
as evidence that high-earning wives have more power over spending; but a 
'new home economist' might argue that wives with high weekly earnings are 
those with high wage-rates (assuming little variation in paid hours), and 
claim that the evidence supports the price-of-time hypothesis. But using 
wife's hours of paid work (rather than earnings) as the explanatory 
variable, if paid hours affect spending, this is evidence in favour of 
bargaining models which does not support the 'price of time' hypothesis. 
So for this chapter, I follow much previous research in using wife's hours 
of paid employment as the key variable to test bargaining models.
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SHOULD WE USE A DUMMY VARIABLE TO MEASURE WIFE'S EMPLOYMENT?
Several researchers have studied the number of hours per week of paid work 
by women, such as Browning & Meghir (1991); Foster (1988); Piachaud 
(1982); Strober (1977); and Weinberg & Winer (1983). However, some 
researchers used a dummy variable (wife is employed, or wife not employed) 
on durable goods ownership - see, for example, Strober & Weinberg (1980); 
this approach would treat a woman who works for one hour per week the same 
as a full-time employed woman, which seems inappropriate; work by Browning 
& Meghir (1991: p. 942) claimed that studying employment status, rather 
than hours worked, led to a bias which was often significant. If a woman's 
employment status strongly influences household spending (independent of 
the extent of her employment), then this effect should be picked up by 
regressions including the number of hours of paid employment. Empirically, 
hours of paid employment seems more closely related (than employment/non­
employment status) to household spending:
"Existing research indicates that the extent of a wife's 
participation in the labour force is a more important 
determinant of expenditure than the fact of employment or non­
employment"
(Foster, 1988: p. 19).
We could use a dummy variable, equal to one if the wife is employed or zero
otherwise, rather than the wife's hours of employment; but if so, should
part-time-employed women be included with full-time-employed women, or with
housewives? Regarding who does the domestic work, there is evidence for
Britain (from BSA data) that men only help with domestic tasks if their
wives are employed full-time:
"Although we might have expected women who work part-time to 
fall midway between women in full-time work and the 
homemakers, it turns out that they are much closer to the 
homemakers. [...] However, in one important area of domestic 
life, the organisation of household finances, women in part- 
time and full-time employment are equally likely to play a 
part (in contrast to women who do not have a paid job, who are 
much less likely to play a part in financial matters)."
(Kiernan, 1992: p. 103).
I cannot justify grouping part-time-employed women with either full-time- 
employed women or with housewives; hence, I use the wife's hours of 
employment, rather than a dummy variable.
This task of deciding how to measure women's employment is further 
complicated because there may be costs such as travel costs associated with 
employment (e.g. Rubin, Riney & Molina, 1990: p. 43; Strober & Weinberg,
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1980: p. 340); if so, an employed-wife household may face more difficult 
financial problems than a similar household with the same total income.
REGRESSION SPECIFICATION
The regression specifications adopted in this thesis are all modified from 
that used by Piachaud (1982): his is one of the simplest versions
discussed in the literature review (chapter 2), but nevertheless has 
powerful implications for this field of economics - Piachaud's results 
(like results of other researchers) suggest that economic theories in this 
field have been completely unsuccessful. Piachaud studied the ownership 
of three durables: washing-machine; refrigerator; and car (Piachaud
estimated three separate regression equations - one for each durable). 
Piachaud found that employed-wife households were not more likely to own 
to these 'time-saving' durables, controlling for household income; this 
contradicts the predictions of bargaining models, and is difficult to 
reconcile with the price-of-time approach.
Because each dependent variable is either zero (durable not owned) or one 
(durable is owned), Piachaud used logit regression, as shown in equation 
[8B] below:
(1~X) = a° +°t;L^r +0C2-^ + a 3 + 0t4A
where X = probability of ownership
Y = family income ‘•8B]
K = number of children
Hw = wifefs paid hours per week
A = dummyi household head at least 3 0
Piachaud restricted the 1977 FES data, as indicated in section 6.6 of this
thesis. Unlike most empirical researchers studied in this thesis, Piachaud
did not use locr of household income; this may explain his fourth sample
restriction, in which he considered only households with incomes between
100% and 300% of the supplementary benefit level applicable to that family:
"Since the analysis is restricted to a limited range of 
incomes, some of the most serious defects of a linear system 
are mitigated"
(Piachaud, 1982: p. 475).
However, Smith (1991: p. 20) commented that Piachaudrs sample restriction 
would exclude a substantial proportion of couples where the wife was
179
employed full-time; this suggests that Piachaud's income restriction may 
distort results by "sample-selection bias'. Hence, for this thesis, I do 
not use Piachaud' s fourth income restriction; and I use the log of most 
variables (including household income), to avoid problems of a linear 
system referred to by Piachaud. Hence, the regression equation used in 
this chapter is that indicated by equation [8C] below:
< l-jo = +“ lY +“ 2K +“a  +“4A
where X = probability of owning durable
Y = log of (family income) t8c-'
K = log of (number of children)
Hw = log of (wife!s paid hours per week)
A = dummyi household head at least 3 0
I limit the sample to two-adult (heterosexual couple) households, where the 
husband is under 65 years old.
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8.4 MY OWN RESULTS: DO EMPLOYED WOMEN OWN TIME-SAVING DURABLES?
I report the key regression coefficient (the wife's hours of paid work per 
week) in tables 8<1> to 8<6> below; I report all coefficients (not only 
wife's employment) in the appendix. The reader should note that I regard 
the findings shown in all tables 8<1> to 8<6> inclusive to be meaningless, 
for reasons I explain in chapter 9; nevertheless, they are based on the 
methodology used by Piachaud (1982), which is broadly typical of much 
economic research in this field. The first table (8<1> below) examines the 
effects of wife's employment on washing-machine ownership.
TABLE 8<1> Specification based on that of Piachaud:
WASHING-MACHINE OWNERSHIP
| : UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
| : LOG OF WIFE'S SAMPLE ODDS LOG OF WIFE'S SAMPLE ODDS |
| : PAID WORK SIZE RATIO PAID WORK SIZE RATIO [
| : (hours/week) (hours/week)
| 1969-74 : -0.104" 19536 3.4
| 1975-80 : -0.094" 19753 7.5
| 1981-86 : -0.007 18798 16.3
| 1987-92 : 0.052 16677 34.1 -0.139 944 9.9 (
| 1993- : 0.073 7185 63.7 0.033 470 9.0 j
Consider the effects of wife's employment on washing-machine ownership, in 
the UK, from table 8<1> above. For the years 1969-74 combined, the 
coefficient is -0.104 (the " symbol indicates that this coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% level); but the coefficient is 0.073 
for the period 1993-96 (this coefficient is not statistically significant). 
In other words, the coefficient is significantly negative in the earlier 
years, but later became positive. Wife's employment increased the chance 
of her household owning a washing-machine in recent years, which supports 
a bargaining perspective; but in the earlier years, wife's employment made 
washing-machine ownership less likely, which is incompatible with all 
bargaining hypotheses discussed in this thesis. I return to this time- 
trend at the end of this chapter, and elsewhere in the thesis. The results 
for urban India in table 8<1> are not statistically significant, and I do 
not consider the sample-sizes or time-scale sufficient to assess whether 
or not there is a time-trend in India (as there appears to be in the UK). 
My interpretation of table 8<1> is that it rejects bargaining models: no
bargaining hypothesis I know of can explain why wife's employment should
181
reduce ownership of time-saving durables (as happened in the earlier years 
of table 8<1> above).
TABLE 8<2> Specification based on that of Piachaud: 
DISHWASHER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF WIFE'S 
PAID WORK 
{hours/week)
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF WIFE'S 
PAID WORK 
(hours/week)
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
j 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993- -0.124" 7185 3.0
There is no coefficient for urban India in table 8<2>, because dishwashers 
were not included in the IVAS1 surveys. Table 8<2> is not helpful in 
assessing the existence of a time-trend, as seen in table 8<1>, because 
earlier FES surveys did not include dishwasher ownership. The only 
coefficient shown (1993-96, for the UK) is significantly negative; this 
appears to reject the bargaining models discussed in section 2.4, but 
given the contradictory findings in table 8<1>, I do not consider table 
8<2> an entirely convincing rejection of bargaining models.
TABLE 8<3> Specification based on that of Piachaud: 
POOD-PROCESSOR OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF WIFE'S 
PAID WORK 
(hours/week)
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF WIFE'S 
PAID WORK 
(hours/week)
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
1969-74
1975-80
1981-86
1987-92
1993-
-0.090
-0.327"
944
470
4.0
2.6
Table 8<3> above considers the effect of wife's employment on food- 
processor ownership: this durable is not included in either FES or BHPS
surveys. The urban India results reject the bargaining models, in that 
wife's employment appears to reduce the likelihood of food-processor
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ownership (the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% in the WAS 
199 7 survey).
TABLE 8<4> Specification based on that of Piachaud: 
MICROWAVE OVEN OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF WIFE's 
PAID WORK 
(hours/week)
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF WIFE'S 
PAID WORK 
(hours/week)
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS | 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993- 0.086" 7185 4.2 -3.481 470 57.8 |
The above results for microwave ovens in table 8<4> are not consistent 
between the UK (a positive coefficient) and urban India (a negative 
coefficient); the UK results are more convincing, being based on a larger 
sample-size, and because the UK coefficient is statistically significant 
(whereas the urban India result is not). Hence, table 8<4> suggests some 
support for a bargaining view; however, it is not very persuasive support 
for bargaining models, because of the negative coefficient for urban India.
As a check on table 8<4>, I now assess if the results are sensitive to the 
exact form of the regression I used. I take one year (1994) and one 
country (UK), and change the regression specification: I use the number
of children, rather than the LOG of number of children, as an explanatory 
variable, on UK (FES) data for calender year 1994. The results are:
— ^ —  = -1.09 + 0.01R, +0.42" Y +0.05A -0.04 N1 - p±
where
C8D]
P± = probability of owning a microwave oven 
Hw = wife's paid work (hours per week)
Y = log of net household income (£s per week)
N  is the number of children in the household 
1 indicates a coefficient significant at 1%
Equation [8D] above indicates that the coefficient on wife's hours of work 
is positive, but not statistically significant; this is neither a clear
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confirmation, nor a clear rejection, of the bargaining model (which would 
predict a significantly positive coefficient). This weakens the case 
suggested by table 8<4> (which showed a statistically significant positive 
coefficient for the UK); but we must be aware that the sample-size is 
rather small in equation [8D] (only 1,773 households), and hence we should 
place more trust in table 8<4> (which combines data for several years of 
FES data) than in equation [8D].
I now report a third alternative specification for table 8<4> above, 
reported in equation [8E] below. Again, I use UK (FES) data for 1994. In 
this specification, I use the wife's net earnings as a fraction of total 
net household income (in a few households, the wife’s earnings were 
apparently more than total household income - perhaps due to errors in the 
data collection; I exclude these households from the analysis). This gave 
an index (indicated by R) which varied from zero (wife has no earnings) up 
to about 0.9999 (virtually all household income is earned by the wife). 
The sample excludes households in which the husband is aged over 65.
— — —  = - 1.31' + 0.06 R + 0.49nr - 0.05 N
1  ~ P i
where
P± is the probability of owning a microwave oven
R is wifels earnings as a fraction of household income 
Y is log of net household income (£s per week)
N is the number of children in the household 
' indicates a coefficient significant at 5%
" indicates a coefficient significant at 1%
[8E]
Equation [8E] above confirms my previous findings. The new index (R) is 
not statistically significant, and hence it does not offer support to a 
bargaining (game theory) model; but it is the predicted sign (i.e. 
positive), so it does not reject a bargaining hypothesis convincingly. The 
non-significance of the coefficient may be due to the small sample-size in 
equation [8E] (only 1,765 households). I do not report similar results for 
India, or for other durables, for reasons of space.
The UK section of table 8<4> above appeared to support a bargaining model? 
however, equations [8D] and [8E] weaken this evidence, because neither [8D] 
or [8E] (using two alternative specifications) offer statistically
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significant support for a bargaining hypothesis. Hence, table 8<4> appears 
to be (at best) very weak support for a bargaining model.
TABLE 8<5> Specification based on that of Piachaud: 
REFRIGERATOR OWNERSHIP
| : UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
| : LOG OF WIFE'S SAMPLE ODDS LOG OF WIFE'S SAMPLE ODDS |
| : PAID WORK SIZE RATIO PAID WORK SIZE RATIO |
| : (hours/week) (hours/week)
1 1969-74 : -0.093" 19536 4.2
I 1975-80 : 0.013 19753 23.9
| 1981-86 : 0.059 18798 85.2
] 1987-92 : 0.132 16677 150.6 -0.166 944 5.9 |
| 1993- : 0.247' 7185 210.3 -0.363" 470 3.9 |
Table 8<5> is perhaps the clearest example of all tables in this thesis, 
of the need to place results in time context (at least for the UK). Like 
table 8<1>, there seems to be a time-trend in table 8<5>, in that the UK 
coefficients change from negative to positive; and in table 8<5>, both the 
earliest and latest UK coefficients are statistically significant, so there 
is strong evidence of a trend from negative to positive coefficients. 
There is insufficient evidence on urban India to assess whether or not 
there is a time-trend there also. Table 8<5> does not clearly support or 
reject bargaining models.
TABLE 8<6> Specification based on that of Piachaud: 
DEEP-FREEZER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF WIFE'S 
PAID WORK 
(hours/week)
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
LOG OF WIFE'S 
PAID WORK 
(hours/week)
SAMPLE 
SI ZE
ODDS
RATIO
1969-74
1975-80
1981-86
1987-92
1993-
-0.063"
-0.043"
0.019
-0.000
6288
18798
16677
7185
1.8 
3.1 
10.2 
22.8
Table 8<6>, based on deep-freezer ownership, offers fairly persuasive 
evidence against bargaining models. Of the four coefficients, three are 
negative; two of these coefficients are statistically significant - both
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negative. Unfortunately, deep-freezers were not included in either of my 
WAS (India) surveys. The time-trend apparent in tables 8<1> and 8<5> is 
not so clear in table 8<6>.
Tables 8<1> to 8<6> above report evidence on six time-saving durable goods, 
and appear to cast doubt on bargaining models reviewed in section 2.4 
above. I now turn to dramatrix evidence, which incorporates ownership of 
several durables at once.
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8.5 DRAMATRIX EVIDENCE ON EMPLOYED-WIFE HOUSEHOLDS' PRIORITIES
Before we rush to reject conventional economic theories r we must consider 
the possibility that the above regression evidence is flawed: the
regression process may in some way conceal the true patterns. For an 
alternative form of assessment to regression, I now turn to the "priority 
ordering' approach of Fine et al, as outlined in section 4.3 above: this
approach uses a "dramatrix' to indicate which durables are given higher 
priorities by different types of households.
For Britain, I chose to report a dramatrix based on data from FES surveys 
from 1993 to 1995/6 inclusive; this is dramatrix 8<7> below.
DRAMATRIX 8<7>
WIFE'S HOURS OF PAID WORK: UK (FES) 1993 to 1995/6
GPl GP2 GP3 GP4 GP5 GP6
% ownership 68.7 77.5 79.2 79.5 79.9 84.4
REFRIGERATOR 0 0 0 0 0 0
WASHING-MACHINE 0 0 0 0 0 0
TELEPHONE 0 0 0 0 0 0
DEEP-FREEZER 0 0 0 0 0 0
CENTRAL HEATING 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
VIDEO 0 1 1 1 1 0
FIRST CAR 0 1 1 1 1 3
MICROWAVE OVEN 0 0 0 0 0 0
TUMBLE-DRIER 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
CD-PLAYER 0 0 0 0 1 1
SECOND CAR -1 0 0 0 0 0
DISHWASHER 1 0 0 0 0 0
Pop uniformity 977 977 977 977 977 977
Subgroup uniformity 877 841 783 873 931 1054
Conformity 882 888 816 903 959 1105
Sample size 4757 536 1213 765 1795 240
VALUES FOR WIFE HOURS: GPl not employed
GP2 1 to 10 hours per week
GP3 11 to 20 hours per week
GP4 21 to 30 hours per week
GPS 31 to 40 hours per week
GP6 41 or more hours per week
Dramatrix 8<7> above does not offer much support to the hypothesis that 
employed-wife households are more likely to buy time-saving durables. If 
a wife's employment increases her bargaining-power (as bargaining models 
suggest), we would expect to see time-saving durables placed at a higher 
priority on the right-hand-side of dramatrix 8<7> above - but we do not 
observe this. The only time-saving durable showing any variation in the
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above dramatrix is dishwashers, which are a lower priority for employed- 
wif e households. I do not report dramatrices for other FES years - they 
are no more convincing than was dramatrix 8<7> in terms of support for 
bargaining models. I do not present an equivalent dramatrix to 8<7> for 
urban India, because of the limited coverage of durables in 1992 (only six, 
of which five are "time-saving'), and the small sample-size in 1997.
In summary, then, dramatrix evidence has not changed the implications of 
regression analysis: that bargaining models have not been successful in
explaining household durables ownership. However, it is possible that 
Piachaud's regression specification (equation [8B], modified to equation 
[8C] for my regression results) was inappropriate in some way. I now 
proceed to consider a possible development of Piachaud*s analysis.
188
8.6 CONTROLLING FOR HUSBAND'S HOURS OF PAID WORK
The above tables 8<1> to 8<6> were based on the widely-used approach of 
studying the effects of the wife1 s hours of paid work on durables 
ownership. I now turn to an alternative model.
In chapter 5, I developed a mathematical model of household behaviour. 
This model was intended to build on the work of Piachaud, and hence 
emphasised the number of hours of paid employment of wives; the final 
equation [5S] in that chapter has some parallels with the regression 
equation [8C], which was tested in the first half of this chapter. But 
equation [5S] includes the husband's hours of paid work, in addition to 
those of the wife: this is a result of the assumption that a husband does
some domestic work (although perhaps much less than his wife). It is 
possible that Piachaud's omission of husband's hours of employment might 
explain why the empirical findings of the first half of this chapter (and 
of Piachaud himself) do not conform to the predictions of mainstream 
economic theories. The next equation adds an extra term to equation [8C], 
and drops the dummy variable for husband's age (which I see no reason to 
include), to form the following regression equation:
(1-X) = a ° +0tl r^ + a 2 ^  +a3
where
X = probability of ownership r8pl
Y = log of (family income)
K = log of (number of children)
Hw = log of (wifels paid hours per week)
Hh = log of (husband1 s paid hours per week)
In table 8<8>, I report estimates based on the above regression equation 
[8F], I indicate two coefficients (husband's and wife's hours of 
employment) in table 8<8>, whereas I only showed one coefficient (wife's 
hours of employment) in tables 8<1> to 8<6>. Full regression results are 
included in appendix section A8<8>.
189
TABLE 8<8> Paid work (hours/week) by husband and wife: 
WASHING-MACHINE OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
LOG OF LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS: LOG OF LOG OF SAMPLE ODDS |
HUSBANDS WIFE'S SIZE RATIO:HUSBANDS WIFE’S SIZE RATIO|
PAID PAID : PAID PAID
HOURS HOURS : HOURS HOURS
1969-74 -0.047" -0.104 " 19536 3.4 :
1975-80 0.012 -0.097 " 19753 7.5 :
1981-86 0.022 -0.021 18798 16.2 :
1987-92 0.028 0.038 16677 34.1 : -0.159 -0.135 942 10.0 |
1993- 0. 018 0.053 7185 63.7 : 0.006 0. 036 470 9.0 |
In the above table, there are three aspects I wish to emphasise. Firstly, 
just over half of the coefficients for the husband's hours of employment 
are positive - whereas just over half of the coefficients for wife's 
employment are negative; this suggests that husbands' employment tends to 
increase ownership of washing-machines, but wife's employment tends to 
reduce it. This claim is not very convincing, as most of the coefficients 
are not statistically significant; but I feel that results in table 8<8> 
justify inclusion of the husband's employment in regression analysis in 
this thesis, which in turn justifies my mathematical model in chapter 5. 
A comparison of the 'odds ratio' (goodness of fit) measure between table 
8<1> and table 8<8>, however, suggests that this new variable (husband's 
paid hours) adds little to the overall explanatory power of the equation.
A second issue regarding table 8<8> is the 'symmetry' prediction I made in 
chapter 5. The mathematical model in chapter 5 implies that an extra hour 
of paid work by the husband should have exactly the same effect on 
consumption of time-saving goods as would an extra paid hour for the wife 
(see equation [5S]): this 'symmetry' between husband and wife is an effect
of the Nash bargaining model adopted (although chapter 5 did not assume 
that husband and wife do equal amounts of domestic work). This 'symmetry' 
implies that coefficient a3 should equal coefficient in equation [8F] 
above, and hence that the husband's and wife's coefficients in table 8<8> 
should be the same, for the same country and time-period. Table 8<8> does 
not offer convincing support for 'symmetry': for FES 1975-80 (UK), for
example, the coefficients for husband and wife are of opposite sign; but 
in five of the seven husband's coefficients in table 8<8>, the husband's 
coefficient has the same sign as the wife's coefficient.
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The third point to observe in table 8<8> is the wife's employment 
coefficient: as for table 8<1>, the UK results appear to display a general
trend of negative coefficients in the earlier years, changing to positive 
coefficients in the later years. The fact that this trend is still visible 
(after adding husband's employment to the regression) suggests that the 
apparent trend in tables 8<1> and 8<5> is not simply spurious.
As a further test, I now present the results of another regression 
including both husband's and wife's hours of paid work: equation [SG] .
This regression equation is identical to [8D] above, except that I add 
husband's hours of work: hence, it differs slightly from the regression
equation [8F] used to create table 8<8> above - equation [8F] uses log of 
number of children, whereas equation [8G] results includes number of 
children without using logs. Equation [8G] is only used for UK (FES) data 
for (calender year) 1994. The results are shown below.
1 =-1.07 -0 . 0001 if,, +0.01 if„ +0.43" Y - 0 . 04i7
1 - P i  h
where
Pi is the probability of owning a microwave oven [8G] 
Hh is husband1 s paid work (hours per week)
Hw is wife*s paid work (hours per week)
Y is log of net household income (£sr per week)
N  is the number of children 
" indicates a coefficient significant at 1%
In equation [8G] above, neither the husband's nor the wife's coefficient 
is statistically significant; hence, equation [8G] does not confirm the 
claim (by game theorists) that wife's employment increases her bargaining- 
power. However, the wife's employment coefficient is of the predicted 
sign, and hence cannot be presented as convincing evidence against the 
bargaining hypothesis. I do not report an equivalent set of results to 
equation [8G] for India, or for other durable goods, for reasons of space.
Table 8<8> refers to washing-machine ownership, and equation [8G] to 
microwave ovens; neither offers much support for bargaining models.
I do not present information like 8<8> or [8G] for the other durables, 
because my main focus in this thesis is on wives' (rather than husbands') 
employment. However, I do report table 8<9> below: this is the only table
in this thesis which reports findings related to single-person households 
(apart from the copy of table 8<9>, in section 4.4). The central column
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of table 8<9> shows the preferences of two-adult households: this column
corresponds to the UK data used in the last row of tables such as 8<1>. 
I wish to concentrate on the left and right-column columns (labelled GPl 
and GP3) : they can be used to assess whether or not men and women have
different preferences (note that both GPl and GP3 columns include single­
parent households, so childrens’ preferences may also have an influence).
DRAMATRIX 8<9>
PRIORITIES FOR SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS: UK (FES) 1993-6
GPl GP2 GP3
% ownership 54.6 74.0 59.4
REFRIGERATOR 0 0 0
WASHING-MACHINE -2 0 0
TELEPHONE 0 0 -1
DEEP-FREEZER -1 0 1
CENTRAL HEATING 3 0 0
VIDEO 0 0 0
FIRST CAR 0 0 -2
MICROWAVE OVEN 0 0 1
TUMBLE-DRIER -1 0 1
CD-PLAYER 1 0 0
SECOND CAR -1 0 -1
DISHWASHER 1 0 1
Pop uniformity 977 977 977
Subgroup uniformity 1331 893 1078
Conformity 1440 893 1168
Sample size 1618 18657 2612
VALUES FOR HOUSEHOLD TYPE:
GPl single man, or male single parent 
GP2 couple, with or without children 
GP3 single woman, or female single parent
Dramatrix 8<9> suggests that washing-machines, deep-freezers, and microwave 
ovens are all higher priorities among women than among men, which suggests 
that women have greater interest than men in owning time-saving durables. 
The evidence from the GP3 column (single-woman/single mother) suggests that 
women do value time-saving durables highly; and hence that in bargaining 
models of couple households, women would choose to buy time-saving durables 
if they could. Yet the regression evidence of tables 8<1> to 8<6> did not 
offer much support to such a pattern.
I do not report dramatrices like 8<9> for earlier FES years, because they 
are similar to 8<9>; and I do not report equivalent tables for urban 
India, because the 1992 WAS survey included too few durables, and the 1997 
survey was restricted to married respondents.
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8.7 IS THERE A TIME-TREND IN PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH?
In section 8.2, I reported previous empirical research testing 'bargaining' 
models; I emphasised that there were contradictory findings from different 
researchers. In seeking to explain these contradictions, I noted that the 
two articles supporting bargaining models (Bryant, 1988 and Oropesa, 1993) 
are both relatively recent, whereas the majority of previous research were 
earlier than this, and rejected bargaining models. It is possible that the 
two more recent articles were picking up the effect shown by positive 
coefficients in the bottom few rows of tables 8<1> and 8<5> above, which 
appeared to support a "bargaining1 model; whereas the rejection of 
bargaining models by earlier empirical researchers such as Strober (1977), 
Strober & Weinberg (1980), Piachaud (1982), and Weinberg & Winer (1983), 
were picking up the negative effects seen in the top few rows of tables 
8<1> and 8<5> above. It is difficult to assess this view, because some of 
these articles were based on UK data, but others on U.S. data; and their 
empirical methods varied. It might be possible to use U.S. data for 
several years, to create equivalents of tables 8<1>, 8<5> and 8<6>; but 
this is beyond the scope of this thesis (which is limited to UK and India). 
This might be a promising line for future research.
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8.8 SUMMARY: INTERPRETING THE ABOVE EVIDENCE
Tables 8<1> to 8<6> above help us to place the findings of Piachaud (1982) 
in perspective. Piachaud based his empirical work on FES 1977; he found 
wife's employment tended to reduce the probability of her household owning 
refrigerators or washing-machine. My results are generally consistent with 
Piachaud's findings: of the ten coefficients in tables 8<1> to 8<6> which
are statistically significant, eight are significantly negative and only 
two are significantly positive. Hence overall, I can confirm Piachaud's 
conclusion that
"the expected result - that those doing more paid work would
possess more labour-saving aids - was not confirmed."
(Piachaud, 1982: p. 481).
In addition, there appears to be a trend in the UK results from negative 
coefficients (in earlier years) to positive coefficients (in later years), 
at least in tables 8<1> and 8<5> above. I discuss this apparent trend in 
section 8.7 below. The overall impression from my empirical work, I 
suggest, is that mainstream economic theories outlined in chapter 2 are 
weak in explaining the observed behaviour. The remainder of this thesis 
attempts to shed light on the apparently poor performance of these economic 
theories.
Empirical results reported above in table 8<8> suggest that husband's hours 
of paid work are about as important as wife's employment, in influencing 
ownership of time-saving durables. But table 8<8> suggests that including 
husband's employment is not, in itself, sufficient to reconcile most 
previous results with the predictions of the economic theories examined in 
chapter 2. In the following chapter, I discuss links between women's 
employment and men’s employment, which may shed light on the rather 
confusing empirical evidence.
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CHAPTER 9
'NON-LINEAR* EFFECTS OF WOMEN*S EMPLOYMENT
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters used conventional economic methods (regression) 
together with a less widely-used method (the "ordering1 technique) to test 
two approaches to the analysis of the effects of wives' employment on time- 
saving durables ownership. Neither of these approaches (the price-of-time 
hypothesis, in chapter 7; and "bargaining' models, in chapter 8) proved 
very successful in explaining my findings for the UK and urban India.
In this chapter, I bring together two other types of evidence, which will 
further reduce any faith the reader may have in either price-of-time or 
bargaining approaches. The first type of evidence, in section 9.2, 
indicates that there are complex interactions between the earnings of a 
husband and wife: these do not seem to be explained by either the price-
of-time or bargaining models.
The following section, 9.3, takes a different tack: rather than using
regression, I report the percentage ownership in groups of households 
divided into different income-bands. Within each band, I study the effects 
of wife's employment, and find inconsistent effects: the effect of a
wife's employment depends on her household's income level. Sections 9.4 
to 9.6 attempt to make sense of the patterns observed in this chapter.
I conclude from the evidence of this chapter that previous researchers' 
empirical evidence is flawed; and that (based on evidence in section 9.3) 
there seems little reason to accept either the price-of-time or bargaining 
models.
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9.2 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND'S AND WIPE'S EMPLOYMENT
Many writers have discussed the effects on household behaviour of wife's 
earnings - both for the UK (Dex, 1985: p. 184; Yeandle, 1984: p. 165), and 
for India (Shukla, 1987: p. 628). All of the approaches discussed in
chapter 2 predict that increases in women's earnings will tend to lead to 
increased ownership of durable goods, all other things being equal; the 
remainder of this section presents new empirical evidence on this issue.
CROSS-TABULATING HUSBAND'S AND WIFE'S EARNINGS
In my assessment, most previous economic research on household consumption 
appears to assume that the wife's earnings are independent of those of her 
husband. Is this assumption justified?
In order to understand links between husband's employment and wife's 
employment, I created tables 9<1>, 9<2> and 9<3> below, which group
households according to husband's and wife's earnings, with each partner's 
earnings split into eight bands. This type of table is known in SPSS as 
a "crosstab' (cross-tabulation). Each crosstab indicates the number of 
households in each group: for example, in 9<1>, there are 1,612 households
in which neither husband nor wife earn anything (the bottom-left corner of 
crosstab), which represent households relying entirely on unearned income 
such as unemployment benefits. For all crosstabs (9<1> to 9<3>), I use the 
same sample restrictions as for regressions (see section 6.6): I study
households containing a married or cohabiting couple (and no other adults), 
in which the husband is under 65 years old. To permit comparisons over 
time, I convert UK earnings for each year to 1996 prices, and Indian
earnings to 1997 prices (see section 6.5).
Crosstab 9<1> is based on UK (FES) data, for the period 1969-74: this is
the same time-period as the first row in tables 8<1> to 8<6> of chapter 8.
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CROSSTAB 9<1> HUSBAND'S and WIFE'S EARNINGS:
UK (FES), 1969-74
WIFE'S NET EARNINGS
(£s per week,
1996 prices)
700 +
601-700
501-600
401-500
301-400
201-300
101-200
1-100
0
0 1- 101- 201- 301- 401- 501- 601- over
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 700
HUSBAND'S NET EARNINGS (£s per week, 1996 prices)
If the husband's earning were independent of wife's earning, and both were 
normally distributed, we would expect most households to be clustered 
around the centre of crosstab 9<1>; because women's average earnings are 
lower than those of men, we would expect most households to be below the 
centre of the crosstab. The observed pattern in crosstab 9<1> shows three 
aspects which I consider to be surprising:
11 18 30 13
1 5 6 38 1210 56 4 96 17
6 7 5 4 2 0 1 1 4 5 0 1 8 7 36 1 6
1612 2 4 1 5 1 7 8 2 6 9 3 5 3 9 1 5 2 68 31 39
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{i} The shaded cells indicate where a husband's income is approximately 
equal to that of his wife. There are relatively few households 
above this line; of the few which are, almost all are where the 
husband is not employed (the leftmost column).
{ii} In households where husbands are unemployed or on low income (the 
left-hand-side of crosstab 9<1>), most wives are not employed.
{iii} Among households with richer husbands (the right-hand-side of 
crosstab 9<1>), surprisingly few women are employed.
The above crosstab 9<1> suggests that husband's and wives' earnings are not 
independent of each other. Consider the third column from the left 
(representing husbands earning £101 to £200 per week at 1996 prices): 
there are 10,610 of which only 5,178 wives are non-earners (49%). Compare 
this with the rightmost column of the crosstab: out of the 50 households
in this column, there are 39 in which the wife is not earning (78%). 
Relatively few wives are employed among the four columns on the right - I 
discuss this further below.
The above findings surprised me, in indicating complex links between
husband's and wife's earnings. I would not have investigated such links,
if it were not for my attempts to understand why household financial
management (associated with Jan Pahl) seemed to explain household durable
goods ownership (see chapter 10). However, I am not the first to suggest
that wife's and husband's earnings are interrelated:
"Spouses' wage rates tend to be positively correlated (because 
of assortative mating) but a wife's labour supply tends to be 
negatively correlated with her husband's income"
(Winegarden, 1987: p. 224).
I discuss links between husband's and wife's employment in sections 3.2 
above.
I now turn to a similar crosstab, which is based on more recent UK data. 
Crosstab 9<2> is based on FES data for 1993-6: this is the same time-
period as the last row in tables 8<1> to 8<6> in chapter 8.
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CROSSTAB 9<2> HUSBAND'S and WIFE'S EARNINGS:
UK (FES), 1993-6
WIFE'S NET EARNINGS
(£s per week,
1996 prices)
700 +
601-700
501-600
401-500
301-400
201-300
101-200
1-100
0
Crosstab 9<2> is similar to 9<1> in several respects: for example, there
are relatively few households above the shaded diagonal line. The key 
difference I wish to emphasise is the right-hand columns: among households
with rich husbands, there are now more women employed. In the rightmost 
column of 9<1>, for example, there are only 57% (51 out of 90) non-employed 
wives compared with 78% in 9<2>. I think this difference might be
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important, because it may explain the apparent trend discussed in section 
8.7 above: I have observed that the richest households tend to own time-
saving durables, regardless of the wife's employment status (see section 
9.3); so there may be a spurious link between durables ownership and the 
employment status of wives of rich husbands. This issue might be settled 
by further research in this field.
Tables 9<1> and 9<2> refer to the earliest and latest groups of years in 
tables such as 8<1>; I do not report crosstabs like 9<1> and 9<2> for the 
intervening years: these are rather similar to each other, and indicate
a gradual increase in the fraction of wives with rich husbands who are 
employed. I now report an equivalent crosstabulation for India. 
Unfortunately, the 1992 survey did not ask for individual earnings data, 
so I am forced to rely on the 1997 survey; because of the small sample- 
size, I simplified the crosstab: rather than eight rows and columns (in
crosstabs 9<1> and 9<2>), crosstab 9<3> has only five rows and columns.
CROSSTAB 9<3> HUSBAND'S AND WIFE'S EARNINGS:
urban India, 1997
WIFE'S NET EARNINGS
(Rupees per month)
6001 or more 
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0
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At a casual glance, crosstab 9<3> looks similar to both 9<1> and 9<2> - for 
example, there are very few households above the shaded diagonal line. But 
my view is that 9<3> is more similar to 9<1> than to 9<2>: most of the
employed women in 9<3> have middle-earning husbands, and wives of richer 
husbands are rarely employed. In other words, urban Indian households in 
1997 seem more like UK in the early 1970s than like contemporary UK.
In my view, the above patterns suggest that certain types of employment
pattern are more acceptable for women, in both the UK and urban India: for
example, it is rare for a wife to earn more than her husband. It is
possible that a husband's employment is dependent on his wife's earnings,
but I suggest that if a wife does earn more than her husband, it is easier
for her to reduce her earnings (such as by taking part-time employment)
than for her husband to earn more. If such patterns do exist, it is
unclear what determines which combinations of husband's earnings and wife's
earnings are "acceptable' : is the pressure (to fit into the pattern) from
inside, or outside, the household? Some writers suggest that society
forces individuals to behave in socially "appropriate" ways:
"Norms regarding appropriate marital or parental behavior for 
men and women may be powerful in their ability to channel the 
behavior of marital partners to one equilibrium among many - 
raising the question of how such norms develop and are 
maintained."
(Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: p. 156).
Julie Nelson (1994: p. 128) suggested that in many upper-class households 
in the USA, there is a trade-off between husband and wife, in which the 
husband agrees to give his wife a high standard of living in return for 
'affiliation', by which Nelson appears to mean obedience and other forms 
of affection. Nelson's observation may explain why employment is so 
unusual among wives of rich husbands. Analysis of social class is popular 
among sociologists, but more rare within economics.
It is possible that employment is low among wives of low-earning husbands,
in order to maintain the husband's self-esteem:
"wives whose husbands are not good providers often submit to 
their husbands' dominance because they feel guilty for 
contributing to their husbands' sense of failure. Hochschild 
(1989) found that wives whose husbands are underemployed, less 
ambitious, or earned less than their wives do not press their 
husbands to do more housework to establish a "balance". 
Rather, they attempt to soothe their husbands' threatened male 
ego, and they bolster their husband's sense of self-worth."
(Lim, 1977: pp. 34-5).
201
Such complications (i.e. complex links between husband's and wife's 
employment patterns) make the task of the economists much more difficult. 
In trying to explain wives' employment patterns, it seems that we must 
consider complex behaviour, such as a wife's attempts to avoid undermining 
her husband's self-esteem. I return to this problem in chapter 10.
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9.3 DOES WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT INCREASE DURABLES OWNERSHIP?
I now turn to what is perhaps the central finding of this thesis. I have 
found that ownership of time-saving durables, in both the UK and urban 
India, displays a completely unexpected pattern: a form of non-linear
relationship. All previous research in this field (that I am aware of) 
assumes that wife's employment will tend to increase ownership of time- 
saving durables, although this prediction has rarely been confirmed 
empirically. But my own research (below) indicates that women's employment 
does increase durables ownership in poorer households, but reduces 
ownership in richer households. If my claim is correct, then this makes 
all previous research in this field (including my own, in this and the 
previous chapter) meaningless.
I demonstrate the non-linear effect of women's employment in the form of 
tables. I divide households into income-bands, according to total net 
household income - including earnings of both husband and wife, in addition 
to non-earned income (the next set of tables are not directly comparable 
with crosstabs 9<1> to 9<3>, which are based on husband's and wife's 
earnings rather than household income). Note that all incomes have been 
converted to constant prices: 1996 prices for UK, and 1997 prices for
urban India (see section 6.5). I do not attempt to compare UK incomes with 
urban Indian incomes, because it is difficult to obtain the most 
appropriate exchange-rate (the Purchasing-Power-Parity exchange rate 
between UK £s and India Rupees for 1996 or 1997 would be desirable, but I 
have been unable to find it). I use five income-bands for the UK FES data, 
but only three for urban India due to the much smaller sample-sizes in my 
WAS India surveys.
For tables 9<4> to 9<12a> below, I combine data from different years in 
order to obtain large sample-sizes. I restrict the samples (for both the 
UK and urban india) to households containing a married or cohabiting couple 
(and no other adults), in which the husband is under 65 years old. Note 
that sample-sizes vary between different durables in the same country, 
because different years of FES and WAS ask about different lists of durable 
goods. Following the style of tables in chapter 8, I place UK tables on 
the left-hand side of the page, and urban India on the right, to remind the 
reader to which country the data refer. I report ownership levels (for 
both the UK and the urban India) rounded to the nearest whole number, for 
clarity - except where two percentages on the same row are identical when
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rounded to the nearest whole number, in which case I report averages to one 
decimal place.
TABLE 9<4> OWNERSHIP OF WASHING-MACHINES
by household income & wife's employment; UK (FES)
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
£1 - £100 
per week
78%
(1635 c a s e s )
87%
(215 c a s e s )
£101 - £200 
per w e e k
83%
(12914 c a s e s )
81%
(4332 c a s e s )
£201 - £300 
per week
91%
(12646 c a s e s )
87%
(15184 c a s e s )
£301 - £400 
per week
95%
(5368 c a s e s )
92%
(12627 c a s e s )
over £400 
per week
97%
(4855 c a s e s )
96%
(12173 c a s e s )
Table 9<4> combines FES data from all available years (1969 to 1996) to 
obtain large sample-sizes, and hence should be reliable. The question I 
wish to ask is: does a wife being employed increase the likelihood of her
household owning a washing-machine? The answer would appear to be yes and 
no: "yes' for the poorest households, and "no1 for the richer households.
In the top row of table 9<4>, employed wives are more likely than non­
employed wives to own a washing-machine, which seems compatible with 
bargaining models (claiming a wife's employment gives her more bargaining- 
power) . But this is reversed in the following four rows of table 9<4>: 
employed wives are less likely to own a washing-machine (for a given 
household income level). It is true that a wife's employment may take her 
household to a higher income, hence increasing her likelihood of owning the 
durable; but the bargaining models outlined in section 2.4 claim that 
employed wives are more likely to own durables even controlling for total 
household income. Table 9<4> suggests that the bargaining models discussed 
in this thesis are not adequate to explain this observed behaviour.
Table 9<4> may be affected by numerous other variables: for example, it
may be distorted by effects of rising real incomes between 1969 and 1996. 
I now report a slightly different table, which I number 9<4a> to indicate 
that it is similar to table 9<4>. Table 9<4a> differs from table 9<4> in 
two respects. Firstly, table 9<4a> uses data from two time periods: the
earliest and latest years for which FES data on washing-machines are
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a v a i l a b l e ,  e x c l u d i n g  d a t a  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  p e r i o d s .  I d e s c r i b e  t h e  l a t e r  
p e r i o d  a s  1 9 9 5 - 9 6 ,  b u t  t h e  1 9 9 6  d a t a  i s  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  1 9 9 6  o n l y .  
T h e r e  a r e  o n l y  t h r e e  y e a r s  o f  d a t a  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d i s h w a s h e r s  a n d  m i c r o w a v e  
o v e n s  ( s e e  t a b l e s  9<6a> a n d  9<8a>), a n d  I s p l i t  t h e s e  t h r e e  y e a r s  i n t o  t w o  
g r o u p s .  T o  b e  c o n s i s t e n t ,  I u s e  t h e  s a m e  f i n a l  p e r i o d  ( i . e .  1 9 9 5  a n d  f i r s t  
q u a r t e r  1 9 9 6 )  f o r  a l l  t a b l e s  9<4a>, 9<6a>, 9<8a>, 9<10a>, a n d  9<12a>.
H e n c e ,  t a b l e  9<4a> h a s  m o r e  c o l u m n s  t h a n  t a b l e  9<4>. T h e  s e c o n d  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  t a b l e s  i s  t h a t  t a b l e  9<4a> d i v i d e s  h o u s e h o l d s  i n t o  i n c o m e  
d e c i l e s  ( b a s e d  o n  n e t  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e )  t o  g i v e  t e n  e q u a l - s i z e d  g r o u p s ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f i v e  i n c o m e  g r o u p s  i n  t a b l e  9<4>; s o  t h e r e  a r e  m o r e  r o w s  
i n  t a b l e  9<4a> t h a n  i n  t a b l e  9<4>. T h e  g r e a t e r  n u m b e r  o f  r o w s  a n d  c o l u m n s  
s h o w  m o r e  d e t a i l  t h a n  t a b l e  9<4>, b u t  t h e r e  i s  a c o s t :  t h e r e  a r e  f e w e r
c a s e s  i n  e a c h  c e l l  o f  t a b l e  9<4a>, a n d  h e n c e  m o r e  r i s k  o f  s p u r i o u s  r e s u l t s .
TABLE 9<4a> OWNERSHIP OF WASHING-MACHINES
__________________by income decile & wife's work: UK
GROUP 
(based on 
household 
income):
196S
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
)-70
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
1991
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
5-96
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
poorest 10% 58%
( 5 3 3  c a s e s )
64%
(85 c a s e s )
95%
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
93%
( 57 c a s e s )
2nd decile 73%
( 5 0 1  c a s e s )
62%
( 1 1 8  c a s e s )
97%
( 2 0 1  c a s e s )
98%
( 9 8  c a s e s )
3rd decile 77%
( 4 3 0  c a s e s )
64%
( 1 8 8  c a s e s )
100%
( 1 4 0  c a s e s )
98%
( 1 5 9  c a s e s )
4th decile 76%
( 3 9 8  c a s e s )
68%
( 2 2 0  c a s e s )
100%
( 1 1 1  c a s e s )
98%
( 1 8 8  c a s e s )
5th decile 79%
( 3 4 0  c a s e s )
68%
( 2 7 9  c a s e s )
100%
( 1 0 2  c a s e s )
99%
( 1 9 6  c a s e s )
6th decile 79%
( 3 1 8  c a s e s )
71%
( 3 0 1  c a s e s )
100%
(85 c a s e s )
99%
( 2 1 4  c a s e s )
7th decile 86%
( 2 7 3  c a s e s )
72%
( 3 4 5  c a s e s )
99%
(72 c a s e s )
100%
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
8th decile 85%
( 2 5 5  c a s e s )
74%
( 3 6 4  c a s e s )
100%
(72 c a s e s )
99.7%
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
9th decile 84%
( 2 1 3  c a s e s )
75%
( 4 0 6  c a s e s )
98%
(58 c a s e s )
100%
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
richest 10% 88%
( 3 0 5  c a s e s )
79%
( 3 1 3  c a s e s )
100%
(83 c a s e s )
99%
( 2 1 5  c a s e s )
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The above table 9<4a> confirms the general pattern of table 9<4>, but with 
reservations. Consider the 1969-70 column of 9<4a>: in the first row (the
poorest decile), employed-wife households are more likely to own a washing- 
machine than non-employed-wife households; and the opposite pattern is 
observed for all other rows of the same column. This is exactly the same 
pattern as was observed in table 9<4>: I call this a "non-linear' effect
of wife's employment on durables ownership. This pattern is not so clear 
for the 1995-96 columns of table 9<4a>, but these columns are rather 
unreliable because ownership was close to 100% in each decile. Overall, 
table 9<4a> does not reject the idea of a "non-linear" pattern I claim to 
see in table 9<4>.
I now turn to the equivalent table for urban India, table 9<5>:
TABLE 9<5> OWNERSHIP OF WASHING-MACHINES
by household income & wife's employment: urban India
WIFE IS NOT WIFE IS
EMPLOYED EMPLOYED
1 - 2000 0.2% 0.0%
Rupees per month (420 c a s e s ) (48 c a s e s )
2001 - 4000 5% 2%
Rupees per month (517 c a s e s ) (49 c a s e s )
over 4000 29% 44%
Rupees per month (305 c a s e s ) (75 c a s e s )
The relatively small sample-sizes in the WAS surveys, combined with the low 
ownership rates among poorer Indian households, mean that we cannot be very 
confident about the figures in table 9<5>. I report ownership levels on 
the top row to one decimal place (rather than rounded to the nearest whole 
number), in order to distinguish between ownership levels on the top row; 
but the reader should note that the small sample-sizes make these figures 
of questionable reliability. There appears to be a non-linear effect of 
wife's employment, but in the opposite way to that seen in table 9<4>: 
wife's employment apparently decreases washing-machine ownership among the 
poorest and middle-income households, but increases the likelihood of 
ownership among richer households. I discuss these issues in section 9.4 
below, but I now examine equivalent tables for other time-saving durables.
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TABLE 9<6> OWNERSHIP OP DISHWASHERS
by household income & wife's employment: UK (FES)
WIFE IS NOT WIFE IS
EMPLOYED EMPLOYED
£1 - £100 1 2 % 2 2 %
per week (171 c a s e s ) (36 c a s e s )
£101 - £200 1 2 % 1 2 %
per week (678 c a s e s ) (242 c a s e s )
£201 - £300 15% 16%
per week (724 c a s e s ) (771 c a s e s )
£301 - £400 32% 2 1 %
per week (529 c a s e s ) (1185 c a s e s )
over £400 60% 43%
per week (705 c a s e s ) (2144 c a s e s )
Table 9<6> above refers to dishwasher ownership; it uses all available FES 
data (from 1993 to 1996). Table 9<6> shows the same "non-linear1 effect 
of wife's employment on ownership as the two preceding tables for the UK. 
The general pattern is that in the poorest households, the wife's 
employment tends to increase dishwasher-ownership; whereas in richer 
households, wife's employment make dishwasher ownership less likely. I now 
turn to a different version of this table, which I call 9<6a>: this
differs from table 9<6> in the same way as table 9<4a> differs from table 
9<4>.
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TABLE 9<6a> OWNERSHIP OP DISHWASHERS
__________________by income decile S wife's work: UK
GROUP 
(based on 
household 
income):
199c
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
i-94
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
199'
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
5-96
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
poorest 10% 1 1 %
( 3 3 3  c a s e s )
1 2 %
(86 c a s e s )
1 2 %
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
1 8 %
(5 7  c a s e s )
2nd decile 1 0 . 8 %
( 2 5 9  c a s e s )
1 1 . 2 %
( 1 6 1  c a s e s )
2 0 %
( 2 0 1  c a s e s )
1 7 %
(98 c a s e s )
3rd decile 1 3 %
( 2 1 3  c a s e s )
1 5 %
(207 c a s e s )
1 3 %
( 1 4 0  c a s e s )
1 6 %
( 1 5 9  c a s e s )
4th decile 2 5 %
( 1 6 3  c a s e s )
1 4 %
( 2 5 7  c a s e s )
2 5 %
( 1 1 1  c a s e s )
2 4 %
( 1 8 8  c a s e s )
5th decile 2 4 %
( 1 2 4  c a s e s )
1 5 %
(29 6  c a s e s )
3 4 %
( 1 0 2  c a s e s )
2 0 %
( 1 9 6  c a s e s )
6th decile 2 7 %
( 1 2 4  c a s e s )
2 3 %
( 2 9 6  c a s e s )
3 6 %
(85 c a s e s )
2 8 %
( 2 1 4  c a s e s )
7th decile 4 4 %
( 1 0 5  c a s e s )
2 5 %
(315 c a s e s )
4 9 %
(72 c a s e s )
3 0 %
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
8th decile 5 4 %
(92 c a s e s )
3 2 %
( 3 2 8  c a s e s )
4 6 %
(72 c a s e s )
3 9 %
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
9th decile 5 8 %
(93 c a s e s )
4 5 %
( 3 2 7  c a s e s )
5 7 %
( 58 c a s e s )
4 8 %
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
richest 10% 8 2 %
( 1 3 6  c a s e s )
6 7 %
(283 c a s e s )
7 8 %
(83 c a s e s )
6 6 %
( 2 1 5  c a s e s )
Both time-periods in table 9<6a> suggest a similar pattern to table 9<6>: 
in the poorest three deciles, employed-wife households are more likely 
(than non-employed-wife households) to own a dishwasher; whereas the 
opposite is true for the remaining (non-poor) households. The only 
exception to this is the second decile, for 1995-96. Overall, table 9<6a> 
confirms the pattern in tables 9<4>, 9<4a> and 9<6>. There is no
equivalent table for urban India, because dishwashers were not included in 
the 1992 or 1997 surveys.
I now turn to the following durable good, food-processors. This item was 
not included in any year of either FES or BHPS surveys, so the next table 
(9<7> below) refers to urban India. Table 9<7> does not indicate the "non­
linear' effect visible in tables 9<4> to 9<6a>; but there is no comfort 
here for bargaining theorists. The game-theory models discussed in section
2.4 would all predict employed women gain power from their earnings; but
208
for all three rows of table 9<7>, employed-wife households are less likely 
to own food-processors. Pood-processors appear different to the other 
five durables (in tables 9<4> to 9<6a>, and 9<8> to 9<12a>) in not showing 
a tendency for wife's employment to increase ownership in any income group. 
I am unable to explain why food-processors should be different; but in 
view of the small sample-sizes in the Indian surveys, I would not place too 
much confidence in table 9<7>.
TABLE 9<7> OWNERSHIP OF FOOD-PROCESSORS
by household income & wife's employment: urban India
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
1 - 2000 11.2% 4.2%
Rupees per month (420 cases) (48 cases)
2001 - 4000 41.0% 20.4%
Rupees per month (517 cases) (49 cases)
over 4000 82.3% 80.0%
Rupees per month (305 cases) (75 cases)
Next, I consider ownership of microwave ovens - this evidence is reported 
in tables 9<8> and 9<8a> for the UK, and 9<9> for urban India. Table 9<8> 
does not display the "non-linear1 relationship between wife's employment 
and durables ownership seen in most tables in this section.
TABLE 9<8> OWNERSHIP OF MICROWAVE OVENS
by household income & wife's employment: UK (FES)
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
£1 - £100 64% 69%
per week (171 cases) (36 cases)
£101 - £200 66% 74%
per week (678 cases) (242 cases)
£201 - £300 77% 79%
per week (724 cases) (771 cases)
£301 - £400 85% 84%
per week (529 cases) (1185 cases)
over £400 80% 87%
per week (705 cases) (2144 cases)
I now offer a slightly more detailed view of the above information. Table 
9<8a> splits the time-period into two, hence adding two extra columns; and
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it divides the five income-bands into ten deciles, thus adding more rows. 
Hence, table 9<8a> has the same structure as tables 9<4a> and 9<6a> above.
TABLE 9<8a> OWNERSHIP OF MICROWAVE OVENS
_________ by income decile & wife1s work: UK
G R O U P  
( b a s e d  o n  
h o u s e h o l d  
i n c o m e );
1992
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
J-94
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
199!
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
5-96
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
poorest 10% 6 1 %
( 3 3 3  c a s e s )
7 7 %
(86 c a s e s )
7 1 %
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
6 7 %
( 5 7  c a s e s )
2nd decile 6 6 %
( 2 5 9  c a s e s )
7 3 %
( 1 6 1  c a s e s )
7 4 %
( 2 0 1  c a s e s )
8 2 %
(9 8  c a s e s )
3rd decile 7 7 %
( 2 1 3  c a s e s )
8 0 %
( 207 c a s e s )
7 7 %
( 1 4 0  c a s e s )
8 2 %
( 1 5 9  c a s e s )
4th decile 8 0 %
( 1 6 3  c a s e s )
7 7 %
( 2 5 7  c a s e s )
8 6 %
( 1 1 1  c a s e s )
8 2 %
( 1 8 8  c a s e s )
5th decile 8 0 %
( 1 2 4  c a s e s )
8 3 %
( 2 9 6  c a s e s )
7 9 %
( 1 0 2  c a s e s )
8 8 %
( 1 9 6  c a s e s )
6th decile 9 0 %
( 1 2 4  c a s e s )
8 2 %
( 2 9 6  c a s e s )
8 8 %
(85 c a s e s )
8 7 %
( 2 1 4  c a s e s )
7th decile 7 8 %
( 1 0 5  c a s e s )
8 5 %
( 3 1 5  c a s e s )
8 2 %
(72 c a s e s )
8 7 %
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
8th decile 7 9 %
(92 c a s e s )
8 5 %
( 3 2 8  c a s e s )
7 9 %
(72 c a s e s )
9 0 %
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
9th decile 8 3 %
(93 c a s e s )
8 6 %
(327 c a s e s )
8 4 %
(58 c a s e s )
8 8 %
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
richest 10% 7 9 %
( 1 3 6  c a s e s )
8 6 %
( 2 8 3  c a s e s )
8 3 %
(83 c a s e s )
8 8 %
( 2 1 5  c a s e s )
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t a b l e  9<8a>: t h e r e  i s  n o  c l e a r  p a t t e r n  o f
o w n e r s h i p  i n  w h i c h  e m p l o y e d - w i f e  h o u s e h o l d s  d i f f e r  f r o m  n o n - e m p l o y e d - w i f e  
h o u s e h o l d s . I t  c o u l d  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  e m p l o y e d - w i f e  h o u s e h o l d s  a r e  m o r e  
l i k e l y  t o  o w n  m i c r o w a v e  o v e n s ;  b u t  t h e  o p p o s i t e  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  f o u r t h  a n d  
s i x t h  d e c i l e s ,  f o r  b o t h  1 9 9 3 - 9 4  a n d  1 9 9 5 - 9 6  ( t h i s  m a y  s i m p l y  b e  a  
c o i n c i d e n c e ,  o r  c o u l d  i n d i c a t e  a  c o m p l e x  r e l a t i o n s h i p ) . A n d  c o n s i d e r i n g  
d a t a  o n  I n d i a ,  t a b l e  9<9> b e l o w  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  w i v e s '  e m p l o y m e n t  r e d u c e s  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  o w n i n g  a m i c r o w a v e  o v e n .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e n ,  t h i s  e m p i r i c a l  
e v i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  U K  a n d  I n d i a  d o e s  n o t  s h o w  a n y  c l e a r  p a t t e r n  b e t w e e n  
w i f e ' s  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  m i c r o w a v e  o v e n  o w n e r s h i p .  T a b l e s  9<8>, 9<8a> a n d  
9<9> d o  n o t  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  " n o n - l i n e a r '  r e l a t i o n s h i p  s e e n  i n  o t h e r  t a b l e s  
( i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ) ;  b u t  n o r  d o  t h e y  o f f e r  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t
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employed-wife households are more likely to own microwave ovens, as claimed 
by virtually all of the economists discussed in chapter 2.
TABLE 9<9> OWNERSHIP OP MICROWAVE OVENS
by household income & wife's employment: urban India
WIFE IS NOT WIFE IS
EMPLOYED EMPLOYED
I - 2000 0.0% 0.0%
Rupees per month ( 1 4 3  c a s e s ) ( 2 6  c a s e s )
2001 - 4000 1% 0%
Rupees per month ( 1 6 3  c a s e s ) ( 2 5  c a s e s )
over 4000 8% 0%
Rupees per month (84 c a s e s ) (2 9  c a s e s )
I now turn to the next durable good: refrigerators, shown in table 9<10>
below (for the UK). Table 9<10> does not display the "non-linear' 
relationship seen in previous tables for the UK; but well over 90% of the 
richer households own a refrigerator, so we are studying a fairly small 
number of non-owners - this may leave us open to the risk of spurious 
results.
TABLE 9<10> OWNERSHIP OF REFRIGERATORS
by household income & wife's employment: UK (FES)
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
£1 - £100 
per week
85%
(1635 cases)
88%
(215 cases)
£101 - £200 
per week
86%
(12914 cases)
88%
(4332 cases)
£201 - £300 
per week
93%
(12646 cases)
94%
(15184 cases)
£301 - £400 
per week
97%
(5368 cases)
98%
(12627 cases)
over £400 
per week
99.1%
(4855 cases)
99.4%
(12173 cases)
I now present table 9<10a>, which differs from 9<10> in the same way as 
table 9<4a> differs from table 9<4> above. Table 9<10a> helps with the 
problem of high ownership levels in table 9<10>, by separating the data for 
1969-70 (the first two years in which refrigerator ownership was included 
in the FES). We can see the same "non-linear' pattern as in many previous
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tables (from 9<4> onwards): in the 1969-70 column of table 9<10a>, the
ownership level is higher for employed-wife households in the poorest 
decile, but lower for almost all other deciles (the exception to this is 
the 8th decile, where employed-wife and non-employed-wife households own 
about the same proportion). I consider that the 1995-96 columns of table 
9<10a> are unreliable, because almost all cells are close to 100% 
ownership. Overall, then, table 9<10a> seems to support the "non-linear1 
pattern in most previous tables in this section.
TABLE 9<10a> OWNERSHIP OP REFRIGERATORS
__________________by income decile & wife's work: UK
GROUP 
(based on 
household 
income):
196S
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
>-70
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
199!
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
5-96
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
poorest 10% 47%
(533 c a s e s )
52%
(85 c a s e s )
98%
(241 c a s e s )
100%
(57 c a s e s )
2nd decile 55%
(501 c a s e s )
53%
(118 c a s e s )
100.0%
(201 c a s e s )
100.0%
(98 c a s e s )
3rd decile 66%
(430 c a s e s )
58%
(188 c a s e s )
99%
(140 c a s e s )
100%
(159 c a s e s )
4th decile 69%
(398 c a s e s )
65%
(220 c a s e s )
99.1%
(111 c a s e s )
99.5%
(188 c a s e s )
5th decile 71%
(340 c a s e s )
68%
(279 c a s e s )
99.0%
(102 c a s e s )
99.5%
(196 c a s e s )
6th decile 76%
(318 c a s e s )
70%
(301 c a s e s )
99%
(85 c a s e s )
100%
(214 c a s e s )
7th decile 79%
(273 c a s e s )
76%
(345 c a s e s )
100%
(72 c a s e s )
99.6%
(227 c a s e s )
8th decile 83.5%
(255 c a s e s )
84.1%
(364 c a s e s )
97%
(72 c a s e s )
99%
(227 c a s e s )
9th decile 92%
(213 c a s e s )
85%
(406 c a s e s )
100.0%
(58 c a s e s )
100.0%
(241 c a s e s )
richest 10% 96%
(305 c a s e s )
93%
(313 c a s e s )
100.0%
(83 c a s e s )
100.0%
(215 c a s e s )
Table 9<11>, below, refers to India: is does not show a very clear
pattern. The top two rows suggest a tendency for wife’s employment to 
reduce the likelihood of owning a refrigerator, but the predicted pattern 
(wife's employment increasing ownership) is shown in the bottom row. Hence 
table 9<11> displays a "non-linear' effect of women's employment, which is 
the reverse of that seen in several UK tables (including 9<10a>); note
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that table 9<11> shows a similar pattern to another table based on urban 
India data, i.e. table 9<5> above.
TABLE 9<11> OWNERSHIP OP REFRIGERATORS
by household income & wife's employment: urban India
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
1 - 2000 2.4% 2.1%
Rupees per month (420 cases) (48 cases)
2001 - 4000 23% 10%
Rupees per month <517 cases) (49 cases)
over 4000 68% 71%
Rupees per month (305 cases) (75 cases)
The final durable good considered here is deep-freezer ownership: this is
in table 9<12> for the UK, but there is no equivalent table for urban India 
(deep-freezers were not included in either WAS survey) . For the UK, table 
9<12> shows a fairly clear "non-linear1 effect, in which wife’s employment 
tends to increase deep-freezer ownership for the top two rows (poorer 
households), but reduces ownership for the bottom three rows (richer 
households).
TABLE 9<12> OWNERSHIP OF DEEP-FREEZERS
by household income & wife's employment: UK (FES)
WIFE IS NOT WIFE IS
EMPLOYED EMPLOYED
£1 - £100 61% 76%
per week (1060 cases) (147 cases)
£101 - £200 64% 69%
per week (5962 cases) (2005 cases)
£201 - £300 79% 76%
per week (6445 cases) (7467 cases)
£301 - £400 89% 86%
per week (3484 cases) (8386 cases)
over £400 95% 93%
per week (3686 cases) (10304 cases)
Table 9<12a> below is a more detailed version of table 9<12>: table 9<12a>
is modified from table 9<12>, in the same way as table 9<4a> is modified 
from 9<4>. Consider, first, the 1979-80 columns of table 9<12a>: these
are the earliest two years for which FES data are available on deep- 
freezers. These two columns show that a wife’s employment tends to
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increase deep freezer ownership, except for the poorest decile of 
households - in which wife's employment apparently reduce the likelihood 
of ownership. A similar pattern is visible for 1995-96, except that now 
the wife's employment reduces the likelihood of ownership in the three 
poorest deciles, rather than just one decile. There are two deciles which 
do not fit this pattern (the 6th and 9th deciles of 1995-96), but here 
ownership differs little between employed and non-employed wife households 
(and are close to 100%). Overall, then, deep-freezers appear to show a 
"non-linear* ownership pattern like those of other durables in this section 
(referring to the UK, and with the exception of microwave ovens).
TABLE 9<12a> OWNERSHIP OF DEEP-FREEZERS
__________________by income decile & wife's work; UK
G R O U P  
( b a s e d  o n  
h o u s e h o l d  
i n c o m e ):
197S
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
>-80
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
199f
WIFE IS NOT 
EMPLOYED
5— 9 6
WIFE IS 
EMPLOYED
poorest 10% 3 8 %
( 5 2 2  c a s e s )
4 4 %
(106 c a s e s )
8 7 %
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
9 1 %
(5 7  c a s e s )
2nd decile 4 9 %
( 4 3 7  c a s e s )
4 7 %
( 1 9 2  c a s e s )
9 4 %
( 2 0 1  c a s e s )
9 6 %
( 9 8  c a s e s )
3rd decile 5 3 %
( 3 6 3  c a s e s )
5 2 %
( 2 6 6  c a s e s )
9 1 %
( 1 4 0  c a s e s )
9 5 %
( 1 5 9  c a s e s )
4th decile 5 8 %
( 2 9 8  c a s e s )
5 4 %
( 3 3 1  c a s e s )
9 5 %
( 1 1 1  c a s e s )
9 4 %
( 1 8 8  c a s e s )
5th decile 6 3 %
( 2 5 5  c a s e s )
5 6 %
( 3 7 4  c a s e s )
9 9 %
( 1 0 2  c a s e s )
9 8 %
( 1 9 6  c a s e s )
6th decile 6 5 %
( 2 0 6  c a s e s )
6 2 %
( 4 2 3  c a s e s )
9 5 %
(85 c a s e s )
9 6 %
( 2 1 4  c a s e s )
7th decile 7 1 %
( 1 7 3  c a s e s )
6 6 %
( 4 5 6  c a s e s )
9 9 %
(72 c a s e s )
9 7 %
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
8th decile 7 0 %
( 1 5 2  c a s e s )
6 9 %
( 477 c a s e s )
9 7 %
(72 c a s e s )
9 6 %
( 2 2 7  c a s e s )
9th decile 8 5 %
( 1 4 4  c a s e s )
7 4 %
( 4 8 5  c a s e s )
9 6 . 6 %
(58 c a s e s )
9 6 . 7 %
( 2 4 1  c a s e s )
richest 10% 8 5 %
( 1 8 2  c a s e s )
8 0 %
( 4 4 6  c a s e s )
1 0 0 %
(83 c a s e s )
9 7 %
( 2 1 5  c a s e s )
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To summarise section 9.3, I wish to emphasise three points. Firstly, many 
tables in this section suggest a "non-linear' relationship: women's
employment appears to have the opposite effect in the poorest households 
to its effect in the non-poor households. By "poorest", I am referring to 
the lowest one, or two, or three deciles - depending on which durable (and 
which year) is being studied. Secondly, this "non-linear1 pattern is 
quite different in the UK and in India. The pattern is much less clear for 
India than for the UK: this may be a result of the relatively small
sample-sizes in the India surveys. But if anything, the Indian pattern 
seems to be the opposite of that seen for the UK. The UK tables suggest 
that wives' employment tends to increase durables ownership for poorer 
households, but reduce the probability of ownership among richer 
households. In India (tables 9<5> and 9<11>), on the other hand, wife's 
employment appears to reduce durables ownership among poorer households, 
but increase ownership among richer households. And thirdly, this pattern 
does not seem to apply to microwave ovens (in either India or the UK). In 
the following sections, I discuss these findings further.
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9.4 DO THE EFFECTS OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT VARY WITH HOUSEHOLD INCOME?
I n o w  a s k  t h e  r e a d e r  t o  s t e p  b a c k  f r o m  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  o w n e r s h i p  l e v e l s ,  t o  
s e e  t h e  b i g g e r  p i c t u r e :  I f e e l  t h a t  w e  s h o u l d  n o t  p a y  t o o  m u c h  a t t e n t i o n
t o  s m a l l  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  o w n e r s h i p  l e v e l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e r e  o w n e r s h i p  i s 
c l o s e  t o  0 %  o r  c l o s e  t o  1 0 0 % ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  s p u r i o u s  r e s u l t s .
Consider the following tables from UK data: 9<4a>, 9<6a>, 9<10a> and
9<12a>. These all show fairly clear "non-linear1 effects, in which a 
wife's employment tends to reduce ownership levels in most income-bands 
(i.e. all but the poorest one or two or three deciles). This is contrary 
to predictions of "bargaining' models, in which a wife's employment is 
predicted to raise ownership of time-saving durables in all households. 
The other UK table in this set, 9<8a>, refers to microwave ovens; this 
might be thought to support "bargaining1 models, because wife's employment 
does seem to increase microwave oven ownership. However, table 9<8a> does 
little to inspire faith in bargaining models, because the fourth and sixth 
deciles show the opposite effect. Hence, these five UK tables together 
seem to reject "bargaining' models.
Tables 9<4a>, 9<6a>, 9<8a>, 9<10a> and 9<12a> allow us to study changes in 
ownership patterns in the UK over time (by comparing different columns). 
In practice, however, the 1995-96 data are not very helpful because 
ownership levels are close to 100% in 1995-96 for most of these tables: 
so differences between employed-wife and non-employed-wife households are 
small, and may be overwhelmed by spurious effects of small sample-sizes.
Turning now to the four tables for urban India, tables 9<7> and 9<9> both 
show a pattern in which richer households are less likely to own the 
durable if the wife is employed, which is the opposite effect of women's 
employment to that predicted by bargaining models. Tables 9<5> and 9<11> 
are "non-linear1 , but in the opposite way to the UK tables: in tables 9<5>
and 9<11>, we see the wife's employment increasing ownership in the poorer 
households and decreasing ownership in the richer households. My opinion 
is that the urban India sample-sizes here are too small to be reliable: 
it is plausible, for example, that future research will find all four 
durables show decreased ownership with wife's employment. But I feel that 
these four tables using urban India data are sufficient to reject the 
bargaining model claim that wife's employment increases durable goods 
ownership.
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9.5 INTERPRETATIONS OF EVIDENCE FROM OWNERSHIP LEVELS
In my view, tables 9<4> to 9<12a> (even without my evidence in chapters 7 
and 8) would be fairly convincing evidence to discard all previous research 
I know of, on the subject of the effects of wife's employment on durables 
ownership. In both the "price-of-time1 hypothesis (tested in chapter 7) 
and "bargaining1 models (tested in chapter 8), economists assumed that 
women's employment will tend to lead to increased ownership of time-saving 
durables, and some evidence supported this view (such as Bryant, 1988, and 
Oropesa, 1993: see chapter 8). But the evidence in section 9.2 above
indicates that wife's employment and husband's employment are intertwined, 
as if by a set of unwritten rules controlling household behaviour. Worse 
still (for the economist), these "rules" appear to change: I found that
in the UK for 1969-74, women with rich husbands were rarely employed; but 
by 1993-6, many wives with rich husbands were employed. This change could 
be a result of changes in "social norms', or it might be an effect of 
economic changes such as increases in wages for women due to "equal 
opportunities' legislation.
An explanation of the fact that among richer households, non-employed-wife 
families are more likely to own time-saving durables was put forward by 
David Piachaud:
"perhaps those women at home all day have a higher preference 
for consumer durables and, in the absence of their own 
incomes, sufficient influence over their husbands to obtain 
them."
(Piachaud, 1982: p. 481; emphasis added).
Here, Piachaud suggests that women have influence over their husbands, and 
that a wife's influence does not (entirely) depend on her earnings. This 
seems to be a rejection of both the price-of-time hypothesis and of 
conventional bargaining models, but Piachaud's (1982) article does not 
offer sufficient detail to form a testable hypothesis.
Section 9.3 considered evidence that there was a "non-linear' effect of 
wife's employment on durables ownership: that for poor households, women's
employment increased durables ownership, whereas women's employment had the 
opposite effect among richer households. One possible interpretation of 
this is that husbands prefer their wives not to be employed, and the richer 
husbands can afford to buy durables wanted by the wife. This type of 
viewpoint is suggested by Julie Nelson, who brings in the concept of social 
class:
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"In marital compromises one may observe deals being struck 
which trade one factor for another, sometimes to extremes.
"I will take care of all your material needs, as long as you 
pledge me obedience" goes the trade of living standards for 
agency freedom between the upper-class husband and his wife, 
in some traditions. Or, since actual and current arrangements 
are more complex than implied by that one cultural image, one 
might see living standards and agency freedom offered in place 
of affiliation: "Here's the checkbook, now don't bother me.""
(Nelson, 1994: p. 128; emphasis added).
Julie Nelson's ideas may be a promising line for future research, but her
1994 and 1995 articles are not in themselves sufficiently detailed to offer
a testable model. It may be very difficult for social scientists to make
progress in explaining cultural forces (such as the class-based behaviour
in Nelson's quote): Ahlander and Bahr suggest that because we live in
households, we cannot see them objectively:
"Today's scholars have no trouble seeing Victorian ideals as 
gendered, socially constructed notions of reality. Yet 
somehow the possibility that contemporary ideas are also 
socially constructed, that the current images of housework 
held by researchers and theorists are perhaps no more 
objective than the Victorian view, has escaped us. Family 
scholars point to the absurdities and ethnocentricities of the 
past, but many of us seem incapable of recognizing the 
possibility that our own definitions are also social 
inventions, faddish and subculture-bound."
(Ahlander & Bahr, 1995: p. 61).
The above ideas of Nelson and Piachaud are possible directions for 
economics, given the empirical rejection experienced by mainstream economic 
theories. A third direction is "household allocative systems', associated 
with Jan Pahl: this is the subject of the following chapter.
SHOULD WE REJECT THE 'PRICE-OF-TIME' AND "BARGAINING' MODELS?
My findings (in this chapter, and in chapters 7 and 8) are not the first 
to reject conventional economic theories. It would be interesting if this 
thesis could destroy all economic research in this field which has been 
done over the last few decades, but this is impossible: this thesis is too
late to kill the "price-of-time1 or "bargaining' models, because (in my 
view) they have already been rejected by decades of empirical evidence. 
Previous researchers have been careful to phrase their criticisms 
carefully, perhaps fearful that a theory might be later reinstated - 
consider, for example, the following comment:
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"In our previous research [...] we found that wives' labor 
force behaviour was neither a significant determinant of 
families' purchase decisions (whether a particular time-saving 
durable was purchased) nor of families' expenditure decisions 
(if an item was purchased, how much was spent). In view of 
the contrary hypotheses advanced both in the popular and
academic press [.. ] the empirical results were considered 
surprising."
(Strober & Weinberg, 1980: p. 339; emphasis added).
In a recent working paper, Alderman, Chiappori & Haddad (1994) suggest that 
it is time to "shift the burden of proof" away from models based on a 
single household utility function, of the type pioneered by Samuelson and 
Becker (see chapter 2). It appears that most economists agree that we 
should reject the "unitary' model. My own findings (reported in this 
thesis) offer further evidence against the price-of-time hypothesis.
In addition to rejecting unitary models, I also report evidence against
bargaining models. The "bargaining' approach has not yet been so widely
rejected, but there does not seem to be any economic model which has been
accepted by economists as a group:
"Until very recently, the standard of the [economics]
profession for both theoretical and empirical analysis was a 
"common preference" model of the family, which assumes that 
family members act as though they are maximising a single 
utility function. [ . . . ] A current snapshot of family 
economics would show the traditional framework under siege on 
both theoretical and empirical fronts. [...] However, no new 
theoretical framework has gained general acceptance as a 
replacement for common preference models, and empirical 
studies have concentrated on debunking old models rather than 
on discriminating among new ones."
(Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: pp. 139-40).
Lundberg & Poliak's imply that the "common preference" models (which I 
refer to as the "price-of-time' hypothesis) have been rejected; and that 
no new theory has been accepted by the economics profession - each new 
model has been found inadequate in some way. This does not prove that 
bargaining models will never be successful. But the fact that economists 
have developed bargaining models for several decades without any being 
found to be acceptable, suggests that bargaining may be inappropriate to 
explain household behaviour.
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9.6 SUMMARY
All of the versions of "bargaining1 models discussed in this thesis predict 
that women's employment should lead to greater spending on goods which 
improve women's welfare (MacPhail & Bowles, 1991: p. 63). Like "unitary' 
models, it appears that "bargaining1 models are unsuccessful in explaining 
household behaviour. The reader may consider the evidence I present in 
chapter 8 to be inconclusive - neither clearly supporting, nor clearly 
rejecting, a "bargaining' model of household behaviour; and because there 
are so many game-theory models of household spending (some of which are 
discussed in section 2.4), some writers in the "bargaining' school could 
argue that their model had been mis-represented (for example, because I 
omitted a variable they consider relevant). But the evidence in section
9.3 of this chapter is more difficult to dismiss. In particular, the idea 
that wife's employment may have the opposite effect in richer households 
to its effect in poorer households seems impossible to fit into any 
bargaining model I know of. If a wife's employment increases her power, 
then it would be expected to do so at different household income levels. 
I conclude that the performance of bargaining approaches is weak in 
explaining household durable goods ownership.
In section 9.2, I suggested that most previous economic research into 
consumption assumes that husband's and wife's earnings are independent of 
each other. But section 9.2 discussed three behaviour patterns (labelled 
{i}, {ii} and {iii}) which cast doubt on this assumption - none of these 
three patterns has been discussed by any game theory economist, as far as 
I am aware. If the "bargaining' economists have failed to notice (let 
alone explain) these three patterns of household behaviour, how much 
confidence can we have in their theories?5
I have no explanation of household behaviour which could fill the vacuum 
left by the collapse of conventional economic theories. However, I suggest 
a possible way forward, in chapter 10.
In defence of other economists, I used a "bargaining' approach 
myself for over six years, while working on this thesis; I would 
never have noticed these patterns, if it were not for my attempts 
to explain the success of Jan Pahl1 s ideas - see chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 10
HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS
10.1 INTRODUCTION: MONEY AND POWER
In my view, empirical findings by previous researchers and myself (reported 
in chapter 7) reject theories of the "new home economics' school of 
thought: the price of a woman's time does not appear to lead to greater
ownership of the time-saving durables studied, controlling for total 
household income. And results in chapters 8 and 9 seem to reject the 
"bargaining' (game theory) approach. However, both theories have been 
under considerable pressure from empirical research before this thesis, and 
(arguably) my research may do no more than confirm earlier empirical 
findings.
This chapter is an attempt to fill the gap left by the collapse of 
conventional economic analysis of households. For at least some of the 
economists and sociologists studied in this chapter, rejecting the "price- 
of-time' and "bargaining' models does not necessarily require us to abandon 
the assumption of "rational' behaviour by individuals.
This chapter looks at "Household Allocative Systems', which may be an 
important issue in understanding patterns of durable goods ownership. This 
area has been studied relatively little by economists, perhaps because 
suitable quantitative data were not available until fairly recently - the 
BHPS and WAS data sets were not made available to the academic community 
until 1994, although a few other survey data sets such as SCELI (see 
chapter 6) were available slightly earlier.
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10.2 APPLICATION OF "HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS' MODELS
The term "Household Allocative Systems' was explained in section 2.8. In 
this literature, writers investigate who determines expenditure within a 
household: husband, or wife, or both husband and wife (jointly or
independently). Most of these writers have made a distinction between 
management and control of money: "management' means arranging day-to-day
household purchases; whereas "control' means deciding how the money should 
be allocated, and making major financial decisions (see, for example, 
Woolley & Marshall, 1994).
There has been relatively little work on "household allocative systems' in 
India. Most of the research on household allocative systems which has 
taken place used small samples - for example, Ursula Sharma (1980) studied 
28 households in Shimla (north west India); in her study of Calcutta, 
Standing (1991) studied 114 households. Kampala Ram reports a study of a 
fishing village in south India, and concluded that women control all 
household financial management (Ram, 1989: p. 140): but she does not
suggest that this applies to the whole of India. This chapter uses data 
from the WAS surveys (outlined in section 6.3).
Previous work on "household allocative systems' divided households into
categories, depending on how money is controlled within the household. One
example is Jan Pahl's four-way classification (Pahl, 1980: pp. 316-327):
"whole wage' system: the husband hands over the entire wage-
packet to his wife, and she returns some of it as his personal 
spending money.
"allowance1 system: the husband gives his wife/partner an
allowance to pay for household expenses, and keeps the rest of 
his wage.
"pooling' system: husband and wife pool their incomes and pay
household expenses from the common pool.
"individual management' system: husband and wife have
separate incomes and each is responsible for certain areas of 
household spending.
Pahl's four-way system of classification is not the only system which has 
been used in the literature on household allocative systems: for example,
Vogler and Pahl used six categories: "female whole-wage', "female pool',
"male whole wage', "housekeeping allowance', "male pool' and "joint pool' 
systems (Vogler & Pahl, 1993).
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A different view is suggested by Kuntal Agarwal (1988: p. 189), reporting 
on a 1985 study of 100 employed (middle-class) wives in Meerut, a city in 
Uttar Pradesh. For money-centred decisions, Agarwal found that "Real power 
is in the hands of husbands irrespective of wife's income, education and 
profession". Only 65% of wives were even consulted by their husbands on 
financial decisions; the remaining 35% of wives were not consulted. But 
for household decisions related to children (rather than money), Kuntal 
Agarwal found that wives with high earnings relative to their husband's 
earnings had more power than lower-earning wives (Agarwal, 1988: p. 188).
In chapter 3, I suggested that (in recent decades) there has been a trend
of rising female employment in many countries. Some writers perceive a
trend in household financial management: Zelizer wrote that in the USA,
"Changes in gender relations influenced the method of 
allocation of married women's money. As women's consumer role 
expanded at the beginning of the 20th century, the traditional 
"dole" or asking method became not only inefficient, but also 
inappropriate in increasingly egalitarian marriages. The 
allowance, a more definite and regular housekeeping income, 
was praised as a more equitable method of allocation, but then 
in turn condemned by home-efficiency experts of the 1920's and 
1930's as an unsatisfactory payment for modern wives. The 
joint account emerged as the new cultural ideal."
(Zelizer, 1994: p. 141).
This chapter will test the importance of day-to-day financial management 
on purchase of "time-saving' durable goods.
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10.3 PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT
Using Household Allocative Systems creates difficulties in measurement. 
Household Allocative Systems are difficult to measure in large-scale 
surveys, although several writers suggest that this is possible (for 
example, questions on household allocative systems are included in the BSA 
and SCELI surveys - see section 6.2). Another problem is the difference 
between "control', "management1, and "budgeting1 within the household (see 
Morris, 1989: p. 450). When respondents answer questions on Household 
Allocative Systems (especially as part of a large-scale questionnaire-based 
survey), they may reply by explaining who carries out day-to-day spending 
decisions such as during shopping. This may seem less important to 
economic behaviour than are major long-term decisions, such as on the type 
of lifestyle the household will have. Hence, their answer is difficult to 
interpret. In recent years, several research groups (such as the BHPS) 
have linked a question on Household Allocative System with a second 
question on who makes the final decision on major purchases in the 
household. It is not clear when replies to this second question should be 
used, instead of information on the Household Allocative System used by the 
household; I return to this problem below.
Early studies of Household Allocative Systems were based on small-scale 
studies and on a qualitative research methodology. Such studies typically 
used unstructured or semi-structured interviewing. An example is Pahl's 
study of 102 married couples with at least one child (Pahl, 1984). Early 
studies of Household Allocative System did not use random sampling to 
select a representative group of respondents: they typically used the
"snowball' technique - beginning with a few respondents (often contacted 
via friends or colleagues), the interviewers asked each interviewee if they 
knew of any other people who might be prepared to be interviewed on such 
issues as financial management. In this way, a sample (typically of around 
one hundred interviews) was built up. This technique has been used outside 
Britain - such as Sharma's (1986) study of Shimla, India. Clearly, we 
cannot be sure that the "snowball1 technique will provide a representative 
sample of the geographical area covered by the survey. Morris (1989: p. 
452) suggests that studies of household allocative systems are usually 
small-scale local studies, so the findings cannot be generalised.
Until fairly recently, it was thought by a number of social scientists that 
intimate financial matters - including Household Allocative Systems - could
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only be discussed in the context of a relatively unstructured interviewr 
which made large-scale or systematic analysis impossible (see for example 
Morris, 1989: p. 452). However, from the late 1980s, questions on 
Household Allocative System have been included in several large-scale 
(questionnaire-based) studies such as BHPS, SCELI and BSA (see section 6.2 
for details). Such datasets are useful for economic analysis, because 
they allows us to control for the effects of various variables using 
regression.
Jan Pahl (1983: p. 251; and 1980: p. 322) claims that the allocative 
system adopted by a particular household depends on several types of 
factors, including the household income level; the sources of the 
household's income (e.g. whether or not the household receives state 
benefits, & the number of earners); and "social norms" - the occupational, 
regional, and ethnic culture in which the household is situated.
Lydia Morris (1989: pp. 452-455) used a different classification system to 
Jan Pahl - Morris's system consists of four categories: the 'whole wage'
system; the 'allowance' system; 'joint' financial management; and 
'independent' financial management. She reported the following findings 
about the types of household which tend to adopt each Household Allocative 
System:
* the first three of these Household Allocative Systems ('whole
wage1 system; 'allowance' system; and 'joint' management) are
most common in single-earner households;
* whole-wage systems are associated with men in low-paid jobs, 
and households dependent on state benefits;
* allowance systems are associated with incomes above the
minimum, and/or with rising incomes;
* shared financial management is associated with higher incomes;
* independent financial management is associated with households
in which husband and wife earn similar incomes;
* for households containing offspring in employment, higher-paid 
children (especially offspring who receive bonus payments) are 
likely to pay 'board'; whereas whole-wage systems are 
associated with lower-paid offspring.
Sharon Witherspoon (1988: p. 187) claimed that, according to data from the
1987 BSA survey, women with full-time employment had more access to
household money; she appears to mean that women were more likely to report
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that the Household Allocative System used by their household was wife- 
managed or jointly managed by husband and wife, if the wife was employed 
full-time.
Peggy Stamp's study of 18 women who were the main earner in their household 
found that none used the 'allowance' system - although this system has been 
found to be fairly popular in other studies of British households (Stamp, 
1985: p. 551). This suggests that women's share of household income is an 
important influence on the Allocative System adopted, but I feel that we 
should be cautious in generalising from such a small sample. Gail Wilson 
(1987: p. 37) claimed that the Household Allocative System adopted by a 
household is most strongly influenced by the household's income level, but 
she also reports finding that a number of other forces are also 
influential.
Empirical research on the SCELI dataset, by Carolyn Vogler (1989: pp. 22- 
32) and by Vogler & Pahl (1993: p. 90), indicates that the level of
household income, the employment position of both spouses, their ages, and 
social class all influence the choice of Household Allocative System. In 
addition, attitudes (especially 'sexist* attitudes among men) are important 
in determining the type of Household Allocative System adopted by a 
household. Carolyn Vogler's analysis suggested that the Household
Allocative System used by a respondent's household was strongly correlated 
with the Household Allocative System used by the respondent’s parents (when 
the respondent was young) . The Household Allocative System used was also 
strongly related to the husband's education level, and to the respondent's 
age cohort. Information may give power to one household member: for
example, Jan Pahl (1980: p. 317) claims that household members do not have 
perfect information on other household members - wives are often ignorant 
of their husband's earnings (contrary to the assumption of perfect 
knowledge, which is used by Gary Becker and several other neoclassical 
economists).
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Pahl and Morris both argue that the system of intra-household resource
allocation adopted by a household can have significant effects on
employment of household members:
women are likely to seek paid work when their household uses 
an 'allowance' system, and where the allowance is inadequate 
(Pahl, 1980: p. 334; Morris, 1989: pp. 456-7);
men have less incentive to do overtime if the household uses 
an allowance system (Pahl, 1983: p. 243; Morris, 1989: pp.
453-7) ;
men are more likely to bargain for increases in overtime pay 
than in basic pay, if their household operates an 'allowance' 
system (Pahl, 1980: p. 320);
- men and/or women are more likely to seek paid work to pay for 
the husband's social expenses, if a 'whole-wage' system is 
operating in their household (Morris, 1989: p. 456);
an 'independent' financial management system may affect 
motivations to earn (Morris, 1989: p. 457);
- men are more likely to seek paid work in an allowance system 
with a fixed allowance (Morris, 1989: pp. 453-457).
Pahl claims that earning money generally gives a household member more 
power within a household (1980: p. 330), but Jephcott found that women's 
power may be reduced when they take paid work (Pahl, 1980: p. 322). An 
individual's power within the household may be influenced by the allocative 
system adopted by the household (Pahl, 1980: pp. 334-5). Catherine Hakim 
(1987: p. 181) reports in her analysis of the 'National Homeworklng Survey' 
that responses to questions about why a wife does paid work are structured 
partly by the system of money management used in her household.
There appears to be little or no direct evidence on the effect of Household 
Allocative Systems on ownership of household durable goods, or on spending 
patterns - there are as yet few datasets with information on both Household 
Allocative Systems and on spending/durables ownership. To assess the 
impact of Household Allocative Systems on household behaviour, previous 
work has relied on small-scale studies (data on Household Allocative 
Systems has not been available for large-scale surveys which include data 
on spending or durable goods ownership). This means that we cannot 
distinguish between the effects of the Household Allocative System the 
household adopts, and other forces (such as income) which influence the 
household's behaviour.
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The use of Household Allocative Systems to analyze all households is 
questionable. It appears from the evidence in Pahl (1985) discussed above 
that Household Allocative Systems may be helpful (and were designed for 
use) in explaining household behaviour in certain rather unusual types of 
household - specifically, households containing violent husbands/male 
partners; but these are not 'typical' households. We cannot generalise 
from evidence obtained from small-scale studies of Household Allocative 
Systems such as Jan Pahl' s study - her sample is not representative of 
households in general. Morris (1989; p. 452) claims that most studies of 
Household Allocative System are small-scale local studies, so their 
findings cannot be applied to households in general. Household Allocative 
Systems are unhelpful in understanding household behaviour in certain types 
of household (such as single-adult households).
Like most writers in the sociological tradition, Pahl does not build a 
mathematical model to predict the behaviour of households; hence, it is 
not clear exactly how to test her ideas. In order to assess Pahl * s view, 
this chapter studies the apparent effects of 'household allocative systems' 
on household behaviour. If Pahl is correct, this might reveal aspects of 
the wife's power over the household which are difficult to measure in any 
other way.
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10.4 DATA ON HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS
The best source of information on household allocative systems that I am 
aware of, is the British BHPS survey (see section 6.2). In this chapter, 
wave one of BHPS (carried out in 19 92) is used; this included more 
questions on "household allocative systems' than any other wave of BHPS so 
far. There are several questions in BHPS on household allocative systems; 
wave 1 included four questions on this topic (numbers {F28} to {F31} below 
refer to the BHPS questionnaire):
{F28} Who looks after household money? (single-wage,
allowance, or shared household finances).
{F29} Who has the final say in big financial decisions?
{F30} Who pays regular household bills?
{F31} Who handles everyday household spending?
Both of the WAS surveys (1992 and 1997) contained two simple measures of 
"household allocative systems': respondents were asked about the day-to-
day management, and about the final control over large financial 
decisions. I study here just three of the possible answers (for both day- 
to-day household management, and final control): husband-managed; wife-
managed; and husband/wife jointly (the other possible answers were 
"independent management' or "other'; but there were few such households 
in the WAS datasets, so they were removed).
It would be possible to include all four of the BHPS financial arrangement 
variables, and both of those in WAS1, in regression analyses (to assess 
their impacts on durable goods ownership); but this would produce many 
tables of regression results. I found empirically that the variable most 
closely linked to ownership of time-saving durable goods is {F31}: this
was the only statistically significant coefficient, in a regression of the 
form of equation [10A] below (i.e. controlling for factors such as total 
household income), in both the UK and urban India. This seems a surprising 
result: purchase of a durable good such as a washing-machine is a large
financial decision, so question {F29} seems more relevant to this thesis 
than question {F31}. I return to this issue in section 10.9 below.
Hence, tables in the remainder of this chapter refer to day-to-day 
management only; analysis based on the other four questions are not 
included here, for reasons of space. I now report the precise wording of 
the questions used in Britain and India, for comparison:
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TABLE 10<l>i QUESTIONS MEASURING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
UK
(BHPS)
Bombay/Madras
{WAS)
{F31} W h o  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
h a n d l i n g  y o u r  e v e r y d a y  h o u s e h o l d  
s p e n d i n g ?  I m e a n  t h i n g s  l i k e  f o o d ,  
h o u s e h o l d  n e c e s s i t i e s  a n d  o t h e r  
i t e m s  o f  g e n e r a l  h o u s e k e e p i n g ?
MAINLY YOU 
MAINLY HUSBAND/WIFE/PARTNER 
JOINTLY WITH HUSBAND/WIFE/PARTNER
{Q3} W h i c h  o f  t h e s e  i s  c l o s e s t  
t o  t h e  w a y  y o u r  h o u s e h o l d  
o r g a n i s e s  m o n e y ?
HUSBAND USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 
WIFE USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 
HUSBAND AND WIFE MANAGE MONEY TOGETHER
Table 10<1> compares the question wordings used by BHPS and WAS: they are
clearly not identical (even after taking account of the sex of the 
respondent for BHPS) . This problem is made more complicated by the fact 
that a number of languages are used in India, and the question was 
translated from the basic questionnaire in English, to the respondent's own 
language. Nevertheless, for this thesis, I will ignore the differences in 
wording between BHPS and WAS surveys, and treat the questions as similar. 
A further problem is that in any survey, respondents may report their 
household finances as "jointly1 managed, even if they are not, because of 
social norms which suggest that all marriages should be built on equality 
between partners: such norms have been reported in both the UK (Brannen
& Wilson, 1987: p. 10) and in India (Ehrenfels, 1956; p. 197; Standing, 
1991: p. 101). I am unable to correct for such problems, but further 
research may shed more light on such issues.
Another complication is that the BHPS survey attempts to interview all 
adults in chosen households, so we usually have the view of both husband 
and wife on questions {F28} to {F31}; in practice, I found that husband 
and wife usually agreed on these five questions, and I decided to use the 
husband's opinion rather than that of the wife. This issue does not arise 
in the WAS data, because only one respondent per household was interviewed 
in urban India (some male, others female respondents).
For both BHPS and WAS1, I convert the above financial management variable 
to an index, which varies between zero for "husband-managed1 finances, 
through 0.5 for "joint-managed', up to 1 for "wife-managed' finances.
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10.5 SPECIFICATION OF THE REGRESSION MODEL
The regression method used in this chapter, like those in chapters 7 and 
8 above, is based loosely on the work of David Piachaud (1982). The aim 
of this chapter is to assess if women gain power as a result of managing 
the household's day-to-day finances. Like Piachaud, I use a logit 
regression model, because the dependent variable (durable good ownership) 
is either zero or one. This produced the following regression equation:
= «0 +« i y  +«2K  + “ 3M
where X = probability of ownership [10A]
Y = log of (family income)
K = log of (number of children)
M  = who manages household finances?
I follow Piachaud's (1982) sample restrictions, except for his rejection 
of households earning less than one, or more than three, times as much as 
the Supplementary Benefit level for their household composition, for 
reasons explained in section 6.6 above. This means that the sample is 
limited to married/cohabiting households, containing exactly two adults 
(with or without children), and in which the husband is under 65 years 
old.
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10.6 NEW EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter offers evidence in the form of logit regressions. The 
regression estimates (using equation [10A]) are reported in the following 
tables.
TABLE 10<2> Who manages household money (husband, wife, or joint): 
WASHING-MACHINE OWNERSHIP
BRITAIN (BHPS) URBAN INDIA
WHO MANAGES SAMPLE ODDS 
MONEY IN SIZE RATIO 
HOUSEHOLD?
WHO MANAGES 
MONEY IN 
HOUSEHOLD?
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS j 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993-
0.942" 1801 27.6 0.552 
0. 799
937
465
9.6 |
8.7 |
The above table suggests support for the ideas of Jan Pahl et al, who claim 
that the system of financial management adopted by a household may reveal 
information on the power structures within households. All three 
coefficients in table 10<2> are of the expected sign, which suggests that 
washing-machine ownership is more frequent in households where the wife has 
some (or complete) say in day-to-day management of the household's 
finances. Only one of the three coefficients is statistically significant 
(that for the Britain), but this may be a result of the small sample-sizes 
I obtained in urban India.
TABLE 10<3> Who manages household money (husband, wife, or joint): 
DISHWASHER OWNERSHIP
BRITAIN (BHPS) URBAN INDIA
WHO MANAGES SAMPLE ODDS 
MONEY IN SIZE RATIO 
HOUSEHOLD ?
WHO MANAGES 
MONEY IN 
HOUSEHOLD?
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS | 
RATIO |
1 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
j 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
j 1993-
0.582" 1802 4.0
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Table 10<3> refers to dishwasher ownership; this durable good was not 
included in either of the WAS (urban India) surveys. The only information 
we have is for BHPS (Britain), where the coefficient is of the expected 
sign and is statistically significant (at the 1% level). This again 
suggests that women who manage household finances (solely, or jointly) are 
more powerful than women whose husbands manage finances.
TABLE 10<4> Who manages household money (husband, wife, or joint); 
FOOD-PROCESSOR OWNERSHIP
: BRITAIN (BHPS) URBAN INDIA
; WHO MANAGES SAMPLE ODDS WHO MANAGES SAMPLE ODDS
: MONEY IN SIZE RATIO MONEY IN SIZE RATIO
: HOUSEHOLD? HOUSEHOLD?
1969-74 :
1975-80 :
1981-86 :
1987-92 : 1.055" 937 4.3
1993- : 0. 292 465 2.7
Table 10<4>, on food-processor ownership, confirms the impression of the 
two previous tables. Food-processors were not included in the BHPS survey, 
but the WAS evidence shows the predicted sign of coefficient; one of the 
two urban India coefficients is statistically significant.
TABLE 10<5> Who manages household money (husband, wife, or joint): 
MICROWAVE OVEN OWNERSHIP
BRITAIN (BHPS) URBAN INDIA
WHO MANAGES SAMPLE ODDS 
MONEY IN SIZE RATIO 
HOUSEHOLD?
WHO MANAGES 
MONEY IN 
HOUSEHOLD?
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS | 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993-
0.427" 1802 2.3
1.575 465 57.1 |
Table 10<5> refers to microwave oven ownership. Again, we see the expected 
(positive) sign on coefficients; one of the two coefficients (that for 
Britain) is statistically significant at the 1% level.
233
TABLE 10<6> Who manages household money (husband, wife, or joint): 
REFRIGERATOR OWNERSHIP
BRITAIN (BHPS) URBAN INDIA
WHO MANAGES SAMPLE ODDS 
MONEY IN SIZE RATIO 
HOUSEHOLD?
WHO MANAGES SAMPLE 
MONEY IN SIZE 
HOUSEHOLD?
ODDS | 
RATIO |
1969-74
1975-80
1981-86
1987-92
1993-
0.749" 937 
0.931" 465
5.5 |
3.6 |
TABLE 10<7> Who manages household money (husband, wife, or 
DEEP-FREEZER OWNERSHIP
joint):
BRITAIN (BHPS) URBAN INDIA
WHO MANAGES SAMPLE ODDS 
MONEY IN SIZE RATIO 
HOUSEHOLD?
WHO MANAGES SAMPLE 
MONEY IN SIZE 
HOUSEHOLD?
ODDS
RATIO
1969-74
1975-80
1981-86
1987-92
1993-
0.497 1802 12.7
Tables 10<6> and 10<7> complete the evidence on financial management, for 
refrigerators and deep-freezers. The BHPS survey did not include 
refrigerator ownership, and neither of the WAS surveys included deep- 
freezer ownership; but the information we do have suggests support for the 
Pahl et al view - that financial management gives a woman influence over 
household decisions: all three coefficients in tables 10<6> and 10<7> are
positive, and two of them are statistically significant (at the 1% level).
My opinion of the above results is that the evidence is fairly convincing. 
There are eleven coefficients in the above tables 10<2> to 10<7> inclusive; 
all eleven coefficients are positive, and six of these eleven are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In view of the fairly small 
sample-sizes available, I consider this evidence to be surprisingly 
unequivocal.
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I experimented with adding wife's earnings (as a fraction of household 
income) to the regression equation [10A] above, to assess whether or not 
financial management was a proxy for wife's earning-power. I found that 
husband-managed households were still statistically different from 
wife/joint-managed households in their ownership patterns, even after 
controlling for wife's (relative) earnings. I do not report these extra 
results here, due to word-length limitations.
I now turn to a different way of obtaining insights into household 
finances: the possession of bank-accounts. This approach may help us to
extend the available evidence considerably.
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10.7 BANK ACCOUNTS AS A PROXY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
For many datasets (such as FES), information on household financial 
management is not available. I consider this to be regrettable, for two 
reasons: firstly, surveys such as FES and GHS have larger sample-sizes
than do BHPS or WAS surveys (see section 6.2); and in general, larger 
samples will tend to give us more reliable results. The second advantage 
of using a survey such as FES is that it allows us to assess whether or not 
there is a time-trend, as was seen in chapter 8 for wife's hours of paid 
work. I hope that more surveys in future will include questions on 
financial management. But even using existing FES surveys, it is possible 
to obtain some picture of household financial practices: I do this using
the evidence on whether or not an individual has a bank account, which is 
included in several (but not all) FES surveys. In some FES surveys, 
information is provided on whether or not a household has a bank account; 
I ignore this, because I do not feel a woman gains any power over household 
finances if only her husband has access to this account. I only use the 
FES surveys which ask each (adult) member if he/she has a bank account: 
for these, I classify households into either 'wife has a bank account' or 
"wife does not have a bank account'. Note that an account could be her 
own, or a joint account with her husband; and I include savings accounts, 
in addition to current accounts. I included a question on whether or not 
the respondent has a bank account in the 1997 WAS1 survey; but (due to cost 
limitations) only one person in each household was interviewed in the WAS 
surveys. Hence, I restrict the urban Indian sample to female respondents 
in the next set of six durables, so the sample-sizes are small.
The regression equation I use to study the effects of a wife having a bank 
account is shown as equation [10B] below (it is very similar to equation 
[10A] above, which was used for financial management).
-(ify)' = “ 0 + alY +<*2K +«3S
where X = probability of ownership 
Y = log of (family income)
K = log of (number of children)
B = 1 if wife has a bank account, otherwise 0
[10B]
I now report the empirical evidence on the effects of the wife having a
bank-account on durables ownership (for FES and WAS surveys), in tables
10<8> to 10<13> below. I do not make specific comments on any one durable
good, but make an overall assessment on the six tables as a whole.
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TABLE 10<8> Effect of wife having a bank account: 
WASHING-MACHINE OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
WIFE HAS SAMPLE ODDS WIFE HAS SAMPLE ODDS |
j 1969-74 
| 1975-80
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SIZE RATIO A BANK SIZE 
ACCOUNT
RATIO |
| 1981-86 0.845" 2937 21.1
| 1987-92 0.911" 16677 34.1
| 1993- 0.426' 7185 63.7 -0.285 331 9.3 |
TABLE 10<9> Effect of wife having a bank account: 
DISH-WASHER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
WIFE HAS 
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
WIFE HAS 
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS | 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993— 0.290" 7185 2.9
TABLE 10<10> Effect of wife having a bank account:
POOD-PROCESSOR OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
WIFE HAS 
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
WIFE HAS 
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS 1 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
| 1987-92 
| 1993- 0.341 331 2.3 |
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TABLE 10<11> Effect of wife having a bank account:
MICROWAVE OVEN OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
WIFE HAS 
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS
RATIO
WIFE HAS 
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SAMPLE
SIZE
ODDS | 
RATIO |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80 
| 1981-86 
j 1987-92 
| 1993- 0.010 7185 4.2 0.108 331 46.3 |
TABLE 10<12> Effect of wife having a bank account:
REFRIGERATOR OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
WIFE HAS SAMPLE ODDS WIFE HAS SAMPLE ODDS |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SIZE RATIO A BANK SIZE 
ACCOUNT
RATIO |
I 1981-86 0.373 2937 107.8
| 1987-92 0.847" 16677 150.6
| 1993- 1.454" 7185 210.3 0.958" 331 4.0 |
TABLE 10<13> Effect of wife having a bank account:
DEEP-FREEZER OWNERSHIP
UK (FES) URBAN INDIA
WIFE HAS SAMPLE ODDS WIFE HAS SAMPLE ODDS |
| 1969-74 
| 1975-80
A BANK 
ACCOUNT
SIZE RATIO A BANK SIZE 
ACCOUNT
RATIO |
| 1981-86 0.535" 2937 4.9
| 1987-92 0.493" 16677 10.2
| 1993- 0.637" 7185 22.8
The above tables 10<8> to 10<13> inclusive offer support to the idea (put 
forward by Jan Pahl and others) that financial management reveals
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information on the 'black box' of the household. I use possession (by the 
wife) of a bank-account as a proxy for wife having day-to-day involvement 
with managing the household's finances; and I feel that the evidence of 
these latest six tables justifies my study of wives' bank accounts. 
Fourteen of the fifteen coefficients in tables 10<8> to 10<13> (considering 
both FES and WAS) are positive; the other (negative) coefficient is not 
statistically significant, and it may be spurious. Ten of these fourteen 
positive coefficients are statistically significant, which suggests that 
this may be a promising line for future research. One of the more 
encouraging aspects of this set of six tables is that there does not seem 
to be a time-trend (which I observed in chapter 8): tables 10<8>, 10<12>
and 10<13> above indicate UK results based on FES surveys from the early 
1980s to the mid-1990s, and none of these three tables show a very obvious 
time-trend.
In summary, I feel that studying whether or not the wife has a bank-account 
may shed light on the domestic arrangements of households, and I feel that 
the findings of tables 10<8> to 10<13> give us confidence that tables 10<2> 
to 10<7> are not purely spurious. It appears that day-to-day financial 
management is important, and is a useful predictor of time-saving durables 
ownership.
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10.8 LINKS BETWEEN 'HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS' AND OTHER FACTORS
R e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  s u g g e s t  t h a t  e c o n o m i s t s  c a n  u s e  h o u s e h o l d
allocative systems to explore household spending patterns. This raises the
question "what determines the household allocative system adopted by a
household?' Several researchers have attempted to answer this question;
for example, Vogler and Pahl studied SCELI (UK) data, and reported that
"The strongest influences on the housekeeping allowance 
system, however, were social class, employment status, the 
ages of the couple and the husband's education, socialisation 
and attitudes"
(Vogler & Pahl, 1993: p. 90).
In the Indian context, Hilary Standing (1991) claimed that women generally 
have little real power over financial decisions, even if they manage the 
household's common fund. However, my results cast doubt on Standing's 
claim, at least in the context of urban India: the evidence in this
chapter suggests that if a wife manages household money, she does tend to 
have more influence over household spending on durables (than does a wife 
whose husband manages the household finances).
Using this perspective, we might suspect that the wife-managed-finances 
variable is really indicating a link between household behaviour and 
attitudes of household members. This might be because wives who manage the 
household finances tend to be those women who have 'feminist' values; or 
because husbands who accept the idea of their wives having a measure of 
power over domestic finances are relatively 'modern' in their attitudes. 
Several such attitude variables are available in both the BHPS (UK) and WAS 
(Bombay/Madras) datasets; I experimented with this idea, by assessing 
whether or not there was a direct link between 'feminist' values and 
ownership of time-saving durable goods. To my surprise, I did not find 
such a link. I also tested the possibility that households in which women 
carried out day-to-day household financial management had more 'feminist' 
or 'modern' attitudes; again, no such link was apparent. However, it is 
possible that the precise wording of the questions used in the BHPS and WAS 
surveys did not successfully capture the appropriate aspects of the 
respondents' attitudes, or that the wrong attitude questions were asked in 
BHPS and WAS surveys.
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FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CLASS
In many households, neither husband nor wife have a bank account: this may
be partly due to class the effects of social class. Sinha & Prabha (1988: 
p. 206) report a study of employed women in Bihar (India), which found only 
8% of blue-collar workers had a bank account in their own name, compared 
with 31% of white-collar workers. But regarding managing the household 
finances, the reverse pattern was observed: 86% of blue-collar women
always maintain the household account, compared with only 52% of white- 
collar women. Note that these figures should not be generalised to the 
whole of India: there are regional variations in the extent to which women
deal with household finances (Whyte & Whyte, 1982: p. 181). Nevertheless, 
they suggest that financial management may be a proxy for social class.
SHOPPING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Using WAS 1997 data, I observed a link between who does the shopping, and 
who handles the household finances (unfortunately, shopping was not 
included in the 1992 WAS survey). When I studied the average time spent 
shopping by husbands, I observed the following pattern:
TABLE 10<14> Time spent shopping by husband (hours per week)
by financial management, urban India (1997)
SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT USED
MEAN STANDARD
DEVIATION
NUMBER 
OF CASES
husband-managed 3.70 5.26 292
j oint-managed 3.66 5.15 99
wif e-managed 1.85 3.20 74
I do not report an equivalent British table to the above table 10<14> for 
urban India: although BHPS includes a question on who does the shopping,
it is a different type of question to that in WAS 1997. I feel that table 
10<14> above is sufficient to establish a link between who does the 
shopping, and who manages the finances.
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10.9 SUMMARY: THE IMPORTANCE OP 'HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE SYSTEMS'
The evidence of the regression results (in tables 10<2> to 10<13> above) 
indicates that household allocative systems offer economists extra 
explanatory power. Even after controlling for wife's employment, the extra 
variable (husband-managed versus wife/joint-managed) was statistically 
significant in most of the regression equations. The evidence in this 
thesis on the influence of day-to-day financial management is far stronger 
than for either the 'price-of-time' or 'bargaining' models I tested in 
chapters 7 and 8. Where women manage their household's finances, they 
appear to have more power over their household's spending patterns.
One question arising from this thesis is why financial management is 
(apparently) linked to durable ownership patterns. It is possible that 
women's management of household money directly affects spending patterns, 
perhaps by giving women confidence in handling money. Alternatively, 
financial management may be revealing another effect which would otherwise 
be invisible - in Jan Pahl's terminology, household financial management 
may be a "tracer" of the impact of the factors which reveals patterns which 
are otherwise overlooked.
In section 2.8, I discussed the possibility of interpreting the empirical 
impact of household allocative systems from a game theory perspective. 
However, this is not the only possible interpretation. Referring to the 
psychology-based theories in section 2.6, women who manage household 
finances might be seen as 'dominant1, and hence likely to control other 
aspects of the household such as durable goods purchase. However, this 
view seems to be weakened by my findings (not reported in this thesis, due 
to the word limit) that the variable 'who has the final say in big 
financial decisions?1 was not closely linked to the ownership of time- 
saving durable goods. This appears surprising: a durable good such as a
washing-machine is expensive (costing several hundred pounds in the UK; 
I found that a washing-machine in India cost around 16,000 Rupees in 1992), 
so I expect such purchases to be seen as "large financial decisions". One 
possible explanation is that women who carry out the household's day-to-day 
financial management may be better informed about the household income, 
which could be interpreted as support for a principal/agent model (see 
section 2.4). I found a strong link between the person who does the day- 
to-day financial management in the household, and the person who does most 
of the household shopping (see table 10<14>). But purchase of a good such
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as a washing-machine is highly visible, and is certain to be noticed by the 
husbands (items such as washing-machines are normally permanently connected 
to water and electricity supplies, and their installation may require a 
kitchen to be redesigned). My discussion of principal/agent models (in 
section 2.4) suggests that a woman's power as an "agent' would not extend 
as far as the purchase of a time-saving durable good of the type studied 
in this thesis. Further research is needed on this.
A central finding of this chapter is that it supports the claims of Jan 
Pahl and others (see section 2.8), on the value of financial management to 
reveal the inner workings of households. This view is not shared by all 
sociologists: for example, Barrett & McIntosh (1982: p. 69) discussed
financial management systems, but wrote that "In practise, the decision­
making power lies with the one who brings in the sole or major income." 
Yet tables 10<2> to 10<13> suggest that day-to-day financial management is 
important: the wife's financial management does seem to be associated with
greater ownership of time-saving durables. Hence, if the ability of a wife 
to buy time-saving goods is a dimension of her power, then day-to-day 
financial management is an indicator of a wife's power - perhaps more so 
than her income, in view of the findings in chapters 7 and 8.
It has been argued that we need a deeper understanding of interactions
between family members: in the Indian context, for example,
"The instruments needed have to be sensitive, innovative, and 
enormously perceptive. A case in point is the new fashion of 
appending questions on decision-making in the family or 
control over income. Superficial questions like "who decides' 
cannot reveal the subtle processes at work. Reported 
decisions after all, merely reflect prior social imperatives.
What is decision-making for different classes of women? For 
a poor woman struggling to keep body and soul together, it is 
a meaningless term. In a severely circumscribed life, what 
are the options?"
(Raj, 1988: p. 893).
Regarding the inclusion of questions on day-to-day finances into surveys, 
I feel that studying "household allocative systems' is a relatively recent 
idea (the earliest large-scale survey I know of which included this was 
SCELI, in 1986/7). I accept that classifying households as "husband1 or 
as "wife/joint' financial management is a very simple system, which misses 
much of the subtle detail; but by showing this variable to be a 
significant influence on household spending (ownership patterns), I hope 
to make a case for other economists to develop this line of research.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSIONS
11.1 WHAT IS ORIGINAL ABOUT THIS THESIS?
This thesis has discussed previous empirical work, and found reason to 
question the standard economic theories. My own evidence in chapters 7 to 
9 implies offers little or no support to these theories.
My claims to originality in this thesis are as follows: firstly, I used
data from many different surveys, to make perhaps the most thorough test 
ever of conventional economic theories of the effects of wife's employment 
on time-saving durables ownership. I was unable to obtain appropriate data 
on India, so I commissioned two surveys; my two datasets may be the only 
data for India in existence with which the theories examined in this thesis 
can be tested. My findings do not support either the price-of-time or 
bargaining hypotheses. I found a previously unsuspected time-trend among 
regression coefficients (see chapter 8).
Using crosstabulations, I found that wives' employment seems to increase 
durables ownership among poorer households, but that it has the opposite 
effect in richer households. This casts doubt on previous empirical tests 
of "bargaining' versus "unitary' models: neither model explains this
behaviour, and attempts to test the theories will have produced meaningless 
results.
Finally, I claim originality in applying insights of "household allocative 
systems': I show that economic models can be improved by using information
on whether or not the wife is involved with day-to-day household financial 
management. My use of bank accounts as a proxy for financial management 
is, as far as I am aware, unique. I found a pattern in both Britain and 
urban India, over a long time-period, that a household is more likely to 
own time-saving durable goods if the wife manages the household finances.
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11.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF 'TIME-SAVING' DURABLES
The above comments suggest that we should be concerned for the state of 
current theories on the microeconomics of demand. Time-saving durable 
goods is not the only topic which has been analyzed by the 'unitary' and 
"bargaining' approaches (Ermisch, 1993, p. 367); these economic theories 
may be more successful in other areas of household behaviour (which are 
beyond the scope of this thesis). But the weakness of these theories seems 
more serious because we are failing to understand a phenomenon which has 
important impacts on people's lives, especially in the Third World. In the 
UK, many labour-saving goods are widely owned; Oakley (1982: p. 171)
claimed that "it is the washing-machine, not the vote, that is the true 
liberator of women". In India, however, such time-saving durables are much 
less widely-owned, as is shown in tables 9<4> to 9<12a> above. In the 
context of Calcutta (India), Standing wrote
"The poor material condition of much of the housing and the 
lack of time and work-saving devices have major implications 
for women's domestic workloads"
(Standing, 1991: p. 31).
This thesis claims that women's employment is not a good predictor of which 
households own durables, despite the predictions of most economic theories. 
Women's employment increases household incomes, so in this sense, women's 
employment does significantly increase ownership of time-saving durables; 
but does an extra £1 (or 1 Rupee) of wife's earnings have more impact than 
an extra £1 (or 1 Rupee) of husband's earnings, on the likelihood of a 
household owning time-saving durables? The answer, according to chapter 
9, is that it depends on household income: a wife's employment in a poor
household has a different effect to a wife's employment in a rich 
household. But in general, the husband's income seems more closely linked 
than the wife's income to time-saving durable goods ownership (see chapter 
7) .
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11.3 HAVE PREVIOUS THEORIES FAILED?
Many economists have criticised conventional economic analysis in the field 
of household consumption, but appear to bury their criticisms - perhaps 
concerned that further research may prove their criticisms unfounded. 
David Piachaud (1982) was more direct than most, in his summing up of 
previous theoretical and empirical work: discussing his own findings,
which tested a model based on "new home economics', he wrote
" I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c o n s u m e r  d u r a b l e s  [ ...] t h e  e x p e c t e d  r e s u l t  - 
t h a t  t h o s e  d o i n g  m o r e  p a i d  w o r k  w o u l d  p o s s e s s  m o r e  l a b o u r -  
s a v i n g  a i d s  - w a s  n o t  c o n f i r m e d .  [ . . . ) O v e r - s i m p l i f i e d  
m o d e l s  o f  i n t r a - f a m i l i a l  b e h a v i o u r  a r e  w o r s e  t h a n  u s e l e s s " .
(Piachaud, 1982: pp. 481-2).
I agree with Piachaud that we should not retain useless theories. The 
evidence I report in chapter 9 gives further weight to Piachaud's implicit 
criticism of conventional economic theories (both "unitary1 and 
"collective1 models - see below).
THE "UNITARY' MODEL
Several writers have suggested that the "unitary' approach (built on the
assumption that the household behaves as if there is a single utility
function) is the standard economic approach to studying household
behaviour: see, for example, Phipps & Burton (1995: p. 178). Rosenzweig
& Schultz (1982: p. 813) argued that the existence of a family utility
function is "A central working assumption underlying the economic
literature on household behaviour". And Rosen (1993: p. 28) goes further:
"Becker's work on the economics of the household and on demography are the
most important applications of economic analysis to nonmarket behaviour".
But the empirical results reported in chapter 7 do not support such a
"unitary' model. I could be argued that the "unitary' framework has now
been discredited:
"Common preference models of the family have proven to be too 
limited a framework for the analysis of household behavior"
(Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: p. 154).
However, I feel that I must add a comment on Becker's contributions. 
Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman wrote
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" O n e  c a n  o n l y  s p e c u l a t e  a s  t o  t h e  r e a s o n s  w h y  e m p i r i c a l  
s t u d i e s  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  m a l e  a n d  f e m a l e  
i n c o m e  o n  c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  f e r t i l i t y  h a v e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  j u s t i f y  
s u c h  d i s t i n c t i o n s  b a s e d  o n  a  N a s h - b a r g a i n e d  h o u s e h o l d  m o d e l  
r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  B e c k e r ' s  t h e o r y  o f  m a r r i a g e .  [ . . . ]  J u s t i c e  
w a s  s e r v e d  w h e n  B e c k e r  r e c e i v e d  a  N o b e l  p r i z e  t h a t  w a s  l o n g  
o v e r d u e .  J u s t i c e  w i l l  b e  s e r v e d  e v e n  b e t t e r  w h e n  d u e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  g i v e n  t o  v a l u a b l e  a s p e c t s  o f  B e c k e r 1s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  i g n o r e d  b y  m o s t  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i c s  
p r o f e s s i o n . "
(G r o s s b a r d - S h e c h t m a n , 1 9 9 5 :  p. 1 1 0 ) .
I d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  a b o v e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m i c s  p r o f e s s i o n  h a s  
c o n s p i r e d  a g a i n s t  B e c k e r .  T h e  e v i d e n c e  i n  c h a p t e r  7 c o n f i r m s  t h e  f i n d i n g s  
o f  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  p r e v i o u s  s t u d i e s ,  w h i c h  f o u n d  B e c k e r ' s  m o d e l  t o  b e  
w e a k  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s ;  b u t  I t h i n k  G a r y  B e c k e r  p r o v i d e d  a  
m u c h - n e e d e d  b o o s t  t o  t h i s  a r e a  o f  e c o n o m i c s  - b y  s p e l l i n g  o u t  p r e d i c t i o n s  
o f  h o w  a  " r a t i o n a l '  h o u s e h o l d  w i t h  a s i n g l e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s h o u l d  b e h a v e ,  
B e c k e r  g a v e  u s  a  t e s t a b l e  m o d e l .  H o u s e h o l d s  d o  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  b e h a v e  a s  
p r e d i c t e d ;  s o  p e r h a p s  e c o n o m i s t s  n e e d  t o  d e v e l o p  a  b e t t e r  t h e o r y .
THE 'BARGAINING' APPROACH
As a reaction to the lack of success of "unitary' models in empirical work, 
many economists have turned to bargaining models (including game theory). 
In this approach, each household member tries to get his/her preferences 
accepted in household decisions. The evidence in chapter 8 suggests little 
support for this view; and further empirical results in chapter 9 suggest 
that household behaviour does not conform to any bargaining model discussed 
in chapter 2. This confirms the picture in recent empirical work, in which 
no bargaining model has been found to be acceptable (see section 9.5).
One possible explanation is that bargaining models can explain the
behaviour of some households, but not others. Consider the following
discussion of discrimination against girls:
iithere is a body of literature that describes the effect of 
scale on intra-household inequality [. . . ] it poses the
hypothesis that for a given set of economic opportunities for 
men and women, the extent of intra-household inequality will 
decrease with the overall welfare level of the household. The 
bargaining approach states that as the size of the cake to be 
bargained over increases, bargaining becomes less important 
and households can afford to invest equally in all household 
members."
(Haddad & Reardon, 1993: pp. 262-3; emphasis in original).
247
The above analysis was not referring to durables ownership, or even 
bargaining between husband and wife; but it suggests that conventional 
bargaining models do not apply to the richest households, because both 
husband and wife can reach a level of well-being they find acceptable - if 
so, then dislike of disharmony associated with bargaining may outweigh any 
advantage which each partner might obtain from achieving a preferred 
spending pattern. To take a simple example, in a middle-income household, 
husband and wife may disagree over whether to buy a washing-machine or a 
video-cassette recorder; but in a rich household, they may be able to buy 
both, so there is less need for conflict. This analogy suggests that the 
poorest households also may have little reason for disagreement, as a poor 
household cannot afford either washing-machine or video-cassette recorder. 
Haddad & Reardon (1993: p. 265) suggest that there are both theoretical and 
empirical reasons to expect an inverse-u pattern: that inequality within
households initially increases as household income rises, but later 
declines again in the richer households.
IS IT TIME TO REJECT PREVIOUS THEORIES?
My results cast doubt on the "new home economics' model associated with 
Gary Becker. Like many previous empirical articles referred to in this 
thesis, I tested - and did not support - the new home economics theory. 
This thesis studied time-saving durable goods, and I am not qualified to 
assess the success or otherwise of new home economics in other fields. But 
I agree with Alderman, Chiappori & Haddad (1994), who claimed it is "time 
to shift the burden of proof": if any economists wish to defend the "new 
home economics', let them provide empirical evidence.
Bargaining models are more diverse than the "new home economics' ; this 
means that it is difficult to imagine how they could all be rejected. 
Nevertheless, I feel that no bargaining model discussed in this thesis is 
adequate to explain the behaviour patterns I have reported in the UK and 
urban India.
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11.4 DO ECONOMISTS NEED HELP PROM OTHER DISCIPLINES?
T h i s  t h e s i s  h a s  c o n f i r m e d  p r e v i o u s  c l a i m s  o n  t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  p o o r
p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  o n  t h i s  a r e a .  P e r h a p s  t h i s  h a d  l e d  o t h e r
social scientists to become disillusioned with economics:
"Conventional economics now seems less useful than once it 
did. [ . . . ] Its focus of concern may be seen as too narrow, 
so that it rigidly addresses a confined range of variables."
(Gershuny & Miles, 1985: p. 24).
Julie Nelson argues that economists should go beyond the' traditional
economic assumption that humans are rational utility-maximisers ("homo
e c o n o m i c u s 1 ), t o  d e v e l o p  a  m o r e  a c c u r a t e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  h u m a n  b e h a v i o u r :
"Homo economicus may not be a good description of women, but 
neither is he a good description of men. [ . . . ] What is 
needed is a conception of human behavior that can encompass 
both autonomy and dependence, individuation and relation, 
reason and emotion"
(Nelson, 1995: p. 136; emphasis in original).
S a m u e l  C a m e r o n  i s  a n o t h e r  w r i t e r  w h o  h o p e s  t h a t  e c o n o m i s t s  w i l l  l e a r n  f r o m
sociologists: "family bargaining is a subject requiring sociological
treatment" (Cameron, 1985: p. 43). Other economists agree that we need
better models of what humans are, if we wish to predict human behaviour:
"The mental models that the mind creates and the institutions 
that individuals create are both essential to the way human 
beings structure their environment in their interactions with 
it. An understanding of how such models evolve and the 
relationship between them is the single most important step 
that research in the social sciences can make to replace the 
black box of the "rationality1 assumption used in economics 
and rational choice models."
(Denzau Si North, 1994: p. 5).
"It is easy to convince most economists that economic analysis 
would greatly enrich all other academic disciplines, but 
economists are surprisingly reluctant to believe that reading 
anthropology, biology, history, psychology or sociology is 
important for doing good economic analysis."
(Bergstrom, 1996: p. 1904).
Some economists seem unwilling to change their approach: Robert Lucas
(cited in Nelson, 1995: p. 137) claimed that rational choice modelling 
provides the only "engine of truth1 we have in economics. Could economists 
use insights from sociology, without abandoning the assumption (basic to 
neoclassical economics) that humans are "rational'? Hilary Standing 
claimed that
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"Styles of management and their implications for decision 
making are thus quite varied and do not correlate 
straightforwardly with demographic, life-cycle and income 
effects. There is a critical area of ideological mediation 
which also explains why the entry of women into waged 
employment does not automatically mean an enhancement either 
in women’s share of household income resources or in their 
decision-making capacity in relation to those resources."
(Standing, 1991: p. 100).
In the above comment, Standing's view suggests that economists do not yet
have models which could explain the effects of women's employment, because
the concept of "ideological mediation' is not part of any model which
relies on the assumption of economic rationality (as most economic analysis
does). Yet Standing's comments above appear to be inconsistent with her
subsequent claim in the same book, that a household's income and life-cycle
stage (together with the conceptualization and management of household
income) permit us to understand household spending:
"Three intersecting variables largely determine what happens 
to women's wages; the form in which household income is 
conceptualized and managed, the income level of the household 
and the stage in the life cycle of the woman earner."
(Standing, 1991: p. 101).
This suggests that economists might combine information on financial 
management with data normally included in economic models (such as 
household income, and demographic variables such as the number of 
children) . I consider this comment by Standing to be supported by the 
empirical evidence reported in this thesis. Studying who handles money in 
the household is associated with the work of Jan Pahl (a sociologist); but 
it makes no sense for economists to refuse to study a topic simply because 
sociologists studied it first. Money (and who controls it) must surely be 
within the remit of economics.
I feel that there is a future for economists to delve further into the 
"black box' of the household, by studying relatively visible factors such 
as financial management: in the words of Jan Pahl, the household's system
of arranging money is a "tracer', which reveals patterns of power and 
deference within households (Pahl, 1983: p. 251). Research by Jan Pahl and 
others is a useful pointer; because of the work of pioneers such as Jan 
Pahl, several large-scale surveys such as the BHPS now include questions 
on household financial management. The challenge for economists is to 
apply the scientific methods of econometrics to the often imprecise ideas 
of sociology.
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A number of writers have advocated stronger links between economics and
sociology, including Van der Lippe & Siegers:
"the relative autonomy of the distinguished research 
traditions, i.e. role theory, exchange theory and new home 
economics, has led to an inadequate understanding of the 
division of labour."
(Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994: p. 133).
This thesis implies that economists have much to learn before we can claim 
to understand household behaviour. However, I agree with Julie Nelson's 
claim that
"overthrowing a model of autonomous choice only to end up 
with, for example, a model of pure social determinism would 
lead to no great improvement."
(Nelson, 1995: p. 137).
In their comparison of economics and sociology, England & McCreary wrote:
"Economists have had virtually nothing to say about the 
greater marital power of husbands and wives. Manser and Brown 
(1979) have analyzed bargaining between spouses, but they stay 
within economists' assumption that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are meaningless, and thus never conclude that 
husbands have more power than wives, since this would imply 
that he gets more of what he wants than she does."
(England & McCreary, 1987: p. 160).
In my opinion, England & McCreary misrepresent economics: economic
bargaining models are about the struggle for power between husband and 
wife. Nevertheless, I agree that economists could go further, and being 
able to assess how much each spouse obtains from the bargaining process 
would be desirable. There seems general agreement that utility levels 
cannot be measured (Diewert, 1974: p. 501), but this need not prevent 
economists from examining and (hopefully) explaining household behaviour.
Robert Poliak suggests that economists could learn from other disciplines:
"the analysis of simultaneous equilibrium in n-markets is also 
partial in that it treats as exogenous "non-economic" 
variables such as institutions and practices, norms and gender 
roles, preferences and values. These variables, it is often 
asserted, belong to other disciplines. But life, unlike 
universities, is not compartmentalized along the lines of 
academic disciplines."
(Poliak, 1994: p. 150).
In order to place conventional economic analysis in context, I reproduce 
below Jan Pahl1s diagram showing links between different aspects of 
household behaviour below (Pahl, 1989: p. 122); I refer to this as my 
figure 11<1>.
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FIGURE 11<1>: Jan Pahl’s overview of household behaviour
■> IDEOLOGIES
\ l /  I M /
CULTURAL \ | / PSYCHOLOGICAL
VARIABLES ----------------- > <---------------  CHARACTERISTICS
| CONTROL I
| OF I
\ I / MONEY \ 1/
SOCIOECONOMIC <-------------- > <---------------> EXPENDITURE
VARIABLES / 1 \ PATTERNS
I I / l \
I I I
*■------------------- > PRACTICALITIES----------------------- '
(e.g. access to banks)
An equivalent economic diagram would contain only two of Jan Pahl1s seven 
factors , with an arrow in one direction: from SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES to
EXPENDITURE PATTERNS. This suggests that economics is narrow in scope: 
most economists do not discuss what Pahl calls CULTURAL VARIABLES, or 
IDEOLOGIES, or PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS, or CONTROL OF MONEY, or 
PRACTICALITIES. But I wish to make clear that as an economist, I resent 
the implication in much sociological writing, that economists can only cope 
with childishly simple models, whereas sociologists can understand the 
complex realities of human behaviour. I feel that economic analysis (with 
its emphasis on mathematical precision, testable hypotheses, and explicit 
mathematical models) is a suitable approach to social science. If we rely 
on sociologists, we may never fully understand human behaviour, but just 
have a mass of separate observations which we cannot generalise.
ARE ECONOMIC MODELS OVER-COMPLICATED?
Perhaps a preference for mathematical models (popular in economics) may be
holding us back from understanding the nuances of human behaviour:
"With game-theoretic models, empirical researchers face 
substantial trade-offs between adhering to the theory and 
developing an estimable model."
(Reiss, 1996: p. 425).
Certainly, the development of my own mathematical model (chapter 5) was 
strongly determined by the need to develop a functional form which was
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differentiablei. in order to be able to "solve" the model (and hence make
predictions from it) - this may partly explain why my model was so
unsuccessful. Consider the following (but not too carefully!):
"Existence of a Nash equilibrium essentially follows from 
continuity and quasi-concavity of utility, compactness and 
convexity of the feasible set. Uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium requires further restrictions on the individual 
marginal propensities to consume. The Jacobian of the system 
of equations defining Nash equilibrium never vanishes so long 
as there is no dependence between the marginal propensities to 
consume the public good"
(Chiuri & Simmons, 1997: p. 382, footnote 6).
Models such as that by Chiuri & Simmons suggest that a wife's employment 
will tend to increase her power; but evidence in chapter 9 (of this 
thesis) suggests that this is only true in poorer households, and that the 
opposite is true at higher income-levels. No amount of sophisticated 
mathematics will make up for unrealistic assumptions; a simpler, but 
successful, model would be preferable to a sophisticated but unsuccessful 
one.
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11.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
It could be argued that we have a long way to go before we can claim to 
understand the dynamics of household spending decisions. I cannot tell if 
new home economics, or bargaining models, can be reformulated to provide 
explanations of household durables ownership which will satisfy empirical 
researchers. It seems possible that economics will gradually adopt new 
methods, as yet unknown. I suggest two possible new directions, which 
might prove to be promising: household financial management; and
improving our models of interactions between husband and wife.
HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Shirley Dex, writing in 1985, seemed unconvinced about the value of
studying household allocative systems:
"Women have been drawn into the labour market at the same time 
that manufacturing production has wanted to sell more domestic 
durable goods like washing machines. Women's employment 
provides a rationale for the purchase of such goods and also 
gives women more control over the household resources with 
which to purchase these domestic goods. If working women were 
found to spend their income on such consumer durables, this 
argument would gain some support. Pahl (1983) has recently 
opened up the issue of the allocation of money within the 
household, but the detail of our present knowledge is 
insufficient to know what women's income is spent on."
(Dex, 1985; pp. 184-5).
Durable goods ownership may be influenced by how "patriarchal' each 
household is (in this context, patriarchal refers to the relative power 
of husband and wife over household decisions): in more patriarchal
households, we might expect ownership of leisure goods to be given a higher 
priority, whereas in less patriarchal households, time-saving durables 
would tend to be a higher priority. Female financial management seems to 
be associated with greater time-saving durables ownership, and hence is an 
indicator of something; it is possible that this "something' could be 
patriarchy. However, I am not convinced that female financial management 
is simply a proxy for patriarchy, because I was unable to find a 
significant link between "feminist1 attitudes and time-saving durables 
ownership (those tables are not reported in this thesis, for reasons of 
space).
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It has been suggested that financial management does not fit easily into
the sphere of economics:
"Work by sociologists on family budgeting suggests 
considerable heterogeneity among families in money management 
practices [...] Economists, however, are unlikely to find 
money management especially interesting as outcome variables 
or appropriate as explanatory variables."
(Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: p. 155).
It should be noted, though, that Jan Pahl (perhaps the key pioneer in the 
field of financial management) does not advocate studying financial 
management as either an explanatory or an outcome variable, but as an 
intermediary variable (Pahl, 1983: p. 251). Until we find the factors 
which determine a household's choice of financial management, it seems 
reasonable to use financial management as a proxy for a more fundamental 
(but as yet unknown) cause.
In assessing work on "unitary' models and "collective1 models of household
behaviour (which were described in chapter 2), it has been claimed that
"The main empirical questions are whether household or only 
individual preferences exist; whether allocations within the 
household are efficient; what transfers are made within the 
family and what mechanisms are in place to allow the 
transfers. [...] Testing whether households are in Nash or 
Lindahl equilibrium [...] would require data on specific 
transfers within the family."
(Chiuri & Simmons, 1997: p. 385; emphasis added).
It appears that economists are now moving towards studying the internal 
dynamics of household finances; I hope this thesis will encourage that 
tendency.
IMPROVING OUR MODELS OF HUMAN INTERACTION
In seeking to understand human behaviour, economists have developed 
theories which assume each person (or household) maximises utility. This 
simplifying assumption allows economists to develop sophisticated 
mathematical models, but sociologists see human motivation as being more 
complicated. For example, Karen Pyke (1994) studied people who re-married 
after divorce, using Hochschild & Machung's concept of an "economy of 
gratitude'; she concluded that men may prefer their wives to be 
unemployed:
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"husbands value their wives' family work and their choice to 
stay home [...] a woman's choice to remain out of the labor 
force may be reflective of her power, rather than false 
consciousness or nonegalitarian orientation"
(Pyke, 1994: p. 89).
This suggests that a woman may gain her husband's gratitude by not taking 
paid work; yet in the same paragraph, Pyke appears to say the opposite: 
"wives are grateful to their husbands for enabling them not to work for 
pay" (Pyke, 1994: p. 89).
Karen Pyke considers that individual households may interpret a resource 
(such as the wife's earnings) differently, depending on their 
circumstances: men with less successful careers may feel threatened if
their wife earns a high income (Pyke, 1994: p. 89). In Pyke' s view, we 
cannot simply assume that a higher-earning wife has more power than a 
nearby wife who earns less - power depends on "symbolic and gendered 
meanings" attached to them by husband and wife. This might explain the 
fact that for high-income households, women's employment may reduce the 
likelihood of owning time-saving durables (see section 9.3).
Pyke claimed that where a man is less successful in his career, he may
restore some of his own self-worth by dominating his wife. In one couple
she studied, the wife had high earnings, and this led to tension between
spouses - but the husband coped better when he took a leadership position
in their church, because he could interpret himself as the spiritual head
(but not the financial head) of his family (Pyke, 1994: p. 88). Such
detailed insights into feelings and meanings could give sociologists a
chance to develop very sophisticated theories of household behaviour; yet
sociologists seem unable (or unwilling) to make mathematical models or
testable hypotheses. My view is that sociologists cannot "see the wood for
the trees': in focusing on minute details, sociologists are unable to
distinguish the important influences from those which are trivial: for
example, Hilary Standing wrote about women in Calcutta:
"If "autonomy', defined in a narrow sense, implies control 
over money [ . . . ] women in the sample vary widely in the 
degree of control which they exercise in this sense, 
regardless of whether they actually manage household funds.
Nor can the degree of control be read off straightforwardly 
from the class and demographic characteristics of the 
household. The ideological mediation of the marriage 
contract, together with complex configurations of household 
circumstances prevent broad generalizations."
(Standing, 1991: p. 108; emphasis added).
256
Perhaps economists in this field have oversimplified their views of human
motivation too far - Becker et al offer sophisticated mathematical models,
but these models seem weak in their ability to predict or explain actual
household behaviour. Perhaps a middle way between economics and sociology
would be desirable. Notburga Ott wrote:
"Certainly, there are factors in the family - in particular of 
an affective nature - which can hardly be explained by 
rationality [...] However, this should not lead us to deny 
rational behaviour in the family as such. If affections do 
not crowd out all rational behavior, we should observe some 
systematical reactions which can be described by an economic 
model."
(Ott, 1992: p. 196).
Finally, I suggest a comment which may point the way forward for economists
in this research area:
"We are far from a unified model of marriage, divorce and 
marital behavior, but a model of distribution within marriage 
that recognizes the independent agency of men and women within 
marriage is a prerequisite to a unified model."
(Lundberg & Poliak, 1996: p. 156).
I feel that the pioneering work of Jan Pahl and others in the sphere of 
"household allocative systems' research give economists a useful way 
forward; this is especially welcome at a time when economic models (both 
"unitary1 and "bargaining') seem to be disappointing in their abilities to 
explain observed behaviour. I am hopeful that future collaboration between 
economists and sociologists will prove beneficial.
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APPENDIX
FULL REGRESSION R mm*mwmwmm
■■■MBHHHHHn 
   __
illiii
This appendix reports the set of coefficients for each regression reported 
in chapters 7, 8, and 10 of the main text. To help the reader compare this 
appendix with tables in the main text, I divide this appendix into 
sections, with one section for each regression table in the main text. 
Appendix sections are numbered appropriately: for example, appendix
section A7<1> below corresponds to table 7<1> (table 7<1> is in chapter 7). 
Sample-sizes, and the 'odds ratio1 goodness-of-fit test, are shown in the 
tables in chapters 7 to 10; I do not repeat them here, to save space.
As in the main text, the " symbol indicates that the coefficient is
significant at the 1% level, and ' indicates significant at the 5% level
(based on a T-test). The following symbols have been used in the appendix:
for durable good x, LOGIT(x)= probability(x is owned)
1 - probability(x is owned)
Y is log of (household income: net for FES & WAS, gross for BHPS).
K is log of (number of children in the household).
A is a dummy equal to 1 if husband is over 30, otherwise zero.
Hw is log of (wife's paid employment: hours per week).
Hh is log of (husband's paid employment: hours per week).
Ww is log of (wife's wage: £s per hour in UK, Rupees/hour in India).
Wh is log of (husband's wage: £s/hour in UK, Rupees/hour in India).
M is equal to 0 if the husband manages household finances,
or 0.5 if finances are managed jointly by husband and wife f
or 1 if household finances are managed by the wife.
B is a dummy variable, equal to one if the wife has a bank account
(individual, or joint with another household member); or zero
otherwise.
At the end of this appendix, I include the questionnaires used in the 1992 
and 1997 surveys in India (retyped by myself). The actual questionnaires 
used a slightly larger paper-size, and hence were slightly easier to read.
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APPENDIX A7<1>
Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: WASHING-MACHINES
FES 1969-74:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(WASHMACH}= -
UK (i
2.11" +0.08 Ww
3.44" +0.13 WLIw
2.67" + 0.25' WL)w
2.17" + 0.42' W(1w
2.87 - 0.09 W„w
+ 0.48" Y + 0.88" K
+ 0.87" Y + 0.94" K
+ 0.84" Y + 1.15" K
+ 0.85" Y + 1.11" K
+ 1.19" Y + 1.52" K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -37.67" +0.76 Wy + 3.65" Y +1.62 K
APPENDIX A7<2>
Husband's hourly wage-rate: WASHING-MACHINES
UK (FES):
FES 1969-74:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -1.44" + 0.62" Wh + 0.25" Y + 0.74" K
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -2.32" + 0.63" Wh + 0.56" Y + 0.79" K
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -3.74" + 0.43" Wh + 0.98" Y + 1.00" K
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -2.42" + 0.41' Wh + 0.87" Y + 0.81" K
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -3.03' + 0.49 Wh + 1.05" Y + 1.22" K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -19.84" +0.18 Wh + 2.18" Y - 0.99" K
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APPENDIX A7<3>
Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: DISHWASHERS
UK (FES):
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(DISHWASHER)= -11.27" + 0.40" Ww + 1.58" Y + 0.41" K
APPENDIX A7<4>
Husband's hourly wage-rate: DISHWASHERS
UK (FES):
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(DISHWASHER)= -14.39" + 0.38" Wh + 2.07" Y + 0.45" K
APPENDIX A7<5>
Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: FOOD-PROCESSORS
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FOODPROC)= -31.24" +0.70 Ww + 3.35" Y - 0.92 K
APPENDIX A7<6>
Husband's hourly wage-rate: FOOD-PROCESSORS
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FOODPROC)= - 8.13" + 0.56' Wh + 0.77" Y - 0.54' K
APPENDIX A7<7>
Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: MICROWAVE OVENS
UK (FES):
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= - 1.90" - 0.12 Ww + 0.61" Y + 0.18' K
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APPENDIX A7<8>
Husband's hourly wage-rate: MICROWAVE OVENS
UK (FES)i
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= - 1.66" - 0.02 Wh + 0.54" Y +0.10 K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= -14.65" + 0.34 Wh + 1.21 Y - 0.92 K
APPENDIX A7<9>
Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: REFRIGERATORS
UK (FES):
FES 1969-74:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 9.28" + 0.52" Ww + 1.90" Y - 0.13' K
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 7.68" + 0.75" Ww + 1.92" Y - 0.03 K
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = 0.28 + 0.39 W„ + 0.73' Y - 0.06 K
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = 0.06 + 0.61 Ww + 0.79' Y - 0.01 K
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT{FRIDGE) = 6.23 +0.19 Ww - 0.12 Y +0.21 K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = -22.53" + 1.27 W„ + 2.01" Y - 0.26 KW
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APPENDIX A7<10>
Husband1s hourly wage-rate: REFRIGERATORS
UK (FES):
FES 1969-74:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 9.19" + 0.65" Wh + 1.84" Y - 0.31" K
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 9.16" + 0.67" Wh + 2.18" Y - 0.24" K
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 2.13 +0.47 Wh + 1.11" Y - 0.17 K
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = 2.05 + 0.70' Wh + 0.41' Y - 0.37 K
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT<FRIDGE) = - 1.49 - 0.39 Wh + 1.27" Y +0.26 K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = -15.55" +0.50 Wh + 1.64" Y - 0.24 K
APPENDIX A7<11>
Becker's price-of-time hypothesis: DEEP-FREEZERS
FES 1975-80: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
FES 1981-86: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
FES 1987-92: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
FES 1993-96: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
= -6.99" + 0
= -6.54" + 0
= -2.45" + 0
= -0.35 + 0
UK (FES):
14 WL( + 1.29"
31" W„ + 1.29"
13 W w +0.76"
08 Ww + 0.56"W
Y + 0.17" K
Y + 0.17" K
Y + 0.65" K
Y + 0.41" K
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APPENDIX A7<12>
Hourly wage-rate of the husband: DEEP-FREEZERS
FES 1975-80: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
FES 1981-86: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
FES 1987-92: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
FES 1993-96: 
LOGIT(FREEZER)
= -8.13" + 0
= -8.03" + 0
= -3.80" + 0
= -0.82 + 0
UK (FES):
10 wh +1.50"
11 Wh +1.59"
19 Wh +0.97"
28 Wh +0.55"
Y + 0.10 K
Y + 0.11" K
Y + 0.52" K
Y + 0.63" K
APPENDIX A8<1>
Specification based on that of Piachaud: WASHING-MACHINES
UK (FES):
FES 1969-74:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 3.44" + 0.74" Y + 0.68" K + 0.49" A - 0.10" Hv
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 3.52" + 0.94" Y + 0.75" K + 0.20" A - 0.09" Hv
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 3.33" + 0.99" Y + 0.72" K + 0.37" A - 0.01 Hv
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(WASHMACH) = - 2.34" + 0.92" Y + 0.58" K + 0.34" A + 0.05 Hfc
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 1.90" + 0.90" Y + 1.00" K + 0.53' A +0.07 H,
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1992:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -33.58" + 3.71" Y - 0.52 K + 1.02 A - 0.14 Hv
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -20.45" + 2.30" Y - 1.10" K + 0.57 A + 0.03 H,
263
APPENDIX A8<2>
Specification based on that of Piachaud: DISHWASHERS
UK (FES):
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(DISHWASHER)= -11.74" + 1.67" Y + 0.16" K + 1.22" A - 0.12" Hw
APPENDIX A8<3>
Specification based on that of Piachaud: FOOD-PROCESSORS
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1992:
LOGIT(FOODPROC)= -27.61" + 3.48" Y - 0.76" K +0.33 A - 0.09 Hw
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FOODPROC)= -11.18" + 1.42" Y - 0.50' K +0.22 A - 0.33" Hw
APPENDIX A8<4>
Specification based on that of Piachaud: MICROWAVE OVENS
UK (FES):
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= - 1.55" + 0.47" Y + 0.11' K + 0.05 A + 0.09" H.
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= -30.36 + 1.99" Y - 0.82 K + 10.96 A - 3.48 H,w
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APPENDIX A8<5>
Specification based on that of Piachaud: REFRIGERATORS
UK (FES):
FES 1969-74:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 9.41" + 2.01" Y - 0.34" K +0.46"
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 6.10" + 1.71" Y - 0.23" K + 0.38"
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 0.67 + 0.88" Y - 0.24 K +0.49"
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 0.06 + 0.85" Y - 0.12 K + 0.21
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = 1.81 + 0.50' Y + 0.09 K + 0.30
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1992:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = -36.43" + 4.35" Y - 1.02" K + 0.96' 
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = -18.34" + 2.24" Y -0.17 K +0.08
APPENDIX A8<6>
Specification based on that of Piachaud: DEEP-
UK (FES):
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(FREEZER) = -7.72" + 1.45" Y + 0.02 K + 0.33"
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(FREEZER) = -7.25" + 1.44" Y - 0.04 K + 0.57"
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(FREEZER) = -3.71" + 0.94" Y + 0.37" K +0.53"
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(FREEZER) = -1.51" + 0.71" Y + 0.47" K + 0.37'
A - 0.09" Hu w
A +0.01 Hw 
A +0.06 R,
W
A + 0.13 H,,
W
A + 0.25' W
A - 0.17 Hw
A - 0.36" Hu
W
FREEZERS
A - 0.06" H,, w
A - 0.04" H,, w
A +0.02 Hw
A - 0.00 fl,w
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APPENDIX A8<8>
Paid work (hours/week) by husband & wife: WASHING-MACHINES
UK (FES):
FES 1969-74:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 3.12" + 0.78" Y + 0.68" K - 0.05" Hh - 0.10" Hw
FES 1975-80:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 3.35" + 0.93" Y + 0.75" K + 0.01 Hh - 0.10" Hw
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 3.04" + 0.98" Y + 0.70" K + 0.02 Hh - 0.02 Hw
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 2.02" + 0.90" Y + 0.54" K +0.03 Hh +0.04 Hw
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 1.42' + 0.90" Y + 0.96" K + 0.02 Hh + 0.05 Hw
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1992:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -32.95" + 3.80" Y - 0.31 K - 0.16 Hh - 0.13 Hw
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -20.28" + 2.33" Y - 1.02" K +0.01 Hh +0.04 Hw
APPENDIX A10<2>
Who manages money (husband/joint/wife): WASHING-MACHINES
BRITAIN (BHPS):
BHPS 1992:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 3.24" + 0.94" M + 0.97" Y + 0.75" K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1992:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -31.88" + 0.55 M + 3.57" Y - 0.36 K 
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -20.25" +0.80 M + 2.31" Y - 1.15" K
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APPENDIX A10<3>
Who manages money (husband/joint/wife): DISHWASHERS
BHPS 1992:
LOGIT(DISHWASHER)= -10.64"
BRITAIN (BHPS):
+ 0.58" M + 1.43" Y + 0.58" K
APPENDIX A10<4>
Who manages money (husband/joint/wife): FOOD-PROCESSORS
WAS 1992:
LOGIT(FOODPROC)= -27.69"
URBAN INDIA:
+ 1.05" M + 3.49" Y - 0.76" K
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FOODPROC)= -10.28" + 0.29 M + 1.31" Y - 0.61" K
APPENDIX A10<5>
Who manages money (husband/joint/wife): MICROWAVE OVENS
BHPS 1992:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= - 3.12"
BRITAIN (BHPS):
+ 0.43" M + 0.62" Y + 0.09 K
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= -15.26"
URBAN INDIA:
+ 1.57 M + 1.41" Y - 1.21 K
APPENDIX A10<6>
Who manages money (husband/jo int/wife): REFRIGERATORS
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1992:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = -34.84" + 0.75" M + 4.22" Y - 0.95" K 
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = -17.17" + 0.93" M + 2.08" Y - 0.41 K
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APPENDIX A10<7>
Who manages money (husband/joint/wife): d e e p-f r e e z e r s
BRITAIN (BHPS):
BHPS 1992:
LOGIT(FREEZER) = - 1.68' +0.50 M + 0.61" Y + 0.79" K
APPENDIX A10<8>
Effect of wife having a bank account: WASHING-MACHINES
UK (FES)i
FES 1981-86:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 1.24 + 0.85" B + 0.63" Y + 0.54" K
FES 1987-92:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 1.85" + 0.91" B + 0.79" Y + 0.67" K
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= - 1.59' + 0.43' B + 0.91" Y + 1.00" K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(WASHMACH)= -19.25" - 0.29 B + 2.24" Y - 1.24" K
APPENDIX A10<9>
Effect of wife having a bank account: DISHWASHERS
UK (FES):
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT<DISHWASHER)= -10.30" + 0.29" B + 1.53" Y + 0.29" K
APPENDIX A10<10>
Effect of wife having a bank account: FOOD-PROCESSORS
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FOODPROC)= -9.57" +0.34 B + 1.20" Y - 0.54' K
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APPENDIX A10<11>
Effect of wife having a bank account: MICROWAVE OVENS
UK (FES):
FES 1993-96:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= - 1.85" +0.01 B + 0.56" Y +0.08 K
URBAN INDIA:
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(MICROWAVE)= -15.50" + 0.11 B + 1.50' Y - 0.90 K
APPENDIX A10<12> 
Effect of wife having a bank account: REFRIGERATORS
FES 1981-86: 
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 0.18
UK (FES)i 
+ 0.37 B + 0.90" Y - 0.45 K
FES 1987-92: 
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = - 0.11 + 0.85" B + 0.83" Y - 0.07 K
FES 1993-96: 
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = 1.70 + 1.45" B + 0.52' Y +0.18 K
WAS 1997:
LOGIT(FRIDGE) = -15.24"
URBAN INDIA:
+ 0.96" B + 1.82" Y - 0.36 K
APPENDIX A10<13> 
Effect of wife having a bank account: DEEP-FREEZERS
FES 1981-86: 
LOGIT(FREEZER) = -4.28"
UK (FES):
+ 0.54" B + 0.95" Y + 0.34" K
FES 1987-92: 
LOGIT(FREEZER) = -3.19" + 0.49" B + 0.87" Y + 0.42" K
FES 1993-96: 
LOGIT(FREEZER) = -1.02' + 0.64" B + 0.62" Y + 0.55" K
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Copy of the 19-U2 India questionnaire* re-typed by John Simister.
SERIAL No I _J _  I _  M
STUDY OF HOUSEHOLD SPENDING PATTERNS
NAME OF RESPONDENT: ....................................................
ADDRESS ............................................................- - • •
  TEL. NO.: ................
NAME OF INTERVIEWER:  DATE OF INTERVIEW:........
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: ........................ SIGNATURE:................
ACCOMPANIED:   BACKCHECKED:   SCRUTINISED:.........
★  A * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Go o d   I am from Indian Market Research Bureau. We do market surveys
on consumer products and services. Currently, we are doing one such 
survey. In this regard, we would like to ask you a few questions. Could 
you spare about 5 minutes to answer them? THANK YOU.
A * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
< 1>
SI.
N O .
W h o  l i v e s  i n  t h i s  h o u s e h o l d ?
COLLECT DATA AS PER THE RECORDING FORMAT
r e l a t i o n s h i p
t o  t h e  | s e x
r e s p o n d e n t  | ( m / f )n a m e  o f  p e r s o n a g e
e d u c a t i o n  
( u s e  c o d e )
o c c u p a t i o n  
( u s e  c o d e )
10
EDUCATION OCCUPATION
1
ILLITERATE 1 UNSKILLED WORKER 1
PRIMARY 2 SKILLED WORKER 2
SECONDARY BUT NOT S S C 3 PETTY TRADER 3
ssc 4 SHOP OWNER 4
COLLEGE, BUT NOT GRADUATE 5 BUSINESS ( WO ) MAN/INDUSTRIALIST 5
GRADUATE AND ABOVE 6 SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL 6
NOT DISCLOSED 7 CLERICAL/SALESPERSON 7
SUPERVISORY LEVEL 8
OFFICER/EXECUTIVE 9
HOUSEWIFE 10
STUDENT 11
RETIRED 12
UNEMPLOYED (EMPLOYED BEFORE) 13
UNEMPLOYED (NEVER EMPLOYED) 14
NOT DISCLOSED 15
270
<1B> IF HOUSEWIFE, ASK: Did you ever work in the past? [ ] YES
[ ] NO
IF YES: Why did you stop working?
[] STOPPED AFTER HAVING BABY 
[ ] OTHER REASONS
<2> Where were you born?
PLACE OF BIRTH:..................
NEAREST TOWN:....................
DISTRICT:........................
STATE:...........................
<3> (SHOW CARD 1)
Which of these is nearest to the way your household organises money? 
[] HUSBAND USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 
[] WIFE USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 
[] HUSBAND AND WIFE MANAGE MONEY TOGETHER 
[] HUSBAND AND WIFE KEEP MONEY SEPARATELY 
[] OTHER:...............................
<4A> In your household, who has the final say in big financial decisions?
<4B> Who should have the final say in big financial decisions in
households?
4A 4B
HUSBAND[] [ ]
WIFE[] []
HUSBAND AND WIFE JOINTLY[] [ ]
OTHERS[] []
<5> I would now like to ask you a few questions about you and your spouse.
HUSBAND WIFE
a: time spent per week on paid work 
(hours)
b: time spent per day on cooking and 
cleaning utensils (hours)
c: time spent per day on washing
clothes/cleaning the house (hours)
d: money spent per week in hotel
/restaurant, for yourself (Rupees) I I I
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<6> I would like to ask you a few questions about the household 
expenditure:
( a
(b
(c
(d
(e
(f
(g
( h  
(i
(j
(k
(1
(m
{n
(o
(P
(q
(r
(s
(t
< 7 A >
<7B>
<8>
<8A>
<8B>
<9>
(Rupees per month)
for eating out with family in hotels/outside |_|__|__|__|
rice, wheat, dal, etc I_I__I__!__I
cooking oil_________________________________ I__I__I__I__I
coffee/tea/milk food drinks__________________ |__|__|__|__|
masala/spices, & instant noodles/foods/mixes |___ |__|__|__|
other provis ions____________________________ I__I__!__I__I
milk and dairy products I__I__ 1__I__I
vegetables and fruit________________________ I__I__ i__I__I
meat, fish and meat products_________________|__|__ |__|__|
bread, jam, sauces, etc_____________________ I__I__ I__I__I
biscuits, chocolate, toffees________________ I__!__I__ I__I
sweets and snacks bought____________________ I__I__I__ I__I
ice-creams__________________________________ I__I__I__ j__I
gas/kerosene________________________________ I__I__I__ I__I
electricity_________________________________ I__I__I__ I__I
house rent/maintenance______________________ I__I__I__ 1__I
servant/maid________________________________ I__I__I__ i__I
laundry_____________________________________ I__|__ |__|__I
loan repayment, if any______________________ I__|__|__ |__|
average total monthly expenses __ __ __ __ __
(above+other) I__|__|__|__|__ |
Savings per month__________________________ I__|__ |__|__|
IF SAVED, ASK: what do you save for? ...................
M o n t h l y  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  |__ j__ |__ j__ |___ |
(SHOW CARD 2) Do you agree or disagree that a woman will be happier 
if she goes out to work?
Do you agree or disagree that her family will be happier if she goes 
out to work?
8A 8B
AGREE STRONGLY 
AGREE SOMEWHAT 
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
DISAGREE SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE STRONGLY
Who mostly looks after the children in this household?
HUSBAND []
WIFE [ ]
BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE [ ]
OTHER: ................  [ ]
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<10> (SHOW CARD 3) Imagine a married couple on a low income, with three 
children old enough to go to school. Should the wife do a paid job?
WIFE OUGHT TO DO PAID JOB [3
WIFE OUGHT TO STAY AT HOME []
WIFE SHOULD CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO DO PAID WORK [ ]
OTHER:   [ ]
<11> (SHOW CARD 3) What about a couple with a child too young to go to 
school: should the wife do a paid job?
WIFE OUGHT TO DO PAID JOB [ ]
WIFE OUGHT TO STAY AT HOME [ ]
WIFE SHOULD CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO DO PAID WORK [ ]
OTHER:   [ ]
<12> (SHOW CARD 2) Do you agree or disagree that it is a husband's job 
to earn money, and a wife's job to look after the home and family?
AGREE STRONGLY [ ]
AGREE SOMEWHAT [ ]
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE []
DISAGREE SOMEWHAT []
DISAGREE STRONGLY [ ]
<13> (SHOW CARD 4) Which of these is sufficient grounds for divorce? 
TICK ALL THAT APPLY: [] TOO MUCH DRINKING
[] BEING VIOLENT
[] BEING CONSISTENTLY UNFAITHFUL
<14> What is your religion?
HINDU []
MUSLIM [ ]
CHRISTIAN [ ]
OTHER:..........
<15> (SHOW CARD 5) Please tell me your caste from this card.
BRAHMIN []
OTHER FORWARD CASTE [ ]
BACKWARD CASTE [ ]
SCHEDULED CASTE/SCHEDULED TRIBE []
<16> Do you own:
[] 'MIXIE' (FOOD PROCESSOR)
[] WET GRINDER (FOR GRINDING FLOUR etc) 
[] REFRIGERATOR 
[] WASHING MACHINE 
[] VACUUM CLEANER
-------------------------------- THANK YOU--------------------
WHO WAS PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW? IS THE RESPONDENT A . . .
[] RESPONDENT ONLY STREET DWELLER []
[] HUSBAND/WIFE ALSO PRESENT SLUM DWELLER []
[] OTHER ADULT(S) PRESENT NEITHER []
[3 CHILD(REN) PRESENT
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copy of the 1097 India questionnaire f retyped by John Simfsfcer* 
IMRB/BOMBAY PROJECT SPENDING Centre: Madras 1
JN/21634 Bombay 2
Delhi 3
Name of respondent: ......................................... Calcutta 4
Address:   Tel. no. : .............
Interviewer 1 s name:..... |___|___ | Date of interview: |__|__ |_|__| | |__|__ |
Accompanied Back-checked Scrutinised
P T
TL 1 TL 1 5 TL 1
EIC 2 EIC 2 6 EIC 2
OFE 3 OFE 3 7 OFE 3
FM 4 FM 4 8 FM 4
Signature: TL/EIC/OFE/FM Signature: TL/EIC/OFE/FM Signature: TL/EIC/OFE/FM
Good.... I am from Indian Market Research Bureau. We do market surveys on 
consumer products and services. Currently, we are doing one such survey. 
In this regard, we would like to ask you a few questions. Could you spare 
about 10 minutes to answer them?
ASK TO SPEAK TO CHIEF WAGE EARNER OR SPOUSE
Qla Could you please tell me if any member of your family works for . . .
Market Research Agency 1 TERMINATE
Advertising Agency 2 TERMINATE
None of these 3 CONTINUE
Qlb We wish to conduct this survey among married persons. Could you 
please tell me if you are married? Yes 1 CONTINUE
No 2 TERMINATE
Qlc What is the highest level to which the Chief Wage Earner (i.e. the 
person making highest contribution to household budget) has studied? 
Qld What is his occupation? (If retired, what was his occupation before 
retirement?) ___________________________________ SEC: | | |
OCCUPATION
Illit
erate
School 
up to 
4 yrs
School 
5-9 yrs
SSC
/
HSC
college 
but not 
graduate
Graduate 
/P.Grad: 
general
Graduate 
/P.Grad: 
profesnl
Unskilled E2 E2 El D D D D
Skilled worker E2 El D C C B2 B2
Petty trader E2 D D C C B2 B2
Shop owner D D C B2 B1 A2 A2
Bus ines smen:
* no employees D C B2 B1 A2 A2 A1
*1-9 employees C B2 B2 B1 A2 A1 A1
*10+ employees B1 B1 A2 A2 A1 A1 A1
self-employed
professional
D D D B2 B1 A2 A1
clerical/sales D D D C B2 B1 B1
supervisory
level
D D C C B2 B1 A2
officer/exec: 
junior
C C C B2 B1 A2 A2
of f icer/exec: 
middle/senior
B1 B1 B1 B1 A2 A1 A1
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Q2a I would like to know some details regarding the members of this
household. Could you please give me the names of all the members
living in this house? How is (READ NAME OF MEMBER) related to you?
What is his/her age? Up to what level has he/she studied? What is 
his/her occupation? 
j FIRST |RELATION| SEX | AGE [EDUCATION OCCUPATION
| NAME OF |-SHIP TO| male=l | (if less than | |
| PERSON RESPONDENT fern =2 | 1 year, put 0)|use code | (use code)
_ + -----------+ ---------- + ----------+-
1 : I I I
- + ------------ + ------------+ ----------- +-
2 : I I I
— I   | ------1--
3 : I I I
- + ------------ + ------------+ ----------- +-
4 : | I I
- + ------------ + ------------+ ----------- +-
5 : [ I I
_ + -----------+ ---------- + ----------+-
6 : I ! I
- + ----------- + ----------- h---------- +-
7 : 1 I I
8 : I I I
9 : I I I
10: | [ |
CODE RELATION TO R CODE EDUCATION CODE OCCUPATION
respondent 1
husband/wife 2
grandparent 3
parent 4
brother/sis ter 5
s on/daughter 
grandchild 6
related to spouse 
other 7
Q2b
CODE
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10 
11
01 unskilled worker
02 skilled worker
03 petty trader
04 shop owner
05 businesman/industrialist
06 self-employed profesionl
07 clerical/salesperson
08 supervisory level
09 officer/executive:junior
10 officer/exec: mid/senior 
8 not disclosed 11 housewife
12 student
13 retired
14 unemployd:employd before
15 unemployd:never employed
16 not disclosed 
Within India, which state or Union territory were you born in?
illiterate 
school upto 4 yrs 
school 5-9 years 
SSC/HSC 
some college, 
but not graduate 
grad/postgraduate 
-general
grad/postgraduate 
-professional 
INDIAN STATE 
Andaman & Nicobar 
Andhra Pradesh 
Arunchal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar
Chandigarh
Dadra & Nagar Haveli
Delhi
Goa, Daman & Diu
Gujarat
Haryana
CODE INDIAN STATE
12 Himachal Pradesh
13 Jammu & Kashmir
14 Karnataka
15 Kerala
16 Lakshadweep
17 Madhya Pradesh
18 Maharashtra
19 Manipur
20 Meghalaya
21 Mizoram
22 Nagaland
CODE INDIAN STATE
23 Orissa
24 Pondicherry
25 Punjab
26 Rajasthan
27 Sikkim
28 Tamil Nadu
29 Tripura
30 Uttar Pradesh
31 West Bengal
32 Outside India
I I 1
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Q2c Were you born in a village/small town or in a city? 
VILLAGE/TOWN 1
CITY 2
Q3 Which of these is nearest to the way your household organises money? 
SHOW CARD "A1 HUSBAND USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 1
WIFE USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 2 ___
HUSBAND AND WIFE MANAGE MONEY TOGETHER 3 |
HUSBAND AND WIFE KEEP MONEY SEPARATELY 4 |__
OTHER:   5
DON'T KNOW/CAN'T SAY 6
Q4a Who makes the important financial decisions in your household?_
Q4b Who in your opinion should make the final I 1
decision in financial matters of the household?__________ |___|__
SHOW CARD "B’ Q4a Q4b
HUSBAND 1 1
WIFE 2 2
HUSBAND & WIFE TOGETHER 3 3
PARENTS 4 4
OTHERS (please specify): ..............  5 5
DON'T KNOW/CAN'T SAY 6 6
Q5 I would like to ask a few questions about you and your spouse. How 
much time do you spend per week, on:
HUSBAND WIFE
5a paid work (hours per week)
5b preparing/cooking food (hours per week)
5c shopping for food (hours per week)
5d cleaning clothes (hours per week)
5e making/mending clothes (hours per week)
5f cleaning the house (hours per week)
5g minding children (hours per week)
5h leisure (hours per week)
Q6a SHOW CARD "C1
How much do you usually earn, per month (after income tax)?
How much does your spouse usually earn, per month (after income tax)? 
What is your total monthly household income after income tax?
LESS THAN Rs. 2,000
Husband
1
Wife
l
MHI
1
Rs. 2,001 - Rs. 4,000 2 2 2
Rs. 4,001 - Rs. 6,000 3 3 3
Rs. 6,001 - Rs. 8,000 4 4 4
Rs. 8,001 - Rs.10,000 5 5 5
Rs.10,001 - Rs.15,000 6 6 6
Rs .15,001 + 7 7 7
Not specified 8 8 8
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Q6b. What percentage of your monthly household I ~ | |
income do you save every month?__________________________ I |___ |
Q7 How much do you usually spend in a month on the following (Rupees)?
7a Rice, wheat, dal, etc 
7b Cooking oil
7c Milk & dairy products, milk food drinks
7d Vegetables and fruit
7e Meat, fish and meat products
7f Bread, jam, sauces, etc
7g Instant noodles/foods/mixes
7h Cigarettes, alcohol, pan, etc
7i Clothes & footwear (including repairs)
7j For eating out in hotels/outside
7k Snacks bought (from street stalls, etc)
71 Gas/kerosene
7m Electricity
7n House rent/maintenance
7o Servant/maid/child-minder
7p Laundry service/dhobi
7q Loan repayment, if any
Do you own any of the following? "MIXIE' FOOD-PROCESSOR 1 2
CODE "1' IF OWNED, "2* IF NOT OWNED WET-GRINDER 1 2
MICROWAVE OVEN 1 2
REFRIGERATOR 1 2
WASHING MACHINE 1 2
TELEVISION 1 2
Is there a water tap in your home? 1 2
Do you have a bank account of your own/with your spouse? 1 2
Q9 Please tell me whether a wife should work outside the home full 
time, part time or not at all in each of the cases mentioned below. 
SINGLE CODE FOR EACH ROW FULL- PART- NOT AT
TIME TIME ALL DK/CS
9a ..after marrying and before having children 1 2 3 4
9b ..when there is a child under school age 1 2 3 4
9c ..after the youngest child starts school 1 2 3 4
Q10 SHOW CARD 'C' Please read the phrases on this card, I will read out 
some statements to you. Could you tell me the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with these statements with the help of this card. 
AGREE STRONGLY 1
AGREE SOMEWHAT 2
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 3 
DISAGREE SOMEWHAT 4
DISAGREE STRONGLY 5
10a "I am always short of time" |__|
10b "I prefer meals which can be prepared quickly" |__|
10c "Convenience foods like instant noodles can save time on cooking"
l__l
lOd "A wife should always obey her husband" j__|
lOe "It is a husband's job to earn money, and a __
wife's job to look after the home and family" |__|
lOf Would your spouse agree or disagree with the statement
"It is a husband's job to earn money, and a __
wife's job to look after the home and family" | |
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Qll *
Q12.
Q13.
Q14.
Which religion do you belong to?
HINDU 1
MUSLIM 2 ___
SIKH 3 | |
ROMAN CATHOLIC 4 |___|
CHRISTIAN (PROTESTANT) 5
OTHER:   6
I will read out some statements to you. Do you think that 
(MENTION STATEMENT) is sufficient reason for divorce? 
REPEAT FOR ALL THE STATEMENTS.
YES NO
Too much drinking | I I
Being violent
Being consistently unfaithful
THANK & TERMINATE
THIS PART IS NOT TO BE ASKED TO THE RESPONDENT
APART FROM THE PERSON YOU INTERVIEWED, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING THE 
INTERVIEW?
Husband/wife present | |
I___I
Other adult(s) present | |
I___I
Child(ren) present | |
WHAT LANGUAGE WAS USED IN THE INTERVIEW? (Please pick one code)
English 1
Hindi 2
Marathi 3
Bengali 4
Tamil 5
OTHER: ....... 6
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CARD A
HUSBAND USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 1
WIFE USUALLY LOOKS AFTER HOUSEHOLD MONEY 2
HUSBAND AND WIFE MANAGE MONEY TOGETHER 3
HUSBAND AND WIFE KEEP MONEY SEPARATELY 4
OTHER:   5
DON'T KNOW/CAN'T SAY 6
HUSBAND
CARD B
1
WIFE 2
HUSBAND & WIFE TOGETHER 3
PARENTS 4
OTHERS (please specify): ..... .... 5
DON'T KNOW/CAN'T SAY 6
CARD C
LESS THAN Rs. 2,000 1
Rs. 2,001 - RS. 4,000 2
Rs. 4,001 - Rs. 6,000 3
Rs. 6,001 - Rs. 8,000 4
RS. 8,001 - Rs.10,000 5
Rs .10,001 - Rs.15,000 6
Rs .15,001 + 7
Not specified 8
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After an overview of alternative m ethods for analysing the ownership of consumer 
durables, a particular m ethod is proposed, drawn from the principles of social choice 
theory, and ultimately leading to the m ethod of ranking durables equivalent to the 
Borda rule. M ethods are also developed for calculating the uniformity of choice and 
for identifying differences in patterns of ownership across partitions of the sample.
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the 
econom ics of consumer durables, even if demand theory 
continues to be dom inated empirically and theoretically by 
the presumption of infinite divisibility and spontaneous 
utility in our items of consum ption. Durables have proved 
more attractive analytically for a number of reasons. First, 
the range of goods available has increased both with techno­
logical developments and with affluence. The main form or 
weight of durable purchases might still be provided by 
accom m odation which, like many other durables, can also 
be rented.1 It is closely followed by the m otor car, but these 
have been supplemented by a growing variety of household  
appliances, expenditure on the latter alone comprising 2%  
of disposable incom e in 1980 in the United States, up from  
0.5% in 1920.2 However, as a consumer durable in m ain­
stream econom ics is readily understood as an asset (subject 
to appreciation or depreciation contingent upon price 
movem ents as well as its shifting capacity to provide 
a stream of utility-enhancing services), it has served as an 
illustrative example for intertemporal utility maximizing. 
Durables raise exactly the same issues for consumers as does 
saving.
Second, durables represent discrete purchases, thereby 
raising particular theoretical problems, given the general 
presumption of continuously variable quantities, and prob­
lems in empirical estimation. Such theoretical and analytical
issues have been addressed more generally so that, once 
again, durables have provided the opportunity for a con­
venient case study and application of evolving analytical 
techniques.
Third, demand theory or, more precisely, the theory of 
optimal consumer behaviour, has broadened its scope not 
only to incorporate optim ization over time (and hence sav­
ing) but also decisions over employment. With the rise of 
female labour market participation, there has been an inter­
est in the substitution between wom en’s paid and dom estic 
labour and, in particular, whether consumer durables are 
(domestic) labour saving, thereby inducing wom en to go out 
to work and to buy them from greater household income.
Fourth, over the past decade, desktop and mainframe 
computing power has been enhanced beyond all recogni­
tion. This has enabled more complex econometrics to be 
readily undertaken on extremely large data sets pitched at 
the household level. The sort of demand analysis now be­
coming comm onplace, including that of durables, would 
previously have been the preserve of a select few.
These, no doubt as well as other material and intellectual 
developments, have prom pted interest in (the demand for) 
consumer durables. Yet it is the very diversity of these 
factors that poses problems for the extension of traditional 
approaches. If consumer durables are treated singly in isola­
tion from one another, through logit/probit methods, for 
example, then powerful assum ptions around additive separ­
ability of utility are alm ost certainly implicitly assumed.
T n  orthodox economics, the difference between forms of tenure might be explained, in otherwise perfectly w orking markets, by 
informational a n d  contractual costs.
2F o r  a historical c omparison of the g r o w t h  of ownership of household appliances in the U S A  a n d  U K ,  see B o w d e n  a n d  Offer (1994). 
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This is liable to be the case where interest focuses upon the 
services provided by a particular durable (subject to its price 
and available income, etc).
On the other hand, if aggregate consumer durable expen­
diture is examined, equally powerful assum ptions are im­
plied by the aggregation over them. In this instance, concern 
is liable to be with saving and employment decisions. In 
short, durables have extremely heterogeneous properties in 
consumption even if they are hom ogeneous in some respects 
as assets for the purposes of intertemporal optimization.
Quite apart from these problems of com prom ising be­
tween the specific and general properties of durables within 
mainstream economics, the theory of consumer behaviour 
and the role of consum ption are readily recognized by other 
social sciences to depend upon much more than prices and 
incomes and utility maximization on the basis of given 
preferences. The diversity of theories of consum ption need 
not detain us here.3 but two com m on and broad approaches 
are important implicitly in what follows. On the demand- 
side from an econom ist’s perspective, 'socialization’ by 
a variety of mechanisms tends to lead to a com m on set of 
aspirations and a corresponding standard of living, whether 
attained or not, and which might differ within as well as 
across countries. On the supply side, technology tends to be 
driven by standardization and mass production, with cor­
responding scale econom ies in the provision of many com ­
modities and, possibly, many consumer durables.
In this light, this paper is primarily concerned with pre­
senting an alternative approach to the ownership of 
durables. It is motivated by analysis drawn from social 
choice theory. Durables are treated as candidates or alterna­
tives over which consumers vote by owning them or not in 
order of acquisition. As such, the method does not offer 
explanation in the sense, for example, of the price and 
income effects of orthodox demand analysis. Rather, it 
merely seeks to identify patterns of durable ownership and 
to assess how com m on they are across the population as 
a whole or across different sections of the population. The 
calculation of such consum ption norms may, however, be 
indicative of causal factors -  comparing those with higher 
and lower income, or with and without children, for 
example just as psephology identifies different voting 
patterns for the major parties across different constituencies 
of interests and characteristics.
The method of examining consumer durable ownership 
developed here has been outlined before (Fine, 1983). Over 
the intervening decade, however, there have been both theo­
retical and practical advances which are not presented in 
print elsewhere. Indeed, the merit of this contribution is 
arguably in illustrating how the previous approach can be 
more fully operationalized and empirical results readily 
interpreted.
We begin, however, with a cursory overview of other 
approaches to the ownership of durables. This is not in any 
sense intended even as a partial literature review, but rather 
as a means of bringing out the distinctiveness and signifi­
cance of our own approach.
II. E X A M I N I N G  O N E  D U R A B L E  A T  A T I M E
M ost neoclassical econom ists use logit/probit (or similar) 
regressions to predict the ownership or not of a single 
durable good. This approach generally assumes that the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value of one if a household owns the durable good, or zero 
otherwise. A number of explanatory variables are used 
to predict ownership levels, these generally including a 
measure of household income. Researchers who have used 
this approach include Piachaud (1982), Bryant (1988) and 
Oropesa (1993). For logit/probit regression, we can use 
critical values from ^-statistics to assess whether or not 
a coefficient is statistically different from zero. A number of 
researchers have used methods other than logit/probit to 
study ownership of an individual durable good; for example, 
Strober (1977), and Strober and Weinberg (1980), and 
Weinberg and Winer (1983) use discriminant analysis in 
place of logit/probit regression.4
The level of household incom e appears to be extremely 
important as a determinant of household durable owner­
ship. This may make it even more difficult to assess the 
effects of other variables. For example, in order to assess 
whether or not w om en’s employment is associated with 
increased ownership of household durables, the level of total 
household incom e should be controlled for; but this may be 
complicated by a number of factors, such as the travel 
expenses incurred by working-wife households.
If two households with the same net incom e have different 
com positions (for example, a single-person household and 
a family of five), then the standard of living in the two 
households may be very different. The ‘household equiva­
lence scales’ approach attempts to control for different 
household circumstances, by taking account of the number 
and ages of household members (DSS, 1993). Using this 
approach, researchers hope to be able to use incom e data on 
households of different types, in order to be able to compare 
their standards of living. In practice, this is very difficult to 
achieve, and researchers disagree about the details on how  
to compare households with different com positions. For 
example, DSS (1993, p. 125) claims that:
There are m a n y  different equivalence scales in existence. Scales 
have been estimated using a wide range of different m e t h o d o l o ­
gies in a n u m b e r  of countries. All the m e t h o d s  of deriving 
equivalence scales, however, have weaknesses of one for m  or
•'For a critical overview, see Fine and Leopold (1993).
4Bay u s  and Carlstrom (1990) use discriminant analysis to find groups of durables.
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another. A s  a result, there is n o  consensus 011 the best m e t h o d  for 
estimating scales a n d  n o  single set of scale values c o m m a n d s  
general acceptance.
In addition to the above problems with controlling for 
income, the permanent incom e hypothesis suggests that, 
even when comparing two households with the same de­
mographic characteristics (such as number of children), 
there may be reasons to question conventional logit /probit 
approaches to studying consum ption. For example, the 
share of household incom e earned by the wife may influence 
how far the household’s incom e is perceived to be ‘perma­
nent’ or ‘transitory’ -  a wife’s earnings might be regarded as 
‘transitory’ income, if she expected to leave employment for 
childbirth. Friedman (1957, p. 85) argues that:
A  c o m m o n  m e t h o d  of analyzing the factors affecting c o n s u m p ­
tion is to ‘hold i n c o m e  constant’ while studying the effect of 
other variables. Income, it is argued, is the maj o r  factor affecting 
expenditures, so, unless its influence is first eliminated, the effect 
of other variables will be s w a m p e d .  In this method, ‘i n c o m e ’ is 
almost invariably taken to be w h a t  w e  have called ‘meas u r e d  
i n c o m e ’ for a particular year. . . If the preceding analysis [i.e. the 
p erma n e n t  i n c o m e  hypothesis] is accepted, it is clear that these 
m e t h o d s  d o  not hold i n c o m e  constant in a sense that is m e a n i n g ­
ful for the determination of co n s u m p t i o n  behavior. W h a t  they 
hold constant is a mixture of i n c o m e  in such a sense -  our 
p e r m a n e n t  c o m p o n e n t  -  an d  accidental additions to or subtrac­
tions from current receipts that play little or n o  role in determin­
ing consu m p t i o n  behavior. A n d  the particular mixture is likely 
to be related to the other variables being studied in a systematic 
way. Instead of eliminating the influence of income, these 
m e t h o d s  simply disguise its influence; it s h o w s  u p  as if it were the 
effect of other variables.
Ill principle, logit/probit techniques could be used to 
consider demand for a number of durable goods at once. 
For example, the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) sys­
tem considers spending on a number of items; in the AIDS  
system, the regression coefficients for all spending items are 
estimated simultaneously, which allows the researcher to 
test for interactions between spending on different catego­
ries. The A IDS approach is not normally used with 
dichotom ous (zero/one) variables, but this problem could be 
corrected by the use of logit/probit regression. However, 
there is a more serious problem; the A IDS m ethodology  
assumes that price data are available 011 prices of the spend­
ing categories being studied, but these are not generally 
available for individual durable goods, which vary consider­
ably in quality and price. Researchers studying broad 
classes of spending can often use price indices produced by 
governments, and an index on durable household goods is 
available in CSO (1994, Table 18.7). However, it is more 
difficult to obtain prices for individual durable goods. In­
deed, it is not clear that any one price index could be reliable
for a particular durable, because prices of durable goods 
often vary widely. Cramer, cited in Pyatt (1964, p. 122) 
reports that prices paid for durable goods are an increasing 
function of household wealth. In addition, durable goods 
often improve over time due to technological advances, and 
this is likely to be reflected am biguously in prices -  as they 
are pushed up by quality but down by productivity increase, 
with the two inextricably linked. Hence, mainstream eco­
nomists using logit/probit tend to limit their analysis to the 
study of one durable at a time.
In summary, it would be desirable to control for house­
hold incomes when exam ining the effects of a different 
variable on durable goods ownership; but in practice, this is 
very difficult to realize effectively. The use of what will be 
termed a ‘social choice’ framework offers an alternative. As 
will be seen, it can be used to control for household income, 
and it can examine the ownership of durables relative to one 
another.
III.  A V A R I E T Y  O F  S O C I A L  C H O I C E  
A P P R O A C H E S
By a social choice approach, we will mean an analysis which 
seeks to rank the ownership of durables in an order derived 
from the patterns of ownership of the population of house­
holds as a whole. Previously, Paroush (1965) has presented 
two approaches originating within pschyom etrics.5 As he 
observes, the definitions involved are somewhat arbitrary, 
but they are of interest because of their connection in 
different ways, as will emerge, to our own more firmly 
rooted methods. For the first, developed by Guttman to 
yield an index termed the coefficient of reproducibility, Rep. 
for short, an order of acquisition of durables is taken as 
given (and can be interpreted as representing a norm for the 
population or at least a standard for comparison). Rep., on 
the basis of the number of durables that each household  
owns or not, simply measures the proportion of ‘correct’ 
choices that are made by the population -  that is the those 
choices that are consistent with the given norm.
N ote that, given the fact durables are owned or not and 
that this is the only information that we have, each house­
hold can make at m ost /c/2 ‘m istakes’ where k is the number 
of durables involved. For, even if ‘wrong’ durables are 
owned according to the given order, all ‘m istakes’ can al­
ways be eliminated by shifting owned to not owned or vice 
versa, whichever is the smaller of the two groups. Conse­
quently, Rep. takes 1 as a maximum value (all choices 
‘correct’) but a minimum value of 1/2 (all choices as wrong 
as possible, each household owns /c/2 durables, and k is 
even!).
5This is concerned with the m e a s u r e m e n t  of the acquisition of h u m a n  capabilities. It illustrates that the m e t h o d s  developed here have 
general applicability b e y o n d  the specific exam p l e  of c o n s u m e r  durables.
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IV . T H E  P O I N T  C O R R E L A T I O N  M A T R I X  
A P P R O A C H
A second method presented by Paroush is based on correla­
tion coefficients. The procedure is to define a variable for 
durable good i (itself running from 1 to k) which has a value 
of one for each household owning good /, or zero for 
a non-owning household. The value of the correlation coef­
ficient between good / and good j, r,7, is calculated for each 
pair of durables - (r0) is known as the point correlation  
matrix.
N ow suppose that all household ownership patterns are 
all ‘correct’ for the ordering of the durables given by the 
index /, Then, the point correlation matrix is what is known  
as a simplex m atrix/1 It has the property that its entries 
decrease the further they are away from the diagonal (since 
there will be less correlation of owned between durables 
/ and j  the greater is ? —./). Consequently, the matrix of 
correlation coefficients can be examined for the extent of 
this property. The ranking of the durables, given by the 
index /, could be changed to improve the performance 
(clearly, if the durables were ranked in exactly the opposite 
order to a perfectly ‘correct’ set of household acquisitions, 
the coefficients would increase with the distance from the 
diagonal).
There is a problem with this approach, apparently over­
looked by Paroush, quite apart from how we are to interpret 
the matrix other than by inspection. First, the point correla­
tion coefficients will depend upon how many durables are 
owned by the households. Consequently, the change in 
matrix values with movement away from the diagonals will 
reflect both this as well as the extent of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
choices. This is essentially equivalent at a disaggregated  
level to failing to understand that Rep. never falls below 1/2. 
It is also possible for the correlation matrix to have the 
desired m onotonicity properties (and to be a simplex 
matrix) without all choices being perfectly ‘correct’. Other 
things being equal, the more choices are ‘correct’, the stron­
ger will be the m onotonicity properties of the matrix but 
other things have to be equal. In other words, for reasons to 
emerge later, it is to be emphasized that the point correla­
tion matrix is far from ideal as a way of interpreting 
the extent to which households reproduce an order of 
acquisition.
V. T H E  P R I O R I T Y  P A T T E R N S  A P P R O A C H
Both Rep.  and the point correlation matrix are constructed  
on the basis of an externally given order o f acquisition  
against which actual choices are measured.7 This leaves 
open the question of how the order of acquisition should be 
derived in the first place. While a natural extension would  
be to select that order that maximizes Rep., a matter taken 
up later, this is not possible for the point correlation matrix 
because of its k2 — k elements (excluding the k diagonal 
elements, each of which is 1).
The priority pattern approach to the acquisition of 
durables identifies an order of acquisition probabilistically. 
The method was pioneered by Pyatt (1964) and developed  
by Hebden and Pickering (1974). Pyatt’s approach is to 
assess the probability that a household which owns a certain 
com bination of durables will purchase a particular durable 
(not already owned) from the set. For the k durables under 
consideration, Pyatt’s approach is to estimate a k x k matrix 
of probabilities, referred to as P*. An element of P* is 
understood as the probability that durable i is the jth  
durable that would be acquired by the household. This 
cannot be observed directly if our only data are on household 
ownership at a point in time. However, can be estimated  
as the probability that i is owned given j  goods are owned  
minus the probability i is owned given j  — 1 goods are 
owned. Each of these last two probabilities can be estimated  
directly from the sample by seeing how many times i 
is owned amongst those that own j  and j  — 1 durables 
respectively.
Note, however, that Hebden and Pickering (who use 
Pyatt’s m ethodology) readily point out some anomalies 
with this approach at the outset. They dispute the inter­
pretation of/** on the grounds that it is possible for p^ to be 
negative (which is impossible for a probability). The first 
term might be less than the second term. Apart from errors 
in estim ation due to sample size, etc., Hebden and Pickering 
(1974, pp. 76 and 86) suggest that a negative ‘probability’ 
might be observed because some households discard (or fail 
to replace) a durable which is thought inferior to an alterna­
tive good -  for example, a black-and-white television might 
be thought inferior to a colour television, so that you are 
less likely to have a black and white set the more durables 
that you have.8
f,A  simplex matrix, as discussed by Paroush, has the property that there exists a sequence of n u m b e r s  4, such that 4, <  dj for i <  j  a n d  
>'ij =  difdj. Paroush s h o w s  that a perfectly ‘correct’ pattern of ownership by households implies that the point correlation matrix is 
a simplex matrix but, as discussed below, appears to presume that the converse also holds, w h i c h  is false.
’This is n o  doubt motivated, rightly or wrongly, within psychometrics by the notion that there is a natural order of acquisition against 
which ‘mistakes’ represent s o m e  form of deviancy.
8This raises a m o r e  general, interesting a n d  c o m p l e x  issue computationally that w e  d o  not cover here; there m a y  be restrictions o n  the 
order in which durables can be acquired or o n  the patterns of ownership. In this case, it might be p r e s u m e d  that a colour television set 
displaces one that is black a n d  white. Similarly, the ownership of a video w o u l d  p e r s u m e  ownership of a television. E v e n  m o r e  certain, the 
ownership of a second car presumes the ownership of a first car as a matter of definition. T h e  problem with such restrictions is that, if 
unaccounted for, they will tend to lead to the proportion of ‘correct’ choices being overestimated. This is because these are not really 
choices since households inevitably get t h e m  ‘correct’.
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A further criticism of the Pyatt approach discussed by 
Hebden and Pickering is practical. It may not be possible to 
estimate all o f the coefficients. Hebden and Pickering point 
out that in empirical work (especially in small samples), all 
of the necessary probabilities might not be defined if, for 
example, no household owns more than (k — 2) of the 
k durables. Hebden and Pickering suggest two alternative 
methods of giving values to the undefined coefficients (called 
extrapolation and scaling up), but report that, ‘neither 
m ethod is entirely satisfactory in all situations’ (p. 93).
Pyatt defines the index E{i) and ranks the durables by the 
values of E( ):
E(i) =  t  jPu (1)
./= i
In other words, 2?(i) is the expected order o f acquisition of 
the ith durable in the statistical sense although it is esti­
mated independently of the allocation of expected position  
relative to the other durables. Pyatt’s claim is that small 
values of E(i) indicate that i has a high priority in the 
population. Thus, E(i) <  E(j )  implies that good i is given a 
higher priority than j,  (p. 25). This approach is used empiric­
ally by both Pyatt (1964), and Hebden and Pickering (1974).
A more substantive criticism of Pyatt is developed by 
Fine (1983, pp. 247-8). It is based on the mathematical 
properties of the m odel underlying the approach. W e will 
use to indicate the probability that a household which 
owns j  goods will buy good i next (confusingly, Fine uses p^ 
in a way which is different to that used by Pyatt, and 
Hebden and Pickering). Fine starts with Equation 1 and 
finds E(i) in terms of p^j to obtain:
m *1 (puj) + *
j= i
(2)
Expanding the summation, we obtain:
E(i) =  - P i n  -  pi]2 ••• - P i | f c ~ i  +  /< (3)
In the above equation, p {y  is estimated as the number of 
households which own j  goods including good i, expressed 
as a proportion of all households owning j  durables. Fine 
denotes the number of households which own j  goods in­
cluding good i by P u and the number of households which 
own j  durables by nj so that p^j =  (Pij/nj). Focusing on the 
first two terms in Equation 13 gives:
E(i) Eil Eil
n2 (4)
N ow  imagine that the pattern of choices for a population  
is changed as follows. Let a member of group n2 which does 
own good i, and so is included in P i2, drop ownership of the 
other of the two goods owned. Consequently, this house­
hold m oves from ni2 to nn , and the number of exclusive first
places for i increased by 1, while the number of shared places 
with two goods decreases by 1. So P (1 increases by one, 
whereas Pi2 decrease by one. The value of Pyatt’s index for 
i becomes:
-  (5)
«! +  1 n2 — 1
where all terms other than the first two are unchanged. Fine 
(1983) then asks us to consider whether the value of index 
E(i) increases or decreases, as a result of one extra house­
hold now having bought good i exclusively. It is perfectly 
possible, perversely, for the index to have increased; this 
would mean that i could fall in the derived order of acquisi­
tion, despite the fact that the ownership of good i has 
become more favourable.9 This is an undesirable property 
of the approach pioneered by Pyatt, which Fine refers to as 
a breach of the ‘m onotonicity’ assumption.
V I. T H E  B O R D A  R U L E  A P P R O A C H
The violation of a property such as m onotonicity led Fine 
(1983) to develop an alternative approach em ploying this 
and other axioms derived from social choice theory. From  
this, the Borda rule was applied to determine an order of 
acquisition. Should the latter be known for households, the 
durable in first place is allocated a ‘score’ of 1, the second  
place scores 2, etc. The durables are then ranked by their 
aggregate Borda scores, with the lowest scoring durable 
ranked first, etc. As, in practice, household order of acquisi­
tion is not usually known, only owned or not, the j  durables, 
say, that are owned by a household are assigned a Borda 
score averaged over the first j  places, (1 -f 2 +  ••• +  j)/j. 
Those not owned are each assigned the average for 
the remaining (k — j )  Borda scores, {{j +  1) +  (j  +  2) +  
... + k } / { k - j ) .
Appealing to earlier work in social choice theory, Fine 
and Fine (1974), Fine (1983) points out that the Borda rule 
over fully specified household rankings uniquely satisfies six 
properties:
1. It is ‘symmetric’; essentially a voting paradox ranks all 
durables equally.10
2. It satisfies m onotonicity; if an extra household buys 
a durable, then that durable cannot go down to a lower 
priority in the order of acquisition.
3. If two groups of households both place durable i above 
durable j,  then the com posite group (which combines 
both groups together) also places durable i above 
durable j.
4. The name we give to durables or to households should  
have no effect on the derived ordering.
9F o r  details, see appendix to Fine (1983). T h e  score of the g o o d  that w a s  previously o w n e d  jointly with i can, perversely, experience 
a decrease in score, raising its ranking, a n d  thereby, switching places with i even though it has b e c o m e  less, a n d  i more, favourably owned.
10F o r  a voting paradox, redistributing the n a m e s  of the goo d s  and/or the households leaves the pattern of choices unchanged.
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5. If a new durable becomes available and each household  
buys il first (or each buys it last), then this should not 
affect the ordering of the original durables.
6. If we reverse the preferences for each household, then we 
should reverse the derived order of acquisition.
These are all extremely weak and appealing conditions in 
the absence of prior information on households and 
durables, essentially requiring that all households and 
durables be treated equally and that the derived order of 
acquisition respond positively to household ownership.
VII .  C O N F O R M I T Y  A N D  U N I F O R M I T Y  I N  
T H E  O R D E R  O F  A C Q U I S I T I O N
N ote also, apart from satisfying m onotonicity, the method  
for deri ving an order of acquisition differs from Pyatt’s in no 
longer being probabilistic. Consequently, if we are to seek 
‘confidence’ in the derived ordering, it cannot be on a statis­
tical basis. It can, however, be calculated in a way identical 
to Rep.
Let .\'i,.v2 be the durables, and let the individual
households be denoted by /. running from 1 to n. Suppose 
there is an externally given ordering of the durables in 
descending order as above, denoted by R, and that the 
households divide the com m odities into those that are 
owned and those that are not. How well does the ordering 
R serve as a norm for order of acquisition for the individual 
household patterns of ownership?
Assign the scores 1. 2, 3 k to xq, ... , x k. Each indi­
vidual household will then be assigned a score, A t say, 
according to the com m odities owned. Obviously, the more 
comm odities that are owned and the less well that they 
conform to the ordering R, the higher will be the score 
assigned to the individual household. Add up the scores 
over ail the households and denote this by A.
Let ai be the number of com m odities that are owned (and 
k — a,- the number of those that are not) by the individual 
household i. Then if i conforms perfectly with R, the score 
obtained will be 1 +  2 +  +  a, =  £?,-(«,- ~b l)/2  =  P,, say.
This is the perfect score that could be obtained by i. If i is 
totally perverse and only owns the lowest comm odities
in the ordering R, then i will score k +  (k — 1) +  (k — 2) +  
••• (k — a; +  1). This equals kat — (1 +  2 +  ••• +  at — 1). 
D enote this by W h W ) =  kat — — l)/2  =  (k -I- l)a,-
-  +  l)/2
Wi  =  (/< +  1 )at -  Pi
Let P  and W  respectively be the sums o f P ; and . Then 
a measure of conformity of the individual household pat­
terns of ownership with R, C say, is given by:
C =  ( W  — A) /{W ~  P)
This ranges between 1 (if A =  P)  and 0 (if A =  W).  In this 
way, a measure of the conformity of the population’s pattern 
of ownership to the ordering R is obtained. It is equivalent 
to Rep., only it has been scaled to lie between 0 and 1, taking 
account of the structure of choices m ade.11
The previous result provides a measure of the divergence 
of individual household consumer behaviour from a norm  
provided exogenously by the ordering R. Given the aggreg­
ate individual household behaviour, what is the ordering 
R that should be chosen as the norm? An obvious answer is 
the one that minimizes C, the measure of conformity to 
R (which equals 1 if all individual households conform to 
R, exactly, or 0 if all revealed choices are ‘wrong’ or 
perverse relative to R). It will be shown that this is the 
Borda rule.
But it is first shown that the Borda rule is identical to 
ordering by frequency of ownership across the households. 
This follows since the score from i for a com m odity owned is 
(1 +  a/)/2 and for not owned is (1 +  a t +  k)/2. The difference 
between these (i.e. the difference in score for being owned  
rather than not) is simply k/2 which is independent of at, the 
number of durables owned by the household i. Thus, each 
com m odity scores more than any other by k/2 times the 
difference in the number of times each is owned. In other 
words, the Borda ordering is by frequency of ownership, 
with all aggregate scores simply having been scaled by k/2.
It is now shown that the Borda or frequency ordering is 
the best in the sense of having the lowest degree of conform ­
ity for the population’s pattern of ownership. Any other 
ordering or norm externally imposed would generate less 
conformity.
M See earlier discussion of w h y  Rep. ^  1 2. a n d  the lower b o u n d  is only possible if each household o w n s  exactly half the durables. 
Essentially the conformity measure calculates the proportion of correct choices m a d e  as a percentage of those that are revealed or 
effectively m a d e  (if all. or no, durables are owned, it is impossible to have revealed effective choices from the point of view of ranking the 
durables). This m e a n s  that, if the choices are m a d e  randomly, the m e a n  value of conformity will be 1/2. M o r e  specifically, the conformity 
measure w o u l d  have the probability distribution of a coin tossed for the n u m b e r  of choices that can effectively be m a d e  -  as determined by 
the n u m b e r  of households, the n u m b e r  of durables, a n d  the distribution of the n u m b e r  of durables owned. This is so, however, only if each 
g o o d  has a 50/50 chance of being owned. M o n t e  Carlo m e t h o d s  were used to calculate w h a t  the uniformity measure w o u l d  be o n  average if 
the chances of ownership of each g o o d  were given independently of on e  another by  the actual frequencies of ownership. This exercise w a s  
undertaken for 10623 households a n d  uniformity calculated. This w a s  repeated 3000 times for a set of 13 durables. This replicated, as it 
were, the 1989'90 ownership of durables for the 1989/90 General H o u s e h o l d  Survey. Average uniformity for this repeated exercise turned 
out to be 0.8443. This c o m p a r e d  with the actual measure for the patterns of ownership of 0.9053, suggesting that the patterns of ownership 
are not random.
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Take any other ordering. It must violate the frequency 
distribution of ownership. Then, it must be that there exist 
x and y  in the ordering such that x  is immediately above y  in 
the ordering but that y  has higher frequency than x. Con­
sider the new ordering with x and y  changed around. The 
degree of conformity will have been enhanced since, subject 
to scale factors, the number of mistakes will have been 
reduced in net terms by the differences in the frequencies 
of x  and y  (since the score will have been increased by 
the number of times that x is owned and y  is not, and 
decreased by the number of times that y  is owned and x is 
not, all multiplied by /c/2). By induction, the degree of 
conformity of the ordering can be improved until it is 
the Borda rule.
Although the Borda rule determines the externally de­
rived ordering that minimizes R ep . or conformity, it would  
be a mistake to consider that the measure correctly repres­
ents the extent to which the population makes ‘correct’ 
choices. This is because the norm has not been derived 
externally but from the household ownership patterns with 
which it is being compared. If all households conform to its 
own Borda rule, the conformity measure will be 100%. But 
conformity, as currently defined, cannot fall to zero even if 
households own durables perversely since the derived order 
reflects the household pattern of ownership as perfectly as 
possible. All households cannot reflect the reversal of the 
Borda rule, although individual households can, for then the 
Borda ranking would itself be otherwise. Even with just two 
households with opposite rankings to one another (each 
owns what the other does not), the Borda ranking would be 
indifference (equal scores) across the durables, and no choi­
ces would be ‘wrong’.12
This illustrates that for endogenously derived Borda or­
dering from the households, the Borda rule must at worst 
get at least half of the choices correct (in case, for example, 
there are matching pairs of reversed household orderings). 
Indeed, as the Borda rule is equivalent to ordering by 
frequency of ownership, it must correctly anticipate a ma­
jority of choices. Consequently, the measure for the propor­
tion of choices that are correctly made needs to be modified 
to give what we term the uniformity measure, U, -  how well 
household patterns conform to their own best ordering 
rather than to one externally im posed independently of 
them. It is given by
U  =  (W /2  -  A ) / ( W /2  -  P)
VIII .  P A R T I T I O N I N G  T H E  P O P U L A T I O N
Suppose the population is partitioned into a number of 
subgroups irrespective o f how these are decided. Then it is 
a relatively easy exercise to show that any conformity 
measure for the population as a whole is the weighted 
average of the conformity measures for the subgroups, the 
weights reflecting the proportion of choices made in each 
subgroup.13 This means that we not only have a measure of 
how well a population as a whole conforms to a particular 
order of acquisition, but that we can also investigate which 
groups on average support or diverge from that ranking as 
a whole.
Similarly, if we take the uniformity measure and calculate 
it across each of the subgroups as if endogenously gener­
ated, this too is a weighted average.14 It is also possible to 
calculate each subgroup’s own Borda ranking and its cor­
responding uniformity measure. This is necessarily less than 
the similarly calculated conformity measure since, as pre­
viously observed, the Borda ranking for the subgroup will 
minimize the number o f ‘wrong’ choices made. Thus, the 
conformity of a subgroup may be greater than the popula­
tion’s uniformity and so have an even greater uniformity of 
its own. Or the subgroup’s conformity may be less than 
average, with its own uniformity greater or lesser than for 
the population as a whole. In the former case, the conform­
ity of the subgroup to the population is low because it has 
a more uniform but different order of acquisition of its own. 
In the latter case, the conformity is low because of the 
relative lack of uniformity within the subgroup itself.
N ow  suppose that the partition is formed though use of 
a socioeconom ic variable, possibly one that can be defined 
quantitatively as in age of head of household, or size or 
income of household. The Borda order can be calculated for 
the population as a whole and for each subgroup (for which 
conformity and uniformity measures can also be calculated).
A ‘dramatrix’ can now be formed by taking the socio­
econom ic variable as the column vector and the durables as 
the row vector, ordered according to the population’s 
ranking. The i/th element shows, for the /th subgroup, how  
much the ith durable is shifted up (positive) or down (nega­
tive) relative to the population ordering. This provides 
a m ost convenient way of presenting results. For large 
divergencies from zero in a column indicate a subgroup that 
deviates considerably in order o f acquisition from the rest of 
the population taken together. M ore dramatically, the row
12There is a serious prob l e m  here 111 that indifference across the durables is consistent with a n y  revealed pattern of ownership. In w h a t  
follows, it will be p r e s u m e d  that such ties in the B o r d a  ranking d o  not occur. This is a reasonable assumption in practice since it is only 
extremely rarely in large data sets that t w o  durables obtain the s a m e  B o r d a  score.
13Thus:
(IT -  A )/(W  — P) =  E [ f %  -  A t) / {W t -  P , m W i  -  P i)i{W  -  P)]
whe r e  the first term, [ ], o n  the right-hand side is the conformity measure for subgroup i of the partition, a n d  the second term is the weight.
14Replace W  by 1/2 IT in the previous footnote.
1056 B. Fine and J. S im ister
Table 1. A ggregate shifts in relative ranking by socioeconomic class
A B C l C 2 D E
%  overall ownership 68.4 63.6 54.9 52.3 48.0 40.6
T V -  16 -  7 -  1 3 3 3
W a s h i n g  m achine -  12 -  12 _ 7 0 -  1 0
P h o n e 16 14 11 -  3 -  1 - 4
Central heating 3 0 6 -  3 -  1 -  4
Freezer -  10 _  4 -  5 1 -  3 -  4
C a r 21 6 -  2 2 -  4 -  13
Drier 2 0 0 -  1 0 2
Cars 7 5 -  4 -  1 -  6 -  6
Dishwasher 1 1 0 0 0 0
Video -  4 -  2 -  1 1 2 4
C o m p u t e r 1 0 4 1 5 5
M i c r o w a v e -  4 -  1 1 0 1 1
C D -  1 -  1 0 0 1 1
vectors, when exhibiting a m onotonic pattern in line with 
that of the socioeconom ic variable, detect the presence of 
relationships between such a variable and the order of 
acquisition of particular durables.
This is all illustrated by the specific example presented in 
the table, where the dramatrices have been aggregated over 
four sample years. In addition, although this is not shown  
here, it is possible to list conformity and uniformity 
measures of the subsamples by class to find which classes 
have greater internal uniformity or greater uniformity to the 
overall norm. Readers can readily draw their own con ­
clusions about the rankings of these durables by class; TVs 
and videos, for example, are inversely related to class al­
though, of course, absolute levels o f ownership may be 
higher for all goods for the higher classes.15 Cars, second 
cars, and phones are more important to the higher classes.
IX . C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S
As previously observed, those studying the ownership of 
consumer durables are faced with a multitude of determin­
ing influences and a choice of methods of empirical invest­
igation, each of which depends upon drastic simplification 
and a focus upon some variables at the expense of others. In 
this light, it cannot be presumed that traditional procedures 
adopted and adapted from orthodox demand analysis will 
always be most appropriate. N or is it assumed that the 
alternative developed here is better in any but a special set of 
circumstances. While having the advantage of addressing 
consumer durables in groups, it neglects price effects in the 
search for com m on patterns across households. It is also 
difficult, if possible, to consider the interaction of a number
of variables,16 and the method has the considerable disad­
vantage of not benefiting from the accumulated weight of 
techniques and case studies enjoyed by econometrics. It is 
also important to recognize that the method is based on 
ordering by frequencies of ownership without directly ad­
dressing absolute frequencies. One durable might be ranked 
higher than another because of a large or small margin of 
difference in extent of ownership and at high or low  levels of 
ownership itself. This all needs to be carefully scrutinized in 
each case.17
Despite these reservations, as illustrated, others have used 
what we have termed social choice approaches to the order 
of acquisition of durables. Our discussion of the Borda rule 
suggests that it is a natural candidate for such methods. 
Remarkably, it can be characterized in a number of different 
ways -  maximizing Rep.  (or conformity), axiomatically, and 
by frequency of ownership. Further, the m ethod is easily 
implemented, illustrated and interpreted empirically 
(through the dramatrix). It can also be used with partitions 
of both the population and the durables into subgroups 
with com m on characteristics, this possibly proving the basis 
for subsequent, more traditional treatments. Finally, it is 
worth emphasizing that the techniques are by no means 
exclusive to durables and are applicable in principle to any 
sequential acquisition of characteristics or ordering of alter­
natives for which consumer durables are but a special case.
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Research has been funded by the Leverhulme Trust for 
a project investigating consum ption norms and female la­
bour market participation. The table and other empirical
15A s  is apparent from the first r o w  of the table, class A o w n s  5 0 %  m o r e  durables than class E.
16This can be d o n e  by partitioning partitions a n d  replicating the procedures already outlined.
1-7F o r  application of the m e t h o d s  outlined here (to data from the National Readership Survey, the General H o u s e h o l d  Survey, a n d  the 
National F o o d  Survey), see Fine et a i (1992a-e a n d  1993) a n d  Fine et al. (1995).
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results have been constructed from data from the General
H ousehold Survey. This was provided through the ESRC
D ata Archive. Nigel Foster and Judith Wright were co­
researchers on the project.
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